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“Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be 
asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an 
ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought—a constant 
checking.”  
— Foucault 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To my daughter Ariana, and the young generation of students in the Middle East 
 in search of freedom. 
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ABSTRACT 
Shadieh Emami Mirmobiny 
 
 
 
PHILOSOPHY OF POWER AND THE MEDIATION OF ART: 
 THE LASTING IMPRESSIONS OF ARTISTIC INTERMEDIALITY, 
FROM SEVENTEENTH CENTURY PERSIA TO PRESENT 
This is a phenomenological study of patriarchy through the examination of its 
genealogy as it relates to/parallels with the creative process. I argue patriarchy, while itself a 
product of human creativity, has artificially elevated itself to prominence, and as such, has 
dominated and shaped subjectivities to its own end. It has done so by undermining 
individuality necessary for establishing the foundation of a more democratic form of 
government in the region of the Middle East. In this democracy, a dynamic balance and 
equity is envisioned between the subject and community.  
Therefore, this study is concerned with the power of imagination, in the broad sense, 
encompassing all creative endeavors that shape the subject. It focuses on the relationship 
between subjecthood, freedom and the infusion of Neoplatonic ideas with iterations of 
Islamic principles manifested in art and philosophy serving patriarchy. This study is 
predicated on the idea that the exploration of art and subjectivity can uncover the hidden, 
implicit power relations between humans and the creative process, and it relies upon the 
philosophy of power to establish a theory that aims to reach beyond what Foucault 
developed.  
vii 
 
Further, it intends to highlight the issue of “gap” in general, and the gap in particular 
that existed between the major Islamic text/principles—a variation of the Platonic “gap”—
and the ideas/actions that have unfolded to this day but have never been questioned. The 
objective of this study is to create a space in which the Middle East and the West, each 
through its “other,” can recognize the importance of the process of the formation and 
preservation of the individual within a collective subjectivity. Finally, this research through a 
new theory aims to make more visible the current movements underscoring the individual 
subjectivity in the Middle East and to work toward protecting and preserving individual 
rights. 
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PREFACE 
 
We are convinced, we know, that in a culture everything speaks: the structures of 
language impose their form on the order of things. This is merely another version 
(a fruitful one, to be sure) of the axiom of the sovereignty of discourse, which 
classical iconography already took for granted.
1
 
        — Michel Foucault 
 
This study is concerned with the power of art and subject formation. It focuses on the 
relationship between subjectivity, freedom and the infusion of Neoplatonic ideas with 
iterations of Islamic principles manifested in art and philosophy serving patriarchy. Similar 
to what Edward Said accomplished in his Orientalism—bringing to our attention the outer-
colonial element and its impact on the collective subjectivity of the Middle Easterners—I 
suggest, although from within the Middle Eastern culture, Neoplatonism has colonized 
subjective consciousness, negating the independent state of the subject in favor of the 
collective consciousness. I argue, therefore, the West is not the antithesis to the Middle East, 
but that one should look within to locate the antithesis. I am conscious that, because this 
thesis focuses on philosophical theories, it may be seen as “idealistic.” Nonetheless, 
philosophy more often than not, particularly when involving power, is translated into 
formulas that shape real life experiences. Such is the incorporation of Neoplatonism, into art, 
philosophy, religion, and culture of the Middle East that has had concrete and tangible 
products; however, it has always been seen positively and hence never been critically 
investigated. In this project, I have developed a critical discourse that centers on the power 
and knowledge that is constructed through art, in its broadest sense (which encompasses 
patriarchy/Neoplatonism), in a process that impacts social practices, influential in shaping 
subjectivities and defining the interrelationship between the subjects.  
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To accomplish this task, I was compelled to highlight the “gap” that existed between 
the major Islamic text/principles—a variation of the Platonic “gap”—and the ideas/actions 
that have unfolded to this day, but has never been questioned. When Plato crafted the 
republic as a system (Book 9), he established a rule predicated on a “gap” between the “real” 
and “illusion,” or the “pure” and “impure,” centered on his interpretation of the “divine.” I 
suggest, contrary to what Plato argues, this “illusion,” is not in the realm of experience 
/senses, rather it must be sought in what humans create, including in Plato’s own work. 
Within his system, consequently, Plato engendered an alterity in the artists (Republic, 
Book 10). Aristotle, in response to Plato, argues for the usefulness of the arts in the republic 
(Poetics 3). Therein he believes the arts provide an appropriate space for the purgation of 
emotions (i.e. impurities) such as “fear” and “pity” through “rhythm” and “song,” a process 
he calls catharsis (Poetics xxxviii). Therefore, Aristotle deems a purpose for art in the 
republic. As a result, art becomes part of the instruments of political power. According to 
Michel Foucault “techniques of power” (1990 [1978]: 11) impose themselves on the 
formation of the subject and result in subjugation (92). Julia Kristeva, argues that through 
this purification the abject is taken back to the pre-language stage. She deems the 
“repetition” (i.e. “rhythm” and “song”) in the poetics as “an external rule” that aims to fill the 
Platonic “gap . . . between the body and soul […] [and] arranges, defers, differentiates and 
organizes . . .  [but] no longer is meaning” (Kristeva 28). Plotinus conceals the Platonic “gap” 
by unifying both the “intellect” and “matter” with the “One” in his philosophy (Fourth 
Ennead, eighth treatise); consequently, it results in the collapse of the space between subject 
and object, a precondition to abjection (Kristeva 17-18). Keeping in view the role of art in 
subject formation and philosophy inspired by Neoplatonic thoughts infused with 
interpretations of Islam, the question I ask is: why has it been nearly impossible for 
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democratic movements to take root in the Middle East and to foster individual rights and 
freedoms?  
This investigation, therefore, is predicated on the premise that there is a common 
thread between the major Western philosophical thought—particularly as manifested in the 
German Idealists—and the philosophy infused with iterations of Islam, both derived from the 
art and philosophy of Platonism and Neoplatonism. On this assertion, the arts served 
patriarchal powers by rendering subjects submissive and unifying them into collective 
subjectivities such that they acquiesce to those powers.  
Whereas they may appear as mere opposites, the West and the Middle East have 
much in common in their foundation, not the least of which are the patriarchal paradigms that 
developed and consolidated over time through art and philosophy. I am aware of the fact that 
the utilization of the binary terms “West” and the Middle East” is problematic and that they 
imply a binary and arbitrary division, subject to continuous criticism. Nonetheless, the very 
point I have stressed here is that they overlap, both in art, culture and philosophy.
2
 However, 
the process of subject-formation in them took place differently, therefore bringing each 
patriarchy out of sync with the other. Whereas many philosophers, such as Kant, Schiller, 
Hegel and Heidegger (i.e. German Idealists) have viewed art as a path toward “freedom,” the 
impact of art as a ‘power’ influencing subjects to submit to patriarchal might lay beyond their 
concerns. It is Foucault who addresses power and its entanglement with subjectivity; 
however, he does not show that power is implemented through works of art by transforming 
individual subjectivity into a compliant, collective subjectivity or into a cultural ego.
3
  
Therefore, contrary to the views of philosophers like Hegel, who saw “the source of 
works of art . . . more free than nature” (Lectures on Aesthetics 5), art has not paved the way 
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toward freedom for the people of the Middle East. In that region, art works have been viewed 
as a source of pride, a sign of civilization—in other words, as the “light of centuries” 
(Agamben 2009 [2006]: 45); yet, my interest lies in the “shadows” cast from that light, which 
is to say how such art alters subjectivities toward capitulation to dominant powers. Finally, I 
assert that it is only by the exposure of the intermedial “gap”—the gap between the text and 
image, or between the text and actions—that the dominant power structure, with a single 
interpretation, can be disrupted and allow art to prompt questions, promote divergent 
thinking, and initiate creative ventures toward change. 
The intertwining of art and power has a lengthy history, and the region of the Middle 
East in particular is exemplary in this respect. There are numerous illustrations that, for 
instance, depict the ruler with symbols signaling his divine connections.
4
 A prominent and 
popular subject of painting from the Middle East, instrumental in forming collective 
subjectivity and coinciding with the time period of interest here, is that of the figure of the 
Prophet in the story of Mi'raj (Ascension of the Prophet). In this image Prophet Mohammad 
is depicted as veiled, traveling through the layers of heaven, and through it the Safavid sufi-
king could claim Divine connection without ostensible transgression beyond the boundaries 
of the faith understood by consensus.
5
 Constructing such an image was facilitated through 
employing the authoritarian iterations of Islamic thoughts offered by mystics such as Ibn 
Arabi. The unifying power of the image, however, concealed the gap that existed between the 
original Koranic text on the Prophet’s ascension and the embellished version created by Ibn 
Arabi, thus externalizing the legitimacy of the ruler’s position in the eyes of his subjects. 
I argue that such art and philosophy did not lead to individual freedom, but rather to 
group or “herd mentality,” (Nietzsche 2002, 86) easily constrained and controlled by 
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patriarchal states. Expounded through Jacques Derrida’s “Truth in Painting,” the 
“supplemental” and “parergon” produced the “interest” on which the agents of patriarchy 
capitalized to solidify the subjects collectively under the rule of the king. Comparatively, 
what occurs in contemporary Europe (contemporary to the Safavids) brings out the “gap” 
between the texts and the artistic interpretations of them, underscoring its significance in the 
development of individuality resulting in the European Renaissance. Conversely, the power 
of the art that developed in Persia, concealed such a gap (the cost of unity sought by 
patriarchy) that did exist between the text and images produced, and it never materialized 
into a question that would foster individual responses. 
The power of art in subject formation and manipulation is not restricted to the 
production of works of art; indeed, image making often begins with the destruction of 
symbols of the preceding powers alongside the elimination of adversaries. Early in October 
2015, the military group ISIS “pulverized” the Arch of Triumph in the ancient city of 
Palmyra in Syria.
6
 In fact, this was not their first attempt at the destruction of art and 
architecture from antiquity; earlier, their invasion of the museum of antiquity and the 
destruction of its statues made the headlines to much expressed sadness and disbelief of not 
only the experts in the field, but of many around the world. Still, there are other examples. 
Another radical group, the Taliban, in March 2001 used dynamite to demolish the centuries-
old standing statue of Buddha in Bamiyan, Afghanistan that had already been defaced in 
earlier times.
7
 Given the fact that art in the region has been held as a source of glorification 
and identity, such acts of erasure that have always taken place across history raise the 
question of: how does art help bring power and majesty to one group, while its appropriation 
or obliteration create an image for another?
8
 What role does art play in shaping who we are 
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and in determining what we (as humans) become a subject to? What links art to social justice 
(or lack thereof) on the one hand, and to individual or collective subjectivity on the other? 
Despite living amidst centuries’ worth of art and architectural works in most cases, a 
great number of people in the world suffer from injustice and tyranny. This study is 
concerned with how creation, appropriation and destruction of works of art, which in my 
view includes philosophical ideas, figure in the process of forming an acquiescent or a 
radical subject. There have been, and still are, many great obstacles in the path toward what 
every free-thinking individual seeks in a society that offers equal opportunities to its 
members. Arguably, the greatest agency and hindrance in forming such a society has been 
patriarchy.
9
 Its power techniques, particularly through art, while enabling patriarchy to forge 
civilizations, have hindered sustainable equity in society at the cost of unity in favor of 
maintaining its grip on power (whether political, religious, ideological, etc.).  
“Power techniques,” to quote Foucault, in their complex structures and network of 
relations, have been instrumental in promoting inequality and injustice, conflicts, mass 
elimination of the “other,” wars, colonialism, violence, but always implied, taken for granted, 
and their presence is almost never visible. Foucault argues that since the formation of the 
political structure, called “state, . . . [m]ost of the time . . .[it] is envisioned as a kind of 
political power that ignores individuals, looking only at the interests of the totality or, I 
should say, of a class or a group among the citizens.” However, it is the integration of the 
older systems (i.e. Christian institutions in the West), into a new political form that produces 
new , more complex “power techniques.” I submit that this task cannot be done without the 
creative endeavors, Thus, the critical study of the art can reveal such techniques, or any other 
cultural product, patriarchy espouses. Similar to Foucault, who writes persuasively on 
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“submission of subjectivities” within Western culture, I am interested in “creating a history 
of the different modes by which . . . human beings are made subjects” (1994 [1982]: 332, 
327). Nonetheless, my interest rests within the Middle East and subject formation by way of 
art.  
I propose that the inability to establish a genuine democratic rule in the Middle East is 
rooted in the lack (or absence of a recognition) of individuality, and free consciousness
10
 due 
to a long tradition of patriarchy (religious, political, colonial, etc.); consequently, the issue of 
what and where the “subject” is never comes up. The tradition of patriarchy in the region has 
maintained its authority by appropriating and building on dominant iterations of a range of 
artistic endeavors and philosophical thoughts—from antiquity, through the Middle Ages, to 
present time—that support and justify the “rule of One” as the rule of the “experts.” The 
objective of the art produced to support such justification, then, has been to unify a diverse 
population into a collective subjectivity and to undermine/eradicate any attempts at divergent 
or unorthodox thinking. 
Patriarchy, while striving to unify, thrives in conflicts, and competition is an effective 
tool in its powerful hands to simultaneously eliminate its rivals and to arrive at its goal of 
domination and tyranny. The dark evidence to these conflicts is all around us: from the 
“Islamic State” conflicts in Iraq and Syria, to “Boko Haram” in Nigeria, and others. These 
crises demand our attention now (Agamben [2006] 2009: 39-54). I define such fusion, which 
relies upon conflict and competition, as an artificial union that pulls the acting subject away 
from its own genuine humanity-focused center and toward superficially imposed, false and 
fabricated unifying ideas wrapped and concealed as philosophy, or better said, as works of 
art.
11
 Therefore, whether in their construction, appropriation or destruction, works of art—as 
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objects or as ideas—are equally vital in this study that investigates art, power, and their 
relations to subject manipulation. Nonetheless, one cannot avoid but to view the art against 
the backdrop of current events and power struggles. 
As the violence in the Middle East escalates, and the harrowing details about the 
rapidly unfolding events dominate the airwaves, our first reaction might be expressed in how 
we distinguish ourselves from the cultures of the Middle East as a way to put distance 
between ourselves and the atrocities committed in that part of the world (Orientalism 91). 
Today, the tendency has been to sum up our differences in our religious disagreements;
12
 we 
blame “their religion” as the source of violence that is taking place “over there.” Having 
stated this, the clues reaching us from the region, for example, in the self-claimed titles, like 
“Islamic State” or the “Islamic Republic of Iran,” do not help the matter either. This is 
evidence that even from within the Middle East, the adjective of "Islamic" is not perceived 
monolithically; therefore, to reduce the problem to one factor is to overlook a much bigger 
issue. I maintain the problem goes well beyond differences in religions or even a clash 
between civilizations rooted in the question of identity, as once was proposed by Samuel 
Huntington (Clash of Civilizations 20). Indeed, it is due to the competing ascendant iterations 
of common ideas, which can be seen in the manifested artistic productions (or destruction) 
that aim to artificially unify each side against the other: whether between the West and the 
Middle East, or even within the Middle East itself. 
Now that severe enough damages have taken place by the radical groups, it is time to 
look closely at the complex nature of the conflicts and what lies beneath them, whether 
among Muslims themselves, or between Muslims and the West. This suggests a perspective 
that cuts through religious, political and economic issues to focus on deeper “relational 
events” behind what comes into view on the surface (Semblance and Event, 23-24). For that 
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reason, criticizing what appears as the symptoms (e.g. radicalized gestures and action as well 
as the violence) will not be adequate in either the understanding of what is taking place or 
finding a possible solution. 
While I believe conflicts arise because of the economy of competition, as evident in 
numerous historical examples, and that they occur because powers aim to consolidate and 
establish their own domination over one another, albeit to the detriment of those subjected to 
it, I deem the issue of rivalry meriting a separate study. Therefore, the boundaries of this 
project are confined to the investigation of the development of subjectivity toward freedom 
as opposed to the domination of a collective subjectivity informed by a uniting idea—most 
likely represented through some form of artistic efforts —under patriarchal struggles. 
Nonetheless, it must be noted, the groups involved in the current conflicts in the Middle East 
represent subjectivities that were shaped by the old modes of patriarchy and subsequent 
colonialism, and they are now feeling threatened and struggling for their survival. In the face 
of the great Western adversaries, therefore, they are acting upon the old strategies and tactics 
of terror and destruction to show they are in control. 
The striving to establish hegemonic status is a problem that engenders inequity, 
alterity, self-alienation and radicalization for those subjected to it by means of technologies 
of power (e.g., art and culture), and it feeds the never ending cycles of violence and injustice 
in the afflicted subjects and regions, ultimately, to the advantage of the hegemonic rule. 
Unless the subjects affected by the “polymorphous techniques of power” (Foucault 1990 
[1978]: 11) are thoroughly examined and the inner workings of such techniques exposed, the 
influential Hegelian Master-Slave dialectic (Phenomenology of Spirit 111) leads us into a 
binary loop, each side entangled in a never-ending cycle of struggle with the other, promising 
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only the unequal relationship. In other words, the dialectic promotes competition between 
two predetermined and preset entities, with a finality waiting at the end. The result suggests 
two possible reactionary gestures as applied to the crisis at hand: one emerging from self-
alienation that accepts and submits to the power in place, no matter how pernicious it is, and 
the other leading to the formation of the radical who moves/revolts to eliminate all those 
standing in its path to arrive at the position of power itself. These two mirror the afflicted 
subject by way of the production (in the former) versus the destruction (in the latter) of works 
of art, respectively. Further, they map well onto Aristotle’s concern with “fear” and “pity” 
threatening the republic, for which he prescribed art as a cathartic channel (Poetics xxxviii), 
and about which Kristeva wrote “of purifying the abject . . . that catharsis par excellence 
called art” (17). In either case, the damage done under such dynamisms to the subject and 
subjectivity deserves a closer investigation. Lastly, subjectivity is affected by abjection that 
first becomes ingrained into the subject, and then, in becoming displaced, it manifests itself 
in horrific reactions when threatened (Kristeva 1). We have witnessed these reactions in 
seemingly random acts of violence against the “other.”13 Kristeva notes the return of the 
subject to the point of unity in abjection when the “I” is threatened or when the space 
between subject and object collapses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
There is contemporary significance to the philosophical thoughts from antiquity, as 
the search for “justice and happiness” remains an ongoing objective for all to this day. Plato’s 
argument that holds the “philosopher-king” as the only one capable of uniting the political 
authority with the knowledge of what lies beyond—in other words, the realm of the “real”— 
constructs a governing formula and a system of socialization and education for the republic 
(Republic, Book 9). To address Heraclitus’ flux, Plato had maintained a space between the 
“real” and the “illusion” (Republic 202-207), with the “real” as “form” being above any 
changes. In Poetics, Aristotle uses that space to purge the destructive emotions through 
catharsis (Poetics xxxviii). This space collapses altogether when Plotinus argues for the 
derivation of everything—from intellect to matter—from the “One” (IV.8), but unlike Plato, 
he does not “express contempt for all that is of sense” (ibid). In Plotinus’ view there is unity 
between all creation and the “One,” which makes the return to the “One” possible (VI.9). 
From here, there is a short distance to Neoplatonism in Christianity and Islam—religious 
institutions already immersed in Greco-Roman heritage and patriarchy—to which realizing 
that unity becomes the principle objective.
14
 The transcendental “Truth,” the higher state of 
being, or “pure self-consciousness” and unifying with it sets the path toward Idealist 
philosophy, exemplary in the works of German philosophers. A remarkable clue leading to 
what facilitates the re-emergence of the idea of unity, transcendence, and the configuration of 
power in nineteenth century Europe lies in G. W. F. Hegel’s work, particularly as articulated 
in his Master-Slave dialectic. 
In the Phenomenology of Spirit ([1807] Oxford 1977), Hegel’s Master-Slave dialectic 
is predicated on the elevated idea of “self-consciousness.” Hegel lays out his argument by 
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first pointing to a “supersensible world” and how consciousness supersedes the senses (e.g. 
seeing or hearing) in order to achieve, through a dialectic process, that self-consciousness 
(79). “A self-consciousness,” Hegel argues, “ exists for a self-consciousness . . . for only in 
this way does the unity of itself in its otherness becomes explicit for it […] [w]hat still lies 
ahead for consciousness is the experience of what Spirit is” (110). In other words, 
consciousness, striving to “experience the Spirit,” is compelled to progress toward growth, 
unity, and pure self-consciousness (ibid). 
Hegel, himself being conscious of history (v), develops the Master-Slave model to 
articulate the power relationship that is projected to make the transcendence happen in time. 
However, he presupposes the elevated status of the “pure self-consciousness,” in line with his 
Christian belief, and does not reveal what makes the “master” what he is. He states: “[s]elf-
consciousness, is . . . simple being-for-self, self-equal through the exclusion of itself from 
everything else” (113). What is its essence and important to it is the “I,” and that which is 
“other” to it becomes “unessential.” What defines the position of the master, I argue, is a 
constructed illusion (not unlike what Hegel himself has done), an idea, predicated on 
Plotinus’s idea of the “One.” To the unity (of the pure self-consciousness) and the diversity 
issued through Plotinus’s hierarchic theory of Hypostasis, and in response to the ever present 
issue of power (evident in history), Hegel replies by condensing it into the master-slave 
formula with a dialectic, yet predetermined relationship. A “consciousness” either struggles 
for the highest status, or submits and serves by working through its attachments (Hegel), i.e. 
purifies itself (Plotinus). As a result, Hegel’s theory has not only explained well the conflicts 
between the rising and falling powers in history, but also has projected a plan for aspiring 
contemporary and future powers (i.e. colonialism, capitalism, etc.). Within this dialectic, he 
explicates a conflict in terms of encountering another “self consciousness. 
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If the “other” is another self-consciousness, there rises the problem of “recognition.” 
Hegel notes: “[e]ach [self-consciousness] is indeed certain of its own self, but not of the 
other, and therefore its own self-certainty still has no truth” (113). Here, Hegel brings up the 
issue of recognition (i.e. unity or submission) and what it entails: “the relationship of the two 
self-consciousness individuals is such that they prove themselves and each other through a 
life and death struggle. […] And it is only through staking one’s life that freedom is won” 
(114). It is the demonstration of a “pure being-for-itself” that reveals absolutism and 
independence, and he who has not done so, even though he may be deemed as a “person, . . . 
he has not attained to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness” 
(ibid). According to Hegel, in the process, the former maintains its multiplicity, yet remains 
independent and “for-itself,” and the latter, becomes dependent and “not purely for itself but 
for another . . . consciousness in the form of thinghood” (115). Therefore, this unequal 
relationship translates into master and slave, respectively (ibid). In order for the dialectic 
progression to work, this relationship must be maintained. Hegel distinguishes the slave as 
the being that is “fearful[,] . . . for it has experienced the fear of death.” This is a 
consciousness that is dependent upon the master, and at the same time exists with 
attachments in the material world (117). However, through “obedience,” and “work” he “rids 
himself of his attachment to natural existence in every single detail, and gets rid of it by 
working on it” (117-119). It is worth noting that, in this “work,” the slave is associated with 
technology and craft. While this may be seen as “aesthetics” under analysis in this study, I 
argue, the slave takes the idea (i.e. form) from, and produces for, the master. The formula 
convinces the subject (slave) that his freedom is through this work. Through the fear of the 
master, the slave obtains “wisdom;” nonetheless, his “consciousness is not . . . aware that it is 
a being-for itself.” It is through the work that the slave becomes aware of his true self (118). 
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Thus, the point in linking art and freedom becomes the counter argument in this study. 
Although, Hegel continues by elaborating on how eventually the slave becomes conscious of 
his self-worth, this formula is problematic, if Hegel’s discourse is viewed as power 
technique. 
Viewed through the lens of Foucauldian “power techniques” and “discourse,” the 
topic of power and its distribution/relation is key in the development and formation of 
subjectivity. Foucault states: “[i]t soon appeared to me that, while the human subject is 
placed in relations of productions and of signification, he is equally placed in power relations 
that are very complex” (Power 327). However, the study of power relations without the 
deconstruction of what Foucault calls the “apparatuses”15—specifically those relying on the 
production of the arts, seems incomplete. After all, how can one address gender, racial and 
religious inequities without full disclosure of the implications of power mechanisms? 
Mindful, then, of power relations grounded in history, this study concentrates on a 
particularly significant historical period in a specific location within the Middle East. A case 
study of the founding of the Safavid dynasty in early sixteenth century Persia will serve to 
demonstrate how an emerging patriarchal power moves to validate itself upon new iterations 
of established and innovative artistic, religious and philosophical products. To legitimize and 
solidify its existence, such a power organizes and implements apparatuses, with 
repercussions well into the future of that region. I particularly selected this era, because it is a 
formative instance in the history of the country we call Iran today. Moreover, it is exemplary 
in instigating systematic shifts while unifying an empire, all patriarchal characteristics with 
which this project is concerned. The models the Safavids employed are not unlike what Louis 
Althusser calls “Ideological State Apparatuses” (Lenin and Philosophy 96) that become the 
active agents to maintaining their political domination. According to Althusser: 
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If the ISAs ‘function’ massively and predominantly by ideology, what unifies their 
diversity is precisely this functioning, insofar as the ideology by which they function 
is always in fact unified, despite its diversity and its contradictions, beneath the ruling 
ideology, which is the ideology of the ruling class (98). 
These shifts, just as they might be manifested in traditional battles, struggles or even 
revolutions that challenge the power bases on the surface, are likely also to appear in new 
artistic movements that unify subjects collectively under a new banner.
16
 Such 
manifestations, I assert, are in reality unavoidable to patriarchy's survival as an ideology,
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but are fortuitous for our purpose, as they lay bare the inner workings of patriarchal 
structures and strategies. This helps us not only to understand better present conflicts, but 
also to foresee future strategies implemented by later forms of patriarchy, for just as with 
‘discourses,’ patriarchy, too, changes with time. 
The emergence of the Safavids serves as a marker, because in addition to being a 
critical point in the history of Iran as an independent state, it is directly linked on the one 
side, with the Neoplatonic philosophy from antiquity, and on the other with the present form 
of government currently in power in that country. In this study, whereas I believe the 
emergence of the Safavids and the compulsory conversion of the population to Shi'ism 
played a key role in retaining the political sovereignty of the country we know as Iran today, 
I submit it was the pre-Islamic Neoplatonic model (unified in image and word) that the 
founding leaders/philosophers emulated (imitated) and infused with iterations of the religion 
of Islam to suit their purposes. Similar to Foucault in The Order of Things (xxiv), I am 
interested in the “history of resemblance” and the “Classical thought,” but from the 
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standpoint of art and subjectivity. But Foucault’s criticism of power seems to not include 
himself, according to Jean Baudrillard ([1977] 2007). 
Watchful of the scholar’s power, I am further interested in Baudrillard spot-lighting 
how “Foucault’s discourse is a mirror of the power it describes” (Forget Foucault 30). 
Subsequently, recalling what Nietzsche notes in measure of man against man (2006, 45-50), I 
echo Baudrillard in raising the question whether creating power techniques can be extended 
to include the intellectual domain, hence explaining why Baudrillard argues Foucault did not 
go far enough in his theory of power.
18
  
I am hoping this study can exemplify an opportunity of knowing through alterity 
rather than excluding or opposing the “other,” a process that took place in Continental 
Philosophy in Europe and opened up philosophy from dialectic to dialogic.
19
 Similarly, I aim 
to open up a space through an intermedial and intertextual study of philosophy in alterity. 
The longer the clearing across time, to use Heidegger's term, the more opportunities for the 
examination of patriarchal power techniques before the moment when absolute power re-
establishes itself once again and conceals its secrets in order to prolong its hold. 
To be sure, the institutionalization of patriarchy across time and space is a 
confirmation of the fact that the accumulated wealth and the power status had to be 
maintained and protected. This was true then as it is now. The striving to compete is 
intimately interwoven with what Heidegger calls “enframing,”20 thereby allowing more 
power to be gained systematically. This raises the question of whether an “authentic” versus 
an “inauthentic” exercise of power is possible, which I will continue to ponder the question. 
Although Heidegger notes this tendency as the modern “technological frame work . . . 
[being] inherently expansionist” (Basic Writings 309), I emphasize the broader interpretation 
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of “the ordering of . . . both nature and man [as being an] attempt to enclose all beings in a 
particular claim—utter availability and sheer manipulability” to include the pre-modern eras 
as well. This systematic operation has been formulated and reformulated, integrated and 
appropriated, however, among different cultures in various regions including the Middle East 
well before modern times. The detrimental consequence has been the historic conflicts in the 
form of wars, economic and colonial competitions, and population displacement, among 
many other challenges. 
The subject formation affected by domination and superiority is significant when 
studying colonialism and the role of art, for instance, as propaganda. This investigation will 
require the insight of scholars such as Fanon and Said, both of whom specifically dealt with 
the issue of alterity and the subjectivity of the people systematically treated as inferior 
through various cultural means. Fanon expresses his concern and objective as “to get man to 
admit he is nothing . . . and get him to eradicate his narcissism whereby he thinks he is 
different from the other ‘animals’” (2008, 6). Said states his concern regarding the binary 
division of “men into ‘us’ (Westerners) and ‘they’ (Orientals)” in another way: “such 
divisions are generalities [i.e. collective] whose use historically and actually has been to 
press the importance of the distinction between some men and some other men, usually 
toward not especially admirable ends” (1979, 45). Inspired by Said, Linda Nochlin examines 
a European “Orientalist” painting in the essay “Imaginary Orient.” Nochlin analyzes “Snake 
Charmer” (late 1860s) by the French academic artist Gerome, in which she argues by 
depicting the Middle Easterners in a negative light, the Orientalists romanticized and 
exaggerated to highlight the distinctions between themselves and the Middle Easterners in 
order to justify their own superiority and domination over them.
21
 This view illuminates the 
colonial intentions behind such works, and in turn, I suggest, perpetuates the cycle of 
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despotism in regions affected by colonialism, for the threatened colonialized and humiliated 
individual is an operative-in-abjection par excellence; his/her (or their) subjectivity is shaped, 
among other things, through the coded visual and literal forms asserting authority that 
constantly oppress and suppress him/her by way of “order.” In Foucault’s view such order is 
implied and created by our interactive experiences. He states: “Order is . . . that which is 
given in things as their inner law, the hidden network that determines the way they confront 
one another, and also that which has no existence except in the grid created by a glance, an 
examination, a language” (The Order of Things xx). This, I argue, extends the power of 
ordering to creativity and objects of art. 
Taking Foucault's power theory further, I expand the power relationship between 
humans to include the subject/object relationship in order to explore how the power imbued 
by a dominant ideology into objects, specifically art objects, affects subjectivity with 
deleterious consequences. Evoking Nietzsche's view on artistic expression as a manifestation 
of “will to power” (WtP 419-422) in “man [who] can place himself so far distant from other 
men that he can form them” 22 (WtP 419), I assert, through the self-alienation brought on by 
the misinterpretation of such “forming,” the subject will either conform or become 
radicalized. Either way, the damage to subjectivity is inevitable.  
In the Middle East, in tracing back the systems of patriarchy through the philosophy 
of Neoplatonism that was absorbed through Christianity by the dominant religion of Islam, 
we see the production of art, philosophy, poetry, architecture, and literature. Such 
productions manifest Neoplatonic thoughts and mainly mirror and serve a centralized power 
that aimed to unify and promote a collective subjectivity.
23
 In other words, Middle Eastern 
and Western philosophical foundations overlap.
24
 Where my interest lies is in the 
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development of individual versus the collective subjectivity. For instance, rallying behind 
patriotic or religious ideals creates collective subjectivity for both the West
25
 and the Middle 
East,
26
 and has unified around a common objective as testified to by recent history. I 
maintain, however, unlike the West, the Middle Eastern regions have not successfully 
experienced a healthy and independent subject formation. The reason may be due to 
patriarchy’s unifying strategies and power techniques, whether through art, literature, 
philosophy, religious or political ideals, without a chance to examine closely such works or 
techniques. As a result, the Cartesian “I” has not fully emerged.27 Such holds true in the case 
of the sixteenth century emergence of the Safavids. 
In the case study of the Safavids, royal art produced during the sixteenth-seventeenth 
century Persia contains evidence of links between such visual imagery and Greco-Roman 
philosophy. These images, then, aimed to facilitate the theorization of a foundation for the 
new political system through a sort of rationalization and unification that was necessitated by 
the incoming Safavids. This, I suggest, is when the ideological blueprints for the 
contemporary government in Iran were drawn, for “the relationship between rationalization 
and excesses of power is evident” (2000, 328). This association confirms the claim that 
earlier religio-political models, which were continuously re-appropriated by all who sought 
power, were not appropriated exclusively by Christian power-bases, but by non-Christians, 
namely Muslims, as well.  
Similar to Foucault’s “relational” method, I suggest the patriarchies-in-opposition fit 
within the same common grounds of various struggles, as Foucault explains. Their conflicts 
are “transversal struggles,” that is to say they are inclusive of all regions. Moreover, the 
objective of the struggle is the “power effects as such,” or how the power is manifested. 
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There are also “immediate struggles” that happen to receive news coverage, so to speak, 
because of their immediacy, as opposed to seeking what may perhaps be the main culprit. 
Further, there are “struggles, which question the status of the individual” in how the 
individual is governed. Additionally, there are “struggles against the privilege of 
knowledge,” and finally as denial of identity (2000, 211-212). Foucault thus sums up three 
types of struggles: against domination, against exploitation, and against one’s own tendencies 
to become subjugated. To this, I will add the struggle against subjugation to dominant 
manifestations of artistic and philosophical works, which is fundamental in a free society
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but lacking in despotic systems. It is noteworthy that Foucault’s three types of struggles can 
potentially turn into hegemonic move themselves, but Foucault seems to be silent about it. 
Nonetheless, these struggles are all applicable to the case study I will examine, but perhaps 
most significant for our purpose are how power is manifested (through art), the governing of 
the individual (the rule of One), and the denying of identity (the compulsive conversion). 
I reference Iran's example at a particular moment in time, in which a major religio-
political shift took place. It brought with it a new dynasty of kings claiming spiritual divine 
associations, a new wave of artistic productions, and a new branch of the religion in 
Shi’aism. Studying this shift uncovers the appropriation of some of the earlier patriarchal 
paradigms, such as Plato's “rule of the guardians” and Aristotle’s art serving the state. The 
synthesis between Plato's “rule of the guardians” and Plotinus's bridging the physical and 
metaphysical realms through the material world hierarchically, as well as the eclectic weave 
of Neoplatonism itself,
29
 has informed the foundation of the politics in the region to this day.  
The appropriation (mimesis?) of Neoplatonic formulas by the Safavids and beyond 
(including the present Iranian rule of jurisprudence) demonstrates the contemporary 
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relevancy of an ideology disseminated through Neoplatonism, namely the theory of 
“Universal Man” utilized to unify under patriarchy. One of the subjects in art reflecting this 
theory is seen in the figure of Alexander, with which the Safavid sufi-kings identified not as 
a historic figure, but rather as the mystic Iskandar, who is visiting a hermit depicted in a 
sixteenth century painting.
30
  
Whereas the appropriation of the theory of “Universal Man” and its infusion into 
Islamic thought took place often by Muslim scholars, I will reason Islamic principles are in 
conflict with it. This is due to the fundamental distinction between the Creator and the 
created proposed by Islamic First Principle, al Tawhid. To accomplish these tasks, the study 
of the medieval Andalusian sage and mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240), who further articulated 
the theory of “Unity of Existence” and gave it visual form through his writings and poetry, is 
a key component of this research. Ibn Arabi’s iterations that are in excess to the original text 
map well onto Derrida's parergon and the Marxian “interest,” and that “excess” benefited the 
position of those in power. By adding details from his imagination (itself influenced by 
Greco-Roman aesthetics), Ibn Arabi embellished the original Koranic text in such a way that 
it generated “interest” in the particulars for the patriarchy in power; the imagery in turn 
inspired further literary aspirations. This ‘interest’ as manifested through works of literature 
or visual art then, I propose, powered by its Neoplatonic unifying attributes, creates a 
commodity that was exploited by the patriarchy through what Marx, in economic context, 
calls “the mystical character of commodity” (Capital 164). Ibn Arabi’s work, when projected 
through Marx’s theory above, becomes intriguing. Marx states: “the mysterious character of 
the commodity-form consists therefore simply in the fact that the commodity reflects the 
social characteristics of men’s own labor as objective characteristics of the products of labor 
themselves, as the socio-natural properties of these things” (Capital 163-165). Analogously, 
22 
 
when a mystic sage, who claims he was given permission from the Prophet in a vision to 
write (Bezels of Wisdom 45), adds details to the account of the event of Mi’raj, his status and 
the work he creates transform the original text into a commodity that ultimately benefits the 
Safavid kings. 
These concerns, viewed through the lens of power, can expose the power relations 
established not just through the traditional, institutional means of power (state apparatus, 
juridical oppression), but also through the unifying, mutual inspiration of art and philosophy 
that promoted collective subjectivities. I aim to go further by suggesting that patriarchies 
need such unification and collective subjectivities to ensure their successful rises to power, 
when clashing with other patriarchies vying for the same position at the top. To maintain the 
position of power/domination, authority and unity, patriarchy has had to obtain a hegemonic 
role by implementing three main strategies: to eliminate, to absorb and make everyone else 
conform (results in collective subjectivity), or to marginalize. 
The case study of the Safavids in this project exposes the inner workings of a 
patriarchy at a critical moment in history, which I call a patriarchal “event.”31 The notion of 
“event” is also taken up by Brian Massumi in Semblance and Event. If we understand 
“event” as relational, that is the coming together of a series of other “goings-on,” then it 
becomes necessary to examine the interrelation of things within an event, the culmination of 
which brings about a new manifestation, in this case, a new regime of patriarchy. 
Through artificial unifications the collective subject formation undermines the 
individual subjectivity, that is to say, it curbs the efforts toward individuality and personal 
freedoms in a society. While patriarchy cannot be eradicated, we can however become aware 
of it and consequently keep it in check.
32
 In its position of absolute power, patriarchy 
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conceals all the “gaps,” whether between text and image or text and text. Such “gaps” can 
lead to individual and diverse understandings or expressions, in other words, dialogism. For 
this purpose, I consider art and even philosophy as concrete documents that can trace back to 
patriarchy how it achieves such concealment and manages to maintain its position of power. 
Hannah Arendt notes how “the ‘imperishability’ of works of . . . art” connects us with the 
past (Arendt 2005, xxvii) and by extension, I suggest with each other. This study can then be 
extrapolated toward other institutions with patriarchal underpinnings, and through a network 
of conscious minds (Agamben's Coming Community), free consciousness can be fostered and 
maintained toward achieving an egalitarian society. 
Tied together with the issue of subjectivity is the ever so significant notion of 
responsibility. A critical problem with collective subjectivity is the lack of accountability that 
accompanies it. Here, there is no oversight to set limits to radicalized actions. Arendt 
demonstrates how such limitlessness can distort even “Kant’s notion of duty” (2005, xxii), or 
how “personal responsibility” becomes subjugated by “acts of state” or “superior orders” 
(2005, 37). In other words, such “acts” or “orders” give importance to collective rather than 
individual subjectivity. However, the investigation of this issue must be postponed to another 
opportunity. 
The first chapter, “Where is the Subject?” provides a definition of the subject as 
considered in this study, and addresses the problem in the contemporary conversations on the 
issue of modernism with regards to the Middle East. What scholars mostly have suggested 
thus far, even those who are mindful of the issues of “subject and object,” does not go 
beyond the economic, political, religious, or historical perspectives in their formulations. By 
intertextualizing philosophy and art against the backdrop of selected historical events, this 
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study, however, intends to draw attention to the issue of “subjectivity” as engaged with “art” 
and “artistic production” in the broadest possible sense necessary to develop a new critical 
discourse, through which the current conflicts can be analyzed from a different vantage point. 
“Subjectivity: Informed by a Long Tradition of Patriarchy,” in chapter two addresses 
the preliminaries by offering definitions of patriarchy, but emphasizing the genealogical 
definition, which entails placing the father at the top of the family/tribal structure, a move 
stemming from the historical necessities that brought about the treatment of the first “other,” 
women, as objects. This chapter includes Frederick Engels’ accounts of “the development of 
the social institutions of the patriarchal family and private property” (Engels 8). A brief 
historical investigation into the roots of patriarchy is followed by the role of the arts from the 
early cities to the time of Greeks and the Romans. It then transitions into Christianity and the 
development of Neoplatonic and mystic thoughts; this investigation will focus on how art 
contributed to an artificial unification (e.g., through depicting “divine connections” of the 
authorities) that led to collective subjectivity benefiting those in power every time. The issue 
of equity will usher in the emergence of the third Abrahamic religion, Islam, and its 
relationship with the other two, Judaism and Christianity, with particular interest in the 
intertextualization of imagery, word and power. The examination of power dynamics within 
Judaism and Christianity with regards to the notions of intermingling of religion and power 
as a sure way to unify the population are considered. Furthermore, the infusion of Greco-
Roman art and Persian artistic and governing models serving the early years of Islamic 
dynastic rules will be of particular interest. 
The study of Ibn Arabi, who became known as the “son of Plato,” is noteworthy here, 
not only because of the association with the ideas from antiquity, but also due to the visual, 
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descriptive nature of his writings and their far-reaching influence to the time of the Safavids 
and the Ottomans. This chapter will end with a study of Islam and the issue of “other,” from 
the Christian West and Muslims’ interactions with non-Muslims that were later to shape the 
European Renaissance. The emphasis will be on how ideas from ancient Greece, Rome, and 
Christianity that had been integrated through the works of Islamic philosophers/scholars 
(some in Spain, others in Baghdad) were now being considered by the Europeans during the 
Renaissance (a sort of knowing through their “other”), but all supporting patriarchy. 
Chapter three will consist of the case study, the rise to power of a new governing 
class, empowered by the already established Neoplatonic iteration of Islam. The background 
to the incoming Safavids is noteworthy; they are closely tied to mystic Sunni tradition, yet 
the founder, who is a Sufi Sheikh’s (spiritual leader) grandson, begins a campaign of 
compulsory conversion of the country to the Shi’ite branch of Islam. By doing so, he creates 
an Ideological State Apparatus, predicated on the Shi’ite tenets, to prevent Persia from being 
absorbed into the great Ottoman rule. This ISA was fortified by the migration of the Shi’ite 
religious scholars from the Amel Mountains (Jabal Amel) in Southern Lebanon, thereby 
changing the socio, religio-political fabric of the region, the ties of which still exist today. 
What role art played in this apparatus has its roots in Ibn Arabi’s major theory, the “Unity of 
Existence,” and in his articulation of the “Universal Man” that proved instrumental in 
unifying subjects. These thoughts transpire from Neoplatonism and form a foundation for the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century Persian philosophers, theorists and artists. However, their 
discrepancies with the principle text were never questioned. Examining the arts of this era in 
comparison to previous art movements reveals the specific political agenda of the Safavids, 
which was to underscore their divine connection. This chapter will also include a detailed 
analysis of the Safavid royal patronage and art work that unified their subjects. Finally, a 
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preliminary and comparative look at the development of German Idealism and an exploration 
of the issue of subjectivity and its Neoplatonic roots, as well as a discussion on one of the 
most influential Neoplatonic Persian Philosophers, namely Mūlā Sadrā wraps up this chapter. 
When René Descartes wrote his famous “cogito ergo sum” in 1637, the Safavids were 
at the tail end of their military conflicts with the Ottomans, and four years after Kant wrote 
his renowned Critique of Judgment, another new dynasty, the Qajar dynasty, was taking 
shape through the violent military and retributory campaigns of its founder. When we map 
these events as reflected through artistic activities, the significance of the study of 
subjectivity becomes evident. This includes Kristeva's notion of abjection and Lacan’s 
interpretation of Freud on the subject of violence and the extreme in turning against the 
“other ‘I’” (Lacan “The Subversion of the Subject,” Hegel and Contemporary Writings 219) 
in connection with the threatened ego/self. The artistic and psychological dynamics of Shi’ite 
Safavids, and Sunni Ottomans, with respect to their different iterations of Islam play an 
instrumental role in how their patriarchal rivalries took shape and influenced subject 
formation among their own people and among themselves. However, while the investigation 
of "abjection" vis-a-vis artificial unities in this context is significant, it must be taken up in a 
future project. 
There is great significance in the examination of the three influential regions in the 
Middle East, Qajar Persia, the Ottoman Turkey and Egypt, during the time of modernization 
and reform. The examination of their art reveals, on the one hand, the nature of the rivalry 
between them and their art as source of pride and identity, and on the other, a competitive 
European economic engagement, which will be discussed in turn in chapter four. Among 
topics of special interest are the state of the subject during the reformation as the fruits of 
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technology offers glimpses of individuality and criticism. This chapter thus, will address the 
pressures that were building upon the contacts (military and diplomatic) already made 
between the West and the Middle East, particularly Persia, that brought with it new 
technology, and education. It demonstrates that the external centers, around which European 
ideas and identities had gathered, were rapidly changing.  
There were two obstacles in the path of achieving social and political reforms in 
Persia. These were the Shi'ite doctrine and the intrusion of the great powers. There was 
earlier a change in the ethos of the society when the country had been converted to Shi'ism, 
which viewed political power different from the Sunnis. Whereas the Sunnis would accept an 
unjust rulers and seek to legitimize their position of authority (a sort of an artificial 
unification), the Shi'ites refused to follow such rulers; instead, they considered their religious 
leaders the only authority to follow (another type of simulated unity).
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 Moreover, due to the 
intrusion of foreign powers (e.g., Britain and Russia), the Persian government was reluctant 
to expand trade and communication relations with the European States. Islam (or whatever 
iterations of Islam that suited the power base) held the country together, and the monarch was 
seen as the ruler who was supposed to defend the "Islamic land" against the non-Muslims. 
The notion of emulation is a significant part of this argument, because it is both a 
destroyer of the space and a dynamic that requires an unequal relationship. Foucault’s insight 
draws our attention to the fact that “[t]he relation of emulation enables things to imitate one 
another from one end of the universe to the other without connection or proximity: by 
duplicating itself in a mirror the world abolishes the distance proper to it […] However, 
emulation does not leave the two reflected figures it has confronted in a merely inert state of 
opposition. One may be weaker, and therefore receptive to the stronger influence of the 
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other” (1994, 20). The emulation of the Western systems of education and artistic training 
had already led to the sending of groups of young students to Europe. It brought about the 
founding of the first Art school in 1851 in Tehran. 
This investigation will demonstrate how ideas from antiquity that strengthen 
patriarchy have endured and served as paradigms for various groups, informing subjectivities 
that are inclined toward an external center and away from individuality and individual 
thinking. In other words, there is no equivalence here for the Cartesian thinking “I.” 
However, this is certainly not the whole picture. Chapter five highlights the interconnected 
intellectual exchange with Muslims that indeed manifests itself through the theory of optics 
and proves critical to the European Renaissance. These thoughts continue to promote the 
goals of eminence and prominence among the male-dominated political and religious powers 
in contemporary times. But, most important is how the collective subjectivity has informed 
human history through conflicts and psychologically damaged and undermined individual 
subjectivity. The early Orientalism and colonialism are then examined through pertinent 
philosophical theories, as they map onto the dynamics of a mobilized economy, and the 
systematic way through which identities and subjectivities are shaped. Fanon’s and Said’s 
discourses on colonialism are of particular interest here, because a greater part of this history 
involves how subjugation of humans by other humans has been justified through the 
collective consciousness. This chapter will also address the concept of taqlīd, a variant 
technique of mimesis that ensured the continuity and unity. 
 Following the collapse of the Qajar dynasty, and the rise to power of the Pahlavi 
dynasty’s founder, Reza Khan, further modernization of the country got underway, which 
included the founding of the country’s first university and establishing the cross country 
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transportation and railroad lines. However, the modernization was met with the disapproval 
of the religious camp. Suppression of the competition and the movement toward a 
nationalistic, centralized power had already begun by Reza Khan, who upon later assuming 
the position of monarchy, became known as Reza Shah. Thus, the final chapter will 
commence with a brief history that links the early modernist movements to nationalism and 
government sponsored reforms. While there had been grass-root movements since the 
Constitutional Revolution to implement women’s education, social, economic and other 
health reforms, the centralized power of the king eliminated such initiatives in order to 
establish its own programs (e.g. the emancipation of women from the veil in 1936). 
Following the 1919 Paris Peace Conference, nationalism as an ideology was 
promoted by the European powers, since it ensured the fragmentation of the Middle East. It 
was also coincided by the crack-down on the opposition and the tightening of personal 
freedoms by the autocratic rules. The more actions taken by the secular, centralized 
government toward modernizing their countries (as with Iran and Turkey), the unhappier the 
religious class, who had grown and penetrated every aspect of people's lives. Strategies were 
adopted by the secular government to keep the clergy in check. The tensions between the 
religious and secular authorities turned them into each other’s “other.” By mid-nineteenth 
century, “imitation” (taqlīd) is implemented into religious rituals and everyday activity, 
fostering collective subjectivities and discouraging individual agency on matters of faith. The 
broadening of power base from religion to political, even to the economic domain, eventually 
made the clergy class very influential and powerful with great access to organizing and 
mobilizing the population, particularly those in the central commercial market (bazaar).
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The steps taken by the government disadvantaged domestic merchants against the foreign 
merchants and investors, and this, among other undercurrents, was one of the grievances of 
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the merchants, associated with the central market merchants, pertinent as we approach the 
1979 revolution in Iran. Thus, the support from domestic merchant class for the religious 
leaders was growing.
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The final chapter will focus on the formation of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
emulating the Platonic formula, but appropriated as the ‘rule of jurisprudence’ rather than 
rule of philosopher. The mapping of the formation of collective subjectivity from the 
Constitutional Monarchy to Constitutional Revolution, from democratic movements toward 
Modernity, and what role the arts played in this equation, is the objective in this chapter. The 
investigation of how the religious authorities eventually step out from under the shadow of 
the secular government (the king) and finally achieve political rule after the revolution of 
1979 in Iran is of great significance here.
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An evaluation of the philosophical constructs that supported the founding of a 
patriarchal government based on religious perspectives will also be of interest here, and can 
be traced back to the migration of the Shi'ite clerics from southern Lebanon. The formation 
of a political system predicated on a specific reading of Islam enables patriarchy to maintain 
a position of power and domination over everyone else. Studying the works of ideologists 
like Ali Shari’ati (Iran), with his new definitions critical to the revolution of 1979, provides 
evidence to yet another philosophization and politicization of Islam once again facilitating 
patriarchy’s absorbing and unifying powers. Shari’ati actually distinguishes his 
interpretations from what he calls "the Safavid Islam" that he saw as a courtly endeavor, and 
argues in support of the independency of Islam (according to how he interprets it) from the 
court. The point was capitalized on by the clergy vying for power with the monarchy, leading 
up to the revolution of 1979 in Iran. 
31 
 
The gradual process of complete takeover and elimination of the “other” groups 
(particularly those who had helped bring the class of clergy to power in an initial move 
toward unity) and restricting individual rights and freedoms soon ensued. Constant 
restrictions and tight control over every aspect of people's lives, particularly in artistic 
expressions, became dominant. Foucault's notes on revolution (2000, 449) and his letter to 
Mehdi Bazargan, the prime minister of the Islamic Republic at the time (2000, 439), will also 
be addressed. This chapter will end with the intertextualization of some of the current 
philosophical theories. 
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CHAPTER ONE  
WHERE IS THE SUBJECT? 
 
And . . . where, strictly speaking, am I? My historical coordinates are altogether different 
[…] The sequence of historical periods means nothing to me […] I talk about history, think 
about it, do my best to understand its mechanisms and linkages, . . .[b]ut during this short 
period, which marks my formal entry to a time of ever-broadening horizons, on the psychic 
level I have continued to inhabit a meta-history in which the before and the after are 
confused with the after and with post-history. And between the two, I find myself postponing 
an End without which there can be no Beginning.
37
    
         — Daryush Shayegan 
 
 
 
In September 2014, the Berlin-based research program, Transregional Studies Forum 
and the Beirut Orient-Institute, organized a conference (Summer Academy) held in Beirut, 
Lebanon, under the title “Language, Science and Aesthetics – Articulation of Subjectivity 
and Objectivity in the Modern Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia.” 38 In 
this conference, the three domains of Aesthetics, Science and Language were structured for 
focused discussions. Each group argued the effects of Western-led modernist movement on 
the three fields in the region, with the emphasis that “the notions of subjectivity and 
objectivity, the individual and the subject [are] . . . key concepts of modernity.”39 Aside from 
a series of lectures that were offered at the Beirut Orient-Institute, and the American 
University of Beirut, all conference formats (i.e. research project presentations, plenary 
sessions, etc.) “were restricted to [the] Academy participants.”40 While many “key notions,” 
such as “center/peripheries, global/local,” modernity/tradition, and translation/mistranslation 
were “intensely addressed,” the discussion on the “subject” itself seemed conspicuously 
absent from the program. 
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This study, with particular attention to the Middle East and Iran, sets out to develop a 
critical discourse that centers on the power and knowledge that is constructed and dispersed 
through art, in its broadest meaning—which includes and deems patriarchy and 
Neoplatonism as artistic endeavors—in a process that impacts social practices, influential in 
shaping subjectivities and defining the interrelationship between the subjects.  
In this chapter, following a brief definition of the term “subject,” it is necessary to 
address the problem of Neoplatonist philosophy, particularly with regards to “beauty,” as 
developed through multi levels of “translations” and “interpretations.” The issue of 
“translation,” is of great interest in this project, for it is through the process of translation that 
attempts are made to cover the “gap” between meaning and text/art work. Keeping the 
“subject’ in view, I will then present selected current conversations on the tension between 
the advent of modernism and the Middle East region. This is to demonstrate that, despite 
being conscious of the key components in modernism, the acknowledgement of the notion of 
the subject as shaped by many factors, especially art—that which this project is engaged 
with—remains beyond the scope of contemporary theorists’ concerns with regards to the 
Middle East. Despite the current discussions signaling an awareness of the modern theories 
among the thinkers in the Middle East, the criticism revolves around the usual suspects: 
politics, religion, legal matters, etc, and not inclusive of the issue of the subject. This 
necessitates the present study that underscores the opening-up of a space for the “subject” as 
an independent, but critical component of modernity, pertaining to the region, without 
excluding the other concerns. Prior to entering the conversation, however, it is imperative to 
define the term “subject,” pivotal to this study.  
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DEFINING THE SUBJECT 
While it is not clear when the use of the term “subject” entered the humanities 
initially, the traces of it in the history of the Western philosophy lead one back to Kant, and 
farther to Descartes.
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 But, for the purposes of this project, the term “subject” references that 
which has been shaped or constructed by variety of external elements. At the core of this 
subject lies ego, which is distinct from “subject” (Lacan [1966] 2004), and is the product of 
misrecognition, but critical in the process of individuation for the child (Lacan 1978). The 
ego is predicated on “being there” (Dasein in Heideggerian terms), and its subjectivity takes 
shape around it as moving through time and space. Once the subjectivity expresses itself 
independently, it manifests individuality. Therefore, while intimately related, these terms are 
not meant as interchangeable in this study, but rather they each represent a specific phase. 
The issue of subjectivity is perhaps the initial stage and the interface with the subject’s 
surroundings, including the subject’s “other,” which is why it is critical to address. 
There is very little argument on the recognition of the formation of the subject as a 
crucial component in modernism. What is unclear is how the notion of the “subject” is either 
taken for granted or is curiously absent from the conversation, when discussing modernism in 
the Middle East. Moreover, the ambiguity of the term has contributed to this challenge. The 
term “subject,” connotes a grammatical agent (as in the one who acts), yet it is also legally 
and politically charged (as in being a subject of a ruler/king); while it is active (as in “subject 
of”), it can be passive (as in “subject or subjected to”) as well.42 
The matter of language
43
 can complicate things further still, as noted by the French 
linguist, Emile Benveniste (1902-1976). He argued for a distinction between the one who 
“speaks” and the existence at the core of the very subject who performs the act of 
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“speaking.”44 Therefore, contends Benveniste, it is the language that first shapes the subject. 
Benveniste states: “It is in and through language that man constitutes himself as a subject, 
because language alone establishes the concept of ‘ego’ in reality, in its reality which is that 
of the being” (Benveniste 224). He notes the problem in the self-declaring Cartesian cogito 
and further explains: “Consciousness of the self is only possible if it is experienced by 
contrast. I use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address” 
(ibid). This definition appears to complement what Lacan argued in his “mirror phase” 
theory, for the child “seems . . . to manifest in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in 
which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, prior to being objectified in the dialectic of 
identification with the other, and before language restores to it . . . its function as subject” 
(Lacan 2004, 4). 
I submit, then, being a subject to oneself, requires passing through the stages of 
“misrecognition” to form the child’s ego (Lacan), to shaping the subjectivity through 
language (Benveniste), connecting with others,
45
 and becoming aware of this process, with 
the “being” intact at the core as the primordial necessity. Although becoming conscious of 
one’s subjectivity is extremely critical—that which has yet to fully materialize in the Middle 
East and has been the source of imbalance between it and the West—it is not an end. In other 
words, my objective is not merely to remain in a fixed position within the Humanist view of 
subjectivity that subsequently requires dignity and rights for the individual alone; it is to also 
underscore what proceeds this development, more in-line with the continental philosophers 
(e.g. Derrida, Foucault), who advocate decentralization of power and, as best articulated by 
Deleuze and Guattari, connecting to one’s “other” in a more organic way. 
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The question may be raised with respect to a comparison between Europe/Christianity 
that has experienced reformation, and the Middle East/Islam that is struggling to reform. I am 
aware of the problem that is noted by Talal Asad (1993). In his Genealogy of Religions, Asad 
addresses the problem that through modernism, the West has created the impression that 
somehow there is more significance in studying its history of thought, in comparison with the 
history of non-Western, namely Middle Eastern regions. He notes: 
It has sometimes been noted that peoples from non-Western countries feel obliged to 
read the history of the West (but not each other’s history) and that Westerners in turn 
do not feel the same need to study non-Western histories. The history of modern 
Western thought, for example, can be (and is) written on its own, but not so the 
history of contemporary Arab thought. One opposition between the West and the non-
West (and so a mode of connection between them) is constructed historically by these 
asymmetrical desires and indifferences. 
Asad, in contrast to Said’s theory in Orientalism, which argues that Western 
knowledge was a “systematic discourse” through which Europe has come to terms with its 
“other” (Said 1979, 3), draws attention to the importance of agency of the colonized (1993, 
2). While Asad brings up a critical point, he does so as a collective consciousness, and the 
issue of the subject is eclipsed by his broad anthropological and historical concerns, 
particularly with respect to the role of religion. In his argument, Asad suggests that 
anthropologists should understand the West first, if they are to make sense of that which is 
imposed on the non-Western population in the name of modernity. For example, he 
approaches the problem “by discussing . . . two elements in medieval Christianity that are no 
longer generally accepted by modern religion: the productive role of physical pain and the 
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virtue of self-abasement” (1993, 2). Nonetheless, while he demonstrates the significance of 
knowledge and power, Asad seems to be more interested, not so much in the subject, but in 
the larger, encompassing issues. 
The process of becoming subject to oneself, nonetheless, since the formation of the 
early cities, as I have suggested in chapter two, has involved the elements of “debt” and 
“fear” that motivated and impacted the fluctuation mixed with tension between the individual 
and the group consciousness.
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 Stated differently, the fear of becoming a “subject or 
subjected to” the conquering power agencies (due to debt, for instance), frequently has given 
rise to a tendency toward a struggle for (or to join with) a superior position at the cost of 
individual consciousness, effects of which are still felt today.
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 There is a gap between the 
subject and the issue of “individuality,” misunderstood in the context of mystic tradition 
(erfan) in the Middle East that this project is engaged with. Nader and Fereshteh Ahmadi in 
Iranian Islam: The Concept of the Individual (1998) is an example of such misunderstanding. 
What is perhaps best refracted in the work of Ibn Arabi and in his theory of Perfect Human 
(al Insan al Kamel), is a “subjectivity with considerable potential” (Vahdat 126), to which I 
will return in detail in chapter three. 
Despite the significance of the topic of “subjectivity,” and what has formed and 
informed it in the Middle East, the discussions have, more often than not, steered either 
toward the direction of praising a glorious past, a sort of “regression toward an original 
mythology”48 in the region, or the consequences of modernity as imposed by the west, 
infringing on the region’s traditions. A significant component in the tradition within the 
Middle East has been the influential, however problematic, Neoplatonic philosophy. 
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THE PROBLEM OF NEOPLATONIC PHILOSOPHY 
Generally speaking, there are three groups of philosophers under consideration in this 
study: philosophers who are preoccupied with creating systems (e.g. Plato, Hegel), and those 
who are focused more on the individual responses (e.g. Kant, Nietzsche). The third group 
searches for an intersubjective, dynamic balance between the two. Setting the third group 
aside for the time being, much of what constitutes the base of Western philosophy,
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 is 
entangled in a tension: the tension between the two former groups. This tension is akin to the 
tension stemming from how one theorizes the relationship between the individual and the 
group; between content and form; particular and universal, or stated more broadly, how one 
finds one’s place within the larger scheme of things. Plato’s Republic aimed to create a 
system in response to what he saw as the Athenian democracy (people-power) having gone 
corrupt. This system received its authority and legitimacy from Plato’s philosophy on what 
he deemed as “good” and “ideal,” predicated on the idea of perfection beyond this world 
(Republic, Book 6 and 7). The theory Plato had imagined and crafted, could not tolerate other 
interpretations and competing views put forth through others’ imaginations. Therefore, 
Plato’s system, in promoting a centralized source of power (knowledge), required the 
expulsion of the artists (Republic, Book 10). In his re-interpretation
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 of Plato’s philosophy, 
Aristotle argues for using the artists to create a “space” to purge from the community what 
would potentially be disruptive to the republic (Poetics, xxxviii). But, times of stability are 
often interrupted by periods of chaos for reasons beyond what the members of a community 
can control. Such times often leave people looking for answers by turning to an inner world. 
There are different names for this “world:” Plato calls it the “real,” others use terms such as 
“metaphysical,” “spiritual,” or see it as one with the Divine. It is not my intention here to 
negate such a “world,” but to emphasize the subjective nature of the language and 
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interpretations used when we describe it for each other. I argue, it becomes problematic, 
when such subjective knowledge, as real as it may be to the one who believes it, becomes 
form and imposed on others. This is the case in Neoplatonism. 
Neoplatonism developed following the formulation of the highly personal and 
imaginative, albeit a hierarchical, philosophy of Plotinus. Plotinus (204/5-270 CE) was active 
during the Late Roman Period, (third to fourth centuries CE), “almost coextensive with one 
of the most disastrous periods in Roman history” (Russell, 284). Plotinus also suffered from 
ailments of the body, even “seemed ashamed of being in the body,” according to his pupil, 
Porphyry (Enneads, 1), which may have influenced his philosophy as evident in his teachings 
(Enneads, 2). Katharine Gilbert and Helmut Kuhn in A History of Esthetics also notice that 
Plotinus  
lived on easy terms with religious mysteries of purification flourishing in Rome and 
Alexandria at the beginning of Christian era[;] . . . he was a practical teacher in the 
busy heart of a complex stirring world (91).  
“Withdraw into yourself and look,” states Plotinus himself, inviting all to “close the 
eyes and call instead upon another vision which is to be waked within you, a vision, the 
birth-right of all, which few turn to use” (I.6, 8-9). As still true today, during the times of 
crisis and the collapsing of the external support, when there is no place to turn to for 
reassurance, and as also later noted by Kandinsky, one is compelled to turn inward, at a 
“spiritual turning-point” (AiT, 86-87), which is necessarily and initially in the personal realm 
and indivisible from imagination, until it enters the collective consciousness through 
aesthetic manifestations.
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One of the significant arguments in the Enneads is the role of “beauty,” to remind the 
absentminded of its essence (I.6.2). In fact the two are so intertwined that some have even 
argued “[o]ne of the best ways to begin a study of Neoplatonism is through a study of its 
aesthetics.”52 But, I believe, prior to tackling the aesthetics, or the concept of “beauty” in 
Plotinus’s Enneads, it is critical to explore the philosophical system put forth by Plotinus, 
through his pupil, Porphyry (Enneads, 1).
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 It is not difficult to see the “valuation” system in 
Plotinus’s thought process; as a true Platonist, Plotinus, believes that there is a “real” world 
beyond the “illusion” to which we are exposed.54  
The map of the foundation of Plotinus’s philosophy is laid out in the Fifth Ennead 
(V.1). In “The Three Initial Hypostases” Plotinus begins by a question: “What can it be that 
has brought the souls to forget the father, God, and though members of the Divine and 
entirely of that world, to ignore at once themselves and It?” (V.1.1) Thus, he begins in the 
material world, the environs of illusion, that which is created, and progresses toward the 
“One”. He states: 
Let every soul recall, then, at the outset, the truth that soul is the author of all living 
things, that it has breathed the life into them all, whatever is nourished by earth and 
sea, all the creatures of the air, the divine stars in the sky; it is the maker of the sun; 
itself formed and ordered this vast heaven and conducts all that rhythmic motion: and 
it is a principle distinct from all these to which it gives law and movement and life, 
and it must of necessity be more [honorable] than they, for they gather or dissolve as 
soul brings them life or abandons them, but soul, since it never can abandon itself, is 
of eternal being (V.1.2). 
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Plotinus identifies, therefore, in creation, there is a core (i.e. the Soul)—distinct from 
what it creates, although connected to the source—which takes its worth from that source, the 
“One,” and in turn, gives value to the “stark body . . . blankness of Matter, the absence of 
being” by “entering the material” turning it into “a living and a blessed thing” (ibid). But, 
unlike “the material body,” the Soul is unified, because “[b]y the power of the Soul the 
manifold and diverse heavenly system is a unit: through soul this universe is a God: and the 
sun is a God because it is ensouled” (ibid). Encouragingly, he then notes once one realizes 
this, there is not much farther toward God. He explains: “The Soul once seen to be thus 
precious, thus divine, you may hold the faith that by its possession you are already nearing 
God” (V.1.3). However, in his greater scheme of things, there is another step, because “Soul, 
for all the worth . . .is yet a secondary, an image of the Intellectual-Principle.” Therefore, the 
Soul, receives its value from the “Intellectual-Principle.” Just as speaking of reason is not 
reason, but only an image of it, “the soul is an utterance of the Intellectual-Principle,” in its 
entirety. For its perfection, “it must look to the Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a 
father watching over the development of his child born imperfect in comparison with 
himself” (ibid). 
Despite imperfection, Plotinus believes there is “loveliness . . . [in] this world,” which 
“comes by communion in Ideal Form” (I.6.2). Plotinus attributes “a faculty peculiarly 
addressed to Beauty” as belonging to the Soul, nonetheless, it recognizes “the Beautiful” 
because it is “accordant with the Ideal Form” (I.6.3). There are “beauties of the realm of 
sense, images and shadow-pictures . . . that have entered into Matter—to adorn, and to 
ravish, where they are seen.” However, senses do not have access to the “loftier beauties . . . 
[that] the Soul, taking no help from the organs, sees and proclaims them […] [s]uch vision is 
for those only who see with the Soul’s sight” (I.6.4). 
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This beauty, Plotinus further argues, “induce[s] wonderment, . . . longing and love 
and a trembling that is all delight […] and those only that feel the keener wound are known 
as Lovers” (ibid). Those who feel the difference between the worldly beauties, and “the 
beauty outside the sense, . . . [must] declare themselves” (I.6. 4-5). To further clarify, he then 
contrasts “beauty” with “ugliness,” to show that “Beauty is the Authentic-Existents and 
Ugliness is the Principle contrary to Existence,” which he equates to “evil,” thus “Beauty-
Good and the Ugliness-Evil” (I.6.6). Ascending toward the “Good,” therefore, is  
for those that will take the upward path, who will set all their forces towards it, who 
will divest themselves of all that we have put on in our descent: so, to those that 
approach the Holy Celebrations of the Mysteries, there are appointed purifications 
and the laying aside of the garments worn before, and the entry in nakedness—until 
passing on the upward way, all that is other than the God . . .(I.6.7). 
In Plotinus’s system, this purification is justified because it unifies the “faculty 
peculiarly addressed to beauty,” endowed by the Soul, with the beauty that resides in 
material, that which we perceive, and more specifically, recognized by the artist.
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The beauty 
in the material form, argues Plotinus, comes from the “Ideal-Form;” this is what the faculty 
recognizes and with which unifies (I.6.3). In the Fifth Ennead, Plotinus further explains how 
this beauty is translated through the mind of the artist, already endowed with the “higher 
beauty,” and when the work of art is created, it is thus not in the material nor is it in the 
artist’s “eyes and hands,” but in bringing the two together, or as Plotinus puts it, “by [the 
artist’s] . . . participation in his art” (V.8.1). The implications in this deduction have been 
pointed to by Gilbert and Kuhn: “The beauty of the statue comes from the way it has been 
worked by the workman, rather than from the simple external facts of relation of parts and 
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color” (113). Nonetheless, the concern for shaping the subject due to this idea, rests outside 
their interest. They go as far as emphasizing the act of unity that takes place in the process. 
Gilbert and Kuhn state: 
A product is dead and less than the artist; the artist is a particular man, and less than 
his art; the art is dependent on an external material medium and so is not self-
sufficient; the creative act dominating Nature is alone self-sufficient. Here act and 
vision are one; color and shape arise together within the process (115). 
Plotinus’s argument on “Beauty” solidifies the subject’s bind to his interpretation of 
the Divine through “the material thing [that] becomes beautiful—by communicating in the 
Reason-Principle that flows from the Divine” (I.6.2). This argument, elevates that which one 
(i.e. the artist) creates, above the “being,” itself and takes for granted all that is predicated on 
Plotinus’s interpretation of the “Divine.” Thus, there is a problem when one’s imagination or 
interpretation, perceived as principle, mingles with subject’s faith, and dominates or rules 
over others. But how does one’s subjective “truth” gain a superior position? There is an 
economy of debt at work in such a dynamic: the excess meaning/value given to what has 
been created (i.e. added interest) diminishes the being’s intrinsic worth, and due to lack of 
independent verification, one feels taken over by the perceived power. On this problem 
Nietzsche states: 
All the beauty and sublimity we have bestowed upon real and imaginary things I will 
reclaim as the property and product of man: as his fairest apology. Man as poet, as 
thinker, as God, as love, as power: with what regal liberality he has lavished gifts 
upon things so as to impoverish himself and make himself feel wretched! His most 
unselfish act hitherto has been to admire and worship and to know how to conceal 
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from himself that it was he who created what he admired [...] When a man is 
suddenly and overwhelmingly suffused  with the feeling of power—and this is what 
happens with all great affects—it raises in him a doubt about his own person: he does 
not dare to think himself the cause of this astonishing feeling—and so he posits a 
stronger person, a divinity, to account for it.
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It is not just the admiration of a “creation” alone, but also how there is power in the 
interpretation, itself created, albeit within certain predetermined cultural guidelines and 
concerns. Nietzsche recognizes the art that is created by way of this interpretation when he 
states “Man as poet, as thinker . . .,” for who would deny himself of the “beauty,” Plotinus is 
pointing to:  
Withdraw into yourself and look. And if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as 
does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he 
smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has 
grown upon his work […] When you know that you have become this perfect work, 
when you are self-gathered in the purity of your being, nothing now remaining that 
can shatter that inner unity, nothing from without clinging to the authentic man, when 
you find yourself wholly true to your essential nature . . . (I.6.9). 
Accordingly, Plotinus urges one to “withdraw into himself, foregoing all that is 
known by the eyes” (I.6.8). If we consider “seeing” with one’s eyes an individual 
act/experience (an act that in Lacan’s Mirror Theory leads to individuation), it then follows, 
not surprisingly, that such outlook does not lead to the formation of the individual’s 
subjecthood. Instead, one is enticed with ambiguous notions such as beauty and love—
subjective ideas that have turned into form—to become an “illuminati,” one whose claims of 
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enlightenment is unverifiable. Evaluation of the “beauty” as inferior to the “beauty outside of 
sense,” has implications: it means downplaying the lived-experience in favor of the 
imaginary and interpretative knowledge that is debatable.  
Beauty and love are the lure, although reliant upon the Intellectual-Principle, which 
keeps Plotinus’s philosophical system together. Nonetheless, the system offers such exquisite 
beauty and potential for creative endeavors, that artists and thinkers alike have overlooked its 
problematic aspects. Gilbert and Kuhn note: “Plotinus makes Beauty both transcendent and 
immanent, and this strains to the breaking-point the logical consistency of his system. But, 
what is loss to logic is at least part gain to esthetics” (117). To be sure, the “being” in 
Plotinus’s value system remains hinged to the metaphysical center, the “One.”. This may 
explain how its interpretations generated, with ease, varied iterations in Christianity and later 
in Islam. The history of Western religious art is filled with numerous examples of 
Neoplatonic interpretations. Gilbert and Kuhn point out that Plotinus’s philosophy had far 
reaching influences “on later thought—medieval, Renaissance, and even modern” (117). One 
finds Saint Augustine nearly repeating word for word Plotinus’s description of the 
harmonious way in which everything endowed with beauty moves together (ibid).
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 Such 
interpretations and literature spilled over during the systematic campaign of collecting and 
translating knowledge from the antiquity by Muslims. Following the translation movement in 
the ninth and tenth centuries, it is no surprise then that many of the Islamic geometric 
patterns—interpreted according to the permissible cultural paradigms—also reflect such 
harmony (S.H.Nasr 1992, 338). Therefore, to examine Neoplatonism in Islamic thought, one 
must return to the earliest instances of the formation of “Islamic philosophy” and its reasons. 
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Tracing back the notion of “Islamic philosophy,” in looking through any text on the 
history of intellectual thought in Islam, one comes across references to a very well-known 
text called “Theology of Aristotle.”58 Despite the title, this book is erroneously attributed to 
Aristotle; however, it offers a revealing clue to the formation of philosophical thought in the 
Muslim intellectual history. The so-called “Theology of Aristotle” is indeed the product of 
the translation movement that took place in the early medieval Baghdad, and “is in fact an 
Arabic version of parts of the Enneads” by Plotinus, with added “aspects of Theology that 
seem to be genuinely innovative and original” (Adamson 2002, 2). It became “the most 
important direct source for Neoplatonic ideas in the Islamic world.” This text informed many 
scholars, “from al-Kindi to al-Farabi and Ibn Sina (Avicenna) to the later ishraqi 
(Illuminationist) school.” 59 This line of influence continued in Iran, as it will be discussed 
later in this study, to other Muslim thinkers, from al-Ghazali to Mūlla Sadrā, Hajj Mūlla Hādi 
Sabzevāri and straight to Iran’s revolutionary leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. What is the 
significance of this particular text? 
Peter Adamson argues that the “Theology of Aristotle” came about to fill the gap in 
Aristotle for Muslims, by “providing extensive doctrines about the nature of God and 
eschatology.”60 This seems plausible since Muslims were clearly aware of two distinct 
schools in Greek thoughts according to S.H. Nasr. He states: 
Muslims came to distinguish between two different schools, each possessing a 
distinct type of science: one, the Hermetic-Pythagorean school, was metaphysical in 
its approach, its sciences of Nature depending upon the symbolic interpretation of 
phenomena and of mathematics; in the other, the syllogistic-rationalistic school of the 
followers of Aristotle, the point of view was philosophical rather than metaphysical, 
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and its sciences were therefore, aimed at finding the place of things in a rational 
system, rather than at seeing, through their appearances, their heavenly essences.
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The knowledge collected by the medieval Muslims from the antiquity was varied and 
often conflicting. One of the objectives of the translation movement was to produce a 
“unified” philosophy that reflected a cohesive empire (Adamson 2002, 3 and Gutas 29). 
“[T]he growing insistence on the essential unity of philosophical truth, on the harmony 
between Plato’s and Aristotle’s doctrine . . . is indicative of an attitude of compromise which 
made philosophy fit to serve as a scientific interpretation of monotheistic and creationist 
religion.”62 This means that it became necessary to produce a philosophical theory that could 
also accommodate a political system, not to mention one that could respond to other 
sprouting intellectual activities due to the translation movement that challenged that unity.
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Neoplatonist philosophy brought into the mix the perfect ingredient that facilitated a Plato-
inspired governing system. 
Therefore, the translation movement in general, and the translation of the Enneads, 
later known as Arabic Plotinus in particular, albeit in parts, was “purposeful and 
systematic.”64  According to Dimitri Gutas, there were two paths of development, once the 
translation activities commenced: “first it expanded in the direction of scholarly precision 
and accuracy for the existing fields, and second into increasingly new areas and subjects 
considered worthy of translation” (116). It must be noted the translation and other intellectual 
activities in the region is often viewed as contemporaneous with the establishing of the city 
of Baghdad, however as pointed out by Gutas, the intellectual work predates the founding of 
the city, which indicates more of a continuity than a change as argued by Michael Morony 
(1984). 
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Morony’s argument is in agreement with the thesis in this study that the West and the 
Middle East are not in a binary opposition. He draws attention to the advent of Islam in 
“western Asia and northern Africa” not as “a watershed between the ancient and medieval 
histories of . . . these regions,” but rather a continuity (3). He deems “two major forms of 
continuity: direct survival . . . and continuity through transmission” (507).65 This brings into 
focus the institutionalization of pre-Islamic Arabia in Islam in the region (ibid). What is 
noteworthy here is the role of political power behind this institutionalization, as the incoming 
Abbasids were trying to solidify their rule.  
In addition to “useful” knowledge such as astrology, astronomy and medicine (Saliba 
2007), philosophy became a subject of interest, even though, “it was . . . a discipline for 
which there was the least amount of practical need,” as argued by Gutas (119). Nonetheless, 
very early on the rulers realized it was “socially relevant,” for it offered an opportunity to 
“legitimize” an ideology to rule over their non-Arab subjects (Gutas 29). This required 
developing a “religio-political discourse” and bringing together a number of competent 
scholars. 
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 Gutas confirms: 
The introduction of philosophy into the Islamic world is indelibly linked with the 
name of al-Kindi (died ca. 870), the first philosopher in Arabic, and the circle of 
scientists and collaborators that he gathered around him.
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Gutas quickly reminds us that al-Kindi was not a philosopher in a contemporary 
sense, but that he was a polymath and believed “mathematical or geometrical proof to be of 
the highest order” (120). Admittedly, al-Kindi sought to “approach mathematical accuracy in 
his argumentation” in order to “advance knowledge,” rather than reiterating or memorizing 
the information from the texts. Further, al-Kindi aimed to utilize mathematical methodology 
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to “the theological and religious discussions of his time” (ibid). For this reason, he required 
the translation of key texts, such as “Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and selections from Plotinus 
and Proclus in Arabic known as the Theology of Aristotle” (ibid).68 This task necessitated the 
continuous sponsorship and support of the caliphs, princes and other notables (Gutas 121). 
This makes the role of the patrons in the translation movement noteworthy, which 
demonstrates the direct political interest in the translation movement.
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 The impact of the 
translation movement paved the way for what was to become a unified Abbasid imperial rule 
lasting five hundred years. But why is there significance in the role of interpretation or 
translation, particularly with respect to power? 
THE PHILOSOPHY OF TRANSLATION 
The theorization of what constitutes the place of the individual within the group, or 
the relationship between the subject and power, often requires an effective process of 
translation and interpretation. Richard Kearny in the Introduction to Paul Ricoeur’s 
Philosophy of Translation elucidates translation as exemplarily “performed” by Ricoeur, for 
he “navigated and negotiated transits between rival intellectual positions”(vii). Further, 
translation is not merely a “linguistic product,” but also “a form of intercultural mediation 
taking place in a specific social and cultural context,” according to David Limon (29). The 
space in between is taken up by Homi Bhabha (1994), who aims to decentralize the 
Eurocentric discourse, and move his focus to what shapes our existence today , which is 
“living on the borderline of ‘present’” (1). Whereas Limon is interested in the “gap” that he 
“perceive[s] . . . between what many translation scholars say should be the case . . . and the 
reality” (30), Bhabha proposes “to focus on those moments or processes that are produced in 
the articulation of cultural differences” (2). The issue of translation in the era of post-
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structuralism has become rather a complex discourse, for it engages many concerns, thus 
itself a worthy subject of a separate investigation. However, for the purpose of this study, it is 
necessary to briefly touch on the significance of the task of translation, but more importantly, 
to draw attention to a specific concern, which is the added information and innovative results 
through the process of translation. 
In On Translation, Paul Ricoeur deems two models of translation: first is the 
“linguistic paradigm,” which focuses on the link between words and their meaning, within a 
language or between languages; second, it is the “ontological paradigm” that involves the 
subject, whether internal (a subject to its own self), or intrasubject (between the subject and 
its “other”).70Walter Benjamin, in the “Task of the Translator” ([1913-1926] 1996), argues 
that “[t]ranslation . . . ultimately serves the purpose of expressing the innermost relationship 
of languages,” and that it is the “intention” that the translator’s task is centered on (255). 
Benjamin further notes that “languages supplement one another in their intentions […] the 
way of meaning is supplemented in its relation to what is meant” (257). The issue of 
“supplement” is noted by Derrida in The Truth in Painting (1987), when he brings up 
“surplus value” (5). He states: 
In another language, given enough space, time and endurance, it might be possible for 
long discourses to propose laborious approaches to it. But, untranslatable it remains in 
its economic performance, in the ellipsis of its trait, the word by word, the word for 
word, or the trait for trait in which it contracts: as many words, signs, letters, the same 
quantity or the same expense for the same semantic content, with the same revenue of 
surplus value” (5). 
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It is the “surplus value” that engenders the interest, that which refutes Kant’s “dis-
interestedness.” In The Truth in Painting, Derrida demonstrates, albeit interpreting between 
the visual and written languages, because there is always a “remainder,” a “surplus” in 
meaning, interpretation of the “truth” in something is never impartial, as in “the thing itself.” 
He states therefore, “[t]he truth . .  is no longer itself in that which represents it in painting, it 
is merely its double,” no matter how good it resembles (ibid). Whereas for Ricouer text is 
“any discourse in writing” (1981, 145), as evident in the aforementioned quotes, Derrida has 
a broader definition for the text. The inclusive way in which Derrida treats “text,” facilitates 
an understanding of the text as ranging from knowledge to events and visual works of art. In 
his parergon theory, which lends itself well to the analysis of a work of art I have discussed 
in chapter three, there is an overlap in the interest, which he argues always exists, with 
respect to a work of art (or an interpretation of it), and the “surplus,” which exists when 
representing it. In his analysis of Cranach’s Lucretia, with regards to the notion of parergon, 
Derrida states: 
If any parergon is only added on by virtue of an internal lack in the system to which 
it is added . . . what is it that is lacking in the representation of the body so that the 
garment should come and supplement it? And what would art have to do with this? 
What would it give to be seen? Cause to be seen? Let us see? (1987, 58). 
In the same spirit, I ask the question of the painting called The Ascension of the 
Prophet (16
th
 century, discussed in chapter three), where the visual version of the Koranic 
text displays more details. It is the added details, I argue, which is the source of interest in the 
subject, and as argued by Marx, it is the source of what benefits he who owns the product.
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The translation and the added interest can be analyzed from another perspective. As sources 
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of knowledge and law, the scriptures have played an integral part in subject formation. 
Mohammad Arkoun, in his article, Rethinking Islam, points to an intriguing aspect of 
interpretation, when it comes to the “Heavenly Book.” He contends that in the “societies of 
the book,” which he defines as “those that have been shaped since the Middle Ages by the 
Book, as a religious and a cultural phenomenon,” there is a “ verticality which has 
constituted the religious imagainaire in the Near East” that has made the criticism of the 
subsequent interpretations of it “unthinkable” (2003, 30). He states: 
Truth is located in Heaven with God, who reveals it in time and through the medium 
He chooses: the prophets, Himself incarnated in the “Son” who lived among people, 
the Book transmitted by the messenger M[o]hammad. There are different modalities 
for the delivery . . . but the Word of God as God Himself is the same from the point 
of view of the anthropological structure of religious imaginaire (ibid). 
Thus Arkoun discerns two meanings for the “Heavenly Book:” one as the Word of 
God, and the other as the “Word of God as God.” The interpretation of the “Word of God,” 
has taken place in Abrahamic religions by the theologians, each in its manifested form (i.e. 
Hebrew, Aramaic, and Arabic); “they used either literalist exegesis of the scripture itself or 
rational categories and procedures influenced by Greek philosophy” (ibid). He further 
explains that this was done through “[g]rammar and logic,” but not in a way that leads to a 
critical method (ibid). Arkoun, therefore, argues that even though the belief is that the 
scriptures are revelations from God, in mediation, and their expressions in human voices, and 
later written form, they become “historical, social and cultural events and manifestations” 
(ibid). Consequently, for example “[t]hat Jesus is presented as the “Son of God” and the 
Qur’an a speech worded by God Himself are theological definitions (i.e. added interest) used 
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in systems of beliefs and non-beliefs particular to Christian and Islamic dogma (2003, 31). 
There is also a translation or interpretation of value that maybe considered here; an example 
would be when Franz Fanon suggested—with  regards to the Hegelian Master-Slave 
theory—that the Lacanian theory of the “Other” was more relevant to the situation of the 
colonized than Marx’s interpretation of master-slave ([1952] 2008). Analogously, in the post-
colonial context, Bhabha offers a different interpretation of how to come to terms with 
cultural differences. He states: “The borderline work of culture demands an ‘encounter’ with 
newness that is not part of the continuum of past and present. It creates a sense of the new as 
an insurgent act of cultural translation” (10). On the problem of translation, Asad highlights 
the fact that there is “inequality of languages,” which he deems as “the global patterns of 
power created by imperialism and capitalism.” He notes:  
[m]y argument is directed against the assumption that translation requires the 
adjustment of ‘foreign’ discourses to their new site[;] . . . they should retain what may 
be a discomforting—even scandalous—presence within the receiving language (199). 
The “interpretation of cultures,” as alluded to by Asad, in the context of social 
anthropology becomes critical when it transcends the linguistics to enter “modes of 
thought.”72 From this perspective, the issue of translation as applied to what transpired in the 
process of importing modernism to the Middle East, and in particular Iran, broadens. 
CONTEMPORARY CRITICAL CONVERSATIONS 
Iranian thinker, Daryush Shaygan, in Cultural Schizophrenia, Islamic Societies 
Confronting the West (1992) argues that as a “major historical phenomenon,” modernism “in 
its broadest sense” has never been dealt with “objectively, in terms of its philosophic content, 
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but always in terms of its traumatic impact on our traditions, our ways of living and thinking” 
(Shayegan 3). The consequence has been what Shayegan calls a “moral component” that has 
complicated the attitude toward the West in “either admiring . . . or shutting itself off from 
European influence” (Shayegan 4). Further, he argues, during the reforms, when the Muslim 
thinkers understood the importance of, and pursued the “individual rights and liberties,” they 
overlooked the fact that such worthy objectives they were striving for did not occur due to a 
sudden and miraculous appearance. Shayegan states: 
[O]ne essential [element] escaped the earliest thinkers, as it does most of their 
present-day successors: these basic ideas, whose qualities were so admired, were not 
the results of some recent miracle, but the end-product of an exceptional historical 
process . . . [that] could not be transplanted without displacing and marginalizing the 
traditional values to which we are so attached, and which occupied every corner of 
our public space.
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From another direction, meaning Europe’s interaction with the art and culture of 
Persia, some interesting arguments have been proposed. In his book, Persophilia (2015), 
Hamid Dabashi takes on Europe’s literary and culturally-charged love-affair with “all things 
Persian.” By juxtaposing the two interconnected lenses of Raymond Schwab (The Oriental 
Renaissance – 1950) and Edward Said (Orientalism – 1978), and by drawing on Jüregen 
Habermas, Dabashi argues: “critical as these two texts are,” neither one considers the 
“category of bourgeois society . . . as the principle site of knowledge production about the 
Orient” (2). Therefore, he emphasizes how “European bourgeois society . . . contributed to 
the creation of the public space—in both form and content” (5). In Dabashi’s view, for 
example, how Europe formulated its perspective about the “Orient” impacted how the 
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“Orientals,” or more specifically Persians, ultimately viewed themselves (22-23). However, 
the issue of power as tied to the uncritically cited examples does not enter the argument.
74
 As 
with Shayegan, Dabashi considers the “public space,” but ties it to the issue of identity, and 
aims to demonstrate how that identity was shaped through the perspective of the Europeans’ 
admiration of the Persian art and culture (228). Nonetheless, Dabashi, focused on the 
“societal” approach, is ultimately “interested in Persian cultural heritage and what happens to 
it when, in the course of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and under the influence of 
European imperial encroachment, it finally exited the Persianate court and emerged to form a 
bona fide public space that it would eventually call Vatan/Homeland” (11). 
Both Dabashi and Said (in Culture and Imperialism – 1984-86) point to “resistance” 
through “national independence” and “self-determination” (Said 1984-86, xii and Dabashi 5) 
as consequences of European imperialism, but neither author locates the place of the 
individual (i.e. the subject) within such self-determination or “public space.” Dabashi 
nevertheless, strives to demonstrate how the “postcolonial public sphere [in Persia] was 
triggered by the European bourgeois public sphere in formal and representational 
affiliations” that was either rejected or emulated by the Iranians (Dabashi 228). As his 
“concern is with the active formation of a public sphere on the colonial site, where both the 
local bourgeoisie and its antithesis were concurrently constructed,” he acknowledges both 
“the bourgeois culture of accommodation” as well as “the multiple and varied cultures of 
resistance.” Thusly he explicates the chasm in the bourgeois space as appropriated from the 
European model, which he argues became augmented for the “colonial site” (Dabashi 5). 
Shayegan, however, articulates this chasm in  
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[t]he tension between the unveiling of new zones of reality and the atavistic 
compulsion to exclude or eject them from the field of knowledge, [which] was bound 
to create fissures in the consciousness: although things were changing externally, 
mental projections still functioned according to the old mode of representation (4). 
Utilizing literary art forms, Dabashi delineates a path through which Persian literature 
entered the “various European intellectual movements,” displacing it in a way that “was 
shocking, destabilizing, yet also invigorating, provocative, [and] self-regenerative.” It is due 
to these nuances, that a “critical momentum” was engendered, in time for the “Persian poets 
and literati,” as they were searching to create a “public space” to “rearticulate themselves” 
(Dabashi 13). Conversely, Shayegan notes the problem of “mental distortion” emerging from 
an “internal chasm,” that stands in sharp contrast to the external nuances. He states this 
“problem can only be raised by people born into these civilizations” (Shayegan 4). Whereas 
Dabashi focuses on the transcultural exchanges between the bourgeois “public spaces,” 
Shayegan is concerned with the internal conflict, which he terms “a contradictory double 
fascination” that stems from “the enchanted vision of a world still infused with the aura of 
collective memory, and the equally compelling allure of the new and unknown” (Shayegan 
5). 
Perhaps Shayegan, more clear and to the point, but without addressing the issue of 
subjectivity directly, provides a picture of the subject that is caught in the gap between the 
traditional and the modern. He eloquently highlights the ‘delay’ which exists in what such 
subject projects and what is actually present before it, that which is “not just a chronological 
dislocation, but an ontological divide” (Shayegan 6). The world of such subject remains 
protected from “revolutions caused by scientific and technical upheavals [that] produced 
57 
 
paradigm shifts which molded consciousness to the imperatives of each new way of 
looking.” The consciousness of such subject “is still rooted in a world of enchantment;” 
while it is continuously stimulated and drawn “to new things[,] but their genealogy and 
archeology remain unknown” to it (ibid). But Shayegan’s work is not without criticism. 
In his book, Venture of Philosophy in Contemporary Iran (2013), M.H. Sadigh-
Yazdchi analyzes Shayegan’s thoughts, and finds traces of a peculiar connection. Shayegan 
was a pupil of Henri Corbin (1903-1978), the renowned French Iranologist and professor of 
Islamic Studies at the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris. Yazdchi argues that Corbin, 
who was trained under Louis Massignon (1883-1962 - a Catholic scholar of Islam and an 
expert on the Sufi, Mansour Hallaj), developed an affinity for the theological and 
philosophical Islam (Yazdchi 88), particularly in Shi’ite apocalyptic narratives. According to 
Yazdchi, utilizing a critique of Heidegger and the nihilistic philosophy of Nietzsche (which 
he argued signaled the end of philosophy and end of the subject in the West), Corbin closely 
examines the idea of Shi’ite jurisprudence (velayat), as the redeemer of what he calls 
“subjectivity’s impasse” in Western philosophy (90). Thus, he innovatively melds together 
the Shi’ite theology with philosophy, and declares it “the panacea to the impasse of 
metaphysics in the West” (ibid). This becomes significant when Yazdchi reveals Corbin’s 
influential thoughts were picked up by Ahmad Fardid, theoretician of Islamic Republic of 
Iran, and S.H. Nasr, Islamic Mysticism scholar. Yazdchi also argues that Shayegan, up until 
recently,
75
 thought along the same lines in situating Iran and Iranians within the mystic-
influenced/constructed cultural past (121). Therefore, as what undermined the process toward 
modernism and true reforms, Yazdchi highlights a connection that brings Neoplatonic 
tendencies to the twentieth century for Iran. 
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One of the recurring themes in addressing reforms in the Middle East has been how to 
reconcile modernism with traditionalism. According to some thinkers such as Tariq 
Ramadan, “there is indeed, in the classical Islamic tradition, a central reference to the need 
for a renewal, revival, and consequently, reform of our reading and understanding” 
(Ramadan 36). On the issue of tradition, particularly post September 11, 2001 however, 
many theoreticians have turned to a critical view of the religion, namely Islam, when 
addressing the current problems in the Middle East. There seems to be a gap between a “so-
called Islamic revivalism [that] has monopolized the discourse on Islam,” and what Arkoun 
calls “silent Islam” (2003). Arkoun argues for “a need to encourage and initiate audacious, 
free, productive thinking on Islam today” (2003, 18). In his view, currently, the politicized 
Islam has dominated all “cultural and social space,” thus making it nearly impossible for 
other thinkers within Islam to put forth their “critical approach” (2003, 19). Emphasizing 
“thinking,” Arkoun states: 
[T]he main intellectual endeavor represented by thinking Islam . . . today is to 
evaluate, with a new epistemological perspective, the characteristics and intricacy of 
systems of knowledge—both the historical and the mythical. I would even say that 
both are still interacting and interrelated in our modern thought after at least three 
hundred years of rationalism and historicism (2003, 19). 
Arkoun explains by pointing to “thinking Islam,” he aims to “indicate a general 
direction of thinking and the main conditions necessary to practice an ijtihad,” which he 
interprets as “[one’s own] intellectual effort to find adequate answers . . . recognized equally 
by Muslims and modern scholars” (ibid). Nonetheless, he distinguishes this practice, from 
the traditional ijtihad, which was established by Islamic jurists in the 8th - 9th centuries and 
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was restricted to the epistemological work—that which still exists, but strictly within the 
domain of orthodoxy. Instead, he proposes “a modern critical analysis of the structure of 
Islamic reason.”76 In his “critique of Islamic reason,” Arkoun requires bypassing the practice 
of “traditional Islamic studies” by Muslims, as well as the “orientalists’ historical 
philological analysis,” which he calls “classical Islamology.”77 Arkoun argues that the 
traditional Islamic studies approach has not been able to appropriately address the modern 
problems of Muslims in the modern “Muslim societies.” As a result, the political scientists 
and fundamentalists have moved in, (those who created, or contributed to creating, the 
political Islam) to fill the vacuum (Arkoun 2002, 10-11). 
As an example of “tools for new thinking,” Arkoun offers his criticism of the 
“periodization of the history,” which he argues has been “dictated by political events” (2003, 
20). We identify periods in Islamic history by the dynastic rules, such as “Umayyad, 
Abbasid, and Ottoman periods.” Instead, Arkoun suggests, one must look to the 
“discontinuities affecting the conceptual framework used in a given cultural space” (ibid). He 
explicates: 
The concepts of reason and science (ilm) used in the [Kor]an, for example, are not the 
same as those developed later by the falasifa [philosophers] according to the Platonic 
and the Aristotelian schools. However, the  . . . episteme introduced by the [Kor]an 
has not been intellectually reconsidered (ibid). 
In his argument, Arkoun utilizes the example of the phrase “the problem of God,” and 
states that such a phrase remains beyond the “thinkable” and consequently becomes 
“unthought” in the “‘orthodox’ Islamic thought.”78 Thus, Arkoun describes a chasm between 
the “cultures and systems of thought related to pagan, polytheistic,” and by extension, their 
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“modern secularized societies” and “Muslim orthodoxy” with regards to thinking (ibid). He 
proposes that the “implicit postulates” within the discourse should be “discover[ed] and 
analyz[ed],” if one is to “control the epistemological validity of any discourse” (ibid). 
Arkoun is concerned with unraveling the enduring ties between the “unthinkable/unthought” 
and the orthodoxy to demonstrate a path toward “a radical reconstruction of mind and society 
in the contemporary Muslim world” (Arkoun 1994, 1). This task, he aims to achieve by, for 
instance, placing the Koran in its “historical, cultural, social, psychological and linguistic” 
context, by way of a “multidisciplinary analysis employing socio-historical psychology, 
cultural anthropology, semiotics, semantics, and hermeneutics.”79 
In response to Arkoun, Nasr Abu Zayd, in Reformation of Islamic Thought (2006), 
asks the question whether there is “a genuine possibility of achieving real reformation 
without constantly clinging to  . . . religious tradition, to justify and appropriate the 
acceptance of reformation” (2006, 101). According to Abu Zayd, it appears that the model of 
associating modernity with Western influence still persists, which has widened the gap 
between reformists and the traditionalists. Abu Zayd acknowledges the flow of the  
wave of civilization [that] was probably born somewhere around the basin of rivers, 
probably in black Africa, Egypt or Iraq, before it moved to Greece, then returned to 
the Middle East in the form of Hellenism. With the advent of Islam, a new culture 
emerged absorbing and reconstructing the Hellenistic as well as the Indian and 
Iranian cultural elements before it was handed to the Western new world via Spain 
and Sicily (2006 101). 
He further notes the contributions of thinkers such as Averroes, through whose work 
“new intellectual light” was transferred to the “European dark ages.” Nonetheless, just as 
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Arkoun does, Abu Zayd brings his focus back to the Koran in order to initiate any kind of 
reform by Muslims themselves. Abu Zayd’s contribution to the conversation, however, rests 
in bringing the “human dimension to the historical and cultural dimension of the [Kor]an” 
(2006, 97). He points to the often-overlooked interactions of humans (such as the 
rearrangement of the Koranic chapters, and the addition of signs of vocalization, after the 
passing of the Prophet), as well as referring to the historical context by both sides—the 
orthodoxy as well as modernists—in order to justify their own interpretations (2006, 98). 
Abu Zayd further states: 
Like the classical theologians and classical jurists, the proponents of modern 
hermeneutics endeavor to articulate their positions by creating a focal point of gravity 
that can be claimed as universal—the irrevocable and the eternal truth. The anti-
modernists would merely shift the focal point of gravity to claim the opposite. 
Abu Zayd is keen to recognize that the solution lies in a “focal point of gravity to 
which all . . . variations . . .[can] be linked.” He further expands on the “human dimension,” 
not in the “canonization,” but in viewing the Koran as discourse(s) rather than text (2006, 
98). Therefore, Abu Zayd emphasizes the “communication” aspect of the Koranic revelation 
and calls for a “democratic and open hermeneutic” approach that is about “the meaning of 
life”(2006, 99). Despite his critical approach, similar to Arkoun, Abu Zayd finds himself in a 
binary position with the West, whereas in this study, I argue for interpreting the emergence 
of monotheism initially as a method of criticism; this approach liberates Islam from being a 
binary to polytheism, Neoplatonism, and generally to the West, a method of criticism of 
systems which have led to self-alienation, undermining social justice. 
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Comparable to the focus in this study, Abu Zayd underscores the lived experience, 
which he has referred to as “the meaning of life” to be connected to the “meaning of the 
[Kor]an,” for “the [Kor]an was the outcome of dialogue, debate, augment, acceptance, and 
rejection, both with pre-Islamic norms, practices and culture, and with its own previous 
assessment, presuppositions and assertions” (2006, 99). However, he makes no mention of 
the subject within this “meaning.” In conclusion, however, Abu Zayd asks: “[a]re Muslims 
ready to rethink the [Kor]an or not?” Rethinking the Koran (from a fixed, closed text to a 
dynamic discourse), he argues, requires willingness to discuss the relationship between the 
West and the Muslim world. Abu Zayd does not seem optimistic on this subject (2006, 101). 
From the anthropologic perspective, Talal Asad is compelled to respond to current 
Western anthropologists, whose publications “containing the word ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ in the 
title” are on the rise, for “political reasons” (Asad [1986] 2009, 1). For this purpose, he has 
introduced the concept “discursive tradition,” which is an “intervention in the anthropology 
of Islam,” by shifting from “the interpretation of behaviors” to the “inquiry into the relation 
of practices” (ibid). This is due to the idea that there is no one Islam, but rather islams, 
according to Ovamir Anjum, and it is within the diverse interrelations of the latter that Asad 
centers this idea (Anjum 659). Recently, responding to the current movements within Muslim 
regions, Western scholarly work has attempted to “conceptualize Islam” in order to be able to 
“speak of the issues of authenticity, continuity, and legitimacy of Islamism”(Anjum 656). He 
further argues that Orientalist theoreticians have failed to notice the “lived Islam” that cannot 
be “essentialize[d].” This is where some anthropologists, like Asad, have countered the 
essentialist views; but, there are also others. Anjum states: 
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Some scholars, primarily anthropologists, have responded to the tendency to 
essentialize by giving up the idea of conceptualizing one "Islam" and instead have 
focused their inquiry on what they call various "local islams." Others have focused on 
sociological or political-economic approaches in explaining the modern forms of 
political and social activism among Muslims to the exclusion of "scriptural" Islam 
from their analysis (656). 
Still there are others who have striven to seek the answer to individual freedoms, such 
as freedom of expression, within the legal and moral domain of the main religious texts 
(“[Kor]an and Sunna”). Islamic legal scholar, Mohammad Hashim Kamali, in Freedom of 
Expression in Islam (1997) has undertaken such a task. Kamali’s framework consists of two 
major themes: “affirmative evidence in support of freedom of expression, and the limitations, 
whether moral or legal” (1). He aims to demonstrate that the “main objectives of freedom of 
expression . . . are the vindication of truth and the protection of human dignity,” and that 
there are plenty of references to ensure individual freedoms in Islam.
80
 (ibid). However,  
despite exposing the orthodoxy in Islamic Shari’a, Kamali does not explain how these 
principles are constantly undermined and not practiced in the majority of governments in the 
Middle East claiming to abide by the Islamic principles. The discussions on rights and 
freedoms after the advent of modernism, without the establishing the place of and 
acknowledging the subject and all that shapes it, therefore, has not been productive. 
However, looking back at the pre-modern times, one may be able to find instances of 
demonstration of human dignity among Muslim literary figures that have been misinterpreted 
as individualism. 
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In his autobiography, Jalal al-Din Suyuti, the fifteenth century Egyptian scholar, 
follows a specific format, which is modeled after the “recognized tradition of Arabic 
autobiographical writing” (Reynolds, 1). This convention encompasses a number of 
motivations put forth by the author, such as: “Speaking of God’s bounty,” (qtd from Koran 
93:11), as well as acknowledging the life circumstances of his forbearers and guides. Most 
importantly, the idea that encourages Muslims “to emulate one’s virtues and meritorious acts 
. . .[which is] found in many areas of Islamic intellectual and spiritual life” is the same idea 
that holds Prophet Mohammad as an example of the “Ideal Man.” (Reynolds, 3). On 
individuality as contrasted to conformity, Amin Banani argues against such binary division, 
and considers a practical aspect for “conformity,” particularly with respect to the members of 
Persian noble class, which possibly could have had political effects (19-20). On Al-Suyuti, 
despite its contrast to “some medieval and pre-modern European autobiographies the public 
recognition (‘confession’),” such form, contrary to the author’s suggestion, does not signal 
individuality of the “self.” Al-Suyuti directly states in writing his autobiography the role of 
his guides: 
I have emulated them and have written this book in order to speak of God’s bounty 
and to thank Him, not out of hypocrisy, nor for my own credit, nor out of pride. God 
is our source of help, and to him we entrust ourselves.
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This statement appears more in line with what Abu Zayd’s criticism notes in 
“creating a focal point of gravity that can be claimed as universal” (2006, 98), than 
individualism. The main point here is that the issue of the subject was not in the domain of 
the “thinkable,” to use Arkoun’s term. Ramadan, on the other hand, argues that despite all 
disagreements between various groups of Muslims—whether among the experts or the 
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general community—there is consensus that “the tool of critical interpretation of texts . . . are 
indispensable means to face contemporary challenges” (36). Nonetheless, there is no mention 
of the place of the subject. Arkoun’s objective is to “historicize” the “divine category [of] 
Revelation” and transition the “religious imaginaire” to a “social imaginaire” that would 
bring about the “deconstruction” and applicability of the hermeneutic method (2003, 31). 
The appealing idea of hermeneutic, with respect to the religious text has prompted 
Mohammad Mojtahed Shabestari to express astonishment at those who question criticism of 
religious thought. Shabestari notes asking such inquiries “is due to a lack of regard for the 
notion of criticism on the one hand, and equating religious thought in [such an] era with a 
finalized truth” (193). He proposes in his book, Hermeneutik, the Book and the Tradition 
(2005), albeit to the community of the religious scholars, the necessity of diverse 
interpretations and establishing interactions between the fields of knowledge, yet does not 
include the issue of the individual (Shabestari 7, 200). 
Unlike Arkoun, who is seeking historicization of religion, Abdulkarim Soroush paints 
a transhistorical picture of religion in his More Abundant than Theology (1996), underscores 
the significance of ideology. However in his view, which is colored by Neoplatonism, 
religion does not abide by the same limitations (Soroush 125). The idea of the individual for 
Soroush is predetermined, and is exemplified in a specific figure (Abuzar Ghafari), who 
epitomizes the hero against social injustice (Soroush 102). His solution from delivering one 
from getting caught in between “modernism” and “post-modernism” lies in mysticism 
(Soroush 363). However, contrary to Soroush, Seyed Javad Tabatabaei has his sight more on 
the administrative problems and chaos that have ensued due to systematic incompetence and 
mismanagement of the resources. Having abandoned any hopes of religious reformations, 
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Tabatabaei proposes his theory of “Iranshahri,” which is predicated on the pre-Islamic 
political thoughts of the Sasanian period (2015, 139). In his view, as a model, the political art 
of government of ancient Iran is the only solution to eliminate current administrative 
problems. Nonetheless, the conflict between the ancient Iranian civilization and what it 
became following the advent of Islam is problematic for Aramesh Doostdar, for he sees the 
source of the problem in Iranian’s affinity for all religious matters, which has led to the 
problem of not thinking for the population (414). Neither Shabestari, nor Soroush or 
Doostdar have brought up the issue of the subject, which is fundamental in the rights issues.
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There are only a handful of thinkers who look to philosophy to make sense of what 
has taken place in the recent history in Iran. Sadigh Yazdchi draws attention to the fact that 
within Islamic culture  philosophy has consistently been viewed as a religious endeavor (5). 
He is keen in his criticism of misappropriation of European philosophy by theoreticians who 
aimed to justify an Islamic revolution. He names Ahmad Fardid, whose theories were built 
on intentional misinterpretations of philosophers such as Heidegger to such a degree that 
toward the end of his life he had stated “Heidegger [was] in the direction of the Islamic 
revolution” (Yazdchi, 13-14).83 
The preceding pages offer reviews of selected current literature on the topics of 
interest in this research. The topics vary from modernism versus tradition, to religious 
reformation, to postcolonial discourses. I demonstrated that, despite the engaging and 
dynamic issues debated, the discourse on the place of the subject and the power of artistic 
endeavors, in their broadest sense—that which is the focus of this project—is absent from the 
conversation. To effectively set up the context, I began the chapter with a definition of the 
subject, clarification on my approach, and then transitioned into discussing the main ideas of 
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Neoplatonism, with the focus on its aesthetics. This also necessitated briefly addressing the 
philosophy of translation, and its significance in this study. What follows in the next chapter 
explicates in detail the formation of the subject, and a thorough accounts of how I have 
defined the artistic endeavors in this study. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
SUBJECTIVITY: INFORMED BY A LONG TRADITION OF PATRIARCHY 
 
[T]he modern Western state has integrated into a new political shape an old power technique 
that originated in Christian institutions. We can call this power technique “pastoral power.”84 
       —Michel Foucault 
 
 
Patriarchy traditionally has established itself on two seemingly conflicting strategies: 
an artificial unification through apparatuses of power (identity, nationality, law, economy, 
art) on one side, and maintaining its position of power based on “othering” and conflict on 
the other. Like well-oiled machines, patriarchal mechanisms of power have been shaping 
subjectivities in accordance with their interests and positions.
85
 Such apparatuses, which 
historically include artistic productions, have been so effective that distinguishing between a 
subjectivity shaped by patriarchy and one that is critical of it has proved challenging. In what 
ways has patriarchy shaped to its own ends individual and collective subjectivities through 
works of art? 
Historically, feminist or pro-feminist discourses have mainly fallen within the 
patriarchal binarism in various paths they have taken, from liberal feminism to radical and 
cultural feminism; that is to say, they have striven to counter symptoms of patriarchy in order 
to achieve equality and recognition, and thus have defined their objectives along the same 
dualities.
86
 One of the theories feminists or pro-feminists have often referenced has been the 
“matriarchal myths” employed to “redeem and revalue ‘the feminine’” without the 
consideration that arguably the sources of such myths themselves may have been patriarchal 
(Eller, 2000, 15). 
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Therefore, what I aim to achieve in this chapter is to draw attention to the 
phenomenology of patriarchy through a genealogical examination of the links between 
patriarchy, art and subject formation in their historical contexts. To reach this aim, it seems 
necessary to trace back the history of human creativity to its earliest known stages. I argue, 
once the early humans learned how to give material form to what impressed them the most, 
namely “power” they experienced in their environments, they discovered a way to possess 
what was intangible.
87
 Similarly, throughout history, patriarchy, itself a manufactured idea, 
has given tangible forms to ideas that have secured its power and shaped the identities of 
those it subjected to this power.
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Giving physical form to ideas was the predicate of what eventually manifested as 
property and itself subject to debt and economy, inevitably and eventually encompassing 
human relations in the early communities, as argued by David Graeber.
89
 In this chapter, 
similar to Foucault,
90
 I am interested in particular in the moments of disruption in history—in 
the case at hand specifically—that which changed human concern from life-centered 
communities to land and property-centered societies that further affected the relationship 
between its members, particularly women, from subjects to objects. I am also interested in “a 
history no longer constrained to be a history of the past, but capable of being a ‘history of 
present’.”91 
A GENEALOGY OF PATRIARCHY: ORIGINS OF ART, ALTERITY AND STATE 
It is difficult to speak of the term “patriarchy” without finding oneself, on the one 
hand, entangled in the history of its metamorphosis, and on the other, in feminist discourses 
on the subject. Using the term “patriarchy” in our own time seems antiquated and irrelevant, 
if we are not conscious of how it came into existence or of its ever-changing, long and varied 
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history. Feminist movements, now in multiple branches, have tried to provide definitions of 
patriarchy. [B]ell hooks opens her essay entitled “Understanding Patriarchy” with: 
“[p]atriarchy is the single most life-threatening social disease assaulting the male body and 
spirit in our nation.”92  Judith Butler notes that feminism has gone as far as to “establish a 
universal status for patriarchy in order to strengthen the appearance of feminism’s own 
claims . . . held to produce women’s common subjugated experience” (Gender Trouble 5). 
Luce Irigaray defines patriarchy as “an exclusive respect for the genealogy of sons and 
fathers, and the competition between brothers” (The Irigaray Reader 23). Such statements fit 
and serve patriarchy well, for it benefits from distinguishing itself in opposition and 
“othering.” Nearly all feminist discourses at one point or another have placed patriarchy in a 
binary position with regards to gender, even though they fully understand that patriarchy is 
too great a phenomenon to be reduced to gender alone. Such discourses have extended to 
pro-feminist views nonetheless. 
Leonard Shlain, in his national bestseller work The Alphabet versus the Goddess 
(1998) draws a line between patriarchy and the female-centered communities by juxtaposing 
them in the contrast between the word and image respectively. This leads us to the question: 
can there be a more encompassing definition of patriarchy? Gerda Lerner acknowledges the 
problem with using the term “patriarchy” in its “narrow, traditional meaning.” She defines 
patriarchy as “the system, historically derived from Greek and Roman law, in which the male 
head of the household had absolute legal and economic power over his dependent female and 
male family members” (1986, 238). However, as David Graeber demonstrates, the history of 
this phenomenon goes farther back to the time of the early cities, stemming from the dynamic 
encounters between the “desert pastoralists” and the “urban life” (176-178). Nevertheless, 
neither scholar considers the role of art or creativity in the equation.  
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In this study, I define patriarchy as a creative endeavor itself; it is a manufactured, 
man-made conception, formed through a synthesis between pastoral authority and city-
inspired systems/organization. Characteristically, it is adaptable and metamorphic, thus 
multifaceted, and strives to disguise itself as a natural or eternal entity, thereby justifying its 
existence through domination and the diminishing of differences at any given time. Such 
domination has led to inequity established and maintained partly through art. 
As testified to by art historical evidence, more than any other method, patriarchy has 
instituted its presence through imagery. How does imagery, then, come to be associated with 
the feminine as suggested by Shlain? I argue, contrary to what Shlain has proposed, both 
image and word have been patriarchal instruments that have formed and informed the 
subjectivities of dominated subjects in favor of maintaining patriarchy’s own position of 
power. I further suggest, as the “one” atop the pyramid of power and as an ideology, 
patriarchy thrives through control and demands recognition from its collective subjects; it is 
uneasy with the issue of individuality and its unpredictability.
93
 For this purpose, 
traditionally, it has sought unity by way of conflict, even in the guise of ‘matriarchal’ 
spiritual theories, which it has successfully achieved, albeit an artificial unity, through works 
of art among other creative products. I call it “artificial” because this unity is predicated and 
reliant on inventiveness, and it comes from a necessity. 
The historical accounts of patriarchy correspond to a phenomenological definition, 
for there is a moment in history when the female/mother-centered societies changed to 
patriarchal structures and spread throughout the early communities. At least, that is part of 
what has been circulating widely among many groups.
94
  It may be necessary here to 
distinguish between the terms female or mother-centered with “matriarchal,” for I believe, 
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historically, “matriarchy” implies a hierarchy akin to patriarchy. Nonetheless, there is no 
evidence a similar structure between the female-centered and the patriarchal societies existed, 
or if such societies existed, they were not part of patriarchal power apparatuses. Moreover, 
matriarchies have fueled an evolutionary theory that leads us toward the supremacy of 
patriarchy.
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Cynthia Eller in The Myth of Matriarchal Prehistory feels compelled to dispute that, 
historically speaking, there was a matriarchy (2000, 7). She challenges feminists’ support of 
the theory and notes that “there is a theory of sex and gender embedded in the myth of 
matriarchal prehistory and it […] is drastically revalued in feminist matriarchal myth.” She 
argues the image of women goes from “shame or subordination” to that of “pride and 
power,” which “up until now . . . has done an excellent job of serving patriarchal interest”(7). 
What is of particular interest here is the shift in focus from interpersonal dependence to 
relying on the land, from mother caring for her children, to mother-earth feeding all (Shlain 
33-34). 
Prehistory, Myth and the Birth of Art 
The task I have embarked upon is a criticism of what humans, since prehistoric times 
(although through different processes and mechanisms), have created by way of imagination; 
they have subsequently added further layers of “artistic” and inventive interpretations to 
these creations, but elevated them to a divine or supernatural status, while they remain human 
creations. By doing so, humans have not only created inequity, but also shaped subjectivities 
toward an imagined and fictional collective subjectivity to suit one group’s interest against 
another. This process precipitated by the materialization of visions and ideas. In this study, I 
define imagination as that which takes shape in a sense of urgency and necessity, but without 
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the presence of reason. As the forthcoming explanation and experimentation will 
demonstrate, the human mind creates images and ideas, where it needs to connect what he 
has no logical explanation for. This can be distinguished from intuition, which as Bergson 
believed, comes from a place of hyper sensitivity (Caygill 2013), and is a kind of 
“sympathetic impulse.”96 
We may consider a distinction between what prompted giving shape and material 
form to figures and what might have been a preceding, rudimentary form of oral cultures.
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Humans (in their present form) have been around for approximately one hundred fifty 
thousand years; however, creation of what comes close to what we call “art” today has taken 
place only in the last one-third of that existence.
98
 In the late prehistoric times, the evidence 
that does reach us includes female statuettes and cave paintings; these bring to mind 
examples such as Woman of Willendorf (Austria, circa 24,000 BCE), Hall of Bulls (Lascaux 
Cave, France, circa 15,000 BCE), or the Oxen in Altamira (Spain, 11,000 BCE). There have 
been many theories, although none with absolute certainty, on what the meaning, purpose or 
even the context of such works may have been. These theories range from “art for art’s sake” 
Fig. 1. Hall of Bulls. Paint on limestone. c. 15,000 BCE. 
Lascaux Cave, Dordogne, France. 
Fig. 2. Woman of Willendorf. Carved 
limestone and red ochre pigments. Ca. 
30,000-25,000 E. Austria. 
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to Henri Breuil’s “sympathetic magic,” to such art being “a symbolic system.”99 What we 
may be able to continue to ponder nonetheless is what the experts have named the “creative 
explosion,”100 or the birth of what we call “art” today, and what that “art” can tell us about its 
creators. 
What did compel the early, prehistoric humans to reproduce forms found in nature? 
How did they determine what to reproduce? After all, these images are far from child art and 
nothing if not naturalistic. Archeologists, anthropologists and art historians have been 
debating about the subject of such art for decades. Prehistoric female statues that have been 
found all over Europe, for instance, have puzzled the experts to this day in whether they were 
meant as goddesses to be worshipped or as charms that may have brought the hunters luck. 
Others see their overstated features as symbols of what mattered to the prehistoric people, 
namely fertility and new life, as is suggested by the exaggeration of gender specific parts of 
the body.
101
 Eller disagrees with the ‘fertility’ interpretation—mostly taken for granted by 
others—as she notes both in Paleolithic and Neolithic female figurines, “the most 
conspicuous problem . . . is that they rarely show signs of pregnancy, childbirth, or lactation” 
(134). 
Whatever the purpose may have been, the link between creating “art” and some level 
of consciousness in the prehistoric people cannot be overlooked. Georges Bataille in Lascaux 
or the Birth of Art argues that the moment of birth for art came when “[r]esolutely, 
decisively, man wrenched himself out of the animal’s condition and into ‘manhood:’ that 
abrupt, most important of transitions left an image of itself blazed upon the rock” 
(preface).
102
 More recently, through the analysis of images and the later development of 
writing, another theory has been proposed. Shlain, projects a conflict between the patriarchal 
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and the female-centered societies with the written “word” as the suppressor of “image.” In 
other words, he sees imagery more in line with the feminine and deems its decline to be due 
to the emergence of writing.
103
 Shlain argues “that the central factor in the fall of the 
Goddess was a revolutionary development which occurred during the . . . period – literacy. 
First writing, and then its more sophisticated refinement, the alphabet, tolled the death knell 
of feminine values both metaphorically and . . . literally” (39). Nonetheless, considering the 
alphabet or the written language itself developed from imagery, can it be argued that both 
images and letters were associated with patriarchy, with one patriarchy replacing another? In 
order to better understand this question, one must look further into the origins of prehistoric 
human creativity and imagination. 
The theories suggested by the experts on the subject of Paleolithic art, as briefly 
mentioned earlier, vary from the art as being “sympathetic magic”104 to such caves being 
places of worship, hence tying art and religion closely.
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 These views were later challenged 
when further scientific studies were conducted. In a study by Andre Leroi-Gourhan and 
Annette Laming-Emperaire, the theory of “sympathetic magic” was rejected, because the 
scientific analysis demonstrated the animals hunted and those consumed by the Paleolithic 
people were different from those depicted in the cave paintings (Gourhan [1983] 1989, 31). 
In the late 1980s, Leslie Freeman, following her study of the Altamira Cave in Spain, 
rejected the idea that the various images showing a herd of bison “dead, asleep or disabled;” 
she argued they were indeed showing the animal dust-wallowing – a behavior seen during 
mating.
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These new theories demonstrate, as expressed by David Lewis-Williams in The Mind 
in the Cave (2002), that “[w]hat is now needed is not . . . more data (though more data are 
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always welcome), but rather a radical rethinking of what we already know” (8). The 
evidence, then, suggests that such imagery may have been created to embody, pin down and 
possess what was seen as magical, fleeting and intangible power, whether in life, death or 
just sheer physical power. Could such illusions have happened when humans took fire inside 
the caves and saw the shadows moving on the cave walls, or is there a “neuropsychological” 
explanation for the process behind the cave paintings? While I have no intention to validate 
my argument through science, the scientific evidence outside of what is mainstream thinking 
has proven to be noteworthy on what may have stirred the cave painters’ imagination. This 
evidence is predicated on light deprivation producing shapes and colors in the visual cortex 
in such a way that the person visualizes images.
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Painted images during the late Paleolithic period are mostly found inside the deepest, 
darkest parts of the caves, and it seems plausible the prehistoric artists may have experienced 
a hallucinatory vision of the powerful animals they observed outside. The absolute darkness, 
or very little light, then, may have incited images of the animals whose powerful presence 
and behavior had already made an impression on the prehistoric artists. Once inside the cave, 
it must have seemed like magic when the visual part of the brain recalled the experience in 
hallucinatory forms and colors.
108
 Prehistoric humans may have wanted to hold onto the 
experience, thus painted the images and sometimes shapes and colors inside the caves. 
Lewis-Williams explains that consciousness is a “historically situated selection” and “not a 
universal, timeless ‘given’” (104). The theory of giving material form to contemporaneous 
experience can apply to both two and three dimensional works of art. The question that arises 
here is: why give material form to an experience or idea? And more critical to this study, 
what were the implications of such development for the early communities? 
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Answering these questions may be facilitated if one addresses theories such as 
“goddess-worshipping” or “woman-honoring,” both of which have artistic repercussions and 
have preoccupied feminist movements and others to this day. However, this preoccupation 
has occurred without the questioning of how the creation of these myths may have had its 
own history (Eller, 2000, 30). In fact, thanks to works of cultural theorists such as Shlain, 
these myths have become women’s own view of their own matriarchal past.109  While 
acknowledging that no paintings of female figures have been found, Shlain emphasizes the 
importance of exaggerated, gender specific features of female statuettes found in great 
numbers in southern France alone (Shlain 30) and quotes Joseph Campbell, who states: “So, 
from the Pyrenees to Lake Baikal, the evidence now is before us of a Late Stone Age 
mythology in which the outstanding single figure was the Naked Goddess…”(ibid). 
Such “invented” myths, as argued by Eller, have prevented women from achieving “a 
future that helps all women, children, and men flourish” (2000, 8). Thus, it is critical to pause 
here to consider the problematic nature of such myths. While prehistoric times aimed to pin 
down hallucinatory images in the caves, is it another level of consciousness that strives to 
create a sense of pride or identity by inventing myths in later times? Consequently, here I 
must draw a direct link between the consciousness that prompts the creation of, for instance, 
the prehistoric art and the developing of the myths transpiring from such creations. Stated 
differently, the art works in question do not just represent what could have been owned (and 
enjoyed, which would substantiate the positions of privilege for their owners); the 
interpretations and myths emanating from this art can also prove epistemic, to be possessed 
and to become a source of claimed privilege.
110
 Therefore, the material representation of the 
“goddess” is primarily at the center of this discussion. 
78 
 
There are numerous examples in the history of the early cities
111
 that demonstrate 
material form given to an idea or ideal serving as a symbol or sign signifying some sort of 
domination and power. This may have taken the form of a human figure representing a deity 
within a community. However, what has been taken for granted is that the sources of the 
attributed power have been what humans themselves projected onto the art work, just as 
historically, experts’ speculations have had the potential to become historical facts over 
time.
112
 Matriarchalists, Eller argues, insist that somehow worshipping goddesses “enhanced” 
the position of women in society, yet we have no proof of this (106). Through examining 
three key Neolithic cultures, “heralded by feminist matriarchalists as matricentric,” namely 
Çatalhöyük, Malta and Minoan, Eller reveals that there is not enough convincing evidence to 
believe they either were engaged in goddess worshiping for long, if any at all, enjoyed a 
matriarchal rule, or even if goddess worship benefited women (Eller, 2000, 142-156). 
Further, Eller blurs the line between what Shlain tries to neatly divide, with respect to 
images being associated with female and written language with patriarchy, by noting that in 
both Western cultures as well as others, “[d]isproportionate images of females is a 
widespread . . . phenomena . . ., and we know that it can coexist with male dominance” (141). 
She also draws attention to an important point that substantiates how patriarchy defines itself 
in opposition. Eller comments that there is an abundance of female imagery present among 
cultures with “male monotheistic religions,” where “deities are not always represented; in 
fact they can be completely—or largely—invisible, as is the case with the putatively male 
god of the major Western religions” (ibid). An example of this is Ishtar in Mesopotamia, 
whose absence in text is well compensated for in the production of her images, whereas 
“numerous male deities discussed in the texts have no ‘visual counterparts’,”113 which Shlain 
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deems as the distinction between the two (female/image versus male/word), but it may also 
point to their co-existence (ibid). 
While such images can be viewed as remnants of the past, they appear to have served 
patriarchy in defining itself through its opposition.
114
 Eller’s argument here not only 
undermines Shlain’s thesis, but also could mean that one patriarchy may have absorbed 
another, without the total elimination of the signs of the old patriarchy. But, the questions of 
whether there was a “patriarchal revolution” and where the underpinnings of misogyny lie 
still remains. 
Foundations of Misogyny from the Neolithic Cultures to Antiquity and Beyond 
There is very little argument about the male voice having been the dominant voice in 
the written history of not just the Western cultures, but humanity in general. Margaret L. 
King and Albert Rabil Jr. in the introduction to the series “Other Voices in Early Modern 
Europe” (2003) note “[t]he recent achievements [of women] have their origins in things 
women (and some male supporters) said for the first time about six hundred years ago. Theirs 
is the ‘other voice,’ in contradistinction to the ‘first voice,’ the voice of the educated men 
who created Western culture.”115 How the male voice came to dominate has a direct bearing 
on how men treated their first “other,” that is to say, women. Lerner states: “[l]ike men, 
women are and always have been actors and agents in history […] [yet] women have been 
kept from contributing to History-making, that is, the ordering and interpretation of the past 
of humankind” (1986, 4-5). King and Rabil Jr. point out: 
The other voice emerged against the backdrop of a three-thousand-year old history of 
the derogation of women rooted in the civilizations related to Western culture: 
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Hebrew, Greek, Roman and Christian. Negative attitudes toward women inherited 
from these traditions pervaded the intellectual, medical, legal, religious and social 
systems that developed during the European Middle Ages (xi).
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From where did this “inheritance” originate? Was there a link between subordination 
and derogation of women historically? Surely the traditions mentioned by King and Rabil Jr. 
were not where it all started. Lerner explores the different positions on the subordination of 
women. In the course of her investigation, various voices in the debate, from traditionalist to 
Marxist to anthropologist, trace the subordination of women to different corners of history 
and human experience. However, following the examination of “hard evidence,” including 
those from Çatalhöyük, Lerner concludes that “female subordination is not universal,”117 
regardless of lacking proof for a “matriarchal” society (35).  
Both Eller and Graeber agree that “a decisive change” took place around 3000 BCE 
that changed the “social organization” in ancient Mesopotamia and brought on “a more 
patriarchal, hierarchical, and warlike direction” (Eller 2000, 157 and Graeber 178). Graeber 
detects in the Sumerian texts of the period a marked change in the status of women and the 
social freedoms that “[render] them wards of their husbands” at the end of the Bronze Age. 
He argues there is a relationship between the signs of ‘human progress’ as evident in the 
“advance of science and technology, the accumulation of learning, economic growth” and 
freedom; however, the connection works in the opposite direction when it comes to women 
(Graeber 178).  
An uneven rate of development seems to have occurred, as Neolithic, rural 
communities gradually transitioned into urban centers, otherwise known as “archaic states” 
or early civilizations. Social organizations changed from “kin dominance to patriarchal 
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families as the chief mode of distributing goods and power” (Lerner 54). However 
unequivocally, they all did not make such transitions, especially if we consider those who 
decidedly, or unavoidably, remained “pastoralists” in the margins of the urban areas despite 
their continued interactions with the inhabitants of the cities. As Lerner and Graeber note, 
these changes nonetheless affected women’s status. Lerner states: 
In Mesopotamia . . . female subordination . . . becomes institutionalized and codified 
in law; prostitution becomes established and regulated; with increasing specialization 
of work, women are gradually excluded from certain occupations and professions. 
After the invention of writing and the establishment of formal learning. Women are 
excluded from equal access to such education.
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Therefore, according to Lerner, the social reorganization and the development of 
hierarchy brought about a shift from “kin-based” to “class-based” society and yielded two 
distinct conflicting communities (55). Graeber picks up on this shift and further explores the 
dynamics between the two: the kin-based, which he calls “pastoralists,” and the urban 
communities. While he confirms the “profound cultural changes” brought on by the 
“pastoralists,” Graeber appears dissatisfied that the slow “restrictions of women’s freedom” 
were merely the outcome of the “gradual infiltration of pastoralists from the surrounding 
deserts who, presumably, always had more patriarchal mores” (178).  
Graeber is in agreement with the feminist view that war and “centralization of the 
state that accompanies it” are two of the most important factors in the harsh treatment of 
women. Nevertheless, to these he also adds the issue of debt. He states: “In . . . Mesopotamia 
. . . an explosion of debt . . . threatened to turn all human relations—and by extension 
women’s bodies—into potential commodities” (179). Therefore, Graeber deems an 
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“economic game,” with an underlying interchangeability of debt and morality,  to be the 
determining element in the relations: the losers would lose everything, including their 
women, and the (male) winners would seek extreme measures to protect their own women 
from falling into the same circumstance of “being bought or sold” in this game (ibid). The 
fallout of this economic arrangement was that the life for the poor on the fringes (i.e. among 
the pastoralists) came under the protection of the father, and the rural areas became a safe 
haven for those running from the laws of the cities. There is clear conflict between the two as 
Graeber explains: 
Patriarchy originated, first and foremost, in a rejection of the urban civilizations in the 
name of a kind of purity, a reassertion of paternal control against great cities like 
Uruk, Lagash, and Babylon, seen as places of bureaucrats, traders, and whores. The 
pastoral fringes, the deserts and steppes away from the river valleys, were the places 
to which displaced, indebted farmers fled […] religious literature . . . echo this voice 
of rebellion, combining contempt for the corrupt urban life, suspicion of the 
merchant, and often, intense misogyny.
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The existence of the tribal people outside the cities and their interactions with the city 
people have always occurred according to Graeber. One of the signs of their intermingling is 
the supplanting of the language of the city people (who are often associated with civilization) 
with the language of the desert people (Graeber 178), which perhaps demonstrates the 
versatility and accessibility of the oral versus the written language often associated with the 
elites. This leads one to think upon the differences that emerge culturally and, as focused on 
by Graeber, economically. A sort of “othering” always takes place that then gets balanced 
when the language of the pastoralists dominates, or in the case of the post-Roman era with 
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the so called barbarian tribes, they become the nobility in Europe. Therefore this holds true 
for the early Medieval Europe after the fall of Rome, as it did for ancient Mesopotamia. 
Perhaps observing the position of the first “other” (i.e. women) can illuminate further the 
dynamics of the othering process. What was the status of women in the oral tradition, as 
traced back to the early Greek life, for instance, illustrated by Homer? 
According to Eller, Homer’s references to women fall under two categories: 
aristocratic women and slaves (2000, 168). Despite the freedom enjoyed by aristocratic 
women in Homeric Greece, as pointed out by Eva Cantarella, “a . . . [Greek] woman’s 
principle tasks were . . .  to be beautiful, to take care of domestic tasks, and to ‘above all be 
obedient’.”120 The pseudo-scientific works of Aristotle, who wrote in the fourth century 
BCE, still reflects the misogyny that existed. Aristotle believed women were inferior to men, 
based on his binary reasoning. He thought form, deemed the essence of all things, to be 
associated with men, and matter linked with women.
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 Hence, he argued that “male principle 
in nature” is active and perfect, and female is passive and incomplete. Further, Aristotle 
suggested that the “male principle in nature” always seeks to reproduce itself, and viewed a 
progressive path for the “deprived” feminine in seeking that perfection, of course through the 
guidance of men. (King and Rabil Jr., xii).
122
 
Aristotle’s writings has had long lasting ramifications, not just for the Greeks, but 
beyond the geographic boundaries of ancient Greece, anywhere touched by Greek language, 
art and culture.
123
 “Greek poetry, drama, and myth are full of the ‘problem’ of women [as,] 
[…] the misogyny evident in Greek literature permeated Greek society.” Further, inequity 
between men and women extended to their sexual relationship, as “[h]eterosexual sex was 
understood as ‘an unequal transaction by which woman steals man’s substance,’ and so men 
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were better advised to have sexual relations with one another” (Eller 2000, 168). But, 
perhaps more telling of this misogyny is the law that gave the male head of the household the 
power of guardianship over women and children that could even determine their life or death, 
as more baby girls were left to die than boys (Eller 2000, 169).  
Graeber paints a similar picture of classical Greece, however from the economic 
stand point. The era of an established Homerian value of man predicated on his honor came 
to an end, as argued by Graeber, “when commercial markets began to develop” following the 
issuance of coinage to pay soldiers and to serve as a means to transact “fines and fees and 
payments made to and by the government” (186-187). Graeber states: 
One of the first effects of the arrival of a commercial economy was a series of debt 
crisis, of the sort long familiar from Mesopotamia . . . ‘The poor, as Aristotle 
succinctly put it in his Constitution of the Athenians, ‘together with their wives and 
children, were enslaved to the rich’ (ibid). 
While the “male honor” developed in the aristocracy’s disdain for the market (albeit 
emulated by all, even those in rural communities), women’s honor, argues Graeber, was 
reduced to “sexual terms: as a matter of virginity, modesty, and chastity.” Women’s honor 
was marred if she “played a part in public life” or appeared without a veil in public.124 The 
issue of veiling of women is also addressed by Lerner, although she sees it as a manifestation 
of class. According to Lerner, veils were visible marks that distinguished women who were 
under the protection (or ownership) of a man (139). This was an established regulation, the 
disobedience of which had severe consequences for the poor, slaves and prostitutes who 
attempted to veil themselves, and it was deemed “a major offense against the state.” Lerner 
references an Assyrian document that gives any man who “has seen a harlot veiled . . . [to] 
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arrest her, produce witnesses (and) bring her to the palace of tribunal” (135). Interestingly, 
many of the punishments from the ancient texts of laws and regulations have found their way 
into one of the most influential books in the foundation of Western civilization and 
particularly its art: the Bible. 
EMERGENCE OF MONOTHEISM: JUDAISM, CHRISTIANITY AND ISLAM: WORD, IMAGE AND 
POWER 
The advent of monotheism approximately 3800 years ago in Jewish tradition was 
when Abraham received his “first encounter with God, who made a covenant with him.”125 
The weight of this covenant, as pointed to by Lerner, has been at the foundation of what 
distinguishes the “chosen people” from everyone else (163). But what significance does 
monotheism represent emerging at the time when polytheism was more tolerant, well 
established, practiced, and persistent despite this new competition? Before addressing this 
significance, we must consider that Judaism, Christianity and Islam all trace their heritage 
back to Abraham as the biblical patriarch, and all deem themselves monotheistic. Further, 
there seems to be correlation among Judaism, Christianity and Islam with how word, image 
and the hybridization of the two were utilized. Stated differently, Judaism established itself 
through words; Political Christianity began with words, but solidified its power through 
image; and Islam took advantage of both word and image in rising to prominence and in 
maintaining its position of power. In short, whether in writing symbols or visual imagery, 
they successfully transformed monotheism, from—what emerged to accomplish initially—a 
new way of thinking and critical assessment of the status quo, to a system of laws and rules, 
adaptable for political and patriarchal purposes and gains. 
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Monotheism and Patriarchy 
Monotheism conflicted with how the place or relationship of people was defined 
within the community and with how communities interacted with one another in connection 
to the sources of power dominating those communities. Shlain notes: 
The Israelites’ sectarian prejudice stood in sharp contrast to other religions of those 
times. Polytheism had many hierarchical layers. There were national gods, local gods, 
family gods, and even personal gods. […] Monotheism encouraged people to think in 
new ways.
126
 
Shlain, points out that despite the many “bloody conflicts fought over land, women, 
booty, or to avenge a perceived wrong, there were no religious wars in the ancient world 
before monotheism” (80). It seems to follow then that monotheism had been viewed as a 
binary alternative—what was to replace the polytheistic structure of the societies of that 
time—for monotheism, as argued by Shlain, had no tolerance for other deities. From another 
perspective, it can also be argued that monotheism initially emerged as criticism of how the 
hierarchical and unjust systems, predicated on material representation of dominant ideas and 
deities, had led to inequity for the majority of the people, particularly the impoverished 
members of the society, for it promoted a sort of a leveling of the playing field, so to speak. 
Nevertheless, following its synthesis with the urban formulas of organization (just as 
language did in the aforementioned examples), monotheism was adopted as a model for 
governing, thus was solidly built into autocratic systems. If we interpret the Jewish law of 
prohibition of imagery beyond material to encompass formulas and abstract thinking, and if 
we were to view patriarchy critically, this was clearly in violation of the commandment that 
forbade creating anything in the Divine’s “image,” to which I will shortly return. 
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It is curious that Shlain notes monotheism to be a religion that “does not mirror 
human society,” and whereas humans are “social animals,” in monotheism essentially, God is 
alone, has no parallel, nor does he have a mother, father, wife (on the assumption of Him 
being male) or offspring. However, instead of exploring what possibilities the significance of 
this perspective offers, he suggests: “if everyone agrees that only one God exists, and 
different groups conceive of Him in different ways, then whose perception of that deity is the 
correct one?” It may be reasoned that the idea was: no one’s perception was indeed correct, 
therefore a sort of equality could have prevailed. To be fair, Shlain builds this argument in 
order to proceed toward demonstrating the abstraction monotheism allows, which “can set 
people free from superstition. But there is a terrible price to pay for devotion to an abstract 
God” (81). What Shlain is missing here can be further elaborated addressing the prohibition 
of imagery. 
The Second Commandment, “Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven images, or 
any likeness of any thing that is in heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in 
the water under the earth” (Exod. 20:4) has been interpreted by Shlain and others as a 
“proscription against making images . . . repeated throughout the Torah . . . (Deut. 4:15-19)” 
(82). Taken as a stand-alone statement, which is what appears to be the case with Shlain, it 
prohibits imagery of any kind. Nonetheless, being mindful of the established conventions of 
the polytheistic societies, as what follows the First Commandment, “I am the Lord thy God. 
Thou shalt have no other gods before me” (Exod. 20:2-3), the Second Commandment seems 
to be closely connected to, thus following, the preceding statement. Law and order in 
polytheistic societies were heavily reliant on physical representations of their deities in 
material form, that is to say human-crafted likenesses of what they believed the deities 
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represented. Shlain, emphasizing that God’s Second Commandment “injunction is all 
encompassing,” questions: 
Why would drawing a bird in flight or a fish leaping in sunlight represent a threat to 
Him? The Second Commandment forbids Israelites from conveying any iconic 
information: no illustrations, no colorful drawings, and no art . . . Why should a 
prohibition against making images be the second most important rule for righteous 
living? (83) 
What Shlain questions here is in support of his argument on the intolerance of 
monotheism as a male-oriented tradition in its opposition to the worshipping of idols as a 
female-oriented practice. Whereas, it should have been directed toward the criticism of the 
problem of polytheistic societies that were predicated on the hierarchy grounded in the access 
to the gods obtained through physical possession. The ancient societies may not have fought 
over their religious beliefs, but the possession of the representation of the deity (or symbols 
of wealth) of the conquered people was certainly critical to the triumphant side and seen as 
the sign of that deity sanctioning the winner, or the conqueror’s deity as more powerful. This 
was due to an overlap between the sacred and secular powers. As Lerner notes in the ancient 
Mesopotamia, “it is characteristic of leadership in . . . [the] early period that there is a 
merging of divine and secular power personified by the ruler” (59). In some cases, the ruler 
established himself by taking over the temples (Lerner 62). So, perhaps the prohibition of 
giving material representation meant there would be no symbol of oppression against the 
vanquished, hence undermining an artificial and imposed hierarchy that undoubtedly led to 
inequity. Generally speaking, possession of the physical manifestation of people’s beliefs 
was one way through which power was exerted over the population. Although this may be an 
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example where one could argue that among the ancient cultures, no one had sympathy for the 
vanquished and they were expected to receive the harshest of treatments, to which my 
response would be, perhaps this is what monotheism had emerged to change. However, in 
reality this is not what happened. 
It seems the study of patriarchy necessitates a closer look at what documents the 
beginnings: The Book of Genesis. Lerner believes that we often forget how much of what is 
written in the Bible is actually drawn from earlier texts, and how much of the Bible has been 
instrumental in forming laws to this day. She states: 
It is . . . taken for granted that earlier Sumero-Babylonian, Canaanite, and Egyptian 
cultural materials were adapted and transformed by the writers and redactors of the 
Bible and that contemporary practices, laws and customs of neighboring peoples were 
reflected in its narrative.
127
 
Lerner keenly points out that regardless of the belief in the Divine essence of the 
book, it has been “the work of many hands” giving it shape, in the case of the Book of 
Genesis, over a period of four hundred years (162). Her numerous examples bring into focus, 
not only the linkage between the pre-existing traditions, but also the different and sometimes 
conflicting accounts in the biblical stories of creation (182). What is certain nonetheless is 
that the woman represents man’s first “other.” Thus, more pertinent to this study are the 
stories about women and specifically the portrayal of Eve in the story of Genesis. According 
to Lerner, the two different written versions of the creation of Eve reveal an inconsistency in 
relation to Adam.
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 One interpretation, which is also the most literal, has dominated the 
studies of the subject for thousands of years; it is that which deems Eve inferior to Adam, for 
she is believed to have been created out of Adam’s rib (183). Although feminists have tried 
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to offer alternate interpretations, it seems it has been a great challenge to dispute the one 
dominant interpretation that indeed has suited patriarchy so well. As a result of this 
dominance, other perspectives are then marginalized and eventually forgotten. Among such 
alternate interpretations, Lerner mentions a brilliant one from a seventeen-year old Rachel 
Speght, the daughter of an English clergy man. Rachel argued, as quoted by Lerner: “Shee 
[Eve] was not produced from Adam’s foote, to be his low inferior nor from his head to be his 
superior, but from his side, near his heart to be his equal” (Lerner 184, and Rachel Speght, A 
Mouzell for Melastomus, the Cynical Bayter and foul-mouthed Barker against Evah’s Sex, 
London 1617). Therefore, the challenge here may not lie in the lack of creative, competing 
interpretations, but rather in how one becomes dominant and serves the interest of patriarchy. 
The short answer is through violence that alienates individuals and prevents them from being 
a subject to themselves. History of monotheism offers great examples of this alienation, 
almost all involving a sort of “sleight of hand,” that is to say a creative way of unifying with 
one stroke, and discriminating with another, for patriarchal purposes. 
The canonization of the Mosaic Law was finalized around 450 BCE by Ezra, the 
scribe, during the time the Kingdom of Judah became allies with and under the domination of 
the Persian Empire (Lerner 162). With the political and military support of the Persian 
Imperials, a particular interpretation of Jewish history rose to prominence in Ezra’s work.129 
In his version, Ezra gave the emphasis to the purity of the blood of the “chosen people.” 
(Book of Ezra, 9:2).
130
 Therefore, with violence enforced by the Persian Imperial rule, Ezra 
“dislodged” the Jewish inhabitants of Jerusalem before he was able to instate his own 
interpretations of the Mosaic Law. While generally Moses has been regarded as the founder 
of Jewish monotheism, the roots of monotheism, as mentioned earlier, go back to 
approximately four hundred years earlier, to the time of the biblical patriarch Abraham, 
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whose covenant with God is a fundamental factor in distinguishing his descendants, 
presumably through a paternal lineage, as the “chosen people” (Lerner 163). The key to 
understanding this presumption, Lerner argues, is in “the social conditions which are 
reflected in the Book of Genesis.”131 Noteworthy here is, Ezra’s interpretation of “chosen 
people” is held up to assert a debt to be paid, a debt for which war and vengeance seem to 
have been recurring themes among the people in that region since the biblical times.
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Considering the fact that such social conditions continue to hold contempt for women and the 
“othering” of non-chosen people, Ezra’s interpretations effectively preserve the same regard 
for the place of women as for alterity in the non-chosen people. In such conditions, most 
appropriate here is the examination of the exchange value in a human economy. 
Graeber elaborates further on such “conditions” discussed by Lerner from the 
perspective of debt. He unpacks the issue of “violence” and its institutionalization during this 
historical time period to explain how a unique being, particularly a woman, whose identity 
and ties were defined by her relationship to her family or community, would be “ripped” 
from her social cohesion before she would be subject to slavery or exchangeable with objects 
through war or vengeance (159). Such violence, according to Graeber, is not merely a 
metaphor, but actual, as in when “the ancient Hebrews spoke of their daughter in ‘bondage,’ 
they were . . . talking about literal ropes and chains” (ibid). “I am not speaking strictly of 
slavery here,” Graeber exclaims however, “but of that process that dislodges people from the 
webs of mutual commitment, shared history, and collective responsibility that make them 
what they are, so as to make them exchangeable—that is, to make it possible to make them 
subject to the logic of debt” (163). But, what does the “logic of debt” do to the individual 
subjectivity beyond a material exchange? One way to explore the link between “debt” and 
subjectivity is to explore the power of words. 
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In the example of Ezra, the carefully arranged words provide credibility by 
referencing the sources of past authorities in Jewish history (e.g. Juda, Benjamin, Israel) and 
the edict of the Persian kings (Ezra, 4:1-24 and 6:10-11).
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 Terms such as “chosen people” 
or “Philistine” are constant reminders of how a patriarchy both unified and strengthened its 
own position through alterity. Lerner states: “The Israeli victory and the need for unity 
against the Philistines reinforced tendencies toward strong leadership among the twelve 
tribes.” This need for unity eventually brings about the rise to power of biblical kings (165). 
With the formation of states and monarchy, the undisputed authority of patriarchy 
evolved from strictly a feature of the tribes to a characteristics of the clan in general. By 1050 
BCE, which, according to Lerner, was when the period of state formation began in Israel, 
monotheism, monarchy and patriarchy had already melded. Such overlap was not unlike 
what already existed among “Israel’s Mesopotamian neighbors” (168). What the state 
formation entails is, on the one hand, curtailing the father’s unlimited power over his 
family’s life or death, and, on the other, the arrangement of property, in particular 
landholdings, which was a patrilineal responsibility. Lerner explains: “The effect of these 
landholding patterns was to strengthen clan allegiance and to give great stability to the 
patriarchal-tribal organizations from one generation to the next (169). The Jewish women, 
however, held less privileges than their Mesopotamian counterparts (171). Yet, Lerner 
underscores the role biblical women played in the transition of matrilocality to patrilocality, 
significant with regards to property (168). Her indirect hint at the link between the 
‘teraphim,’ or the ‘house-gods’ and what legitimized one’s title to property/estate is an 
example of the main thesis in this study.
134
 This reference is not unlike when in the 9
th
 
century the monks at Conques stole the reliquary of Sainte Foy (St. Faith) from Agen,
135
 as 
they both point to the value bestowed by humans upon a physical and artistic representation 
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of what was deemed to be of spiritual importance and which signaled prestige and wealth. 
Thus, as was through words, the establishing and domination of one interpretation was 
achieved in imagery as well. In fact, the use of imagery never went away and has been an 
integral part of any established authoritative system. Here, it is necessary to address the 
significance of imagery and image-making in relation to patriarchy. 
Patriarchy’s Image and Imagination 
Being a product of imagination itself, patriarchy has relied on art and imagination for 
centuries, as attested to by art historical evidence. The associations between artistic 
productions and both religious and secular establishments recede far in time. Perhaps it can 
even be traced back, as discussed earlier, to the time when humans understood how to 
imagine projecting power to represent physically something intangible, and then link this 
process to some mystical and magical source. Nevertheless, what Foucault calls “pastoral 
power technique” (a synthesis between the rural beliefs and customs, and the established 
urban infrastructures) should be kept in view in the creative process and its utilization by 
patriarchy. Through what process has the power of imagination and by extension 
exaggeration played a key role in shaping individuals under patriarchal domination? The 
answer rests in the historical accounts of sacred images. 
The power of imagination, as argued by anthropologists, may have even preceded the 
act of creating iconic objects, that is to say, objects resembling humans or animals. Edwyn 
Bevan, in Holy Images (1940) states:  
[A] material object identified with a god need not resemble anything else . . . [I]t may 
be a shapeless stone or a tree […] Anthropologists have told us that image worship 
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was preceded by an earlier stage in which the material objects treated with religious 
regard by man were aniconic, rocks and trees, springs and rivers, not things shaped 
by man’s hands to resemble any living thing (13). 
Clearly, as it appears from this passage, what the earlier humans achieved had more 
to do with their imagination tightly interwoven with their emotions (possibly dominated by 
the emotion of fear) and passions than just technical skill in shaping the material itself. The 
primeval human emotion of fear, then, has been preserved or protected within what his 
imagination could conjure and transferred from one generation to the next. Whereas the early 
humans’ fears were part of their necessary survival mechanism, the deeply buried fears find 
new ways of manifestation in later times, as “deferred action,” and remain a determining 
factor in subject formation.
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Edmund Burke, in A Philosophical Enquiry notes “[n]o passion so effectively robs 
the mind of all its powers of acting and reasoning as fear” (53). Friedrich Schiller, in On the 
Aesthetic Education of Man argues that “[m]an is superior to every terror of Nature so long 
as he knows how to give form to it, and to turn it into his object” (121). Both Schiller and 
Burke acknowledge the link between the emotions and art, but argue for regulating the 
passions under reason toward idealistic goals. However, the imagination that veils the 
primeval fear is not excavated deeply enough to expose this emotion. Perhaps Baudelaire 
expresses it most aptly: 
Countless layers of ideas, images, feelings have fallen successively on your brain as 
softly as light. It seems that each buries the preceding, but none has really perished.
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The link between the products of imagination and the emotions can explain why art 
has been expected, for the most part, to be responded to by way of emotions. It further makes 
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clear how art has been an effective part of the patriarchal techniques of power. To investigate 
how such techniques work, one must look to a time when fear prompted human imagination 
to select objects for the spiritual appeasement of forces he has felt threatened by, yet did not 
have any control over.
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Believing a piece of wood or stone to have “power for good and evil” prompted 
certain treatment of it in order to attract the benevolent forces and to deflect the evil ones 
(Bevan 14). This treatment corresponds to the vulnerability humans experienced with regard 
to natural occurrences, for instance. Further, as gathered from the developed rituals 
surrounding objects of worship, simply making an image did not necessarily bring about the 
qualification of divine status (Bevan 31). The development of such rituals adds another layer 
of creative and imaginary work. Selecting a particular piece of stone or wood, or perhaps 
enhancing a found natural form to resemble a familiar object, such as a face, was then 
accompanied by some sort of justification to attenuate humans’ senses of uncertainty, 
insecurity, powerlessness and fear. Objects imbued with human-projected imagined powers 
eventually were adopted, classified and ranked into systems established by urban structures, 
thus being absorbed into organized, religious structures. The belief that somehow there was 
an unseen link between an object and a living being crystallized into rituals and practices 
such as “sympathetic magic” (Bevan 27). In the times of distress, such as invasions by 
foreign armies, as argued by Bevan, cries to an unreachable divine helper might have been 
redirected to the deity at hand in material form, for the relief sought as such was deemed 
more immediate (28).
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 Lerner deems this ability to be what distinguishes humans from 
animals, for humans “make mental constructs to explain the meaning of their existence and 
their relationship to the supernatural” (199). Such connections were clearly not reason-based, 
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as explained by Bevan, but rather “understandable as the outcome of intense desire and 
passion” (27). 
What this study is concerned with, however, following the establishing of the 
aforementioned connections, is how the products of imagination and their dominance have 
impacted the shaping of passive, subservient subjectivities. I will be focusing on the two key 
emotions Aristotle is concerned with in his Poetics: “fear” and “pity.” In the opening, I noted 
the seemingly paradoxical strategies upon which patriarchy has established itself: imagined 
grounds for unity and “othering,” which are in fact two sides of the same strategy. How has 
this strategy translated into works of art, for instance, the syncretic transferring of the power 
of one deity’s representation, when necessary, into another? And how did objects, or even 
ideas, imbued by imagined power become the center of artificial unities and instrumental in 
systematic othering, benefiting none other than patriarchal systems? 
ARTIFICIAL UNITIES: FROM ANTIQUITIES TO THE INFUSION OF NEOPLATONIC PHILOSOPHY 
INTO ISLAMIC THOUGHTS, ART, MIMESIS, PURIFICATION AND THE STATE 
There is very little argument about the influential power of art and its ability to shape 
a culture, forge a civilization or even inform who we are today. What is often taken for 
granted, however, is how artistic products can operate beyond the level of consciousness, 
through emotions, when involving the collective, particularly in the hands of the state. After 
all, humans have been called “social animals,” but that is not by default. All social 
interactions are predicated on learning the skill, given the emotional traits they bring into the 
mix with them.
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 I could have considered “pleasure” or “pain,” but as Corey Robin concurs 
with Locke (Second Treatise of Government, 84), and Burke (An Enquiry, 32), “without fear, 
we are passive; with it, we are roused to ‘the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of 
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feeling.’” (Fear: The History, 4).141 Arendt also notes human action to be driven not by 
“pleasure but pain,” and “not desire, but fear are his true guides” (The Human Condition, 
309). Therefore, the “rousing” factor has been the element of “fear.” Art has served as a 
“unifier” predicated on managing “fear” long before Aristotle wrote his Poetics. But, perhaps 
Aristotle’s Poetics is the first time such art is considered within a political context. 
To be sure, it is not by accident that Aristotle pivots his idea on the two emotions, 
“fear” and “pity.”142 Both are grounded in movement or action for change. Robin, in Fear: 
The History of a Political Idea notes:  
[F]ear alerts us to real danger or propels us to take action against it . . . [F]ear is 
supposed to arouse a heightened state of experience . . . It quickens our perception as 
no other emotion can, forcing us to see and to act in the world in new and more 
interesting ways, with greater moral discrimination and a more acute consciousness of 
our surroundings and ourselves (4). 
The definition of “pity,” as indirectly elaborated on by Aristotle, is when the feeling 
of sadness takes over, when one understands the injustice in the unfolding of events, when 
the audience beholds one does not deserve what one gets (Poetics, xxi). Aristotle does not 
directly point to the link between “pity” and justice, nor does he state anything regarding the 
“othering” involved in the process of “catharsis.” This is because he is concerned with 
purging the undesirable and potentially dangerous, unpredictable emotions that could 
threaten the republic his teacher had crafted. 
Thus, Aristotle sets out to channel and manage the emotions of fear and pity through 
tragedy, with its most important element, plot (Poetics, xxi). This formula has been a perfect 
98 
 
match for patriarchy’s two sided strategy: creating artificial unity and systematically 
promoting alterity. 
Patriarchy’s Artificial Unities: from Antiquity to Modern Times Imagined through Art 
It is necessary here to discuss and demonstrate how art has been an effective 
instrumental State Apparatus that has altered the ability of a society toward change by means 
of the Aristotelian formula. The use of “fear” to create a cause to bring about political unity 
is one objective still in use to this day; even though “modern writers and politicians oppose 
political fear as the enemy of liberty, reason, and other Enlightenment values, they often 
embrace it . . . as a source of political vitality.” This is evident in the “collective renewal of 
the fear” in the aftermath of events such as September 11 or, further back, Soviet despotism 
during the Cold War era (Robin, 4). But the “political fear,” which must be established on 
political events, according to Robin, cannot be effectively accomplished if the emotion of 
fear had not been capitalized on as it has been. 
The glorious history of artistic and cultural development in the foundations of 
Western civilization is filled with examples of art aiming, on the one hand, to put fear in the 
hearts of people, make them feel insignificant and self-alienated and, on the other, to 
synthesize collective passive subjectivities, in other words, artificial unities. An early 
example that brought people together in a ritual-related location is the relatively recently 
discovered “Göbekli Tepe” in Turkey. 
While the excavation is still ongoing in Göbekli Tepe, some information has come to 
light. A number of “walled enclosures” in circular form have been found on this site, dated to 
be approximately 7000 years older than Stonehenge, but share “an enigmatic sense of 
99 
 
unfathomed ritual significance.”143 Upright carved stones, quarried in one piece, in T-shape 
forms, and have been decorated using shallow relief carvings of animals, foxes, cranes, 
boars, etc. Evidence tells us people came from near and far, and they gathered there possibly 
for religious purposes, because no remains of permanent settlements have been found for 
about a 50 mile radius (Spivy, 47). Nevertheless, according to the site’s excavator, Göbekli 
Tepe marks ‘the dawn of a new world, a world with powerful rulers and a complex, 
stratified, hierarchical society’ (Spivy, 48). 
Artistic Implications into the Present Time 
 What have the implications of art serving patriarchy been? How have they shaped 
subjectivities? Where do the Abrahamic traditions fit in? The development and utilization of 
the visual arts within the Islamic cultures is a peculiar problem. At its strictest, in accordance 
with the same Commandment put forth by Moses, Islam forbids the depiction of living 
beings. Yet, there are numerous examples of figurative imagery found throughout Islamic 
lands. The compelling question here is why? What is the concern with imagery? 
To be sure, the fear of returning to idol worshipping may be the first answer that 
comes to mind. However, as mentioned earlier, the issue should be considered in the broader 
scope of the human potentiality to imagine, to create, and to exaggerate. Just as we are able 
to make things out of wood or stone, we have the capability of projecting intangible 
meanings on to what we make: a sort of intellectual creation that parallels the physical 
fabrication. According to recent studies explicated earlier, when brought under certain 
circumstances, our brain, which is hardwired for such activity, can generate vivid images.
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In the minds of prehistoric humans, experiencing such visions must have seemed like 
a supernatural event and attributed to contacting another world, hence blending into religious 
rituals and beliefs. As the early cities developed and religion became institutionalized, such 
activities were organized and utilized to serve the priest-kings and temples. Here rests the 
connection between religion, politics and image making, which enabled a few to claim access 
and exclude or control other members of the community’s access. This produced a privileged 
class protected and enforced by religious rules and rituals that implemented unfair policies 
and did not regard individual rights; additionally, such a class was divisive and in 
competition with rival religious groups that had their own hierarchies, and often led to 
constant warfare. But, the issue goes beyond the physical idols and idol worshipping; it is 
deeply rooted in the human tendency to believe in self-produced illusions of the Divine and 
illusory concepts of self-righteousness. What better way to distinguish oneself from one’s 
“other?” 
There have been serious implications, as testified to by history, for societies with 
religious practices based on such illusions if we are concerned with values like human and 
civil rights. The focus here, however, is on recognizing the power of human creativity and 
distinguishing it from the Divinity or the Devine Himself. This is why image making was 
forbidden in monotheism, mostly evoked when speaking of the Islamic faith; yet, as with 
their Jewish and Christian predecessors, it did not inhibit Muslims from creating imagery, 
visually or intellectually. The reason may rest in the infusion of patriarchy with historic 
monotheism.
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It may be considered that often, following the domination of new ideologies in 
regions with established cultures, the pre-existing traditions, in resistance and response to or 
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out of reconciliation, prompt the philosophers and theoreticians as well as artists to lay out 
different ways of explaining and interpreting the new ideas in order to create unity within a 
culture and to prevent its complete disintegration.
146
  
This has often taken place as a means to maintain a sort of consistency, albeit through 
conflicts, and a political power’s domination. The ongoing violent events in the Middle East 
are constant reminder of this and cases in point.
147
 Therefore, it is not implausible that these 
integrated theories and philosophies have been utilized to construct image, prestige and 
power through words and the visual arts, and this has proven a particularly significant and 
effective strategy for an emerging culture, civilization, or even an ideology.
148 
But, creating 
unity, which I will call “artificial unity,” is only half of the story. The other half is the 
systematic “othering” that ensures conflict. Anywhere there is a patriarchal rule, one finds 
both “artificial unity” and “alterity” as two strategies working alongside one another. 
MONOTHEISM AND THE ISSUE OF THE “OTHER:” INNER VERSUS OUTER ALTERITY 
Holding in view the first instance of “alterity” that “others” the woman for the man, it 
seems necessary to begin here with a definition of the term. Emmanuel Levinas, in Totality 
and Infinity defines alterity as “the radical heterogeneity of the other,” that which stands 
radically different from the self representing the other (36). But the point of departure is 
where the “I” stands, as the “I” is consistently reassessing its “identity,” for a great deal 
happens to it as it moves through time. Levinas states:  
A term can remain absolutely at the point of departure of relationship only as I.” [...] 
The I is not a being that always remains the same, but is the being whose existing 
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consists in identifying itself, in recovering its identity throughout all that happens to 
it. It is the primal identity, the primordial work of identification.
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Thus, Levinas deems two states of alterity: all that stands distinct from the self and a 
state in which the self stands as its own “other.” Such relationships exist among people and 
cultures, and it has even permeated the written history of philosophy. Peter Park argues, for 
instance, that the exclusion of Europe’s “other,” namely Africa and Asia, was because the 
Europeans “deemed them too primitive and incapable of philosophy” (Park 2013, 2). Here, I 
have no intention of proposing why that is the case or whether we can do away with the issue 
of “othering.” What I am interested in is the idea that learning, the progression of thoughts 
and ideas, consciousness in short, have all taken place in moments when they have been 
projected through the cultural “other,” but we rarely hear about it. Perhaps this is because the 
monotheism that reaches us is a “historical” monotheism that has primarily been operating in 
a divisive manner, within or without its own boundaries.
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A case in point is the development of the Continental Philosophy in Europe. The 
Hegelian dialectic discourse, which itself developed from the Cartesian “I” through Kant’s 
autonomous self, was decentralized and became dialogical once the discourse on the issue of 
subjectivity was moved to the “edges” or parerga, to use Derrida’s term, when transcended 
the German border, spilling back over into France. This “slippage” happened analogous to 
Lacan’s theory of the development of individual consciousness forming by reflecting off of 
others, as in the case of the philosophical consciousness between the German and French 
philosophers in their alterity.
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 According to Lacan’s theory, this takes place through the art 
of language (Lacan in Keenan, 210). While the German philosophers insisted on the 
aesthetics as the interface facilitating the process of the development of consciousness and 
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subject formation, the “French” philosophers, or better said what evolved there from, directly 
or indirectly emphasized the art of language as key in this process.
152
 The German 
philosophers therefore, I suggest, projected the subject onto a narcissistic mirror that 
concealed the need for “other,” but the French called attention to and disseminated through 
language, voice and verbal communication apparent in the writings that reflect “several 
Hegels” that emerged subsequently.153 The resulting egocentrism in German philosophy 
could not get beyond the central axis of the self, around which the Idealists and the 
Romantics had gathered. 
Analogously, subsequent to the “translation movement” in Andalusia and in the 10th 
century under the Abbasid Caliphate in the Middle East that was manifested through 
sciences, upon returning to Europe, became instrumental in the European Renaissance.
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However, this exchange had no reciprocations on the same scale whereby a dialogism could 
continue. 
The Role of “Islamic Philosophy” in Helping to Shape European Renaissance 
While there has recently been more attention paid to the role the Muslims played in 
Europe’s rebirth in science, there has been very little discussion about the underlying 
philosophy. While the West sees itself as the true heir to Greco-Roman achievements, it is 
not through Ancient Greece or Rome that the West accesses those achievements. To be sure, 
not all the translated texts were Greek in origin, and as Peter Adamson (2016) has argued, 
Muslims did more than just preserve the knowledge from the antiquity (8-9). 
Hans Belting (2011) points to the “explosively controversial implication of such 
texts” that “did not become evident until the Renaissance, in the work of Copernicus, for 
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example, or, in the case of the camera obscura, in the work of Kepler and Descartes.” 
Referencing the “visual,” Belting demonstrates the significance Western and the Middle 
Eastern cultures’ place on perspective and light. He sums up the Arab contribution: “[I]t may 
suffice to note that while Arab visual theory gave a predominant role to light, which is 
essentially aniconic, it relegated pictures to the realm of the mind exclusively.”155 
Viewed from another angle, Belting’s argument that the “invention of perspective and 
its essential tie to the gaze of an observer” rests at the root of the differences between the 
“West and the Arab world” (55) seems incomplete.156 He does note the combination of the 
two informs the “sharp contrast to the restrictive control placed on the gaze in many Islamic 
societies” (ibid). Nevertheless, the monolithic gaze offered through the already determined 
linear perspective of the artists (often representing the establishment) seems to escape 
Belting’s keen eye. Thus, there exists “control” over what is viewed collectively in both the 
“West and the Arab world.”  However, as with Lacan’s mirror stage, necessary in the 
development of the child’s individuality, the control that takes place (mis)leads the individual 
to believe it is his/her own view in the West. This is due to the conflict, or “gap,” that 
ultimately materializes, which raises questions and the individual answers to such questions. 
Contrastingly, for instance, the decision to “plaster over” images, as in 1847 after uncovering 
of the murals in the Aya Sofya in Istanbul by Sultan Abdülmecid (ruled 1839-1861), speaks 
to how the manipulation of the “gaze” in imagery prevented the same experience from taking 
place among the Muslim population. The “gap” is therefore concealed from the Muslims 
view.
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The question here still persists as to how such activities led toward individualism, 
more or less, in the West, but did not bring about the same results for the inhabitants of the 
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Middle East. I pose this question with the understanding that “individuality” is not the 
ultimate destination in the project of human freedom; it is rather a step toward that direction, 
just as in the child’s development of the self/individual (Lacan in AiT 620). 
The Space between the Individual and the Collective 
In the human freedom project, the individual’s relationship with respect to the 
collective (community/society) has, to a large extent, been the subject of numerous 
discussions among philosophers and other thinkers, virtually since the beginning of 
philosophy as we know it. Here, I am not aiming to review all that has been proposed on this 
matter, as that lies beyond the scope of this study. I intend to investigate nevertheless this 
relationship from the perspective of the “gap” that exists between two seemingly opposing 
entities, i.e., the individual and the collective in this case.  
In The Truth in Painting Derrida raises, from a footnote in Kant, an argument that 
questions the “finality without end” in Kant’s Critique of Judgment.158 In other words, he 
detects a space-in-between, a “gap,” that blurs the edges in the judgment of taste as 
articulated by Kant. If we understand “gap” to appear where there is apparent conflict, then, I 
suggest, just as it did with Derrida, it can offer opportunities to arrive at the possibility of 
multiple answers to the question raised in this study, which is: why hasn’t individuality 
flourished in the Middle East? 
Earlier, I established a connection between patriarchy’s “artificial unity” and 
“othering” strategies that manipulate subjectivities. Aristotle’s answer to Plato’s separation 
of the “pure” and “impure,” to use Kristeva’s terms,159 in his republic was his justification of 
mimesis and the experiencing of the “tragedy” for cathartic purposes in his Poetics. Put 
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differently, the “gap” between the “pure” and the “impure,” in Aristotle’s view, is 
transformed into a space in which the undesirable emotions of “fear” and “pity” can be 
purged and homogeneity can be maintained to protect the unity needed within the republic. 
Therefore, “gaps” are threatening for patriarchy’s desired uniformity; thus, they are either 
transformed, as in the case with Aristotle, or concealed through imagination, exaggeration 
and creative endeavors in the art sponsored by patriarchy in power, as with the Safavids in 
seventeenth century Iran. 
During the Renaissance and upon the revival and reemergence of the works from 
antiquity, initially there was concern over the conflict—gap—between Christianity and 
pagan knowledge and art, as well as science/reason and religion/faith. This is evident in the 
works of artists of the period, such as Michelangelo (1475-1564) and Veronese (1528-1588). 
While both artists worked closely with the patriarchal establishment, they expressed a certain 
degree of individuality in their work that did not always meet with the authorities’ 
approval.
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 In his book The Cheese and the Worms ([1980] 2013), Carlo Ginzburg’s 
research on the story of a sixteenth century miller, who was tried and executed by the 
inquisition tribunal, highlights another such moment of individuality. Among his accusations 
was that “he maintained that the world had its origin in putrefaction” (xi). Whereas his 
worldview had taken shape from a “peasant culture,” (using the analogy of how cheese is 
produced through the natural process and the worms to explain creation) that which came 
from lived-experience, it did not bode well with the church’s interpretation, which was 
predicated not on the real world, but idealistically and through imagination. 
The art that concealed the “gap” sponsored by the Safavids, prevented in Persia the 
kinds of individual expressions that were taking place in contemporary Europe. The primary 
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purpose of the ideology and supporting art was to preserve the unity. To this end, the added 
“supplement outside the work,” which Derrida calls parergon, is “what comes to be added to 
Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone without being a part of it and yet without being 
absolutely extrinsic to it” (1987, 55). 
Furthermore, the question arises as to who claims and ultimately benefits from the 
added interest? In Europe, the artist initiates this process, and is even admonished for it; the 
surviving documents of the trials of the artists and scientists attest to the presence of the 
conflict. In Safavid Persia, the king’s divine claim is well established, and therefore art 
merely gives the claim its material form, and nearly without any traces of conflict.
161
 The 
development of the Safavids and their philosophical foundations are subjects of the next 
chapter. 
In this chapter, I demonstrated that there is interest in the developmental process of 
creativity, patriarchy and subject formation. The phenomenological investigation reached 
back into the earliest known times of human artistic endeavors, in the caves. My argument 
draws attention to an alternative explanation for the creative endeavors that is predicated on 
the necessity (a lack or void in reason) and what matters the most sympathetically or 
culturally. I also discussed historic examples that explicate the development of patriarchy, 
underscoring the ever so important issue of debt that has shaped and continues to inform 
subjectivities. 
Patriarchy’s strategy of “alterity,” brings up its first “other,” which is women. I have 
discussed the roots of misogyny from the Neolithic cultures to the antiquity and beyond. The 
emergence of the Monotheistic traditions, and their relationship with “word” and “image,” as 
well as the infusion of Neoplatonism in these traditions have also been addressed. This 
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chapter also demonstrated how learning through “alterity” has been fruitful for the 
Europeans, but in turn the same process did not occur in the Middle East. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SAFAVIDS: 
THE PHILOSOPHICAL AND ARTISTIC AFFIRMATIONS 
 
Oh my beautiful Shah [Ali] my moon, the fulfillment of my desires, the beloved of my heart. 
Oh Thou, in whose beauty God manifests himself.
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I am Faridun, Khusrow, Jamshid, and Zohak. I am Zal’s son (Rustam) and Alexander . . . I 
belong to the religion of the ‘Adherent of the Vali [Ali]’ and on the Shah’s path I am a guide 
to everyone who says: ‘I am a Muslim.’163 
 
       — Shah Isma’il (Khata’i) 
 
The nearly two and a quarter centuries of the Safavids’ rule (1501 - 1722) has been 
heralded debatably as the time during which the groundwork for modern Iran was laid 
through the resurrection of ancient ideas.
164
 The story of the Safavids can therefore be 
thought of as a story of revival, of rebirth, however Persian in style as the founders identified 
with Persia’s splendid mytho-historical past. This revival was eventually implemented by a 
powerful central governing system inspired, at least in part, by the pre-Islamic idea of “king 
of kings.”165 However, just as the ancient model of the “king of kings” (Shahanshah) implied 
the ascent of the Persian king above all kings, the Safavids “created” and promoted an 
ideology—from the infusion of Hellenistic thoughts, myths and preexisting beliefs with 
iterations of Islam—that allowed the Safavid king to view his position above the diverse 
groups that the Safavids subjugated in their rise to power. How the Safavids achieved this 
objective through artistic endeavors in practice is the subject of this chapter, which not only 
aims at offering a different perspective on the meaning and purpose of the creative arts they 
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espoused, but also seeks to open up the significance of the “creative arts” as a process that 
maps onto “patriarchy” so well that at times they seem imperceptible and inseparable from it.  
The investigation of “creativity” as such is of particular concern in this study, insofar 
as it manipulates subjectivities at the expense of individualism.
166
 Hence, in this chapter, I 
am interested in how, through the creative process, the Safavids maneuvered to promote a 
unified, crafted discourse that shaped “Modern” Iran’s religion, culture, and identity, albeit 
from their diverse contemporary discourses. Moreover, I am concerned with how the 
Safavids successfully established the basis for alterity that strengthened and ensured the 
longevity of the newly founded dynasty. Both strategies have had long lasting imprints in the 
region, and their impact are still felt to this day. I intend to examine the link between these 
strategies and “imagination,” and its extension, “exaggeration.” On the basis of that link, I 
suggest, while the Safavid project may have brought political unification, to the country we 
know as Iran today, it left “individualism” reliant on the Safavid patriarchal ideology 
predicated on imagination and exaggeration, made tangible and claimable through 
artistic/creative activities. As a result, collective subjectivity grew stronger to the detriment 
of individual, diverse thinking. This is in contrast to the views of the German Idealists, whose 
vision, just as with the Safavids, coincidentally align with Neoplatonic philosophy, and who 
deemed art and creativity to represent a pathway to freedom.
167
 Consequently, contrary to the 
German Idealists’ understandings of the liberating powers of art, under the Safavids, 
creativity in general and its manifestations in various art forms in particular, contributed to 
the production of a collective cultural ego and a “herd instinct,”168 both instrumental in the 
longevity of Safavids’ religio-political ideology. 
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In the Safavid Iran: Rebirth of a Persian Empire, Andrew Newman notes the 
endurance of the Safavids in comparison to their European contemporaries, concluding that 
such survival was due to “[t]he distinctly heterogeneous ‘discourse’ of the shah” (8). 
Newman maintains the success of the Safavid story may rest in how they unified the various 
constituents. He states: 
[T]hat discourse itself comprising both statements and actions – reflected and thereby 
legitimized the individual discourses of each of the polity’s constituent elements and 
facilitated both the recognition and incorporation of ‘new’ constituencies into the 
project . . . and [therefore] the transcendence and thus the subordination of each.
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This chapter will therefore begin with the genesis of the Safavids and the contributory 
role of “imagination” and “exaggeration” in their rise to power as the new patriarchy. 
Further, concerning the sources of inspiration for the ideology espoused by the Safavids, the 
exemplary visions and influences of Ibn Arabi will be discussed. What follows next will 
include the examination of selected visual works, from the preceding conventions to the 
repertoire of the artists at the Safavids’ court, to underscore and expound two instrumental 
concepts, namely the “Unity of Existence” and the “Perfect Man.” Finally, a comparative 
look at the Neoplatonic connections between the Safavid art, as inspired by the philosophical 
thoughts of the period, and the German Idealist views on art will suggest why the artistic 
endeavors have not ushered in free-thinking individualism under and beyond the Safavids. 
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THE ORIGINS OF THE SAFAVIDS: NEW PATRIARCHY, NEW DOMINANT ITERATION OF ISLAM, NEW 
POWER TECHNIQUES AND THE ROLE OF ART IN THE IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUS 
The “conventional wisdom” traces the lineage of the Safavids to a Sufi order, based 
in Ardabil, founded by Shaykh Safi-al Din (1252-1334) (Newman 2). However, as the 
founder of the Safavid dynasty, the complexity of Shah Isma’il’s formative years speaks 
directly to how the preludes to his unifying idea took shape. What makes the Safavids an 
appropriate case study here is that the elements facilitating the formation of the new 
patriarchy are, in one way or another, predicated on a sort of “creative” or invented 
discourse. These elements include, among others, a hybridized heritage, military loyalty and 
capacity, a climate of diverse discourses and constituents, and internal as well as external 
politico-economic tensions and opportunities. 
There is very little dispute in how Shah Isma’il saw himself, as he put forth an 
encompassing and transcendental image of himself in his poetry, the examples of which open 
this chapter.
170
 Nevertheless, during his formative years, those who surrounded him, 
protected him and rescued him from being eliminated by rival forces may have had a hand in 
how this image was molded.
171
 While much of the history written about Shah Isma’il tends to 
create a mystical aura around his persona,
172
 in retrospect, perhaps in part prompted by the 
necessity of what was about to happen (i.e. the emergence of the new Safavid dynasty), 
historical evidence validates a long and trying process with extraordinary circumstances at 
work prior to his arriving at the helm of the new empire.
173
 Even so, ultimately his image in 
his poetry, which was to address his Qizilbash supporters (who became his devoted military 
forces),
174
 as an example, reveals the propaganda of how he shaped his supporters’ heart and 
113 
 
minds, and this played an instrumental part in his ascent to power. 
175
 But the affiliation of 
the Qizilbash to the Safavi house had begun earlier.
176
 (See Appendix I)  
The devotional ties of Qizilbash to the Safavi Order can be traced back to around 
1447, when “owing to an influx of levies from a number of Turkish tribes, the order is said to 
have embraced a new militant, messianic religio-political discourse” (Newman 2). These 
devotional ties were predicated on ghuluww, or exaggeration, in viewing the leaders of the 
order as divine, which appears to have been part of Safavid propaganda. Savory deems this to 
be a kind of “extremism” which came about due to the Mongol invasion interrupting 600 
years of caliphal orthodox rule. For the “religious tolerance . . . of the Mongol rulers deprived 
Sunni or ‘orthodox’ Islam of its dominant position” (23). A breathing space was thereby 
created for the development of other groups including the “extremist” Shi’i and the popular 
Sufi religions that flourished. Babayan differentiates between the terms ghuluww and 
“extremism” (xlvi) in that ghuluww manifests an identity closely linked with a particular 
belief in the cyclical nature of time and its continuity and rejects the emphasis on the “end-
time” discourse (xvii). Referencing Ricoeur’s “pervasiveness of time,” she notes the 
relationship between the “temporal conceptions to the way we act,” and even to the way we 
create cultural products in particular (xix, xxiii).
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How does the “temporal conception” link with “exaggeration? How do we explain the 
phenomenon of “exaggeration?” Is it associated with imagination? Is this exaggeration the 
remnants of what the prehistoric artists expressed in the statue of the Woman of 
Willendorf?
178
 In other words, is it an innate instinct that aggrandizes what is important to 
humans at a given moment in history?
179
 Or, is it the equivalent of what the Greeks in the 
Riaci statues willfully tweaked, as demanded by their culture, to create an overwhelming 
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transcendental effect through exaggeration (Spivy 81)?
180
 Does our view of time determine 
what we create? What is the role of culture in modifying how we perceive these creations? 
Here it appears necessary to elaborate on the notion of “ghuluww,” or exaggeration 
with respect to imagination. Early on, in chapter two, I argued for the possibility of 
imagination, and particularly visualizing pictures, when there is light deprivation to the brain 
in the visual experience. Similarly, the brain, in the interest of self-preservation, creates its 
own links when it feels endangered. The brain fills the gap of the unknown when not enough 
information enters the active mind. Viewed differently, is it plausible then to ask: when the 
reality is too harsh to face, do humans tend to surpass or circumvent the reality by way of 
exaggeration? Do “fear and pity” play a role in the act of “exaggeration?” As the product of 
the mind, exaggeration is directly linked with our temporal conception. If we consider the 
link between the “temporal conception” and the exaggerations about the Safavids’ founder, 
and if Shah Isma’il’s crafted persona can be seen as a cultural product, predicated on the 
Qizilbash’s cyclical cosmology, as suggested by Babayan, Ricoeur’s theory holds that all 
cultural productions such as “literary . . . visual . . . and [the] symbolic” are subject to the 
influence of “the pervasiveness of time.” 
Ghuluww or exaggeration means in Arabic, “to exceed the proper boundary” 
(Babayan xlvi), and while denoting transgression, it can also point to limitations or 
deficiencies. Alexander García Düttmann, in Philosophy of Exaggeration notes a link 
between “thought” and “exaggeration,” arguing that the latter not only signals a boundary, 
but that it exposes the thought itself (15). The question here is: what does constitute the 
boundary? Düttmann states: 
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Every inside and every outside that arise through a demarcation of a limit are in 
themselves open and cannot enclose this openness without in turn exposing 
themselves to it. What opens within them is the abyss of the unmanageable or the 
sublime, of pure exaggeration, which can no longer be contained by any given 
demarcation and transgression of a limit. 
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Can the boundary be the unbearable reality, as in what T.S. Elliot asserts in his Four 
Quartets: “humankind cannot bear much reality?”182 Exaggeration, therefore, can be seen as 
a way to get past the limitations of what may be challenging or nearly impossible to face or 
tolerate. This may bring further into focus why Babayan deems ghuluww to be a form of 
resistance; the syncretic synthesis of myths is a “creative way in which cultural production is 
negotiated” in opposition to dominant discourses (xviii, 135). I must clarify. I use the term 
ghuluww here not just in its particular capacity as applied to the devoted followers of the 
Safavids, but rather in its broader meaning that includes the creative act of exaggeration as a 
counter force and an opposition—with  the idea of preservation behind it—to the dominant 
thoughts. 
It can be argued that the “exaggeration” became institutionalized once the Safavid 
dynasty materialized. This took place through the “unified language of [Kor]anic truth,” 
according to Babayan, which eliminated the “very language with which they led a successful 
revolution in early Modern Iran” (xix). However, it was well replaced by other forms of 
cultural productions, encompassing literary works (e.g. history, poetry, epics), visual 
products (e.g. painting, architecture), and symbolic inventions (e.g. rituals, celebrations) that 
served the Safavids more effectively. 
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Creativity as an Ideological State Apparatus 
Perhaps, Shah Isma’il’s own poetry is an appropriate place to commence addressing 
this topic. Both Newman and Babayan take note of Isma’il’s pen name, Khata’i (the 
culpable), but make no connection between it and his poems, as a mark of humility, in which 
he claims to be “the absolute truth” (Newman 13), and “of divine nature” (Babayan xxxi). 
Babayan does bring up the fact that as a Muslim ruler, Isma’il would have seen himself as the 
heir to the legacy of Abraham and other ancient prophets, beginning with Adam. 
Nonetheless, considering the notion of the eternal nature of time in Isma’il’s 
perspective, he did not believe in a beginning or an end to the line of spiritual leadership 
(Babayan xxxi). Therefore, he sets claim to contradictory notions, as stated in a poem 
(quoted by Babayan): “know that Khata’i . . .  is of divine nature, that he is related to 
M[o]hammad Mustafa. He is issued from Safi, he is the scion of Junayd and Haydar . . . he is 
related to Ali Murtaza.” Consequently, he creates a “fictitious” spiritual genealogy for 
himself (ibid). Newman assesses from his poems “rather a distinctly heterogeneous, multi-
confessional messianic dimension . . . lying at the heart of his spiritual discourse” (Newman 
13), despite contradictions therein.
183
  
From the perspective of the visual arts production, the establishing of “the royal 
academy of painters, illuminators and calligraphers” by Shah Isma’il in Tabriz continued to 
be maintained by his successor and son, Shah Tahmasp (1514-1576).
184
 The idea of the “king 
of kings” found no better place of expression than in Firdowsi’s Shahnameh (Book of 
Kings), composed in the tenth century. Stuart Carey Welch, in his A King Book of Kings, 
noted Shahnameh “was practically a part of any Iranian ruler’s regalia – usually along with a 
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poem extolling the king himself” (15). However, the visual work could not have been 
imagined without the Neoplatonic ideas that assumed the elevated position for the king. 
NEOPLATONISM AND THE THEORIZATION FOR THE NEW-INCOMING POWER – IBN ARABI’S 
INFLUENCE ON THE SAFAVIDS  
With the birth of Islam in the early 7
th
 century, the scattered people of the Arabian 
Peninsula, entangled in their tribal laws and feuds on the one hand and pressured by the 
Byzantine’s and Sasanian’s on-going conflicts on the other,185 found a unifying identity that 
ultimately brought them political prominence. By the mid eighth century the coalescing 
presence of Islam had reached the western border of China in the East and Southern Spain in 
the West. Through Islam, they found their independence, and in order to maintain their newly 
achieved identity and eminence, they resorted to politicizing Islam with the vehicle of “art” 
as their ally, just as their neighbors and predecessors had done with their own ancient 
religions in the past.
186
 Therefore, inasmuch as it was difficult to completely forget the old 
ways, they created an amalgam of old traditions and the new idea of Islam, justified and 
unified by a cohesive art, supported by—and in turn promoting—a strong and wealthy 
political system, constituting what we know as an Islamic culture riddled with paradoxical 
ideas today.
187
  
It is not by chance that the formation of “Islamic” art coincides with the formation of 
the first Islamic dynastic rule by the Umayyads (r. 661-750), who, disregarding the Prophet’s 
teachings, dictated the necessity of art, as a unifying element of power and prestige, 
emulating it from Persian and the Greco-Roman Byzantine empires, and consequently from 
every other culture they encountered.
188
 The construction of the Dome of the Rock in 691 as 
a political statement perhaps is just one of the earliest examples supporting this claim.
189
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The political and cultural image of the Islamic rule is further enhanced when in the 9
th
 
century the Abbasid Caliph, al Ma’mun (ruled 813-833), formed the Dar al Hikma (House of 
Knowledge or Wisdom), through which the translation movement commenced, and the 
knowledge from the antiquity became available to Muslim scholars, leading to its 
consequential disbursement through the translation movement throughout the known 
world.
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Neoplatonism and Mysticism in Islamic Thoughts – Ibn Arabi and His Vision 
Among the achievements of the philosophers of antiquity, the Gnostic knowledge had 
already permeated Christianity through the wisdom of the Greeks and the political power of 
the Romans;
191
 it finally found its way into the Islamic culture by the medieval times through 
the translations of the ancient texts under Muslims.
192
 The Gnostic interpretation of Plato’s 
“Allegory of the Cave” perhaps is one of the more widely known mystic ideas from 
antiquity. When studying the theories of real versus illusion argued by Medieval Muslim 
mystics as discussed in the “positive symbol” and the “negative illusion,” we are reminded of 
Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave.”193 The negative and the positive appear in Persian poetry, for 
instance, and referred to as the microcosmic (alam-i-asghar)—the profane man—versus the 
macrocosmic (alam-i-akbar)—the spiritual man.194 Rumi points to this notion in his poem to 
awaken his own spiritual potential: 
Therefore in outer form thou art the microcosm,  
while in inward meaning thou art the macrocosm. 
In the investigation of cultural integrations, one of the most influential figures whose 
impact is seen to this day is the Andalusian sage and mystic, Mohyiddin Mohammad Ibn 
119 
 
Arabi (1165-1240), who is a profound example in contributing to the synthesis of pre-Islamic 
cultures into Islamic thoughts and even artistic activities. Undoubtedly, not only was he 
familiar with such theories, but also incorporated them into his own. Hence, the notion of 
Wahdat al Wujud (Unity of Existence), synthesized by Ibn Arabi espousing Plato’s “Allegory 
of the Cave,” which is viewed as its origin, was the significant pivot that connected the 
western and eastern mysticism and earned Ibn Arabi the title “Ibn Aflatūn” (son of Plato);195 
it fostered the formation of additional mystic traditions in various regions, including the 
Middle East and as far as Indonesia.
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Ibn Arabi’s personal life story to a great degree informs his views and later scholarly 
works. He came from a city in the south eastern region of Spain known as Murcia in the mid 
twelfth century, during a time in which, despite the constant conflicts between Christians and 
Muslims, the field of literary and visual arts thrived in the multi-cultural atmosphere of 
Spain. His family moved to Seville for political reasons when he was about eight, during 
which time he began to learn the literary knowledge available to him.
 197
 According to his 
own accounts, he became familiar with the mystic tradition when he was nearly twenty. He 
remained in Seville for another decade, but managed to travel around in Spain and to meet 
contemporary scholars and mystics, including a ninety-five year old woman in Seville, whom 
he mentioned in his al Futuhat al Makkyya (Mekkan Revelations). Ibn Arabi’s travels took 
him around many Islamic regions such as Alexandria, Mecca, Baghdad, Konya, all of which 
are considered major cultural and intellectual centers, finally bringing him to settle in 
Damascus; during his years in Damascus, he wrote prolifically until his death there in 
1240.
198
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Ibn Arabi is one of the few figures who has been revered and respected by Sunnis, 
Shi’ites and Sufis alike; further, Muslims take such pride in his writings and theory that his 
works are currently part of Islamic advanced education, not to mention recent non-Muslim 
interest reflected in conferences, societies and online communities created in order to learn 
about and share Ibn Arabi’s literary works. Yet, his work has never become the subject of an 
extensive critical study to point out his inconsistencies (gaps) with Islam itself. Very few 
scholars have raised concerns about the subject. Nasr Abu Zayd, for instance, when 
discussing Ibn Arabi and the modern conflicts in the Middle East, goes as far as proposing 
the solution of not elevating Ibn Arabi as a figure of authority in order to promote a sort of 
intellectual pluralism.
199
 However, he never mentions the existing discord between Ibn Arabi 
and Islam as one of the fundamental problems. 
One of the most significant contributions of Ibn Arabi’s, manifested in the theory of 
“Unity of Existence,”200 has pervaded not just the Middle Eastern region’s cultures, but has 
reached the Islamic world from the African Continent to Southeast Asian territories and 
beyond. R.W.J. Austin, referencing Asin Palacios in the introductory remarks to his 
translation of the Bezels of Wisdom, Ibn Arabi’s magnum opus, even extends the Andalusian 
sage’s impact to Dante’s Divine Comedy and recognizes the conjured images by the author to 
have been inspired by Ibn Arabi’s mystic visions.201 
Ibn Arabi’s articulation of the theory of “Unity of Existence,” is founded on the idea 
that all creation is connected to an intellectual center. For the existence of every creation, it 
deems an aspect that is real and one which is an illusion, and to put it visually, places them 
on concentric circles connected through radii to the center.
202
 It is noteworthy that the visual 
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arts associated with esoteric Islam that mirror the ideal geometric or circular patterns are 
inspired by and in many cases correspond to this.
203
 
The theory of “Unity of Existence” argues for the manifestation of the macrocosm in 
the microcosm with an intrinsic connection to one another.
204
 Thus, it sees existence as one 
and interprets that unity as the Divine.  This perspective promotes the belief that humans 
have the potential to unify with God, or to reach divine status, through the idea of al Insan al 
Kamil, or the “Perfect Man,” just as Prophet Mohammad was believed to have done. The 
Ascension of the Prophet, as a subject of artistic productions, is a key example as interpreted 
by Sufis in that it represents the unification of humans with the Devine.
205
 This theory was 
first put forth by Plotinus who argues for the possibility of this unification through ecstatic or 
mystical vision.
206
 Ibn Arabi’s writings reflect appropriation of thoughts and ideas from Plato 
and Neoplatonists to Mutazilis and Ismailis, which tremendously influenced his thoughts and 
works, most prominent of which is the very theory of Wahdat al Wujud argued for in his 
book Fusus al Hikam (Bezels of Wisdom).
207
 
The Fusus al Hikam from its inception is riddled with Ibn Arabi’s personal 
perspectives and experiences that cannot be confirmed on an individual or non-individual 
level, yet they occupy a place of privilege and authority within the Islamic cultures. His 
writings and thoughts are supported only by his “intellectual speculation” and “ecstatic 
visions,” and admittedly neither is compatible with reason.208 In the Preface of his book, he 
claims he received in a vision the prompt to write this manuscript.
209
 In each of the twenty 
seven chapters that follow, he discusses a selected prophet-figure, each as a facet of God’s 
wisdom, to validate his thesis. Titus Burckhardt draws a comparison between Ibn Arabi’s 
illustrations of these facets that include prophets from the Old Testament to the Gothic 
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sculptures that filled the portals of cathedrals, such as Chartres, with such figures; the only 
difference, Burckhardt notes, is the portal figures are all looking to the central figure, the 
Christ.
210
 
The notion of “unity” is emphasized throughout the book in the love that binds God 
with all creations; this is how unity is achieved, and according to Ibn Arabi, “it cannot be 
arrived at by . . . means of any rational thought process  . . . [but] only [revealed] by divine 
disclosure.”211 Therefore, Ibn Arabi deems a special place for ecstatic visions and the 
prophets that ornament his chapters, each prophet a sign of an aspect of God’s Knowledge 
symbolized in “word.” He explains that the essence of God is bestowed upon each of his 
prophets in order to refract and make Him known, for by being in “existence [they] would 
reveal to Him His own mystery.”212 The first chapter, for instance, begins with Adam as 
God’s manifestation on earth that justifies the beginning of the process: the creation of the 
“Perfect Man.” This notion is manifested thus through each chapter and appropriately in each 
example. No doubt, in the Introduction to his book, by sharing how he was compelled to 
write the Bezels, Ibn Arabi is revealing his own experience as a case in point and proclaiming 
his place among the other “universal men” (Bezels of Wisdom 45). 
To be sure, Ibn Arabi is not the first mystic or scholar to discuss such matters; 
previously, others such as Avicenna, Sheikh Shahab al-Din Sohrevardi, Sheikh Farid al-Din 
Attar, Mansour Hallaj, Shams al-Din Tabrizi, and others commented and left their 
impressions regarding this subject. The significance of Ibn Arabi’s contribution in proposing 
the doctrine of Unity of Existence, however, is in his consolidation of the previous thoughts 
and works into a practical formula that became a main source of reference and authority, 
inciting creativity and emanating enough power and spirit to eventually attract the support of 
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great political powers, such as the Ottomans, who adopted his writings as major textbooks in 
their madrasas.
213
 Even the Ottoman’s rivals to their east, the Shi’ite Safavids, recognized the 
value of Ibn Arabi’s works as interpreted through works of Persian Scholars like Mullā Sadrā 
(c.1571-1640),
214
 his teacher Bahā’ al-Dīn Āmilī (c.1547-1625), and Mir Dāmād (d. 
1631/32);
215
 these artists and scholars have been credited, however in a positive way, with 
philosophizing Islamic views that in turn inspired the creation of the visual and literary arts 
in 17
th
 century Persia. One example is the Safavid Mosque of Sheikh Lotfollah in Isfahan 
that constitutes one of the four pillars of the Safavid architectural expressions.
216
 Most 
importantly, I think the vivid language and visual quality in Ibn Arabi’s writings has inspired 
the inventive interpretations in the visual arts produced within the Islamic lands, particularly 
in seventeenth century Persia, which clearly contributed to the prestige and image of the 
Safavids. 
It must also be noted Ibn Arabi had his critics as well; in fact the theory of Wahdat al 
Wujud had very steadfast opponents, namely Ala Al Dawla Semnani (from the North Eastern 
region of Iran, during the post-Mongol invasion era).
217
 Although, such discourses never 
made it outside the ecclesiastical domain or were relevant enough to current affairs to create 
any sort of long lasting mark.
218
 Sheikh Ala’Oddolleh Semnani, a Sufi himself, in opposition 
to Ibn Arabi’s theory, warns against the outcome of such scheme by drawing parallels 
between what happened in Buddhism before and after the advent of visual imagery. 
Following the invasion of the Mongols, understandably, Semnani is concerned with such 
implications affecting the dominant Islamic culture.
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GREEK TEMPLES AND FLYING HUMAN-HEADED HORSES: GREEK ELEMENTS IN THE ART 
KNOWN AS “ISLAMIC,” ARTISTIC EXPRESSIONS OF THE IDEAS OF “UNITY OF EXISTENCE” AND 
“THE PERFECT MAN” 
How do Greek temples connect with a seventeenth century painting from Persia 
called Mi’raj showing Prophet Mohammad’s Ascension to heaven on a human-headed 
horse? What does this connection reveal about subject formation and the visual arts in 
seventeenth century Persia, and by extension the region of the Middle East? Who benefited 
from such art works? 
The Image of the Sufi-King in Visual, Literary, and Philosophical Works – Unity of 
Existence and the Universal Man 
The analysis of examples pertaining to the image of the “Sufi-King” in visual, 
literary, and philosophical works and their Greek and patriarchal associations are the subject 
of investigation here. The influential power of Plato’s political and Plotinus’s metaphysical 
philosophies are acknowledged. But what may not be as widely known is that the similarities 
between these Western-based philosophies and the Middle Eastern thoughts are not 
coincidental, but rather a common, continuous narrative that signal the patriarchal agencies’ 
appropriation of Platonic and Neoplatonic philosophies as a (constructed) unifying narrative, 
a move that is not exclusive to the Middle East. This took place well before the advent of 
Islam, and it did so with detrimental consequences for the individual consciousness, in 
particular, in the Middle East. 
I must note the use of terms such as West or Middle East, while binary and 
questionable, are unavoidable in this study for the time being. Equally problematic here is the 
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term “Islamic” as applied to an art reflecting contradictions on multiple levels. Likewise, one 
should not treat Platonism and Neoplatonism as mere theories that attempt to bridge the 
space between the physical and metaphysical worlds;
220
 but rather, one needs to understand 
them as phenomena that have concrete consequence in shaping the world. Therefore, they 
function as vehicles transmitting models of resemblance from antiquity to the present time, 
serving patriarchy by concealing the contradictions. And finally, the term patriarchy is the 
underlying phenomenon in the persistence of systems predicated on absolute power.  
I describe patriarchy as a human-constructed presence that is artificially inflated and 
elevated (by humans over humans), but it diminishes all other presences and expressions, and 
strives to assimilate or conceal differences using artistic endeavors among other measures. 
This assimilation, exposed in the hybridized art produced through the royal and aristocratic 
patronages, has then been supplemented with words articulated by philosophies predicated on 
a transcendentalist idea, namely the “Universal” or “Perfect” man. This ideal then enabled 
patriarchal systems that appeared in different clothing at different times, such as the Medicis 
in the 15
th
-16
th
 century Florence or the Safavids in the sixteenth through the eighteenth 
century Persia, to ensure the continuity and domination of the doctrine of absolute power. I 
understand there may be other perspectives on the subject, but there are two concepts that are 
of interest here with respect to the mechanism of continuity and domination: The “Unity of 
Existence” and the idea of the “Perfect Man.” 
To establish the premise, I concentrate on one particular subject, the Mi’raj or 
Prophet’s Ascension, a fine example of which is a prominent 16th century painting from the 
Safavid period, in that it not only points to the Neoplatonic influences, but proposes that the 
interpretations stemming from these influences are a sort of parergon that served the interest 
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of the royal patrons, i.e. the agents of patriarchy. Considering the investigation of works of 
art from the region, collectively known by the term “Islamic,”221 has been mainly limited to 
formal analysis, not to mention the art is seen as a source of pride in the region (Fetvaci and 
Gruber 874), and taking into account the significance of such art as evidence of patriarchy’s 
culturo-aesthetic and religio-political apparatuses, in this case informed by Neoplatonic 
thoughts (that which links the Middle East and the West, as argued early on), the critical 
analysis of this painting seems timely and fitting here. 
The issue of subjectivity with respect to the conflict toward the visual arts has only 
recently received some attention by some scholars; nevertheless, the “viewers’ . . .  responses 
toward the painted images . . . remain largely uncharted terrain” (Gruber 2017).222 By 
employing critical theory in the analysis of this painting, it is my intention to commence a 
dynamic investigation with the purpose of developing a theoretical reasoning that would 
explicate, from a different perspective, the use and support of the art of this kind by 
patriarchal systems, namely the 
Safavid kings (r. 1501-1722). 
In the Ascension example 
there is more information in the 
painting beyond the source of the 
story, the Koranic text. The added 
information, visualized in a 
painting, then conceals and 
discourages questioning the 
discrepancy (gap). The added information as “surplus value,” (Marx), I suggest, in the 
3. Mohammed meets the prophets Ishmael, Isaac and 
Lot in Paradise. From a manuscript called “Apocalypse 
of Muhammad,” written in 1436 in Herat, Afghanistan 
(now in the Bibliotheque Nationale, Paris). 
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parergon was commoditized and exploited by the rulers to further solidify and justify their 
positions both as secular and religious figures in order to assure the continuity of their rule. I 
submit, therefore, that Neoplatonism and, by default, patriarchy are not just ideas from 
antiquity, but have been the active, fundamental ingredients in the models of assimilation 
serving absolute power and shaping collective subjectivities, while undermining 
individuality, particularly in the region of the Middle East. Thus, I propose, the artificial 
unity brought on by such systems—what Foucault calls the “culture of resemblance”—has 
been a major impediment toward respecting or even acknowledging individualism, a 
preliminary step toward democracy in the Middle East. 
In this investigation the study of the image of the Prophet’s Ascension or Mi’raj is 
essential for a number of reasons: first: its Koranic source that connects it with “Islam,” 
second: as a subject made into a visual work – commonly understood as forbidden in Islam – 
but produced at royal workshops repeatedly, and third: as an example of art covering over the 
“gap” between the original text and the single, dominant interpretation, but at the same time, 
exposing Neoplatonic ideas infused with the Islamic ones. 
The subject of Mi’raj is drawn from one of the most revered stories in Islamic 
religious literature regarding the Prophet’s night journey, in which Prophet Mohammad is 
said to have traveled from Mecca to Jerusalem with the guidance of Archangel Gabriel.
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Some trace back the embellished, narrated version of the story to Tarikh Tabari or Tabari 
History (from 10
th
 century) that quotes Ibn Abbas, one of the Prophet’s uncles, as the 
narrator.
224
 
There are two types of journeys as explained by Christiane Gruber, a scholar in the 
field of Islamic book arts, who has recently written on the subject: one horizontal, as in the 
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journey from Mecca to Jerusalem, and the other vertical, which is to the various levels of 
heaven.
225
 While the popularity of this story has engendered many renditions beginning as 
early as mid-eighth century, a number of key elements are present in all accounts; in later 
texts and paintings, the Prophet is described as riding on a human-headed horse, called 
Buraq, flying through the heavens, and surrounded by various angels. Historically this 
subject appears in three types of books: history, poetry and devotional manuscripts. 
Pre-Safavid and Safavid Images of the Sufi-King: A Philosophical Analysis 
One of the earliest examples comes from early 14
th
 century. It is a page from Jami al 
Tawarikh (compendium of chronicles) from 1307. The image of the prophet appears on the 
left riding on a human-headed horse, and on the right there are two angelic figures just 
exiting the sky (heaven), in fact one is still on the threshold. The one closer to the center is 
offering the Prophet sustenance—reportedly a bowl of milk. The tail of the horse is 
peculiarly shaped into another figure similar to the horse’s head, but this figure is wielding a 
4. Illustration on vellum from the book Jami' al-Tawarikh (literally "Compendium of 
Chronicles" or History of the World), by Rashid al-Din, published in Tabriz, Persia, 
1307. Now in the collection of the Edinburgh University Library, Scotland. 
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sword and a shield. There are stylized clouds in the sky on the upper left, and the low horizon 
shows layers representing a shallow depth of space. An apparent appropriation of Chinese 
linear descriptive marks link the clouds to the folds 
in the garments and to the landscape, which is not 
surprising, knowing there were Chinese artists in 
Tabriz, North West of present day Iran, since late 
thirteenth century according the Basil Grey.
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In another example, which comes from a 
15
th
 century Mi’raj nameh, or a devotional book of 
Mi’raj, now in Biblioteque Nationale in Paris, the 
Prophet is shown scenes from paradise–he appears 
on the upper right hand corner and Gabriel on the 
upper left, and he is pointing to the tree and the 
birds at the center of the painting. Lower in the 
painting, a group of inhabitants of paradise are 
riding on camels and exchanging bouquets of 
flowers.  In the lower left a couple appears – one 
holding the hand of the rider. There are three 
women and two men. 
The next example comes from a book of 
poetry called Bustan e Sa’di from Bukhara or 
Herat, now at the Metropolitan Museum (done 
possibly in the style of Bihzad, the renowned 
5. Prophet Mohammad shown scenes 
from Paradise. From a manuscript 
entitled Mi’raj Nameh, 15th century. 
6. The Mi’raj or the night flight of 
Mohammad on his steed, Buraq. Folio 
from Bustan Sa’di. 1525-35. 
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early Safavid artist). In this illustration, the Prophet appears in the center on Buraq 
surrounded by angels. Below, there are three figures, one of which is sleeping (the youngest), 
which may point to the fact that this event takes place at night, but the other two older figures 
seem to be vigilant. The viewer’s eyes follow the positions of the three figures to a Mihrab, 
or prayer niche, in the background out of which rays of light resembling flames project 
upward and take our eyes toward the focus of the image. Archangel Gabriel is the one with a 
crown. The poem is a praise for the high spiritual status of the Prophet and the inability of 
Gabriel to accompany him after a certain point. 
In a page from history of the prophets called 
Qisas al Anbiya from the 16
th
 century written by Ishaq 
ibn Ibrahim, known as al Nishapuri–which was copied 
in Shiraz and is now in the Berlin State Library–the 
standard features of a Mi’raj painting are present. The 
only difference here is that the prophet’s face is 
covered, which appears to have started a new 
convention.  
Painted in 1539-43 for Shah Tahmasp (Shah 
Ismāil’s son and successor) in opaque watercolor, gold 
and ink on paper, it is titled Mi’raj and is ascribed to 
the renowned later Safavid court painter, Sultan Muhammad. In this painting the Prophet 
appears with his face covered under a white cloth, at the center on a human-headed horse 
floating in mid-air, surrounded by stylized rays of light, resembling flames, and encircled by 
a number of gift-bearing angelic figures with various costumes signaling their status and 
7. 16
th
 century copy of the page 
on the Prophet’s Mi’raj from: 
Qisas al Anbiya, written by Ishaq 
ibn Ibrahim al Nishapuri (12
th
 
century). Berlin State Library. 
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ranks amidst swirls of clouds. On the left, the slightly higher-placed figure of Gabriel 
identified by his crown leads the way by gesturing his arms forward; the upward movement 
of the flames, painted in gold, implies motion toward the seventh heaven (as told in the 
fourth of Nizami’s five tales), the edges of which appear where the blue of the star-filled 
night sky meets the swirling clouds that occupy the lower half of the picture.  
If the Koranic accounts do not provide these 
details, what are we to make of the added information? 
Considering the Safavids came from a line of mystics, 
the story of Mi’raj as understood within Sufism may shed 
some light. The concept of Mi’raj is significant within 
Sufism as it exemplifies a sufi’s ultimate, unmitigated 
goal of experiencing God. Sufis believe Prophet 
Mohammad was a sufi par excellence, especially as 
depicted in the night journey during which he travels 
through the layers of heaven and reaches within the 
presence of God. Thus, the event becomes a source of 
inspiration and a critical moment for the sufis and a 
subject for artists. 
One of the texts that contains the details of the night journey is the al Futuhat al 
Makkyya by the already mentioned Andalusian sage and mystic, Ibn Arabi (1165-1240). In 
the section on the Prophet’s Mi’raj, Ibn Arabi describes the details, including the name 
(Buraq) and the appearance of the human-headed horse along with what the Prophet saw at 
each stage. The visual and mystical appeal of these details prompted the producers of other 
8. Sultan Muhammad, Mi’raj, 
The Ascension of the Prophet 
through the Heavens from a 
manuscript of the Khamsa 
Nizami. 1539-43.  
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devotional texts, such as The Ilkhanid Mi’rajnama of 1286, to incorporate them into their 
own versions of the story.
227
  While not illustrated itself, this Mi’rajnama virtually gives the 
same accounts, including the human-headed horse in the story told by Ibn Arabi. 
Before tending to the possible source(s) of the added information, critical viewing of 
such addition, which I suggest to be a sort of Koranic parergon, seems appropriate here. In 
The Truth in Painting, Derrida defines parergon as what “comes against, beside, and in 
addition to the ergon, the work done [fait], fact [le fait], the work, but it does not fall to one 
side, it touches and cooperates within the operation, from a certain outside” (1987, 54). 
Aware of the necessity of connection between word and image, Derrida makes us conscious 
of the space in between the two, which he calls passé-partout (1987, 7). It is this “space in 
between” that yields the “interest” and, in this case, the added information and interpretation; 
as Derrida puts it: 
With regards to the idiom of painting, of that to which this . . . locution [...] can . . . be 
understood in a multitude of ways. [...] But untranslatable it remains in its economic 
performance, in the ellipsis of its trait, the word by word, the word for word, or the 
trait for trait in which it contracts: as many words, signs, letters, the same quantity or 
the same expense for the same semantic content, with the same revenue of surplus 
value.
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But, the question with regard to the painting in question, to which I shall return, is: 
who benefited from the “interest?” The Koranic accounts of the story come from two 
chapters: 17 and 53.
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 Chapter 17, Isra (The Children of Israel), verse 1 states:  
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Praise be to the One Who made His servant travel by night from the sacred place of 
worship to the furthest place of worship, whose precincts We have blessed in order 
that We may show him some of Our signs. 
Little more information is provided in Chapter 53, al-Najm (The Star), verses 6 
through 18: 
So, he acquired poise and balance, and reached the highest pinnacle. Then he drew 
near and drew closer until a space of two arcs or even less remained, when He 
revealed to His servant what He revealed . . . . He saw Him indeed another time by 
the Lote Tree of the Limit beyond which no one can pass, close to which is the 
Garden of Tranquility. . . . Indeed, he saw some of the greatest signs of His Lord. 
As evident from these verses, there are no other details provided as to how this 
journey took place, and what the specifics of the Prophet’s personal experience were. 
However, in the literature produced later on the subject, there are no shortages of the 
particulars that vividly describe the experience; it is the particulars that supply the 
iconography in the images depicting this event, and in these details lay the clues to thoughts 
colored by Neoplatonism. The specific painting that is the focus of this paper comes from a 
book called Khamsa Nizami (five-tales [of poetry] by Nizami) commissioned by and 
produced in the Safavid royal court just a little over a decade after the death of Shah Isma’il, 
the founder of the Safavid Dynasty. 
Analogous to Derrida’s theory, but reversing the order, i.e. text to painting in the case 
at hand, more information appears in the painting that solidifies a dominant position. Here, I 
consider a possible source of inspiration for the added information. The details depicted in 
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the Mi’raj painting are astonishingly reminiscent of Plotinus’s narrative of ascending toward 
the One. 
Pertaining to the ascension and in order to “come to [the] vision of the inaccessible 
Beauty,” Plotinus in The Enneads refers to it as “fleeing to the beloved Fatherland” and 
points out this is not possible by foot. He states: “What then is our course, what the manner 
of our flight? This is not a journey for the feet; the feet bring us only from land to land . . .” 
Further, in III.8 Plotinus asserts that from nature all things are inspired to grow and produce 
through Contemplation that has Vision as its end. All conflicting powers are then unified 
toward this Vision.  
The Charioteer (the Leading Principle of the Soul, in the Phaedrus Myth) gives the 
two horses (its two dissonant faculties) what he has seen and they, taking that gift, 
showed that they were hungry for what made that vision. 
The resemblance of the details, whether in text or painting, suggests a connection 
between the iconography of the ascension in the Mi’raj painting and this passage. At some 
point, starting late 15
th
 and early in 16
th
 century, “an iconographical shift” took place where 
the white veil covering the face was added.
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 Another version, which is in the style of the 
aforementioned Sultan Muhammad, is currently in the Rhode Island School of Design 
Museum. If we view the Koran as the main source for this subject, more relevant here is that 
the visual versions all include details that do not appear in the source text. Contrary to 
common belief, and as evident from cited earlier examples, the covering of the face of the 
Prophet did not always exist; it happened possibly due to more religious restrictions, but 
more likely for propaganda purposes through a newly defined identity, as argued by 
Gruber.
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 Whatever the reason may have been, it does seem that covering the face, even 
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though it does not undermine the identity of the main character in the story, leaves the door 
open to speculate whether the faceless image could transcend representing just the person of 
the Prophet to include the ruler. 
This speculation points to: who benefited from the “interest” yielded by the added 
information. Generally speaking, royal artists produce with the status of their patrons in 
mind; in other words, illustrations manufactured for royal patrons are almost always intended 
to create an image and to send a particular message. Therefore, as represented in the 
Prophet’s Ascension, there is more than just an illustration of the story. The details, similar to 
what Plotinus describes in ascending toward the One, in the Mi’raj painting, underscore the 
divine connection claimed by the Safavid Sufi-kings, who aimed to legitimize their roles as 
both king and spiritual leaders
 
(in other words, their image as the Perfect Man), thus ensuring 
the continuity of patriarchy within their reigns. 
A critical examination of the added details by way of Marx’s commodity theory may 
articulate how the agents of patriarchy accomplished this task. In his theory of commodity, 
Marx emphasizes value. He states: “. . . every commodity contains useful labor, i.e. 
productive activity of a different kind, carried on with a different aim” (Marx 133). To make 
something useful, according to Marx, labor has to be involved, and it is because of that labor 
that commodity, and consequentially its profit-making attributes, exists. Marx notes how 
from the raw material a useful object is produced and becomes a commodity. He argues it is 
in the relationship between the “manifested social character of the products of the labor” that 
the magic of commodification takes place. He points out, “It is nothing but the definite social 
relation between men themselves which assumes here . . . the fantastic form of a relation 
between things.” Thus, Marx deems the value imposed in the process of commodifying, a 
136 
 
constructed, imagined, and arbitrary one. This theory lends itself well to explain how the 
parergon or the added value to the texts and images just discussed can be seen as a 
commodity; it is imagined and added, with help from the assimilating powers of 
Neoplatonism, to fuse the image of the ruler with the divine. Because of these surplus values, 
the rulers, at whose workshops these illustrations were made, were able to maintain their 
positions of absolute power, consistent with Neoplatonic ideas. A resemblance is not difficult 
to see between the human-headed horse carrying the figure of the Prophet and the Neo-
Classical architecture –in its assimilated form – that was borrowed in the West to project 
economic or political power. 
Foucault, in the Order of Things, points to the history of resemblance and how “a 
culture experiences the propinquity of things, how it establishes the tabula of their 
relationships and the order by which they must be considered.” He expresses concerns “with 
a history of resemblance: on what conditions was Classical thought able to reflect relations of 
similarity or equivalence between things, relations that would provide a foundation and a 
justification for their words, their classifications, their systems of exchanges?”232 The 
conditions Foucault is referring to here are not unlike the relationships between things as 
defined through Platonic and Neoplatonic ideas. One of the examples is in the transformation 
of the figure of Alexander in Safavid illuminated manuscript. 
The tradition of book illumination goes back to pre-Islamic times.
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  One of the great 
literary works serving as an inspirational source for imagery is the work of Shahnama (book 
of kings) completed in the year 1000 by Firdowsi (940-1020); it is of the collected accounts 
of Persian history written in epic poetry. Many versions of this book were produced and 
illustrated, but the only remaining copies were produced after the Mongol invasion (Gray 
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19). One of the perplexing 
characters in Shahnama is 
Alexander, who has transcended 
the historic figure. 
The transformation of the 
historic figure of Alexander, 
who arrived in the fourth century 
BCE on his campaign to form his 
own empire and conquered a 
great part of the Middle East, including ancient Persia, but is commemorated, and his 
heroism and piety celebrated in illuminated manuscripts deserves a closer look. Two sources 
are cited as examples: first one is from a series of paintings of a Shahnama known by its 
former owner’s name Demotte that survives only in dismantled folios, exemplary of the 
Ilkhanid courtly arts, titled Battle of Iskandar (Alexander) with the Dragon (Tabriz, 1330-
1336), and the other is from Khamsa Nizami called Iskandar Visiting a Hermit (Herat, 1535-
1540). 
The notion of al-Insan al Kamil, (the Perfect Man), finds visual expression in 
manuscripts; one example is of the myth and the stories about Alexander (Iskandar) in the 
region.
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 In a page from a 14
th
 century Persian illuminated Shahnama, Alexander is shown 
riding on his white horse wielding his sword at the so called dragon – referred to in the title 
included at the top of the image as “rhinoceros” – but clearly a monstrous depiction of an 
imaginary animal associated with evil. Alexander is charging ahead fearlessly, while his 
troops, shown in a cluster of riders, follow behind him. A hint of landscape in the 
9. Battle of Iskandar (Alexander) with the Dragon, 
from Shahnama Firdowsi (known as Demotte), Tabriz, 
dated 1330-1336. 
138 
 
background is indicated in overlapping hills and trees. The scene is so fraught with fear that 
even his horse turns its head away, rearing. The image underscores Alexander’s heroism, 
which should appear peculiar, since historically he is the one who overthrows the Persian 
Empire.
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In another page from the same Shahnama, shown in a painting titled The Bier of the 
Great Iskandar, a devastated crowd has 
gathered around his coffin and is mourning 
his death. (Gray 32) Each corner of his 
coffin is punctuated with a tall 
candleholder. One figure has its back to the 
viewer and has thrown himself (or herself?) 
on the cloth-covered coffin. Figures in the 
foreground have raised their arms over their 
heads in mourning gestures; some have 
even torn their robes off their bodies in their grief. Such expressions of sorrow seem 
implausible for the historic Alexander, but not for Alexander as the “Perfect Man.” More 
puzzling is when the historic Iskandar becomes mythical Iskandar in the literary works where 
he is transformed into a Salik (a pupil on the mystic path) who sets off toward the East in 
search of enlightenment. In this interpretation, the military campaign is completely 
substituted with a spiritual journey. In another painting attributed to the Persian 16
th
 century 
painter Mir Mussavir, produced in the Safavid royal workshop in 1535-1540, Iskandar, 
young and handsome, dressed in a richly brocaded Persian coat, appears before a hermit; he 
is seated with legs folded underneath, in the manner the pupils traditionally sit in the 
presence of their master. The sage is depicted within the opening of a cave, outside of which 
10. The Bier of the Great Iskandar, from  
Shahnama Firdowsi (known as Demotte), 
Tabriz, dated 1330-1336.  
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a tree stands. Iskandar’s horse is being tended to in the foreground, and a few other figures of 
attendants fill the composition. The picture frame seems open on two sides as the stones from 
the cave and the leaves from the tree spill over the 
edges.
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 The story might have been inspired by the mystic 
story of a supposed meeting between Alexander and 
Diogenes. 
As demonstrated in these examples, there are two 
distinct roles in which Alexander appears in text and 
image: one portrays him as a warrior and a hero, the other 
as a seeker of mystic knowledge, on a spiritual quest. In 
either role, no hostility is shown toward the man who 
was a conqueror of the region. Alexander reached as far 
as India in 326 BCE, before his death in Babylon in 323 BCE.
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 Instead, assimilated well 
into the visual vocabulary, the cultural and ideal values are projected through him, and 
perhaps exploited by the rulers who identified with him and commissioned the works. The 
written text for both roles reveal a constructed image of Alexander, not as the historical 
figure, but as the manifestation of a constructed identity representing the “Perfect Man,” one 
who accomplished greatness militarily through his courage and prowess, and one who had 
connections to the Divine through his mystic quest; this is consistent with Ibn Arabi’s 
formula of al-Insan al Kamil. 
If we view Alexander’s military campaign in the region in late 4th century BCE as a 
symbol of the arrival of Classical Greek culture, and realize that the philosophical and mystic 
influences from ancient Greece had already reached and been established in the region by the 
11. Mir Mussavir, Iskandar 
Visiting a Hermit, from 
Khamsa Nizami, 1535-1540. 
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time Islam was introduced (in 7th century) with such stories already part of the existing 
folklore, and following the translation movement and the dissemination of knowledge 
including Greek philosophy in the 9
th
 century, Ibn Arabi’s theories must have seemed 
familiar during and after the Middle Ages in the Middle East. Nonetheless, as with the earlier 
example, in Alexander’s case we are once again confronted with a parergon and surplus 
value in comparison to the historic texts,
238
 as well as the Koranic text with regards to the 
Perfect Man. This necessitates further examination of the subject, since the notion of Perfect 
Man appears to be the hinge on which the patriarchal powers have claimed legitimacy and 
divine sanction. 
The concept of Perfect Man is in direct conflict with Koranic text that not only makes 
no reference to such an idea, but contradicts it in many places. The statements, “. . . God is 
Greater
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 . . . (29:45),” “He has no equal (112:4)” or “there is no divinity but God (2:163),” 
are a few examples among many that oppose the “Perfect Man” and clearly distinguish 
between the Creator and the created. To be sure, in citing these contradictions, I do not intend 
to carry out a sort of a purification or redemption of Islam. The raising of such discrepancies 
is aimed at drawing attention to the “gap” that exists, so that it may open up a space for 
individual responses. Furthermore, the elevation of humans to divine status is a concept that 
reaches well before the advent of Islam and to ancient Mesopotamia, Egypt and the time of 
Greek antiquity, in which the kings and heroes were declared gods or sons of gods. The 
Romans further continued this tradition by the process of apotheosis, declaring their favorite 
emperors as gods.
240
  
Just as the Greco-Roman visual vocabulary entered Christianity,
241
 the whole notion 
of humans becoming interchangeable with God permeated Christianity from antiquity as well 
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and integrated into Christian doctrine represented by the institutionalized religion, while 
quintessentially there is evidence pointing to a difference between the Creator and the created 
in all Abrahamic monotheist traditions.
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 Therefore, Ibn Arabi’s thoughts are more in line 
with the exchangeability between the Creator and the created than with monotheism. In a 
poem he writes: 
I am in love with no other than myself,  
and my very separation is my union ...  
I am my beloved and my lover;  
I am my knight and my maiden.
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The apparent conflict in the poem above has the potential to reveal a “gap” that 
should lead to individual responses. However, the assumed authority that dominates and the 
creativity involved lead to the concealment of that “gap.” 
THE SAFAVID DREAMERS AND THE GERMAN IDEALISTS: NEOPLATONIC IDEAS IN THE WORKS 
OF GERMAN PHILOSOPHERS AND THE ROLE OF ART AS COMPARED WITH THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
ARTS DURING THE SAFAVID REIGN 
It may appear peculiar to speak of the Safavids and the German Idealists in the same 
breath. However, upon a closer look, one can recognize both sides’ affinity for the 
transcendental Neoplatonic ideas, itself predicated on Platonic philosophy. To unpack this 
statement it is necessary to begin with a brief analysis of the link between Platonism, 
Neoplatonism and their patriarchal association, followed by a brief analysis of German 
Idealism and Romanticism. The objective here is to expose the “gap” that exists between the 
“misrecognition” of the self, shown through the Neoplatonic mirror as “perfect,” “ideal,” and 
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“divine”, and the potential to advance the individual from this illusion, as suggested in 
human development by Lacan. Then, keeping the individuality intact, I intend to examine 
how this phenomenon unfolds in the European instance, or as the case is in the Middle East 
particularly with respect to the Safavids, how the individual remains dissolved in the 
collective (through an artificial unity) with its fate finalized. 
Platonism, Neoplatonism and the Lacanian “Mirror Phase” 
The power of imagination in Plotinus has had consequences in the development of 
Neoplatonism. Kevin Corrigan, in Reading Plotinus notes “Neoplatonism is sometimes 
thought to sublimate or bypass the individual or other person entirely” (2). Plotinus’s 
thoughts, presupposing the Pre-Socratics, are a sort of contemplation on, and at times 
creative interpretation of, works of philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Stoics, Skeptics, 
and others.
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 Thus, in his system, he is very much reliant on Plato, and Platonists, like 
Aristotle, and other “ancient philosophers.” According to a Neoplatonist expert, his major 
work, the Enneads, is “not so much a body of philosophical opinions as fifty-four 
philosophical meditations, many of which are quietly revolutionary in their scope and 
creativity” (Corrigan 23). Such assessment compels us to view the Enneads as a work of art, 
but nonetheless a highly pervasive one and easily adaptable to patriarchal values, hence a 
parergon itself. 
The whole patriarchal synthesis hinges on the idea of guardianship of one over the 
rest. The reverberations of the soul in nature, as argued by Plotinus, may link to the 
Intellectual-Principle, however they are imperfect. “[F]or its perfection . . . [the soul] must 
look to that Divine Mind, which may be thought of as a father watching over the 
development of his child born imperfect in comparison with himself” (V.1.3).245 The Platonic 
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idea of the philosopher as the guardian provides specific instructions for such a guardian. 
According to Plato, the education of a young man
246
 groomed to be the guardian should 
include “arithmetic, geometry (plane and solid), astronomy and harmony,” not in a utilitarian 
capacity, but, as stated by Bertrand Russell, “in order to prepare his mind for the vision of 
eternal things.” (131) 
Plotinus’s answer to the question posed by the early philosophers in bridging the gap 
between the physical and the metaphysical world is in his hypostases, that which is “real 
existence” and “underlie everything we experience” (Corrigan 23). His three principles, The 
One (or the Platonic Good), The Intellect (or Being that encompasses all beings and 
intellects), and the Soul (encompassing all souls, and all creations in the material world 
inspired by One through the Intellect), the unity (Plotinus considers “all beings are beings by 
virtue of unity”), of which is fundamental to grasping his answer to the above question and to 
understanding Neoplatonism (V.1.5, V.1 and 10, VI.9.1). 
The Intellect (nous) “stands as the image of the One,” because “[the One] in its self-
quest has a vision: this very seeing is the Intellectual-Principle” (V.1, 7). The One emanates 
the “Divine Mind.” Just as the Intellect determines its being from its origin, the One, the Soul 
has the Intellect as its underlying principle, but itself issues the material world and operates 
by reasoning. Therefore, it is possible to know the Divine Mind, which we forget through our 
self-will. Plotinus begins the Fifth Ennead by asking “What can it be that has brought the 
souls to forge the father, God, and, though members of the Divine and entirely of the world, 
to ignore at ones themselves and It?” (V.1.1). In knowing the Divine Mind, one can and must 
study one’s soul, at the point which is most like its true source. To that end, one must also 
purify that which has given shape to the body and the senses; that which remains is the 
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Divine. Therefore, the element of cognition is critical in understanding the relationship 
between the three that unfolds through a process of purification (V.1.10). By purification 
Plotinus does not mean negation or elimination, rather transcendence beyond the material 
world, however, through the material world. 
It is in this state, according to Plotinus, that one can not only see nous, but also see 
the One, and therefore establish direct connection with the Divine (V.1.2). The problem with 
this theory is an existentialist one in that it does not distinguish between the seer and the 
seen, the creator and the created (V.3.7). This flaw then leaves the door open for patriarchy to 
substitute itself for the “One” and assume all its privileges. This view is predicated upon the 
conformity to the “One” who does not recognize the “other.” Thus, Plotinus, in contrast to 
Plato, does not equate nature or the senses to evil.
247
 By extension, the representation of 
nature or senses in art is not negated, for it is deemed the handy work of the Soul, from what 
it remembers of the One, through the nous. What connects the hierarchy of the One, Spirit 
(nous) and Soul, Plotinus argues, is love that is stimulated when things are remembered (I.6.2 
and III.5.1).   
There is determinism in this “love,” and free will is seen as an obstacle (Russell 296). 
There is a clear purpose for this artistic beauty as well. Therefore, he emphasizes the beauty 
perceived through the senses and considers it key to recognizing what lies beyond. This 
beauty of nature is then extended to configurations created by artists representing natural 
forms, which are also primarily reliant upon “seeing;” thus, visual art becomes an important 
player in Plotinus’s scheme of things. 
Analogously, Plotinus holds up a mirror to humanity claiming what is reflected 
(whether in nature or in a work of art) in fact signals the perfection all must strive for; 
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however, this is nothing but an illusion. Since it looks toward the One, where “rest is 
unbroken” and “all is content,” there can be no change or movement (V.1.4).  Plotinus’s 
mirror disregards that as humans we “see” things differently, are all dependent on one 
another in many ways, and have our experiences shaped through one another’s. As Anthony 
Kenny notes on Wittgenstein, “[e]ven the words that we use to frame our most secret and 
inward thoughts derive the only sense they have from their use in our common external 
discourse.”248 Plotinus’s philosophy, however, makes the individual dependent upon the 
“One” that historically has easily been replaced by patriarchal aristocracy or religious dogma, 
and has led all toward absolutism. This dependence is solidified in the power patriarchy 
acquires by making its own possession all that can reflect that perfection or ideal based on 
Neoplatonism, including art. In this, Plotinus provides what serves as the foundation of 
aristocratic, patriarchal rule. 
It is then a small wonder that Plotinus’s notion of the “One” seems strikingly similar 
to Plato’s “Idea of the Good,” though it appears to have originally come from Parmenides. 
Kenny asserts “the dominant place in Plotinus’ system is occupied by ‘the One’: the notion is 
derived through Plato, from Parmenides, where Oneness is a key property of Being . . . [I]t is 
the basis of all being and the standard of all value, but it is itself beyond being and beyond 
goodness” (92). This may explain why Russell calls Plotinus a “melancholy optimist.” 
Plotinus, in the unstable and unhappy world in which he lived,
249
 was seeking happiness 
through “reflection upon things that are remote from the impressions of sense.” This, 
Plotinus achieved through the power of “thought and imagination” (Russell 286). In other 
words, he sought freedom from what he could not control or change, in thought and 
imagination, an idea which centuries later Kant relies upon to develop his theory of criticism, 
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or well beyond that, Deleuze and Guattari form their Schizophrenic excursions as means to a 
creative escape from the all-encompassing ties of capitalism.
250
  
In the Fourth Ennead, Plotinus explains how the soul, which has no independent 
reality, descends and enters a body suitable to it. It then “has the desire of elaborating order 
on the model of what it has seen in the Intellectual-Principle” (IV.7.13). However, joining a 
body separates the soul from its place of unity with other souls as essence, and is made to 
govern “what is lower than itself” (IV.8. 2-3). Here is when we are confronted with an 
individual entering the natural world.  
There are similarities between this individual in recognizing himself/herself as the 
one who descended from an essence connected to the Divine Intellect and the child who sees 
himself/herself in the mirror for the first time, according to Jacques Lacan. The child 
perceives a seemingly complete image of the self, and that forms the foundation of his/her 
ego; this is a necessary step, albeit an incomplete image of the child as a being who is very 
much dependent upon others to fulfill his/her needs. This is what Lacan calls 
méconnaissance, and it is experienced through “seeing.”251 
In order to explain human subjectivity and account of the individuated self, Lacan 
asserts in his ‘Mirror Phase Theory’ that such a development takes place based on an illusion. 
“This image is a fiction because it conceals, or freezes, the infant’s lack of motor co-
ordination and the fragmentation of its drives. But it is salutary for the child, since it gives it 
the first sense of a coherent identity in which it can recognize itself” (Mitchell & Rose 30). 
The result in the self that is shown to the individuals through Neoplatonism is not dissimilar 
to this principle. It gives an inaccurate portrayal of the individual, albeit a coherent spiritual 
identity in theory; it turns one inward toward seeking and longing for the essence or 
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purification. The difference is the Lacanian child has the opportunity to move beyond this 
stage, while the Neoplatonian soul does not, because of the latter’s predetermined 
destination. 
Interestingly, the metaphor of mirror is often used by Neoplatonists to encourage the 
individual to recall the connection with the Divine.
252
 To visualize this connection, Plotinus 
places the “Intellect” (Spirit) in between the “One” and the “Soul” and speaks of the beauty 
that exists there: “. . . all is transparent . .  . so that everywhere there is all, and all is all  . . . 
There, is all the stars; and every star, again, is all the stars and sun . . . while some manner of 
being is dominant in each all are mirrored in every other” (V.8.4). 
Comparably, the same pattern is repeated even with the progression of thoughts in 
philosophy with regard to the shaping of the idea of the “I.” Philosophically speaking, 
Lacan’s theory can also apply to the Cartesian cogito in that it confirms the existence of the 
“I.” The moment Descartes draws this conclusion is the moment in which the philosophical 
“child” sees itself in the philosophical symbolic mirror and becomes aware of its 
philosophical ego, but there is no mention of the thoughts being shaped by any other being 
other than the “I;” therefore, it lacks the ability to identify the valuable connection with 
others. This ego becomes the center of the philosophical discussion from this point on upon 
which philosophers like Kant, for example, base their thoughts.
253
 Where there is a 
difference, nonetheless, is when the “seeing” shifts to “thinking” beginning with Descartes. 
None of these philosophers however, question the issue of the “point of origin” until Mikhail 
Bakhtin (1895-1975), who draws attention to “utterance” and dialogism.254 The distraction 
toward the self, whether in the psychological development of the biological child or the 
philosophical development of humanity, can be seen as the impediment in striving to connect 
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dialogically with others. In Plotinus, as stated by Russell, this is seen as a flaw, as he believes 
Plotinus’s philosophy discourages willing any change. In fact, being reliant on deterministic 
principles in Neoplatonism, the free will is viewed as a sin (Russell 296). 
The shift from the “seeing” to “thinking” opened up the possibility for a deeper 
investigation of what is being “seen.” This brought forth the notion of the individual as a 
thinker, who, while still isolated, was beginning to claim an identity, based on reason, 
distinct from what it had experienced as a subject to a patriarchal system. However, the 
Neoplatonist influence endures because the individual remains dissolved in the collective 
(through an artificially imposed unity), and during the times of uncertainty, has no path other 
than moving inward. In the words of Kandinsky: “When religion, science, and morality are 
shaken . . . when the external supports threaten to collapse, then man’s gaze turns away from 
the external toward himself” (AiT 87). 
Idealism in German Philosophy, Neoplatonism and Creative Expressions 
In the course of the development of consciousness in Western philosophy, if we 
consider the Cartesian “I,” 255 as the starting point of the journey toward subject formation, it 
is Kant who builds on what Andrew Bowie calls “the shared structures of our subjective 
consciousness which are the ‘condition of possibility’ of objective knowledge,” in order to 
lay the foundation for a subject formation independent from the Divine (2). Therefore, what 
Kant did (and his followers pursued along the same lines) was replace nature, as predicated 
upon the Divine,
256
 with a nature defined through aestheticism and beauty as responded to by 
the human mind (Bowie 3). This substitution gave some sense of empowerment to humans, 
albeit an “imaginary” one to use Lacan’s term in the case of the individual,257 or in a broader 
scope, to the new incoming bourgeois class, nevertheless. 
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The individuation of the child as a subject in “I,” according to Lacan, is reliant upon 
the theory of “mirror stage,” in which the child sees himself/herself in the mirror and realizes 
he/she is a separate being; however, this is in fact a misrecognition (méconnaissance) that 
comes at the cost of seeing the image misleadingly as perfect. This misrecognition, Lacan 
argues, contributes to the narcissistic formation of his/her “I,” and “the narcissistic image, 
which [comes] from the pleasure derived from meeting himself in the mirror, becomes when 
confronting his fellow man an outlet for his most intimate aggressivity” (qtd in Keenan 218). 
Similarly, the “I” becomes pivotal to the development of Western philosophy in the process 
of subject formation as it unfolds through the works of German philosophers. 
In Bowie’s attempt to reposition subjectivity within Kant’s aesthetic theory in 
response to recent postmodern theories, he argues both Idealism and early Romanticism to be 
“immediate consequences” of Kant’s philosophy striving to define subjectivity,258 while both 
place the “I” at the center. I submit, there is a correlation between the notions of perfection 
and the autonomy of the “I,” and the Idealism or even Romanticism that emerged out of 
Kant. Idealism and Romanticism are predicated on a predetermined unity with the natural 
world in which consciousness can take place in the case of the former, or can never occur in 
the case of the latter
259
 (Bowie 98); both consequences were influential in the development of 
proceeding philosophical theories in Germany. These theories are significant, as justified by 
Bowie, for “they regard the experience of natural and artistic beauty and the fact of aesthetic 
production as vital to the understanding of self-consciousness” (Bowie 2). 
An example of Idealists’ thought would be in the philosophy of Fichte. Upon Kant’s 
emphasis on the subject as being where the object can be recognized, Fichte took it as far as 
stating that it is the “I” that produces the world, and that “the absolute . . . is the action of the 
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I” (Bowie 70, 75). Consciousness, Fichte argues, happens in what he calls “reflexive 
splitting,” in which the “I” both splits and is unified spontaneously. More importantly for 
Fichte, this is not a chain of events, one leading to another, but rather he turns the “I” toward 
itself in apperception. He states: “the activity . . . does not . . . lead endlessly to other effects, 
but can instead . . . ‘go back into itself,’ and thus has a ‘being for itself’: I and activity which 
returns into itself are completely identical concepts” (Bowie 73). 
The early Romantics, however, were unconvinced of the “spontaneous splitting and 
unity” in reaching consciousness while remaining “absolute” at the same time, and believed 
that the “imagination” played an important role in the formation of subjectivity. Novalis 
rejects the ‘view from nowhere,’ responding to Fichte’s “eye” in the conscious self’s ability 
to “‘see’ itself seeing” (Bowie 75) and argues that the consciousness process “is not 
transparent to itself,” but rather it has to be represented to itself (Bowie 89). Novalis argues: 
“consciousness itself is a ‘being outside being in being.’ This means it is an ‘image’, ‘an 
image of being in being’” (Bowie 90). However an image of the “I” is not the same as the “I” 
itself; this, Novalis resolves by maintaining “the very sense of its absence points to its 
undeniable existence” (Bowie 91). This “negative recognition”260 that informs “. . . Novalis’s 
Romantic notion of art” arises from “the necessary failure to represent an absolute ground, in 
this case the I . . .” (Bowie 95). Novalis states:  
Self-consciousness in the greater sense is a task – an ideal – it would be that state 
within which there was no movement in time . . . In real self-consciousness we would 
just change – but without going any further . . . we are not I by inferences and 
indirectly – but immediately . . . All our memories and events link to a mystical unity 
which we call I (ibid). 
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The Idealism in Hegel is in his collapse of the subject into object. For Hegel, the 
ultimate objective is “Absolute Truth,” to be arrived at through the mind’s mediation of 
empirical knowledge (phenomena), awarding it new meaning and situating it within its 
rightful place in time; this is guided by Geist (i.e. essence, spirit, mind), and it continues until 
self-consciousness is achieved; it implies change of human spirit across time, but suggests a 
path toward a destination for art and for history. Therefore, the more we acquire knowledge, 
the more we unite with it, and the closer we get to “Absolute Truth.” To avoid Kant’s binary 
problem of acquiring knowledge from the “outside” world and uniting it with our faculties on 
the “inside,” Hegel, as with the other Idealists, shows “how thought and being are 
inseparable” (Bowie 141). 
The further criticism of Kant’s binary division of the world into phenomena and 
noumena brings in other philosophers, such as Schopenhauer, who argues the “world’s most 
inner essence” to be the “Will.” Never appearing on its own, the Will manifests itself through 
the desires of body; therefore, “the phenomenal world is grounded in the Will, which 
objectifies itself in different ways in all of nature” (Bowie 262). The link Schopenhauer 
establishes between the Will and subjectivity is then picked up by Nietzsche in the “will to 
power” which eliminates “a metaphysically grounded notion of history” (Bowie 275); 
Nietzsche rejects any “higher collective historical goal,” as in Hegelian “philosophy’s 
continuous self undermining […] as constituting a progression that incorporates the refuted 
views of the world into a higher synthesis” (Bowie 275).  Similar to Schopenhauer, Nietzsche 
believed in the intuitive accessibility of the ‘one truly existing subject’ (i.e. Nature, Life, 
Will, etc.) rather than rationalism, and saw the point of art as “the pleasure for the ‘true 
creator’.” Nietzsche sees “our highest dignity in the significance of works of art – for only 
aesthetic phenomenon is existence and the world eternally justified” (Bowie 280). However, 
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those who create culture in Nietzsche’s view are not from the masses. While Nietzsche sees 
the “essence of modernity” in its “lack of center” and in the diversity of cultures, he does not 
have a favorable view of it. His proposed solution to “the de-centered state of culture [is] in 
terms of a ‘re-birth of German myth’,” which is the creation of “superior beings” and not 
consequence of “education, cultural opportunity, and democratic debates” (Bowie 281). 
In The Origin of the Work of Art, Heidegger returns to the issue of “essence” and of 
“Being” (Heidegger 143). He asks: “[I]n defining the essence of the thing, what is the use of 
a feeling, however certain, if thought alone has the right to speak here?” (Heidegger 151). To 
answer, he “interprets” feeling as “more intelligently perceptive . . . more open to Being than 
all reason” (ibid). Here is where he notes a rift: “[T]he current thing-concept always fits each 
thing. Nevertheless, it does not lay hold of the thing as it is in its own being, but makes an 
assault upon it”(ibid). As a solution, Heidegger proposes a “free field” in which the thing can 
“display its thingly character directly” (ibid). This is the field of aesthetic (aistheton). To be 
sure, Heidegger is looking to Kant here when he defines aistheton as “perceptible by 
sensation in the senses belonging to sensibility.” He further notes: “Hence the concept later 
becomes a commonplace according to which a thing is nothing but the unity of manifold of 
what is given in the senses” (ibid). 
Heidegger’s investigation into the “thingness” of things and tracing the words back to 
their origin also is suspiciously reminiscent of Freud’s method, but he never opens it enough 
to move beyond the central discourse of the essence. Heidegger notes that, the reason 
everyone thinks is in understanding of a meaning of a word, is due to its “core.” However, 
there is a “leap” between the underlying experiences (as also later pointed to by Foucault) 
and its origin that will not carry over in translation (Heidegger 149). In a different time 
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period, this will leave us not with the presence of the same core, but rather with layers of 
interpretation and re-interpretation of the word.
261
 He then concludes: “No wonder that the 
current attitude toward things – our way of addressing ourselves to things and speaking about 
them – has adapted itself to this common view of the thing”262 (ibid). This is not unlike what 
Foucault is interested in: the “history of resemblance” (Foucault xxiv). 
Safavid Idealism through Creative Reverberations: Mūla Sadrā 
What defines “Idealism” among the Safavid kings is not a consistent idea and is 
intimately interwoven with the patriarchy’s objectives that reveals it was continuously facing 
a paradox: constancy and unsustainability.
263
 Whereas Shah Isma’il’s military campaigns 
necessitated a divine leader (one that could liberate – a messiah), we witness him claiming 
such a position. However, once the control of the land had been achieved and such a position 
could no longer be sustained, and when his successor, Tahmasp, is confronted with a 
different set of challenges in order to manage, he is forced to claim to be, not the divine, but a 
representative of someone like Prophet Mohammad, who received revelations (Babayan 92). 
This image is expressed well in the exemplary subject of Mi’raj discussed earlier. In his 
memoirs, Tahmasp projects himself as a “Muslim king and friend of God (vali)” (Babayan 
99). 
Thus, once the fragmented region was consolidated under the Safavid founder, it 
became necessary to establish a rule of law (shari’a), which had to come from the Shi’a 
school of thought due to converting the country into Shi’ism. There had been no precursor to 
such authority to administer or pass down the law from a Shi’a position of power. This 
problem was remedied through the migration by invitation of the Shi’a ulama (religious 
authorities) from Jabal Amil located in the mountainous region of Southern Lebanon 
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(Babayan 2002, 407). This move eventually set in opposition the shari’a-minded theologians 
against the combination of the “alchemical, mystical, and philosophical spheres” that had 
resurfaced “in the early modern period” in Iran, and resulted in the fragmentation of the 
mainly Greco-Roman, pre-Islamic beliefs and practices.
264
 It was crucial nevertheless, for the 
Safavids to maintain their domination over all despite such opposition. 
Perhaps nowhere more appropriate than in the transition that paved the way for the 
reign of Shah Abbas I (r. 1588-1629) is the location we witness another creative aftershock. 
At this time, a sweeping motion replaced the ghullāt worldview that had initially brought the 
Safavids to power, thus giving way to the rise of the “philosopher king” (Shadow of God on 
Earth), as defined by a reconciliation between Shi’ite and Sufi (itself with Platonic and 
Neoplatonic) views. Hence, a balance was called for between the two that was achieved in 
the works of contemporary philosophers such as Mullā Sadrā, to whom I shall return. As was 
necessary, therefore, the Safavid patriarchy modified and morphed, forged a new ideology, 
and even eliminated its own ideological progenitors to remain in power.
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By the time of Shah Abbas I, the messianic phase that had established the Safavid 
Imperial rule dwindled due to not only the need for law and order to manage and administer 
the affairs of the empire, but also a desire to forge a new encompassing image of the king.
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This diminishing, however, by no means eliminated the various Alid perspectives and 
sentiments as testified to by Shah Abbas’ precursors’ change of position. Babayan explains: 
Unlike his father [Isma’il], who claimed to be messiah/God, Tahmasp positions 
himself within that comfortable distance of dreams that had become a recognized 
mystical medium of communicating with the divine, an accepted distance between the 
holy and the human.
267
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Further, there is the issue of creativity to consider that speaks to the existing 
understanding of how different styles of piety were viewed as possessing the knowledge of 
the unseen (ghayb), sometimes labeled as “magic” or “alchemy.” This was, to be sure, of 
great interest to the king and other regional or local authorities, who believed “mystical 
circles and spiritual guides . . . [to be] the repository of temporal authority” (Babayan 94). 
Babayan further notes the “creative act” as significant to Medieval Muslims, whether it be in 
“fashioning the universe, a beautiful poem, a painting or a song,” as it was deemed emulation 
of the act of creation, for it “stimulated sensual responses” (Babayan 95). She states: 
Artists were believed to be endowed with a special power and ability to perform 
miracles in the way that they could mirror the magnificence of creation. The ability to 
capture that splendor was deemed to be magic, through words strung together in 
poetry that aroused emotions or colored images that constructed realities.
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Also noteworthy here is the understanding of “nature” among the “philosophers 
(hukamā) and the alchemists,” which was predicated on the knowledge from antiquity. Such 
views can be traced back to the time after Alexander’s arrival to the region, when the Greek 
and the Babylonian ideas were exchanged.
269
 These ideas were established on the balance 
between the four elements (air, fire, water, earth) and the view of the interchangeability of 
the elements and their potential toward purity. What was deemed significant and sought after 
was an equilibrium. “[T]he purest compound was analogous to the perfect individual” 
(Babayan 97). The other notion came from the idea of the heavenly bodies’ influence on 
people’s lives and events. Peter Adamson explicates how by the second century AD there is 
an “intimate connection” between astronomy and astrology, evident in a work called 
Almagest by Claudius Ptolemy that found its way “even into Arab tradition” (196-7). What is 
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of particular interest here is how “[m]agic could be explained using ideas from Stoic and 
Platonist physics, in particular the idea that the whole cosmos is like a single organism.” 
Adamson states: 
The parts of the universe relate like parts of a body, so that they are capable of being 
‘jointly affected’—in Greek sumpatheia, [a] word that lives on in English as 
‘sympathy.’270 
The task of the sciences then was to reveal the underlying patterns of the cosmos, so 
they can rationalize the creation of a parallel symmetry in the material world. Babayan 
exemplifies: “[T]he circular motions of heavenly objects and the fourfold nature of elements 
were used as frameworks through which harmony could be created on earth” (97). Therefore, 
the cosmic patterns, mathematical principles and rules of proportion translated into models 
and motifs and were manifested in various art forms, from poetry to painting and 
architecture. However, for Shah Abbas I, this was only part of the plan. 
Shah Abbas I faced many challenges upon arriving at the Safavid throne in 1587 in 
Qazvin, both internally (with the supporters of other Safavid potential rivals) and externally 
from the Ottomans to the west, who had captured Tabriz in 1585, and the Uzbeks to the East, 
who had seized Herat and were moving toward Mashhad.
271
 Aside from his politico-military 
challenges, Abbas I also had to resolve the challenges posed to his spiritual leadership (as 
pir) by various Sufi elements, who openly questioned his authority (Newman 51). Shah 
Abbas’s court chronicler, Eskandar Beg Munshi, according to Newman, deems his military 
successes and victories over his rivals to be due to “Abbas’ divinely inspired creation of the 
ghulam or qullar corps—small forces composed mainly of non-Qizilbash Arab and Persian 
tribal volunteers” (52). 
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The term ghulam, meaning “slave,” already existed during the reign of Abbas’ 
precursor, Shah Tahmasp. However, it proved to be a most effective system during Shah 
Abbas’s reign to “preserve the vitality of the Safavid household.”272 The master-disciple 
relationship that existed through the Sufi hierarchy was easily transitioned into a master-slave 
structure, through which much of the same expectations (total devotion and loyalty) 
applied.
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 In the meantime, Shah Abbas moved his capital to Isfahan in 1590 to proclaim the 
dawning of his new era. “Isfahan served as a new physical and cultural environment from 
which the ruler and his slave household extended their power throughout the empire.”274 
However, Newman speaks of a “spiritual disquiet on the urban scene” (68). The spreading 
out of the urban life had contributed to the rise of “urban ‘popular’ classes . . . [that] 
encouraged the expansion of links between urban artisans and craftsmen and urban-based 
messianic Sufi discourse,”275 with those trades congregating in and patronizing “some of the 
capital’s coffee houses” in which “oppositional discourse [was] on offer” (Newman 68-69). 
Out of his concern for such congregations, Shah Abbas “delegated clerical associates of the 
court to monitor the activities of these venues.”276 The objective of the clerics was to 
“influence ‘popular’ spiritual discourse in the period” and align it with the Twelver Shi’ism 
(Newman 69).  
Earlier, the socio-religious influence of the messianic ideas, as argued by Babayan, 
had kept the criticism by the “shari’a-minded ul[a]ma” at a minimum. However, the 
migration of the Shi’a jurisprudence from south of Lebanon brought on a shift. Still, among 
the “Jabal Amil intellectuals” were those renowned individuals, like Mir Damād and Shaykh 
Bahai, who found the “shari’at-minded quest for God insufficient.” For this reason, “[t]o 
their studies on religious sciences (fiqh and hadith) they added philosophy (hikmat) and 
mysticism (irfan) (Babayan 407). Their student, Sadr al Din Mohammad Shirazi, known as 
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Mullā Sadrā (1571/2-1640), followed the style of his teachers in synthesizing, as stated by 
Babayan, “philosophy or sufism with purely rational quest for God” (ibid). Newman points 
out Ibn Arabi’s influence, among “other prominent Muslim thinkers from the twelfth to the 
sixteenth century,” on Mullā Sadrā’s “reconciliation of philosophy with gnosis (irfan),” 
predicated on the Andalusian mystic’s gnostic formulations, however “grounded . . . in the 
revelation of the Twelver Shi’ism” (Newman 70). But how did he actually accomplish this? 
Mullā Sadrā’s influential contribution rests on the question of “being,” in other 
words, on what later becomes “a leitmotif in . . . the eastern tradition: existence” (Adamson 
2016, 388). He drew from two opposing views.
277
 One view is predicated on the “primacy of 
essence,” as had been argued by Suhrevardi, and the other is the “primacy of existence,” a 
belief closer to the Neoplatonists and mystics, particularly the Andalusian mystic, Ibn Arabi 
(ibid). The philosophers in the former group “hold that there are real things outside the mind, 
but no existence that would belong to those things,” for “existence is a judgment of the 
mind.” The second group believes, on the other hand, that “existence or ‘being’ does have 
reality outside the mind,” and in Mullā Sadrā’s view this existence is light. Adamson 
explains, according to Mullā Sadrā:  
God is pure existence or pure light, whereas other things are always limited in their 
existence or illumination. Like Suhrevardi, then, Sadrā describes created things as 
suffering from darkness. Like the Sufis, he says that such things are compromised by 
non-being and privation, lacking the perfect existence that belongs to God alone. And 
like Avicenna, he says that this is because created things are contingent, whereas God 
is necessary.
278
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By stating “there is nothing real apart from existence,” Mullā Sadrā is clearly 
following the same Neoplatonic formula of “Unity of Existence,” and equals it to God. He 
further distinguishes the perfection of the Divine—because God is pure existence—from 
other things created, for in the latter there exists “lack or limitation” (Adamson 2016, 389).279 
Adamson argues that Mullā Sadrā solves the Platonic problem of real versus illusion by 
thinking “not only that all existence is marked by continuous variation in intensity, but also 
that all existence is in constant motion, even in respect of substance” (Adamson 2016, 392). 
Mullā Sadrā explains this motion in his “philosophical masterpiece,” The Four 
Journeys. The phrase had already been applied by Ibn Arabi, when expounding the centrality 
of “God as the guide for those who travel ‘from Him, to Him, in Him, and through Him’.” 
Closer to Mullā Sadrā’s time, the metaphor had been used again by a precursor of Mullā 
Sadrā’s.280 Therefore, it is not by accident that Mullā Sadrā chooses this as the title of his 
book. The journeys, according to Mullā Sadrā, take place “along a two-way street” 
(Adamson 2016, 388). First the creations “come forth from God like rays from a shining 
light.” The role of light is key, for it will serve as the “path back to the divine” (ibid). The 
journey back requires one to change, admits Mullā Sadrā. He argues, existence does go 
through changes, although so slowly and gradually that we tend to overlook it. Adamson 
notes here that the idea of “transformation . . . by soul as it inclines towards the body,” had 
already been expressed by the later Neoplatonists (395). Sadrā’s contribution, however, is in 
the way in which he illuminates how “all existing things strive to return to God.” Most 
important in this process, in Sadrā’s view, are the humans and required for this change is 
“knowledge” (ibid). But, knowledge is not merely something to acquire through senses.281 
Rather, “[r]eal knowledge” requires becoming one with it (Adamson 2016, 396).282 The 
process of “knowing” here maps onto what Fichte explains in the consciousness of the “I” 
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(Bowie 70, 73, 75). The separation of the creation, and the returning, by unifying the mind 
with knowledge, mirror the “splitting” of the “I” in order to arrive at consciousness. It is 
Mullā Sadrā, however, in the case of Iran in particular, that remains the bridge linking the 
antiquity’s philosophy to later philosophical, political, and Islamic thoughts. 
As rightly pointed out by Adamson, there is little doubt about Mullā Sadrā’s long 
lasting impressions, which reach well into the Modern times, as his philosophy remains a 
religiously and socially relevant subject of study among the religious scholars in Iran today 
(Adamson 2016, 441), and to which I shall return in the final chapter of this study. However, 
before examining the contemporary links, it is necessary to travel through the events leading 
to the period called Modernism, not just as it impacts Iran, but affecting two other important 
powers in the region, namely Egypt and the Ottoman Turkey, particularly following the rude 
awakening brought on by Napoleon’s Egyptian military campaign. 
In summary, this chapter focused on a number of critical points. First, by bringing in 
the case study of the Safavids, it made concrete in an historical situation, the thesis in this 
study. After a brief overview of the emergence of the Safavid dynasty in Iran, I focused on 
how the Safavids, in rising to political power, despite their roots in mystic-Sunni Islam, 
employed creativity, both in literary and in visual forms. I further identified the 
Neoplatonism in Islamic thought, by highlighting one of the most revered mystics, Ibn Arabi. 
As Ibn Arabi’s work was highly visual, and served as inspiration for further creative 
endeavors, I analyzed several examples that reveal the two principles of his philosophy: The 
Unity of Existence, and The Universal (Perfect) Man, as projected through the court 
sponsored arts. 
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It was also necessary in this chapter to identify the shared Neoplatonic ideas within 
both the German Idealist works, and the Safavid-supported philosophy and art that show 
traces of Neoplatonic and idealistic concepts. I concluded this chapter by drawing attention to 
the most influential figure in philosophy during the Safavid reign, Mūla Sadrā, whose impact, 
as I will demonstrate in the final two chapters, still continues to this day. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
MIDDLE EAST BEYOND THE SAFAVIDS: 
THE PRE AND EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY: MODERNISM, NATIONALISM, AND 
THE ARTISTIC ENDEAVOR 
 
When this process which we can call ‘modern’ began, the greater part of the Middle East was 
ruled by the two great empires, those of the Ottomans and Safavids […] they were the 
product of the whole process of Islamic civilization to which they were the heirs […] they 
were societies dominated by cities, and by the relations between city populations and those 
who ruled them.
283
 
       — Albert Hourani 
 
There have been many perspectives through which “modernity” can be defined, 
explained or critically investigated. The conventional consensus on the term “modern” 
however, often draws on what is measured in scientific, technological or even cultural 
achievements encompassing city life,
284
 while the history of the development of thought in 
Europe demonstrates a necessary undercurrent to the scientific or hegemonic cultural 
progress.
285
 This undercurrent is the development of the consciousness of the “I” or the 
subject-hood, which has also been influential in the advent of modernism. I am aware of the 
problem of the subject that objectifies. As Horkheimer and Adorno point out in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment, “Man’s domination over himself, which grounds his selfhood, is almost 
always the destruction of the subject, in whose subject it is undertaken” (54). Thus, 
consciousness of the “I” alone is not as important as how the “I” then becomes aware of its 
“other” and connect to it via language as noted by Mikhail Bakhtin. However getting through 
this stage is a pre-requisite to reach the next stage, at least in learning from the Western 
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experience. Here, I won’t get into the role of subject-hood in the opening a new social 
space/class in a society as it took place in Europe. One might argue, there is bound to be a 
clash of the “I’s” due all sides becoming self-centered, at some point, as it happened during 
the world wars within the western civilizations. But all can learn from that experience. 
Hourani’s statement above, therefore, may be considered with the discernment that 
his use of the term “modern” does not necessarily reflect the process of the development of 
new ideas that were taking shape in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe focusing on 
the individual, but rather the fruits of the advancements of that understanding through 
technology, primarily as linked with military purposes.
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 The view that exposes the issue of 
subjectivity and subject formation (or lack thereof) with respect to the concept of 
“modernity” has been continuously overlooked when it comes to studying the Middle Eastern 
regions, specifically Persia, or as known by its “modern” name, Iran. I propose, the absence 
of the question of subjectivity and subject formation as an inevitable part of the discourse on 
modernism in the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, has been due to the 
overlooking and bypassing of the portion of the philosophical investigation of the “I,” from 
Descartes to Kant (or an equivalent to such thoughts). The comparison of such discourses 
within the recorded history of philosophy has been argued against by Peter K. J. Park in 
Africa, Asia and the History of Philosophy: Racism in the Formation of the Philosophical 
Canon 1780-1830. Park notes that Africa and Asia were not without philosophy, but they 
were intentionally excluded from the history of philosophy by Western philosophical minds. 
Park, however, does not present any evidence that points to the slightest attention paid to the 
individual as a subject to itself within African or Asian philosophies. Indeed, the exclusion 
itself attests to what I aim to demonstrate here. 
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In this chapter, I will continue pulling on the thread of the ever-present Neoplatonism 
that blurred the space between the individual and the collective, the universal and the 
particular, i.e. subject and object. I aim to demonstrate, while the bulk of modern scientific 
achievements in the nineteenth century were initially dedicated to military purposes, some of 
the technological advancements that trickled into the production of the arts began to pave the 
way for hybridized and diverse cultural productions that can be considered the early steps 
toward individuality that hint at a diverse subject formation in the Middle East.
287
 Stated 
differently, the democratization of the modern way in which cultural products could be 
created (i.e. photography, graphic arts, theater, and mass publications) offered opportunities 
to capture early occurrences of different viewpoints—on many occasions opposing the 
dominant positions of power—critical to modernity in the region of the Middle East. 
Nevertheless, because the discourses, philosophy, and theories on issues such as the “self “or 
“alterity” were absent in that instance,288 those artistic and cultural achievements found no 
validation or acknowledgement and were reduced to fragments of recorded history, whether 
viewed favorably or negatively, without a chance for anyone to critically study them. This 
view is not unlike what Daryush Shayegan refers to as “false consciousness” (Shayegan 1997 
ix). Therefore, the cultural achievements of modernism were often capitalized on by the 
dominant patriarchal powers, particularly in creating a modern image of themselves to the 
outside world.
289
 Here, I aim to discuss in detail the Europeans’ arrival at the self and 
individual experience due to the works of Muslim scholars, and in particular, the theory of 
vision. However, I maintain it was this important theory that was overlooked by Muslims, for 
the implications of the theory of vision did not find a place to flourish in the pragmatic 
political structure in the Middle East at the time, yet it was explored fully by the Europeans, 
as attested to by the Renaissance artists’ works.290 Therefore, as exemplified in photography, 
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bypassing the individual experience has been one of the consequences of this disregard. 
Another corollary has been due to the West’s possession of key archeological information,291 
but historically, not sharing equally and fairly the finds with the people of the Middle East. 
The inequity in information distribution is another subject that shall remain beyond the 
boundaries of this study, and it must be postponed to future opportunities. 
The view of the self in the Middle East is so distorted and problematic that the 
dilemma has even permeated the works of the Middle Eastern scholars in Diaspora.
292
 In 
discourses on modernism in the Middle East, by taking an originary approach, some 
researchers appear to get caught in a competitive
293
 (a kind of my-culture-is-superior-to-
your-culture) approach; they race toward uncovering the proof of which culture has had the 
most advancements before anyone else did in history. For instance, some argue the ancient 
Persian civilization preceded the West in modernism, in their cultural and technological 
advancements, and even praise the wisdom of the divinely sanctioned ruler (according to the 
Bible), Cyrus the Great, embracer of diversity and human rights.
294
 Abbas Milani in Lost 
Wisdom: Rethinking Modernity in Iran, argues that contrary to the belief that modernity 
began in the west, there were many waves of modernism in Persia since the ancient times, 
waves that in turn influenced other civilizations,
295
 namely the European art and culture. 
Milani downplays the fact that Persia itself received these influences from Egypt, Babylon, 
Assyria, and other nations it came to conquer. Instead, he highlights a global high esteem for 
the king as: “[T]his . . . praise was partially in recognition of . . . the fact that the vast Persian 
Empire of the time was a paragon of religious and cultural tolerance (12). The issue of 
tolerance has specifically become a subject of interest ever since concerns have been raised 
over the increase of intolerance in recent decades, following the establishing of the 
revolutionary government in Iran. Nonetheless, without a clear view of the consequences of 
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such broad statements, one is not able to critically investigate the causes of such intolerances 
in recent years. These broad, sweeping views undermine the question of individuality and 
subject formation, for tolerance in the modern sense requires respect and acknowledgement 
of alterity and the individual rights. 
The issue of modernity in the Middle East is a massive subject, and for this reason, I 
will limit this study to the three Middle Eastern regions of Egypt, Persia, and Ottoman 
Turkey in the nineteenth and twentieth century, post Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798. 
To further clarify boundaries, this study chiefly focuses on the intersection of certain 
historical events with specific, selected examples of artistic endeavors represented in theater, 
visual arts (painting, sculpture, architecture and photography), as well as journalism, all of 
particular interest here due to their link to modernization programs. This is not just to reveal 
a similar pattern of Western influences that impacted the waves of modernity in these 
countries, as manifested in the technology, cultural, and artistic products, but also to locate 
and investigate the early instances of individual, critical, and diverse thinking in these three 
influential regions. These instances have rarely been considered beyond historical interests 
because the experiential process of individual awareness and subjecthood has repeatedly 
been disrupted by the dominance of patriarchy.
296
 Patriarchy, infused with and drawing 
legitimacy from the ever present Neoplatonic sentiments, continuously has returned to 
artificially unifying against the basis of differences and alterity, even under the guise of 
modernization, in order to maintain its own status of power.
297
  
It must be further noted that this study is within the premise that the written history 
about the Middle East has either been recorded by those from outside the cultures, or when 
recorded from within, it has gone through periods of erasures and manipulations, therefore, 
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suffering from a lack of reliable and verifiable continuity. Consequently, the historical 
evidence alone is not adequate and must be investigated as it intersects with the artistic 
products and carefully examined through a philosophical lens. Since the advent of modernist 
movements, no thorough, independent, and self-critical investigation of the available 
recorded history, as crossed with the relevant creative cultural products has taken place,
298
 it 
is the aim of this study to open up a space necessary to begin with the question of the 
self/individual-awareness, albeit an initially self-centered one, like those found among 
Napoleon’s soldiers in his Egyptian campaign (Cole 2007, 11).299 
THE  PRESSURES OF THE WAVE OF MODERNISM AND THE SUBSEQUENT REACTIONS 
At the turn of the nineteenth century, military competition appeared widespread with 
Europe enjoying a hegemonic position over the Middle East. This era had as one of its 
significant markers, the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt that had occurred only a couple of 
years earlier. Its impact, however, was not just restricted to Egypt. Napoleon’s campaign was 
based on what historians have viewed as a way to establish France’s political status and 
domination as a world colonialist power, in competition with the British. (See Appendix 
II.A).  
Egypt and Modernism: Napoleon’s Invasion of 1798  
Egypt in the second half of the eighteenth century was not in a suitable socio-
economic condition. In a brief paragraph, Cole sums up Egypt’s situation in the decades 
leading up to the Napoleonic invasion: 
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The eighteenth century was not kind to Egypt. Between1740 and 1798, Egyptian 
society went into a tailspin, its economy generally bad; droughts were prolonged, the 
Nile floods low, and outbreaks of plague and other diseases frequent. The slave-
soldier houses fought fierce and constant battles with one another, and consequently 
raised urban taxes to levels that produced misery. Now a new catastrophe had struck, 
in the form of Bonaparte’s plans to bestow liberty on Egypt.300 
Indeed, Napoleon had underlined his Egyptian campaign as one that was going to 
“liberate” the “unfortunate inhabitants of the Nile,” who had been tyrannized by the slave 
soldiers, the Mamluks. In his address to his soldiers, as he prepared to invade Egypt, keeping 
his arch enemy the Great Britain in view, he capitalized on Egypt’s poor socio-economic 
status and the autocratic leadership in phrases emphasizing the tyranny and exploitation of 
the people by the slave soldiers, who were serving the Ottomans. In one of his proclamations 
that was written aboard the Orient he states: “[s]oldiers . . . you are about to undertake a 
conquest, the effects of which on the civilization and commerce of the world are 
immeasurable. You shall inflict on England the surest and most palpable blow, while 
awaiting the opportunity to administer the coup de grace.”301 Overall the image was being 
created for the French army, who envisioned their campaigns as comparable to those led by 
likes of Augustus and Alexander.
302
 Napoleon, as the master of propaganda, also had plans in 
place to communicate his mission as clearly as possible to the Egyptians. But, there was the 
problem of language. 
Worse than “ungrammaticality and awkward wording,” Cole argues, was the content 
of Napoleon’s proclamations that “sought to express concepts for which there were no 
Arabic words,” so they were met with confusion and were difficult to understand (Cole 2007, 
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30). It is in the examination of such instances that one realizes not just the cultural 
disconnections, but how much Neoplatonic philosophy is deeply rooted in the region. One 
significant term in these proclamations is the term “republic.” In quoting from Abd al-
Rahman al Jabarti, the Cairene cleric and historian, Cole notes, al Jabarti’s explanation of the 
term that appears “less like a democracy and more like a rule of philosophers similar to that 
proposed by Socrates in Plato’s Republic . . . is no accident[,] [for h]e was a Muslim 
Neoplatonist” (Cole 2007, 33).303 
Another significant issue was the incompatibility between the Egyptian and French 
military. The Egyptian military forces were far behind the French, both in number and in 
technology.
304
 The French army was more orderly and disciplined to the point that the 
Mamluks had noticed and were quoted as having said “[t]he French army, which marches in 
tight squares . . . are linked with one another, and . . . they march like the pyramids” (Cole 
2007, 69). The acknowledgement of this incompatibility meant taking actions to promote 
improvement. Roger Owen in Egypt and Europe: from French Expedition to British 
Occupation notes in early nineteenth century the predominantly agricultural economy of 
Egypt experienced two sets of forces exerting pressure toward reforms: a number of 
reformist rulers, and Europe’s expansionist economy (114). The former prompted programs 
by rulers such as Muhammad Ali (r. 1805-49), Said (r. 1845-62), and Ismail Pasha (1863-
79), and the latter brought forth increasing trade, first in European export and then in their 
investments (ibid). (See Appendix II.A). 
During the nineteenth century, the issue of debt plays an important role in shaping 
Egypt’s path toward modernism, meanwhile producing subjectivities suited for colonialism. 
Owen submits that this is perhaps the first time in the history of Great Britain that it attempts 
170 
 
to colonize without the use of military power, at least initially; he further deems the 
subsequent invasion of Egypt “occupies a central role in the genesis of theories of capitalist 
imperialism (111-112). Europe’s commercial and financial expansion, therefore, initiated 
new methods of colonialism in the Middle East at this time that were mainly guided by the 
“financial community” but has had long lasting impressions on the colonized. In the words of 
Maurizio Lazzarato: “The ‘modern notion of economy’ covers both economic production and 
the production of subjectivity” (Lazzarato 11). 
The modernization campaign, backed by European finances, included building 
projects, and perhaps the most significant one, the construction of the Suez Canal, which 
opened in 1869. Artistic productions that aimed to project a modern view of Egypt played an 
important role in this very international event. Concurrent with inaugurating the Suez Canal, 
Ismai’l Pasha, (also known as Khedive Isma’il), had planned to celebrate the opening of the 
first Opera House in Cairo by employing European architects’ services. Designed by the 
Italian architect, Pietro Avoscani (1816-1890), the tripartite structure with an arched portico 
closely resembled La Scala Opera House in Milan which had opened in 1778.
305
 While 
Avoscani used wood instead of stone in this royal opera house, he maintained the clarity and 
rationalism of neoclassical design in the use of architectural elements such as pediment and 
12 & 13. Pietro Avoscani and Rossi (architects of Cairo Opera House, left), 
opened in 1869. Comparable to La Scala in Milan (right, opened in 1778). 
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decorative columns. The theater structure was accentuated at the entrance, with two 
neoclassical and allegorical sculpture groups, personifying the visual arts. The Khedivial 
Opera House burned down in 1971. 
Perhaps no evidence more directly than the guest 
list can speak to the fact that the Khedive wanted to 
showcase Egypt as a modern state, however, in 
appearances. The names on the guest list included heads of 
state, dignitaries, and artists; for the opening ceremony of 
the Suez Canal, Khedive Isma’il welcomed the wife of 
Napoleon, Empress Eugenie, Emperor of Austria, Emile 
Zola, Henrik Ibsen, and Eugene Fromentin among others. 
The Opera House, also known as Khedival Opera House, made its debut during the 
celebrations “with a cantata in honor of Isma’il and a performance of Verdi’s Rigoletto” 
(Hourani 2013). 
Similar to his grandfather’s modernization campaign, Khedive Ismai’l was trying to 
carry out an objective that proved to hold contradicting consequences: borrow money from 
Europe to modernize, and at the same time, maintain Egypt’s independence from Europe and 
the Ottomans (Owen 116). From the side of the Europeans, this was an opportunity to expand 
economic interests and political influences. Marx explains this phenomenon in Capital from 
the point of view of expansionist, capitalist Europe, in that “[w]hatever the social form of the 
production process, it has to be continuous [;] it must periodically repeat the same phases” 
(715). This means the same formula of debt spills over into non-European regions, by way of 
the export of capital, when necessary. Nevertheless, the conflict within Khedive’s goals 
14. Allegory of the Arts, 
Mohammad Hassan 
(1892-1960).  
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offered opportunities for criticism. The moments of contradiction (gaps) always make for an 
ideal opportunity to engender different perspectives, whenever possible. For Slavoj Žižek 
(2012), it is such conflicts that signal importance. In addressing the space in which power 
and resistance interact, he paraphrases Foucault stating that “power itself generates resistance 
to itself.” By resisting, one becomes the subject of that power (Žižek, 106). On this basis, the 
resistance to the power of patriarchy in the form of reaction through the arts deserves a closer 
examination in nineteenth century Egypt. 
The Egyptian National debt did not escape the keen eyes of the political satirist, 
James (Yaqub) Sanua (1839-1912), who captured it in his publication, Abou Naddara Zarqa 
(man with blue spectacles) in the issue dated November 25, 1878, which shows Khedive 
Ismai’l as a street musician with a tambourine, singing to collect money in order to pay off 
Egypt’s debt.306  
A modernist himself, Sanua had been active as a playwright, before the publication of 
Abou Naddara.
307
 Sanua’s activities in the realm of performing arts brought in mixed results 
15 & 16. The Abu Naddara published by James Sanua (1839-1912), (left, front 
page). Critical view of Egyptian politics: political ills of the day. November 25, 
1878 cartoon showing the Khedive begging for money to bail out Egypt. 
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from the Khedive. Upon requesting and receiving funding from Khedive Isma’il to form a 
theater company, as he had learned it was done in Europe, Sanua was able to produce three 
of his plays, and subsequently perform at the Khedive’s Qasr al-Nīl. Two of his plays, Anisa 
ala Muda (The Fashionable Young Lady), and Ghandur Misr (The Egyptian Dandy) were 
met with such enthusiasm and encouragement from the Khedive that, following one of the 
performances, he came up to Sanua on the stage and exclaimed: “You are truly the founder 
of our national theater, you are our Egyptian Molière.”308 Even so, not all was accepted 
during the modernization movement in Egypt, which underscores the superficiality of 
modernism in the region. A single example here can suffice. When Sanua’s play, al Durratān 
(The Two Co-Wives), which was a harsh criticism of polygamy, went on the stage, the 
Khedive was said to have been “furious and told Sanua that if he were not man enough to 
satisfy two wives, he should at least leave the ones who were able to do so alone.”309 Thus, 
there appears to persist a continuity in the traditional, patriarchal manner of thinking, even 
from those who were seemingly striving to modernize. This demonstrates how steps taken 
toward modernism in the region did not go beyond the surface, as criticism of established 
conventions was not looked upon favorably. In Persia, the tradition of patriarchy persisted, 
however, mainly through the domination of the religious authority of the Shi’ite doctrine in 
the decades leading up to the eighteenth and subsequently, nineteenth century. 
Qajar’s Persia: Modernism and Patriarchy  
While early in the nineteenth century steps had already been taken toward 
modernizing Persia (Lambton 151-154), the relationship between the internal entities, 
whether they were religious or secular, with the external influences, such as British, French, 
or even American, was a complex one. To better understand the advent of modernity in 
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Persia, Ann K. S. Lambton suggests one must consider both the “Shi’ite doctrine towards the 
holders of political power and . . . the intrusion of the Great powers into Persia” (145).310 
Therefore, due to the conflict of interest between the former and the latter, any attempt 
toward implementing reforms remained superficial. 
Clearly, the modernization had its compulsory beginnings in the military realm. 
While the reforms were, not surprisingly, for military purposes initially, they were bound to 
bring about changes politically and socially. Lambton confirms: “The first impulse for 
change almost certainly came from contact with the alien civilization of Europe in the 
military and the diplomatic fields. […] Indirectly, however, the military missions encouraged 
political and social change.”311 
Insofar as Shah Abbas had successfully manipulated and integrated the two strands of 
religious thoughts—Shi’ite and Sufi—into one cohesive political system with the king as the 
highest position of authority, by the late seventeenth century the monarch’s political status 
failed to uphold its balance of influence. In the fourth quarter of the seventeenth century, one 
man became the dominant influence behind the last Safavid king, Shah Sultan Hussein (r. 
1694-1722). Muhammad Baqir Majlisi (1627-1699 or 1700), “a leading theologian,” was the 
“power behind the throne.” Majlisi’s writings became the principle authority on matters of 
government under the banner of specific iteration of Shi’ism (Afary & Anderson 42). He 
pursued a severe suppression of “all Sufi and philosophical tendencies within Shi’ite Islam 
and sanctioned the relentless persecution of Sunnis” (Afary & Anderson 43).312 He further 
reinstated the power of spiritual “mediators and intercessors for man with God.”313 The “new 
interpretations” in Majlisi’s writings, “aimed to transfer the public’s devotion from the Sufi 
mystics to the twelve Shi’ite imams,” which placed shariat authority above all other sources 
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of power (Afary and Anderson 43). However, it was no more than a creative and imaginary 
theory to eliminate competition, to dominate and move toward strategies to artificially unify 
non-conforming factions.
314
 
As this, in some respects Islamic, or better said, Shi’ite oriented “counter 
reformation,” was sweeping against the harmony and balance established earlier by Shah 
Abbas between the various sources of religious authorities, the literature on two key concepts 
was articulating further the required active life of 
piety. These concepts are none other than jihad 
and shahadat that both found reflections in the 
specific interpretations (among the Shi’ites, of 
course) of the Karbala narrative as “the themes of 
martyrdom and unjust usurpation of power by 
earthly rulers,” between the Prophet’s grandson 
Hussein, and the Umayyad rulers respectively 
(Afary and Anderson 43). These narratives 
manifest themselves in various commemorative 
gatherings and ritual performances that seem to 
have had solidified the specific iteration of Shi’ite 
doctrine, but also acted as a sort of Aristotelian 
catharsis through performance of tragedy.
315
 This is not surprising since there are historical 
and cultural links. One such ritual performance is known as Ta’ziyeh, which according to 
scholars like William Beeman, has pre-Islamic connections. Beeman argues mourning rituals 
in Ta’ziyeh resemble those events performed in ancient Greece for the death of Dionysus, or 
in ancient Egypt for Osiris that signify “cosmic renewal and rebirth” (Afary and Anderson 
17. Royal Theater (Tekiyeh 
Dowlat). Painting by Kamal al 
Mulk, late nineteenth century. 
Round architecture, amphitheater 
style, where Ta’ziyeh (passion 
plays) were held.  
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44).
316
 Others have also pointed to the ancient Persian roots of such ritual performances, such 
as the death of Siavash, son of the Persian mythical king, Keykāwus.317 Regardless of the 
origins, the cathartic influence of such rituals is hard to overlook. “The spectators freely 
show their anger and hatred toward the antagonists by shouting at them and cursing them, 
and they show sympathy for the protagonists.”318 The cathartic effect plays well into 
patriarchy’s greater program of artificial unification, while alienating the “other” and further 
shaping a sort of a collective subjectivity that suited patriarchy. This and other mourning 
rituals engaged the participants emotionally and physically to a degree that it etched the 
message of Karbala tragedy in their “hearts and minds . . . helping to shape their world 
view.”319 Furthermore, some scholars have noticed the similarities between the Shi’ite and 
Christian passion plays. Afary and Anderson find “troubling appropriations of Shi’ite and 
Christian passion plays,” a noteworthy aspect missing from the contemporary studies about 
the ritual performances about Karbala in the month of Muharram. They state: 
The medieval passion plays of Europe contrast the purity, decency, and love of Jesus 
with the fiendish, mischievous actions of the Jews, who were blamed for his death. 
Likewise in the Iranian Shi’ite passion plays, the saintly qualities of the Shi’ite 
leaders are contrasted to the unethical and vile conduct of the early Sunni leaders, 
who supposedly snatched the mantle of leadership unjustly, taking it away from 
Hussein and showing no mercy toward his family, including infants.
320
 
Ta’ziyeh, a derivative of the term azzā, meaning mourning or “to express sympathy 
with, to console”321 and to mourn, has become a term referring to passion plays in Iran that 
dates back to the sixteenth century (Afary and Anderson 45). As a demonstrative part of the 
Shi’ite sympathetic sentiments toward the Prophet’s lineage, through his daughter Fatima and 
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son-in law Ali, the tragedy of Karbala that took place on the 10
th
 day of the month of 
Muharram, 61 AH (October 10, 680 CE) and concluded in the massacre of the Prophet’s 
grandson, Hussein and 72 male members of his family, initially served as a commemorative 
event through the ritual of mourning.
322
 “By the middle of the eighteenth century, the 
mourning rituals had developed into a new form of theatrical performance. In the nineteenth 
century, numerous guilds of players and performers were organized with the support of the 
royal court and the elite” (Chelkowski 1991, 214).323 The significance and success of such 
passion plays have been measured by the large number of audiences they attracted, as noted 
by European diplomats and compared with European theater that only “attracted a small elite 
group” at this time (Manafzadeh 1991, 317).324 Therefore, in the nineteenth century, in the 
Iranian capital of Tehran, it became necessary to build a theater to accommodate such a 
crowd. 
One of the most famous theaters in Iran was commissioned by Nasser al-Din Shah 
Qajar (1831-1896), who was reportedly very fond of Ta’ziyeh, and ordered the construction 
of the Royal Theater (Tekiyeh Dowlat) built in ca. 1873. Willem Floor in The History of 
Theater in Iran (2005) suggests the Shah was influenced by his trip to Europe in ordering the 
building of a modern theater. However, being 
concerned with the religious leaders’ reaction, 
he designated the Royal Theater for religious 
performances, and the European plays were 
instructed to be performed at the hall of the 
Dar al-Fonun, the first modern polytechnic 
institute of higher education, which had been 
18. Tekiyeh Dowlat, central courtyard, 
1873. 
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established in 1851 (215).  
The round structure of the Royal Theater, included three tiered archways wrapping 
around a central court, holding a raised round stage in masonry with the diameter of 58 feet, 
in addition to another 20 feet around it, which served as seating area for women and 
accommodated “thousands on thousands.”325 The circumference of this area consisted of four 
steps, providing the seating place for men. The three-tiered arcade that rose to 78 feet high 
consisted of balcony seats reserved for the aristocratic and wealthy families. The structure 
was supposed to have a dome, but after the construction efforts failed, wooden ribs were used 
to hold a tent like cover in place to provide shade during summer afternoon performances.
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At night, the space was illuminated by a large number of glass lamps in various colors 
“concentrated against the wall in immense glittering clusters.”327 Tekiyeh Dowlat survives 
only in nineteenth century photographs and in a famous painting by Mohammad Ghaffari 
(Kamal al Mulk – 1847-1940), for it was dismantled in 1947 and replaced by a bank.328  
Contrary to common belief, Kamal al-Mulk 
was not self-taught
329
 and had attended Dar al-
Fonun, shortly after he arrived in Tehran at the age 
of twelve. He was discovered by Nasser al-Din 
Shah during one of his end-of the-year-visits to the 
school, when the king saw a portrait the young 
artist had painted of a deceased courtier.
330
 Kamal 
al-Mulk’s teacher at this time was Mirza Ali Akabr 
Khan Muzayyan al-Dawlih, who had studied at the 
École des Beaux Arts with Ingres.
331
 
19. Kamal al-Mulk (Ghaffari). The 
Hall of Mirrors, before 1896. Oil on 
canvas. 
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Kamal al-Mulk himself got an opportunity to go to Europe in 1896 to study; upon his 
return, he brought back to Iran what is considered European Academic style, however 
viewed as “modern” style in Iran.332 During his travels in Europe, he visited and studied in 
museums by copying from the old masters (Diba 2013, 95). By this time, the Academic style 
in Europe was seen as rigid and associated with the establishment, and new styles such as 
Impressionism had already made a space for itself through exhibitions and reviews by the 
critics.
333
 Nonetheless, it is the Rembrandt’s, the Titian’s as well as William Bouguereau’s 
paintings that Kamal al-Mulk was copying to study at the museums of Europe.
334
. When 
compared with the Persian established styles, such as those developed by Bihzad, or 
idealistically executed by Sultan Mohammad (mentioned in chapter three of this study), 
regardless of its European connections, it was deemed modern. One of his celebrated 
paintings, The Hall of Mirrors that he completed before1896, the year of the assassination of 
the king, has been viewed as an example of his photographic style (Diba 2013, 95). 
Layla S. Diba, in her article “M[o]hammad Ghaffari: The Painter of Modern Life,”335 
explains that before Dar al-Fonun, there was no distinction between arts or crafts. Artists 
learned and produced through the old apprentice system, but a hierarchy of the arts was 
observed, with calligraphy holding a more elevated place than easel painting (Diba 2012, 
646). According to Diba, “[t]he year 1862 marked a turning point in the history of Persian 
painting and its relationship to modernity,” because the status of painting was changed from 
court sponsored workshops and being considered as “crafts,” to a distinct “academic 
discipline” (ibid). 
Persia, early on during the reign of Nasser al-Din Shah Qajar, the last of the Qajar 
kings who “exercised true power” from 1848 until his assassination in 1896,336 had already 
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begun to experience a wave of modernization. His teacher, and later Prime Minister, Mirza 
Taghi Khan (Amir Kabir, or Amir Nizam, 1807-1852), during his brief time in office, had 
undertaken great modernization campaigns, one of which was the founding of the school Dar 
al-Fonun and engaging Europeans in teaching there. However, his dismissal and 
assassination, on the order of the king himself in 1852 nearly brought modernization progress 
to a halt, as his successor, Agha Khan Nūri did not support the school (Lambton 154). 
Modernism in nineteenth century Persia was seen as “novelty,” argues Diba. Some of 
the earliest groups of students sent abroad, included those who were sent to learn painting 
and printing.
337
 One of the most prominent court painters of the Nasiri court was Abu’l 
Hasan Ghaffari, Sani’ al-Mulk, who was sent to Italy in 1861, and upon his return was 
assigned to teach the two aforementioned subjects to the students at Dar al-Fonun in 1862. 
Diba notes the printing press was used to produce a courtly “illustrated newspaper” that was 
aimed to exhibit a carefully constructed modern view of the Persian court (647).
338
 Lambton 
notes “the introduction of the printing press in the first half of the nineteenth century and the 
foundation of the official gazette in 1851 were also factors making for modernization” (157). 
However, once the printing tool was made available, it was difficult to restrict it to court 
propaganda. Diba informs, during the final five years that Abu’l Hasan was at the height of 
his activities, “the images he produced for the court newspaper revealed its evolution from a 
propaganda tool to a record of urban life and social issues dangerously close to social 
critique.”339 
Lambton, nonetheless, deems the publication of the “Persian press abroad”340 to be 
more influential “in stimulating political change” toward the end of the century, than 
“encouraging social change” (Lambton 157). Among these publications, was the “newspaper 
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Akhtar which had been published by Iranians in Istanbul since the 1870’s” and “Qānūn 
published in England by Malkum Khan, a European educated son of an Armenian convert to 
Islam.” These publications encouraged criticism of the government “from a more modern, 
reforming, and nationalist view point” (Keddie 1972, 336). 
Despite these efforts, Nasser al-Din Shah remained in favor of the art for state 
propaganda in order to maintain his image and visibility through the modern technology. He 
was well aware of the connection between the academic styles of art in France and such art’s 
link to the state. Nasser al-Din Shah also modeled state sponsored exhibitions, similar to 
Paris Salons, which he himself would attend. Noteworthy is the change in the format of 
painting from album to canvas and frame (Diba 2012, 650), which transformed the viewing 
experience from individual and private of a few elite to a shared and communal event. Just as 
with Europe, the advent of photography which had already been introduced in Persia by mid 
nineteenth century, proved influential in the art of painting as it “provided Persian Painters 
with a shortcut to illusionistic and naturalistic paintings.”341 Diba argues “[t]he interaction 
between photography and painting illustrates Iran’s original response to modernity and 
creative reuse of European technology” (Diba 2012, 651). 
Of great significance here is that photography that began as a personal hobby of the 
monarch,
342
 as with printing, quickly spread beyond the court, and within a short period of 
time not only spread to provinces but also began to cater to the new bourgeois class and 
branched out into “commercial photography studios.” Like many contemporary scholars of 
Iran, Diba views the role of the new technology instrumental in transitioning toward 
modernity; however, she stops short of further developing the issue of subjectivity. She 
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states: “Most importantly, the new medium responded to Iranian aspiration toward modernity 
and new definitions of identity” (Diba 2013, 91). 
It is worth mentioning an incident involving a contemporary Neoplatonic 
philosopher’s encounter with photography, for the philosophical implication of this anecdote 
supports the principle thesis in this study.
343
 On one of his trips to Sabzevar, Nasser al-Din 
Shah visited a prominent Muslim philosopher, Hajj Mulla Hādi Sabzevāri in 1869-70. The 
king was so thrilled by this visit that he ordered his Court Photographer (akkasbashi), Âghā 
Ridā to take a picture of the philosopher. Iraj Afshar cites two versions of the story, 344  in 
both of which he confirms that Mulla Hadi had never before seen or heard about 
photographs.
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Hajj Mulla Hādi was a pupil of the school of Mullā Sadrā346 (discussed in chapter 
three) who believed, in accordance with Neoplatonism, that only the soul was capable of 
producing images,
347
 “and this faculty was beyond the scope of any man-made machine.” 
Therefore, when the process of imprinting his image on the silver plate was explained to him, 
Hajj Mulla Hādi thought it impossible (Afshar 264).348 
By the end of the nineteenth century, photography in 
Iran was enjoying a commercial life. The Tehran-born 
Armenian Antoine Sevruguin, who was known as “Anton 
Khan,” is one of the names associated with commercial 
photography. He has been heralded as “the most prominent and 
prolific commercial photographer in Iran at the end of the 
nineteenth century” (Stein 119).349 In addition to numerous 
photographs he took, he has been credited as having authored “a 
20. Sevruguin, 1880s. 
Isfahan Bazaar. 
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treatise on photography for Muzafar al-Din Shah in 1878 when he was in Tabriz” (Stein 
120). Sevruguin traveled extensively and photographed people, historical locations, and 
architecture along the way “with equal facility.” Sevruguin was conscious of the aesthetic 
possibilities of his subjects and their surroundings in front of the camera, as demonstrated in 
his staging, backdrops and angles.
350
 However, the diversity in his subject matter, from 
images of ordinary people, women in the traditional chador (all-over cover), young and old 
dervishes, to public executions, attest to how he used this new technology to capture not just 
royal subjects (which he also did, given his prominent court position), but also to offer a 
close account of different facets of life.
351
 
The contacts with Europe that had been established earlier continued during Nasser 
al-Din Shah’s reign with the increasing availability of Western cultural exemplary products, 
such as published literary or visual material as well as fashion (Stein 125). However, the 
“shah was still padishah-i Islam and Persia the mamalik-i Islam” (Lambton 150). Therefore, 
the role of the king as the protector of the Islamic land was still a status accepted by the 
religious leaders (ulama) at this time. While there was uneasiness concerning the new 
technology supported by the monarch, there seems not to have been much organized 
objection from the ulama. This uneasiness fueled the continued resistance to modernization 
despite efforts by contemporary theoreticians and intellectuals such as Malkum Khan, who 
had tried to “clothe modernization in an Islamic garb” (ibid).352  Similarly, but earlier in the 
eighteenth century, the Ottoman rulers, too, faced the concerns regarding the reaction of the 
ulama on their attempts toward modernization. The difference was that the arising occasions 
of conflict did not prompt the Qajar rulers to initiate “a program of reform as happened in the 
Ottoman Empire or Egypt.”353 
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Despite the importation of technology and cultural exchanges on different levels on 
the one hand, and “a melding of elites—upper ‘ul[a]ma, large-scale merchants, court 
bureaucrats, tribal leaders, and large landowners—through intermarriage and shared 
interests” on the other, a deep gap remained between classes. As Lambton surmises, “the 
fundamental issue in social change, which concerns the relationship of man to man and the 
purpose of society, received little consideration and it was, perhaps because of this that social 
change still remained very limited” (Lambton 166). 
Ottoman Turkey at the Threshold of Modernity 
In the early decades of the eighteenth century, the earlier military successes of the 
Ottomans, were giving way to a series of defeats and shrinking borders. This turn called for a 
change in policy and attitude toward Europe, from an adversary to be “crushed” to an 
“indispensable element of the Empire’s policies, through establishing embassies and 
expanding the responsibilities of their diplomats.”354 However, as with the Egypt and Persia, 
Ottoman Turkey seems to have commenced reforms in the military sphere first.
355
 
Similar to Egypt, although at a different pace, the pressures of modernity on the 
Ottoman Empire coincided with the weakening of the political hold, due to economic 
dependence on Europe. Regardless of the dependency problem, nevertheless, the interruption 
brought on by World War I provided “new opportunities for freedom of action; the 
capitulations were abolished and . . . ‘the Turks were finally masters of their house’.” 356 This 
led to socio-political and economic changes, including the encouragement of women to join 
the work force, all elements needed to transform the country into a modern state.
357
 While I 
will offer a more analytical examination on the role of the religious leaders, a major 
difference between Qajar Persia and Ottoman Turkey or Egypt with regards to reforms, there 
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remains in the Shi’ite philosophy of distrust in the temporal government; hence, the ūlamā 
did not effectively participate in the official programs aiming at reforms in Persia (Lambton 
146). The Sunni philosophy (in Ottoman Empire and Egypt), on the other hand, did not 
prevent the religious leaders from participating; they were already involved in institutional 
judiciary and educational institutions in the Empire (Heyd 29).
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Perhaps the willingness of some of the ūlamā359 to participate in the reforms 
undertaken by the Ottoman Empire can be seen in their support of the new technology of 
printmaking, introduced as early as 1727, of which the şeyhül-islām had demonstrated his 
support through issuing official religious permission (fetva).
360
 (See Appendix II.B).  
The role of religion in reforms merits a deeper investigation, more than what a 
historical review may reveal. The resentment of the members of the religious class toward 
the European reforms and the mediating role of the ūlamā reviewed from Nietzschean 
perspective can be rewarding. In Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche introduces the figure of the 
“ascetic priest,” (Nietzsche 2006, 86) who gives meaning to resentment risen from suffering, 
thus shaping subjectivities.
361
 While he has Christianity in view, his argument maps onto 
establishment-oriented Islam and the undermining of individuality as well. Of great interest 
here is the “ascetic priest’s method,” which according to Nietzsche aligns with “herd-
organization” and the “awakening of the communal consciousness of power to such a pitch 
that the individual’s disgust with himself becomes eclipsed by his delight in the thriving of 
the community” (Nietzsche 2006, 103). He further notes: “[H]e has obtained the mastery, 
corrupted the health of the soul’ (Nietzsche 2006, 109). But how does the “ascetic priest” 
accomplish this task? 
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Nietzsche calls it a “change in attitude, […] an artist veering round into his own 
opposite”362 (Nietzsche 2006, 68). Nietzsche explains further: “[A]n ascetic life is a self-
contradiction: here rules resentment without parallel [;] . . . here is an attempt made to utilize 
power to dam the sources of power” (Nietzsche 2006, 86). He also notes “at every single 
period the ascetic priest puts in his appearance: he belongs to no particular race; he thrives 
everywhere; he grows out of all classes” (ibid). If we view this “change of attitude” in the 
ūlamā from Nietzsche’s perspective, the significance of the role these religious leaders in 
mediating the reforms, while justifying their ruling to the population, becomes evident. Heyd 
suggests that the ūlamā were fearful “of the Sultan, particularly of Mahmud II.” He makes it 
clear that “the Sultan made use of the ūlamā’s spiritual influence on the people to obtain 
religious sanctions and secure popular respect for his innovations” (Heyd 39). In a master-
slave relationship, in which the master demands complete submission of all his subjects (as 
did in Mahmud II), the role the ūlamā played was not just administering to religious 
permissibles and non-permissibles, but also to craft just the right language to manage the 
resentment of the oppressed. Nietzsche states: 
When he has to tackle sufferers of the lower orders, slaves, or prisoners (or women, 
who for the most part are a compound of labor-slave and prisoner), all he has to do is 
to juggle a little with the names, and to rechristen, so as to make them see henceforth 
a benefit, a comparative happiness, in objects which they hated—the slave’s 
discontent with his lot was at any rate not invented by the priests.
363
 
Heyd seems to be critical of the Sultans’ decisions regarding including the ūlamā in 
the government, nevertheless disregarding the long-standing position of the Sunni 
justification of temporal power. While the integration had brought unity within the Ottoman 
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Empire that prevented a conflict between the religious and secular entities within the 
government, “it hampered the free spiritual development of Islam during the decisive period 
of its confrontation with Western civilization” (Heyd 54). Even so, a centralized government 
with a “new ruling class” of bureaucrats called “memurs” emerged out of the reforms 
(Tanzimat).
364
 The reforms also engendered a group of young Turks, who received modern 
education because of the reforms and were sent abroad to complete their studies; they 
brought about intellectual consciousness to a certain degree, which manifested itself in 
cultural productions. 
Stanford J. Shaw in the History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey notes the 
“emergence” of the middle class and “intelligentsia” following the decline of the religious 
leaders’ role in Ottoman Turkey, which were potentially posing concern for the ruling class. 
Shaw states: 
The emergence of an Ottoman middle class in turn produced an intellectual 
awakening and was paralleled by the development of a new Ottoman intelligentsia, 
which displaced the ūl[a]mā in their traditional role of cultural leadership in the 
Muslim community. Ottoman intellectual reorientation manifested itself in many 
different ways. Its most general characteristic was the displacement of both forms and 
themes of traditional Ottoman literature, produced largely by and for the Ruling 
Class, and the substitution of different ones imported from the West – plays, novels, 
operas, short stories, essays, and political tracts, treating not merely themes of love 
and passion and the lives and interests of the rulers but also presenting great political, 
economic, social, and religious problems and ideas that were of concern to everyone 
in the empire.
365
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Thus, the vehicles of disbursing new ideas, which were consequences of 
modernization, began to make a space among the population and to help circulate and mingle 
ideas throughout different population groups. One important group to note is the “Young 
Ottomans” (Yeni Osmanlilar), who were active during the decade of 1865-75. They took on 
the responsibility of being “the self-appointed critics of the system and . . . began to create 
public opinion while introducing concepts such as parliamentarianism, nationalism, and 
patriotism into the Ottoman political consciousness” (Shaw 130).366 Their preferred medium 
was the press, which had been the earliest form of mass communication. 
Of course, the printing press had facilitated the disbursement of information and 
knowledge since 1835 (Shaw 128). In addition to the publishing of books, it is “the 
newspapers and other periodicals” that were published and took away the monopoly of the 
government publication, Takvim-I Vekayi (Calendar of Events), which was first published on 
July 25, 1831, following in the footsteps of Egypt’s Muhammad ‘Ali, who published Vekai-i 
Misriyye (Events of Egypt) in 1829. One such publication was Çeride-i Havadis (Chronicles 
of Events), published in 1840-60, interestingly founded by a British journalist, William 
Churchill. Shaw lists the names of nearly half a dozen periodicals that were published during 
the period of reformation (Tanzimat) until the later decades of the nineteenth century to 
demonstrate how widespread this medium was (Shaw 129).
367
 The explosive publishing 
wave of newspapers and periodicals was accompanied by the new literary wave led by the 
“Young Turks” (Shaw 130). 
Spear headed by Ibrahim Şinasi (1824-1871), the new movement benefited from his 
experience and studies with the French.
368
 In 1861-1870 Şinasi published his own paper, 
Tasvir Efkār (Description of Ideas), “which soon became the leading forum for the 
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expression of new literary forms and political ideas.” In his Selection of Works, he failed to 
praise the sultan and had enough problematic ideas, such as “no taxation without 
representation” to cost him his post at the Council of Education at the time (Shaw 131). The 
Tanzimat government, despite its reformatory intentions, saw the potential threat in the free 
expression of ideas in publications such as Tasvir Efkār and began to suppress the 
movement. As a result, many members of the movement escaped to Europe in order to 
continue their writing and distributing freely, by way of the “foreign post offices,” which by 
Capitulation terms, “were beyond the control of the Ottoman government” (Shaw 131).369 
The spreading of the ideas was not limited to published media. Here is where the role of 
theaters should be examined. 
The earliest recorded theatrical performances in Ottoman Turkey go back to the time 
of the French Revolution, and took place at the embassies and mainly for the foreigners, 
although they were sometimes attended by the Sultan and the Crown Prince (Shaw 129). 
However, by the time of the reform (Tanzimat) campaigns in 1839, three theaters had been 
built, and served as venues to Italian plays, even though still mainly for foreign audiences 
(ibid). The development of theater briefly can be traced from the first Ottoman theater, called 
French Theater (1840), which was built by an Italian by the name Giustiniani, co-funded by 
the Ottoman and foreign European resources, to the first Turkish-language theater (1867) 
called Ottoman Theater (Tiyatro-i Osmani), founded and managed by an Armenian company 
in old Istanbul, to a small popular theater (Tuluat Tiyatrosu) opened in “the Muslim quarters 
of Istanbul.” In 1855 the first royal theater was built in neoclassical style as part of a palace 
complex called Dolmabahçe Palace, built in an eclectic European classical style, to which I 
shall return under architecture.
370
The theater appears to be a medium at which, not just 
translated European plays (to avoid censorship) were produced and performed, but also 
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controversial, patriotic, multi-lingual, and even subjects from everyday life would be 
produced and brought to the stage (Shaw 129).
 371
 Regardless of its focus on modernization, 
the Tanzimat government, however, remained uneasy about the activities of the new class of 
intelligentsia that was basically moving toward limiting the powers of the monarch, and 
advocating a representational type of government. This put the official modernization 
campaigns at odds with the democratic movements in the nineteenth century; it indicated 
conflicting objectives that seemed to curb democratic moves at every turn by the Tanzimat 
government, to ensure the stability of the monarch’s rule. To maintain a modern image of the 
ruler, one of the areas of concern was the modernization of the sultan’s place of residence, as 
an expression of his power, particularly when receiving European envoys. However, for the 
Ottomans, the expression of power through architecture in the context of modernism began 
earlier. 
Shirin Hamadeh argues it was following the Ottoman defeat of 1683 in Vienna and 
the acknowledgement of Europe’s military supremacy over the Ottomans that the importance 
21. Ottoman Dolmabahce Palace one of the last ostentatious Ottoman buildings. Cost $1.8 
b. The style of the palace itself is a fusion of Neoclassical and Baroque (1843-1856). 
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of architecture in a modernization process was understood (Hamadeh 2004, 4).
372
 This 
understanding manifested in the emulation of great European Neoclassical, Baroque and 
Rococo styles, which “gradually permeated the architecture of Istanbul, especially from the 
1750s on.” By the end of the century, it was accepted, common practice for aristocracy to 
hire European architects to design and 
build their places of residence (ibid).  
Palace complexes have been 
built for centuries; it seems logical for 
all offices of administration and 
power, as well as the royal private 
religious structures, to be not just in 
close proximity to the residence of the 
ruler, but also an expression of wealth and power. The Ottoman sultans were no different. 
Thus, amidst all reform programs, modernization had to be implemented where it concerned 
the palace complex as well. Shaw argues, a new sense of admiration and appreciation for the 
West were fostered during Mahmud II’s rule. It was the sultan’s understanding that the 
survival of the empire depended upon its modernization according to the European standards, 
and that he had to act accordingly if the empire was to “hold its own against a 
technologically advanced Europe” (49) 
The arrogant way in which the Ottomans had viewed the Europeans, was now giving 
way to active, systematic reforms in order to seek their approval/acceptance, and to be seen 
as their equals. This new perspective influenced so many aspects of administration, military, 
and basically life from change in fashion, to ideas, and even “entertainment” (Shaw ibid). It 
22. Dolmabahce Theater within the palace 
complex. Neoclassical. 
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began with Mahmud II moving out of the Ottoman sultans’ historic and traditional dwelling 
in 1815 (i.e. from the Topkapi Palace) to a “modern palace built along the Bosporus at 
Dolmabahçe” (ibid).373 Built in 1857-1859, the palace complex includes the detached royal 
theater that was designed in neoclassical style, “with two . . . pediments on the façade (Yazici 
35). Unlike the Khedival Theater in Cairo, the theater in Dolmabahçe was finished in stone, 
but similarly had three visible tiers, with rectangular and arched windows occupying the 
second and third tiers in the case of the latter. The interior was lavishly decorated, with velvet 
and gilt decorations, attributed to the designer of Paris Opera House, Sèchan (Yazici 36). It is 
clear that the theater was a place of not just putting on theatrical performances, but a space in 
which the sultan’s European and other foreign guests could be entertained.374 
The palace complex was designed and built in such a way that from the Bosporus, it 
projected an image of highest European, 
classical, and historical standards. The 
palace structure itself was an eclectic 
collection of elements from various 
European historical periods, including 
Baroque, Rococo and Neoclassical. But at 
the same time, the decorations of Ottoman 
emblems, such as Tugra, or official seal 
was integrated into the decorative elements 
of the building. But these highly significant 
and symbolic buildings were the products of reforms and a synthesis of European 
architectural elements infused with the Ottoman taste that aimed to surpass the European 
achievements. This itself is worthy of a separate study.
375
 However, to demonstrate the case 
23. An example of calligraphic official 
seal (Tugra) embedded into the pediment 
of an administrative building within the 
palace complex.  
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in point, as evident from the visual examination of some of the features incorporated in the 
Dolmabahçe Palace, the Baccarat crystal balustrade in the administrative quarters of the 
palace that shows this synthesis, is a prime example. In approving the designs of their palaces 
like Dolmabahçe, the Ottoman aristocratic, ruling families were aiming to create such a 
cohesive visual language from this synthesis that would wash over any mimetic and 
illusionistic attempts on their part of the reforms that may have pointed to the gap existing 
between the illusion of reforms and a real one. However, it is in another medium that some of 
the aforementioned gap can potentially be viewed. 
The arrival of the technology of capturing images in the Ottoman Empire, not 
surprisingly, was closely associated with military, just as painting was initially taught for 
military ends, for the practical purpose of this technology was recognized by the Ottoman 
sultan and other reformers.
376
 This pragmatism has been discussed by Wendy Shaw in her 
article, “Ottoman Photography of the Late Nineteenth Century: An ‘Innocent’ Modernism?” 
in the examination of a royal portrait.
377
 She notices the portrait of Sultan Abudlaziz (r. 1861-
1876), photographed in 1863, in comparison with portraits of other European leaders from 
around the same time period, appears awkward with a lack of balance between light and 
shade, which captures an unflattering impression of the sultan. He appears to take up much of 
the space, with almost no breathing room around him (Shaw 2009, 84). Such early portraits 
exemplify more of a straight forward documentation task, rather than project a specific idea 
or angle to the subject presented. However, this soon changed and the intrinsic power of 
mechanically reproduced images began to offer opportunities to create a positive image of 
the Ottoman Empire with regards to the reformation movement. 
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In 1893, Sultan Abdülhamid II presented to the British Library a set of albums that 
contained 1,800 photographs (albumen prints) that represented “the Sultan, the sovereign of a 
still considerable territory with a great history as a reforming and enlightened ruler.”378 This 
may seem in conflict with what Wendy Shaw argues, that photography for the Ottomans 
“provided . . . an innocent eye, coupling the technology of photography with the nineteenth 
century positivist drive for information” (Shaw 2009, 80). Shaw bases her argument on a 
comparison between the development of photography in Europe vis-à-vis the advent of this 
technology in Ottoman Turkey. Whereas, the advent of photography in Ottoman Turkey was 
concurrent with the art of painting and lithography, therefore initially, unlike Europe, it did 
not have a previous referential source from which to draw; thus, it was free to operate in an 
independent way (ibid). Nonetheless, the medium’s use and application was transforming 
contemporaneous to the reformation movement.
379
  
Some twentieth century scholars have analyzed the nineteenth century photographs 
with a post-colonial perspective. However, the stereotyping and using blanket statements 
have been challenged by other scholars recently. Michelle L. Woodward rejects such broad 
labeling and states, after the mid and toward the late nineteenth century, the increasing 
number of the commercial photographers and their independent photographs tell a different 
story. She argues: 
The photographic visual conventions of late-nineteenth century representations of the 
Middle East were, contrary to the emphasis of much scholarship, not monolithic or 
hegemonic, but rather reflect a complex range of perspectives—from fictional 
Orientalist clichés such as erotic harem scenes to the documentary images of 
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modernization found in the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid II’s photographic 
albums.
380
 
There is no doubt that commissioning photographs by wealthy European travelers and 
prearranged and staged images correspond to some of the photographic works produced in 
the second half of the nineteenth century; these photographs and images were meant to 
satisfy the Europeans’ curiosity about cultural aspects of the life under the Ottoman that were 
out of reach for foreigners. But, as suggested by Woodward, there are plenty of examples that 
demonstrate the independence of the photographers in capturing subjects that were 
interesting to them. Woodward’s study shows, even though she focuses on the “people in 
public” as subject, there are enough examples that not only reflect diversity in the sitters, 
individuals who may have been marginal or seen as alterity in the Ottoman society,
381
 but 
also examples that, contrary to stereotypical “Oriental” works that projected a negative light 
on the Ottoman culture by way of inclusiveness, create a harmonic synthesis between the 
authentically local as well as consciously modern. From a comparative assessment between 
an Istanbul-based studio, that of the Sèbah family and a French family studio in Beirut, 
owned by the Bonfils, Woodward proposes: 
The focus . . .  is on how these two studios chose to photograph people in public 
places such as markets, streets, mosques, and baths in the period 1870-1900. Looking 
closely at this portion of their work, it appears that the Bonfils work was generally 
unable to transcend popular European notions of the ‘Orient’, while the Sèbah family 
developed a mode of representation that combined a detailed view of local Ottoman 
society with visual signs of a new modern order. In particular, the Sèbah family 
created a unique style of photographing groups of people in public spaces—what I 
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call ‘community portraits’. This style reveals a negotiation between tourist desires for 
exotic images and local Ottoman self-conceptions as modern citizens, in the process 
subverting common European notions of static and backward Middle East.
382
 
Here citing one set of examples from Woodward’s article suffices to demonstrate the 
two different approaches to capturing the images of people in public places. Bonfils’ photo 
shows a carpet merchant’s store front, with the owners and two of his employees (identified 
by their clothing and seating arrangements) in a pose that anticipates a potential buyer, or in 
fact offers the vantage point for the European spectator. Sèbah’s photograph, on the other 
hand, shows a diagonal angle from which the camera is looking out toward a larger group of 
the community members with diverse appearances and ages (Woodward 366, 369). 
Woodward’s analysis demonstrates the Oriental approach in Bonfils, as opposed to 
Sèbah’s style is more in tune with showing the diversity under the Ottomans. However, in 
these and other similar examples, both photographers are responding to a kind of a market for 
25. Bonfils. Magasin de tapis au Khan Khalil au 
Caire, albumen print. 9x 11 ¾ inc ca. 1885-1901, 
University of Pennsylvania Museum archives 
photographic collection. (Michelle Woodward’s 
article).  
 
24. Sèbah and Joaillier. 707: Marchand de 
Kebabs à Stamboul, gelatin silver print, 8 ½ 
x 10 ½ in. undated. Visual Collection of the 
Fine Arts Library, Harvard University, 
James Ackerman Photographic Collection. 
(Michelle Woodward’s article).   
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such photographs, which demanded to see what the ordinary people did and how they lived. 
Granted, these images also show conscious attempt on the part of the photographer to 
provide a specific angle (according to Woodward); however, in the process, they both 
manage to capture not just diversity in their subjects, but also different choices in 
photographic approaches.  
Further noted by Wendy Shaw is the intriguing point that he Ottoman experience of 
photography is different from that of the Europeans, truly a modernist advent. She sees “the 
bypassing” of the photography experience from the long standing tradition of painting (as 
was the case for the Europeans) for the Ottomans itself “a modernist success” (81). In other 
words, aside from the “exotic” subject matter, the Europeans must have seen a fresh 
perspective unlike what their eyes were familiar with. Nonetheless, in the process of 
modernism, “photography experience” is not the only experience that was circumvented. 
When it comes to the development of the “I,” in the philosophical thoughts, whether it has 
been done consciously or inadvertently, bypassing the individual experience has had grave 
consequences, not just for the Ottoman Turkey, but for the Middle East as a whole. Here, one 
must ask: where does this circumvention come from? 
In this chapter, my objective was to demonstrate how pressures of modernism—
mainly felt initially in the imbalance experienced militarily—impacted other non-military 
aspects of life in the Middle East. I argued that the reforms begin by upgrading technology in 
the military and continued in creating a modern appearance. I examined three regions, 
namely Egypt, Iran and Ottoman Turkey, that show exemplary attempts at reforms, but all 
proved unprepared (due to the persisting traditional power structures) to adjust and accept the 
consequences of modernism (freedom of expression, and press) in an enduring manner. I 
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specifically selected a number of artistic endeavors that potentially could have served to 
foster a polyphonic society, and led to the recognition of the subject, and passing through it, 
in these regions. I argued the arts (visual and performing) as well as attempts at free and 
critical journalism, which are essential in a modern society, began by imitation, followed by 
creative transformation, which was dangerously moving toward criticism of the government. 
Therefore, very quickly they were subjected to censorship and the wrath of the central 
powers, and could not progress through the challenges between traditional versus the modern 
tendencies. As a result, they became apparatuses for propaganda serving the patriarchal 
powers. 
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CHAPTER FIVE  
Configuration of Power in the Context of Modernism: 
Patriarchy, Colonialism, and Subject Formation  
 
It is certain that mechanisms of subjection cannot be studied outside their relation to the 
mechanisms of exploitations and domination. But they do not merely constitute the 
“terminal” of more fundamental mechanisms. They entertain complex and circular relations 
with other forms.
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        — Michel Foucault 
 
In the nineteenth century Middle East, the sidestepping of the discourse on 
subjectivity and individual experience in the Middle East was followed by a gravitation 
toward and merging with the Hegelian romantic and idealistic philosophy
384
 that saw no 
distinction between the object and the subject,
385
 and was already embedded in the local 
cultures through the Neoplatonic views.
386
 One of the artistic endeavors that consistently uses 
Neoplatonic symbolic language is poetry, particularly in Persia.
387
 Hegel was familiar with 
Persian poetry through Goethe and others.
388
 Ian Almond (2010) tells us of Hegel’s partiality 
toward the Persians, particularly in terms of their poetry. He states: 
Hegel talks about Persians like he talks about no other Muslims. Bearing in mind his 
wholesale dismissal of Turks and ambiguous portrayal of Arabs, it is difficult not to 
be impressed by the way he weaves poets such as Rumi, Nisami [sic] and Firdusi [sic] 
in and out of analyses filled with a whole variety of reference to European 
literature.
389
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Hegel’s affinity for Rumi’s and Nizami’s poetry may be explained in their shared 
Neoplatonic roots.
390
 It is the Neoplatonic undercurrent in the arts that we return to here to 
pin point the domination of the idea that, despite the proponents of mysticism’s claim that it 
encourages individuality, there is no subjectivity other than what is based upon “theomorphic 
ontological foundations” (Vahdat 126).391 This dependent relationship between the individual 
and the finalized destination, I submit, is not without its downside that actually undermines 
the “I” through statements relying on imaginative finds that have become authoritative. The 
consequence has been the reinforcement of the dissolved individual subject into factions, 
may they be political, ethnic, or religious. It has further ensured the perpetual subjugation to 
and identification of the population with the external sources of authority and power (i.e. 
ideology), in other words, leaving no time or space to cultivate a way to become subjects to 
themselves.
392
 Moreover, this created an uneven playing field that facilitated the Europeans’ 
colonialization of their recognized “other,” the Middle Easterners (that which has been called 
Orientalism by Edward Said); after all, alterity is the other side of recognizing the “I.” This 
was due to the advantage of the already developed sense of self, the “I” that served as a 
Eurocentric measure, through which the Europeans could safely arrive at their position of 
power and domination in the Middle East region throughout the modern era. In this 
formulation, I am aware that Eurocentricism can be argued a collective subjectivity, but I 
submit it is a collective subjectivity that has passed through the question of the Cartesian idea 
of the thinking subject, albeit a self-centered one, and it has been a work in progress itself. In 
that phase, while the subject still recalls its subjectivity, I suggest, it is taken over by 
patriarchy (source of power/authority) under different banners, such as nationalism or 
cultural superiority, even preservation of religious beliefs, rendered into a collective, and 
turned against its alterity for the patriarchy’s dual purpose of artificial unity and inciting 
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conflict to better strengthen its own position of power. Thus, the Dionysian energy is 
channeled against the other. 
I will discuss this in detail through Nietzsche, who reveals the unraveling of much of 
the subject in the West by way of what he calls “killing God,” whether by the church or the 
philosophers.
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THE CONTEXT OF MODERNISM AND THE ISSUE OF THE SUBJECT: ISLAM AS POLITICAL 
IDEOLOGY AND IDEALISM IN THE SUBJECT: HEGEL FRONT AND CENTER 
It is my intention in this segment, in the context of modernism, to trace back the roots 
of a disregard for the individual experience to an earlier time in a specific locale—that 
fostered the stimulation of the arts and sciences by none other than Muslim scholars—that is 
in Medieval Baghdad.
394
 This is also the time when Islam as an ideology, which had been 
shaped earlier (through the formation of the first dynastic rule – the Umayyads), was firmly 
established due to the requirements of a new empire. The positions of authority among the 
Umayyads’ successors—the Abbasid caliphs—were keen to attract the knowledge from the 
antiquity; however, not all scientific threads were pursued to maximize full potential, 
specifically with regards to the idea of the individual. Therefore, from that point, one must 
follow the progress of arts and science to the European Renaissance, and specifically to the 
development of spatial perspective. I assert that, even though many of the scientific finds 
were achieved by the medieval Muslims (Belting 2011), starting in the beginning of the 
thirteenth century, there is a shift in focus from critical, empirical, and scientific to the 
metaphysical, which became dominant in the philosophical subjects studied by Muslims.
395
 
Around the same time in Europe, the opposite took place. As a result, the findings of scholars 
and scientists such as Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham) (965-1040) and his experiment-based work 
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on optics, for instance, were not further pursued by the communities of later Muslim scholars 
that served and were mainly supported by the centralized political power. Unlike the 
aristocrats and merchants of the Renaissance, perhaps the Muslim religio-political rulers did 
not find a practical purpose for Alhazen’s work on optics as they did in the application of 
other works, for instance the writings of the Arabic Plotinus that chiefly adapted the 
Neoplatonic philosophy to an Islamic one (Adamson 2002). 
Accordingly, the constructed and hybridized Muslim position of patriarchal 
authority/power, whether in Persia, or Ottoman Turkey that had drawn its inspiration from a 
Neoplatonic iteration of Islam,
396
 the likes of which we have seen in the example of the 
Safavids, indeed garnered the lasting impressions of an ideological Islam, which can be 
traced back to the infusion of Islamic thoughts with Greek philosophical works during the 
translation movement.
397
 Keeping this pattern in view, I suggest that, during the modernist 
and nationalistic movements of the nineteenth century (detailed discussion of which is 
forthcoming in the final chapter), the patriarchal agents of power gravitated toward and 
followed a Hegelian philosophical alignment that encompassed both a transcendental and 
political philosophy, rather than a Kantian one, which could have been more subject-
oriented.
398
 The short explanation may possibly be because it suited securing the position of 
established power theoretically and ideologically better, for it clearly projected an image of 
the dominator and the dominated (within the master-slave frame) that the rulers could easily 
plug into. At the same time, that which could break the dichotomy of the master-slave 
formula economically was missing; there appears to be no substantial middle class 
(bourgeois class) or its equivalent that, in their rise to prominence, could identify with what 
Kant had proposed, as it did in Europe.
399
 The socio-economic structure in the Middle East, 
and particularly Persia seems more complex;
400
 however, as Lambton notes, despite the 
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advent of modernist reforms in the nineteenth century Persia, what defined the one-on-one 
relationship and the individual’s relationship to and its place in the society as a subject did 
not receive much attention.
401
 
Consequently, when the technological advancements were brought over to 
modernize, the pieces that could ignite an aspiration for individual experience that would be 
specific to Muslims were not identified. Instead, as exemplified in photography by Wendy 
Shaw,
402
 the technology carried the European experience of individuality. Viewed from a 
mimetic perspective therefore, the reformers in the Middle East strove to superficially 
emulate, and for those in the religious ranks, the technology’s endeavors were deemed as 
competitive alterity. Subsequently, the traditional camp felt threatened by them, hence 
resisted or rejected them where they could. 
Modernism and the Disregard for Individuality in the Middle East 
The tackling of the rise of new patriarchy against the backdrop of modernism in the 
Middle East and the link to a nationalism movement in the nineteenth and the twentieth 
century demands that we keep the issue of subjecthood and its history in view. The journey 
of the seeing subject can be argued, to enter a materialized stage during the Renaissance, 
which is the time of rediscovering individualism and reason. In fact, this is the time of not 
just rediscovery, but also acquiring the position of learning from the antiquity through 
Christian Europe’s “other,” the medieval Muslims.403 One of the most influential theories 
that reaches the Europeans at this time is the theory of vision, which has been credited to 
Alhazen and is most critical to the development of the subject.
404
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There is a correlation between the vanishing point in linear perspective—the viewer’s 
position and vantage point—and the using of zero. This connection, which may seem 
surprising at first, was initially noticed by Brian Rotman in 1987.
405
  Once one realizes the 
fact that both are signs that can alter “the meaning of all other signs,” it becomes convincing 
(Belting 9). Rotman “regards the introduction of zero to Arabic numerals and the invention 
of the vanishing point as parallel occurrences.” Hans Belting explains Rotman’s argument: 
The vanishing point is ‘unoccupiable’ by a person or indeed any physical object, but 
it gives a viewer ‘the possibility of objectifying himself, the means of perceiving 
himself, from the outside, as a unitary seeing subject, since each image makes deictic 
declaration; this is how I see . . . from this particular spot at this particular instant in 
time.’406 
This finding had practical application during Renaissance, when artists began 
implementing it as a technique and became increasingly engaged with it.
407
 But, why were 
the Renaissance artists so preoccupied with this technique? The question of why there was 
such an interest in the “accurate” depiction of space during Renaissance, aside from the 
interest in science and reason, maybe answered as, because it was a kind of assertion of their 
individual point of view, which was empowering. The key term here is “accurate,” which 
basically connotes how the individual’s eye experiences what is in one’s field of vision, not 
what is reality to everyone the same way and at the same time. This was one way the 
individualism found a way to express itself during Renaissance, but it did not end there. 
These artists were chiefly supported by the class of merchants and bankers. Not 
surprisingly, then it is the “mercantile capitalism” in fourteenth century Italy that acquires the 
use of both (linear perspective and zero) for “trade and technology purposes” (Belting 10).408 
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Therefore, what the artists created was what the patron wanted everyone to see; in a way, the 
artists quickly relinquished their position for the benefit of their patron. Yet, the significance 
of Alhazen’s theory and the “geometry of the visual field” in creating the illusion of space, 
while made the translation of the three-dimensional world into a two dimensional picture 
possible in the West (Belting 11), did not go very far for the Middle Easterners. If we believe 
the Lacanian “Mirror Phase” theory to be true, the act of seeing is then an individual 
experience, by way of which the symbolic child (subject) experiences autonomy, albeit as an 
illusion, just as in the linear perspective. It is this experience that prompts statements like, 
“The way I see it . . .” that underscore an individual’s point of view. This is also true on the 
part of those whose perspectives (of political or religious power) were being given visual 
forms, namely the members of the aristocratic groups or the church, specifically for 
propaganda purposes.
409
 However, such an experience remained as part of the “unlived” 
experience, to use Agamben’s term,410 even during the modernization, for the Middle 
Easterners, who as subjects without a memory of the self being a subject to itself,
411
 often 
saw through the eyes of their rulers, or in terms of spiritual guides, through the filter of 
religious interpretations of their religious scholars.
412
 Additionally, the visual arts (that which 
requires individual visual response) were not in place to the same extent, as they were in 
Europe, to play a significant role before the advent of photography —for the obvious reason 
of the long standing prohibition of imagery.
413
 Therefore, the issue of “misrecognition” of the 
self never comes up in the visual realm, let alone recognition of the self-hood, because it is a 
given that the individual place and objective within the universal is predetermined 
(Morewedge 51).
414
 What did come up, however, was the misrecognition through the idea of 
the “perfect man” as I have addressed earlier, which was defined through the Neoplatonic 
lens and has essentially gone without criticism to this day. Comparatively, the subject’s 
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vantage point in Europe finds its way toward the Cartesian cogito, whereas the one who is 
deterministically dissolved in the universal ideals, unaware of its subjecthood becomes the 
collective subjectivity that can be easily persuaded by dominant powers for or against 
something, in an artificial unity. The subject, whether individual or collective, however, is 
not immune to objectifying the “other,” as I will explain shortly. 
Through the translation movement, from the mid-eighth to the end of the tenth 
century, numerous texts from antiquity were translated, from Greek to Syriac, then to Arabic, 
thus preserved in Arabic, until their translation into Latin after 1198 (Adamson 2016, 182; 
Gutas 1). The content of these texts then became the driving force behind the Renaissance 
movement, as it has now become evident and argued by Belting and others. The Renaissance 
becomes an instance in which the discourse on humanity touches on the rights and dignity of 
man that can be traced to the translation movement in Baghdad.
415
 From there, to continue 
the journey of the subject, one can follow a straight path to Roger Bacon (1214-1292), who 
“tried to apply his knowledge of optics416 to theological questions;” to Johannes Kepler 
(1571-1630), who “was the first to describe [the eye] as an optical instrument;” to his friend 
Galileo (1564-1642), who developed the telescope;
417
 to Rene Descartes (1595-1650) and his 
cogito, “separating image and perception.” As he put it: “it is the mind that sees, not the eye” 
(Belting 125). The gap left in Descartes on vision is subsequently filled by Kant.
418
 The 
subject becomes once again the topic of concern in Kant, whose freedom project frees the 
subject from the established aristocracy and the church, and liberates to one’s own judgment 
under the universal unification of nature and the faculties.
419
 
It must be noted, however, it isn’t until Nietzsche that even in Europe, the more 
realistic picture of the self is revealed. Even then, it has taken another century for his views 
207 
 
on subjectivity to find their deserved position. He is critical of the “modern” philosophy and 
holds both the religious authorities as well as the philosophers responsible for “killing 
God.”420 Nietzsche in Beyond Good and Evil argues: 
So what is really going on with the whole of modern philosophy? Since Descartes . . . 
all the philosophers have been out to assassinate the old concept of the soul, under the 
guise of critiquing the concepts of subject and predicate. […] People used to believe 
in “the soul” as they believed in grammar and the grammatical subject: people said 
that “I” was a condition and “think” was a predicate and conditioned – thinking is an 
activity, and a subject must be thought of as its cause. Now, with admirable tenacity 
and cunning, people are wondering whether they can get out of this net – wondering 
whether the reverse might be true: that “think” is the condition and “I” is conditioned, 
in which case “I” would be a synthesis that only gets produced through thought 
itself.
421
 
For Nietzsche, the subject, after Descartes and Kant, becomes a construction and 
contingent of “thinking,” thus interpreted as such, and by extension, a product of imagination 
and creation. The implication is that it places thinking/imagination as superior to the subject. 
This eliminates the opportunity to ask the question of why someone does something.
422
 
Instead, a “being” is identified and defined by its “thinking” faculties to be human, and 
deserving of certain “rights.” This conceals the causal gap, that which encourages the inquiry 
leading to consciousness of the subject. It is this subject (the one who does the defining) that 
upon arriving at its subjecthood, as noted by Horkheimer and Adorno in ([1944] 1989), turns 
to objectifying others, even itself.
423
 Thus, as understood by Nietzsche’s criticism, it can be 
surmised that it is Hegel who puts the subject in place of the “predicate” within the collective 
208 
 
consciousness, and formulates an ideology on this basis that creates a perfect, continuous 
prescription for a perpetual concealment of the causal gap, that is to say, the contradiction 
that exists between the subject and the object, or the particular and the universal, 
undermining the possibility of raising questions that is so critical to the progression of the 
individual/subject and its consciousness. At the same time, it ensures the duality of the 
dialectic; if the subject is the one who defines the object (i.e. the other), then the unequal 
relationship between the master and the slave thusly continues in a never-ending loop. The 
Hegelian dialectic seems to have found an impression in the modern Middle East, but its 
sympathetic seeds were planted long before the nineteenth century.
424
 
Modernism and the Birth of “Islamic” Ideology: Why Hegel but Not Kant 
The widely documented period from approximately mid eighth century to the end of 
the tenth century pinpoints the “transformative” epoch, during which much of what was 
written and available in Greek “throughout the Eastern Byzantine Empire and the Near East 
[was] translated into Arabic” (Gutas1). Some have even argued the ninth century to be when 
philosophy began in the Islamic world (Nasr [1968]1992). Therefore, in tracing back the 
“Graeco-Arabic scholarship,” one must examine the “translation movement” and its roots. 
What brought on such a movement that lasted a century and a half with such influential 
implications? 
The critical necessity to establish Bayt al-Hikma (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad, in 
translating and preserving the texts from the antiquity in medieval Baghdad, has been 
thoroughly investigated by Dimitri Gutas (1998). Gutas makes a very convincing case 
regarding the coinciding of the translation movement with the establishing of the new 
“Abbasid dynasty as the manager of a world empire,” and as it pertains to “the special needs 
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of the society in Baghdad” (Gutas 7). Adamson concurs that the translation movement began 
almost at the point of the founding of the new dynasty during the rule of al-Mansūr (r. 750-
770), and continued during the time of al-Mansūr’s grandson and successor, al-Ma’mūn (r. 
813-833) (Adamson 2016, 20).
425
  It is through the translation movement that the 
“Hellenizing through the Islamic world” took place (ibid). 
Adamson, in his extensive study, points to an influential figure who dominated the 
translation movement and under whose supervision many scholars and translators were busy 
poring through the ancient texts, namely al-Kīndī (801-873). Al- Kīndī’s credit as the first 
Arab philosopher was “defined in large part by his engagement with the Greek tradition that 
preceded him” (Adamson 2007, 3).426  Adamson draws attention to one of the most important 
texts influencing the later Islamic philosophers; it is authored by the one named “The Arabic 
Plotinus,” whose writings, known erroneously as Theology of Aristotle, are comprised of 
translated parts of the Enneads, with commentaries, and even include “new philosophical 
positions of its own” (Adamson 2002, 1). This clearly demonstrates from where the 
Neoplatonic influences entered Islamic thought. But, why did the Greek philosophy so 
preoccupy and dominate the translation movement? 
It is important to remember, not unlike Christianity at its start, Islam began as a 
humble religion of the poor and an advocate of social justice and equality. There were no 
instructions within the teachings of the Prophet or the Koranic text on how to operate an 
Empire, as the turn of events proved necessary. But, there were living examples (the 
Byzantine and Persian Empires) not too far from Muslim borders. Although the narrations 
from the Prophet’s accounts (Hadith) have been cited as a model,427 much of what has 
become part of the administrative structure, court rituals, and even the political philosophy, 
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has been developed based on the absorption of the cultures encountered, and essentially, how 
a reconciliation can be reached between Islamic principles and other cultures that Muslims 
encountered.
428
 To grasp the reasons and motivations behind such massive undertaking, 
therefore, it is imperative to turn to what informed the “imperial ideology” of the Abbasids, 
who were preparing to absorb one of the largest civilizations at the time (i.e. Persian), and 
aimed to strengthen their own ideological positions against the Christian Byzantine. Gutas 
recognizes that, “the Zoroastrian Sasanian elements” were effectively influential “in the 
formation of this ideology” (Gutas 28). He names two astrologers in the service of the caliph 
al-Mansūr as evidence to his claim. The caliph, according to Gutas as quoted from the 
historian al-Ahbari, “had in his retinue the astrologer Nawbaht the Zoroastrian, who 
converted to Islam upon his instigation . . . [a]lso, . . . Ibrahim al-Fazārī, the author of an ode 
to the stars and other astrological and astronomical works, and the astrologer ‘Ali ibn-Īsā the 
Astrolabist” (30). Gutas, through citing passages from three versions of a text that hold the 
“formulation,” demonstrates that the “Zoroastrian Imperial ideology of the Sasaninas” was 
focused on the consistent and continuous campaign of the successive Sasanian emperors, 
who actively documented their legacy by contributing to the collection. He notes: “This 
treasure-house of Zoroastrianism and Persian civilization also contained an account of the 
transmission of learning and the sciences in Persia, from the earliest times until the reign of 
Chosroes I” (35). 
Clearly, the appropriation of the ancient Persian ideology of the “king of kings” in 
this context became necessary for the Abbasids. It was not sufficient to just satisfy the 
“demands of both Sunni and Shi’it Muslims,” by the Abbasids claiming they were 
descendants of the Prophet;
429
 it was also crucial for the Abbasids to demonstrate that they 
were true successors “of the ancient imperial dynasties in Iraq and Iran, from the 
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Babylonians through the Sasanians” (Gutas 29). In order to fully absorb the heart and soul of 
the Persian Empire, so to speak, as consistent with the history of other in-coming patriarchal 
dynasties, it was necessary for the Abbasids to justify their rule over everyone, including the 
Persians with an intellectual structure, i.e. philosophy.
430
 Gutas confirms: “In this way they 
were able to incorporate Sasanian culture, which was still the dominant culture of large 
masses of the population east of Iraq, into mainstream ‘Abbasid culture (ibid). This 
necessitated the possession of the contemporary knowledge, an encompassing philosophy, 
and ideology that could satisfy the requirements of their ambition. This formula would be 
applied again by the Safavids, who were pursuing a similar goal, as discussed in the previous 
chapter. Gutas demonstrates that the undertaking of the translation movement following the 
founding of the round city of Baghdad
431
 was to support the Abbasid’s multifaceted political 
aims of rivalry with the Byzantine on the one hand, and supplanting the Persian hegemonic 
culture on the other.
432
 
Therefore, the translation movement did not just foster the preservation and 
translations of the texts from the antiquity, but it gave rise to the flourishing of nuances in 
philosophical thoughts and theories that aimed to unify under the new imperial rule. 
Adamson names al-Fārābi (c. 872-950/51) as “[t]he first Muslim philosopher to offer . . .[a] 
holistic original system” (Adamson 2016, 63). Significantly, this system included political 
philosophy, among other subjects. His philosophy argues for the interconnectedness of 
everything, which he applies to socio-political aspirations in his two books: Principles of the 
Opinions of the Inhabitants of the Virtuous City and The Political Regime (Adamson 2016, 
67). He blends together the “emanationist scheme of Neoplatonism with ideas from 
Aristotle.”433  This fusion would cause a sort of a split among the medieval Muslim 
philosophers, in that some, while maintaining Islam as their religion, followed the reason 
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branch of his theory and became Aristotelian philosophers, like Avicenna (980-1037) and 
Averroes (1126-1198), although, as Nasr points out, rejected Aristotle’s “question of motion” 
(Nasr 1992, 126). Others would take the Neoplatonist branch, as in al-Ghazāli (1058-1111), 
and move toward the East to eventually dominate the scene of Islamic philosophy.
434
 But, 
how did this divide unfold? 
With the great translation movement came the development of schools or movements 
that began actively discussing and arguing the important and sometimes controversial issues 
of the day such as “determination and free will, the nature of the divine attributes,”435 and 
what is determined as eternal or as created. One of such issues was whether, for example, the 
Koran was eternal or God’s creation. 436 This was clearly an important argument for a 
governing system that identified itself as Islamic, because it was seen as a principle source of 
authority, whose intellectual possession had to be justified. There are two schools that 
flourished from these intellectual fermentations which were divided, interestingly, on the 
issue of the human free will versus the absolute Divine power (Adamson 2016, 10, 13, 106, 
109). The subscribers to the former, the Mu’tazilites, argued on the basis of two principle 
predicates: first, God is one (as in one with his power, knowledge, attributes), and second, 
God is just. Thus, they argued humans were responsible for their own actions, not God, 
because “no one can be morally responsible for actions that are not in their own power” 
(Adamson 2016, 13). This implicates their assumption “that there are moral laws that we can 
discover using our own reason, and by which even God is bound” (Adamson 2016, 107). 
However, this was met with the objection of the second group, the Ash’arites, who are 
considered the instigators of a “Sunni revival” during the Middle Ages (Adamson 2016, 105) 
and argued for the “Divine command theory of morality,” which was intended to maintain 
the absoluteness of the Divine will and power (ibid). S. H. Nasr argues that the Ash’arites 
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were theologians, and therefore, did not concern themselves with all philosophical questions, 
rather only “religious matters’ (1992, 305). Nonetheless, Adamson presents an argument by 
the Ash’arites that can explain the Sunni position of siding with the dominant and often 
tyrannical political power.
437
  
The Ash’arites’ “Divine command theory of morality” implies an entirely different 
set of logic practiced by God that can often be counterintuitive to human logic, such as to 
“torment innocent children,” or “punish believers, . . . [f]or justice means nothing more nor 
less than agreement with God’s will” (Adamson 2016, 108). Actions receive their moral 
context from God; thus, for example, in the determination of whether or not the act of murder 
is justified, the Ash’arites argue that “inevitably depends on . . . [the] context . . . provided 
ultimately by God’s law” (ibid). Naturally, the Ash’arites deem the responsibility of 
interpreting “God’s law” to be under the authority of the judges and scholars of Islam. More 
revealing is how, according to the above argument, justice or injustice becomes linked to 
actions. These actions are then elaborated on by the Ash’arites, who are in agreement with 
the Mu’tazilites with respect to the “physical theory,” and the “created things as atomic 
bodies, which have properties or ‘accidents’ that belong to them only for one moment at a 
time.” The atoms exist by way of these “accidents,” that have a “fleeting existence;” 
therefore, they are not eternal and must have been created, which obviously means, they were 
created by God. Therefore, “[i]t is He who creates every atom and every one of its attributes, 
giving them existence at each moment they exist” (ibid). The Ash’arites thus underscore the 
transitory and reliant characteristics of the “accidents” that directly fit in with what is created. 
Consequently, as an example, the actions of an autocratic caliph or a victorious party in a 
conflict can easily be viewed as what God has willed. In the eastern regions initially, despite 
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the “spread of Ash’arite theology,”438 the development of thought and engagement with the 
Greeks had taken a different turn. 
As still is true both today and in the Middle Ages, no respected philosopher could 
produce work without dealing with the works of the Greek philosophers. Both Adamson and 
Nasr name the aforementioned al-Kīndī as the first Arab scholar, who was a critical 
contributor to the process of incorporating Greek philosophy into Islamic thoughts. 
(Adamson 2007, Nasr 1992). About al- Kīndī and his influence, Nasr states:  
It was he who initiated the process of formulating a technical philosophical 
vocabulary in Arabic, and of rethinking Greek philosophy in terms of Islamic 
doctrines. In both these respects, he was followed by al-Fārābi, through whom the 
basis for Peripatetic philosophy became well established in Islam. The philosophers 
of this school were familiar with the Alexandrian and Athenian Neoplatonists and 
commentators on Aristotle, and viewed the philosophy of Aristotle through 
Neoplatonic eyes.
439
 
Al- Fārābi then in turn was most influential on Avicenna, as admitted to in his 
autobiography (Adamson 2016, 116). As the “greatest Islamic exponent”440 of the Peripatetic 
school, Avicenna incorporated the rational aspect of the school, reworked the Aristotelian 
thoughts into original philosophy, and even designated a new name, “Oriental philosophy,” 
to differentiate it from that which was practiced in the West (Adamson 2016, 116).
441
 It 
appears the feeling was mutual from the Western corner. The Aristotelian influence reached 
its height in Averroes, “who became the most purely Aristotelian of the Muslim Peripatetics, 
and rejected, as an explicit aspect of philosophy, those Neoplatonic and Muslim elements 
that entered into the world view of the Eastern Peripatetics, such as Avicenna” (Nasr 1992, 
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293). Therefore, one of the points of departure seems to be Neoplatonism that marks the 
separation of the Islamic Western and Eastern philosophies. This is certainly not to say the 
Western Islamic thinkers did not demonstrate Neoplatonic flavors in their works, as the later 
example of Ibn Arabi (1165-1240) can demonstrate. It is rather in the varied combination of 
Neoplatonism with other philosophical or religious thoughts and interpretations that we see 
the differences, for instance, as it is seen in its infusion with Ash’arism in the East while 
denouncing philosophy at the same time. 
Nasr deems the domination of the Ash’arite theology as a major suppressor of the 
rationalism “with the help of Sufism,” and in short, a major blow in the “destruction of” 
philosophy in Islam (Nasr 1992, 307). Adamson concurs and also points out that even though 
the Ash’arites’ arguments were reason-based, they did not consider themselves philosophers 
(Adamson 2016, 112), therefore seeking reasoning only to protect their faith (Nasr 1992, 
305). It is Algazel (al-Ghazālī), the prominent Ash’arite figure, who accomplishes the task of 
the criticism of the philosophers. However, as Nasr puts it, it is al-Ghazālī who “establish[es] 
a harmony between the exoteric and esoteric elements of Islam” (ibid). Nevertheless, as 
Adamson quickly brings to our attention, al-Ghazālī’s refutation of the philosophers was 
more aimed at the Islamic Aristotelians (i.e. Avicenna), than Aristotle or Plato (Adamson 
2016, 112). 
Before tending to the essence of the intertextual conversations of al-Ghazālī (1058-
1111) and Avicenna (980-1037) on some controversial issues, certain political, social, and 
intellectual context seems necessary in order to understand the importance of the domination 
of the Ash’arite over Aristotelian thinking in the East. While the intellectual discussions were 
ongoing between various groups/schools of thought, up until mid-eleventh century, they were 
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mainly court-patronized, or funded by aristocratic families, as was the case of al-Kīndī in the 
former, and Avicenna in the latter. Following the rise to power of the Turkish Seljūqs in 
1038, and their employment of a powerful pro-Ash’arite vizier, Nīzām al-Mūlk (1018-1092), 
the status of sponsorship for such intellectual exchanges changed. Nīzām al-Mūlk established 
a series of state-sponsored madrasas, or institutions of higher education that were named 
Nīzāmiyya after him, and were designed to institutionalize the teaching of philosophy for the 
first time in the Islamic lands (Adamson 2016, 142). These schools were located in places 
such as Baghdad, Nishapūr, Herat, and other medieval intellectual centers in the Middle East 
and Central Asia. The schools’ curriculum included “parts of philosophy, especially logic . . . 
that educated legal scholars and theologians . . . around this time” (Adamson 2016, 142). The 
main objective of the school was to advocate and actively promote the revival of Sunni Islam 
following the demise of the rule of the Shi’ite Būyids (Adamson 2016, 142). 
It is in the Nishapūr Nizamiyya that al-Ghazālī studied and trained in Ash’arism under 
his teacher al-Jūwaynī, whose teaching curriculum included Avicenna’s philosophical work 
that had already permeated kalām (rational theology). Al-Ghazālī developed such close ties 
to Nīzām al-Mūlk that as a young professor, he was appointed by Nīzām al-Mūlk to teach at 
the Baghdad Nizamiyya.
442
 However, al- Ghazālī’s assessment of the state of scholarly work 
was increasingly making him anxious and skeptical. Adamson notes a “serious breakdown in 
the summer of 1095 [when] . . . religious reflection on the meaninglessness of his daily 
occupation as a teacher caused him to stop eating, and even rendered him unable to speak” 
(140).
443
 It is worth noting this is the year he abandoned his prestigious post in Baghdad (the 
same year the first Crusades were launched to capture Jerusalem) and traveled in the Middle 
East between Damascus, Jerusalem, and then headed toward the east in 1099 (Moosa 6). It is 
clear in his writings that he believed that the spiritual guidance should come from the 
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“learned” and that they were the true “heirs of the Prophet;” however, he laments they are 
lacking in numbers in his time (Moosa 8). While al-Ghazālī held a low opinion of taqlīd, or 
“the uncritical acceptance of authority,”444 and encouraged “careful personal reflection,” he 
saw the “independent judgment” as a way that “can wind up giving us a reason to depend on 
authority. In such a case, our acceptance of that authority no longer falls under the heading of 
taqlīd, since it is not uncritical or slavish” (Adamson 2016, 143). 
Most significantly in his personal crisis, it is the question of “skepticism,” which 
plays an important role in al-Ghazālī’s own transformative experience.445 The skepticism that 
came over al-Ghazālī, as argued by Adamson, was not the same skepticism that preoccupied 
Descartes. Al-Ghazālī had learned that the sensory perception had to be corrected by the 
power of the mind.
446
 However, the doubt had set in: what if the mind is in error? What then 
was to deliver the mind from being misguided?
447
 Therefore, he reaches for the highest 
authority. Adamson explains: 
Like Descartes, al-Ghazālī sees skepticism as a challenge to be overcome . . . But al- 
Ghazālī does not point to anything like the Cartesian cogito to get himself out of his 
skeptical fix. Instead, he tells us that it was God who released him: a light was 
unexpectedly cast into his bosom . . . It is through this light that we must seek the 
“unveiling” (kashf) of truth, and it is given only by divine generosity.448 
Therefore, al- Ghazālī incorporates into the Ash’arite and partial philosophical 
doctrines the mystic experience. His attitude toward philosophy remains “ambivalent,” for 
the reasoning and “rational theology” in al-Ghazālī’s view had a practical purpose in 
“defending a virtuous religion against its detractors,” while he remained unsatisfied with the 
proofs presented by the philosophers (Adamson 2016, 144).
449
 This, Adamson believes to be 
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so, because of “Avicenna’s rigorous and influential studies in logic and epistemology” that 
enriched the theological studies with establishing a “more self-conscious” study method 
(ibid). Consequently, al-Ghazālī differentiates in the works of philosophers, where it is 
“concerning natural philosophy,” which he finds more or less acceptable, and where it 
involves “ethics and politics [which he thinks] are simply plagiarized from earlier prophetic 
traditions” (Adamson 2016, 145). 
Al-Ghazālī’s engagement with Avicenna had some interestingly ironic consequences. 
It is true that not only Europe came to know Avicenna through the translations of al-
Ghazālī’s work,450 which he had written to refute Avicenna, but that also al-Ghazālī played 
an instrumental role in the survival of philosophy in the East. Adamson remarks that this was 
because, “[h]e made the tacit, but crucial, assumption that explaining and then criticizing 
Avicenna is the same as explaining and criticizing philosophy itself.” This consequence 
secured Avicenna’s place, rather than Aristotle’s, “as the main point of reference.”451 
As a result, in his book Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfa (translated as Incoherence of the 
Philosophers), al-Ghazālī lays out his criticism of the “philosophers,” which as Adamson has 
noted, was aimed mainly at Avicenna, by first summarizing and then critiquing Avicenna’s 
work (147). There are three principle areas of dispute that al-Ghazālī outlines, all of which 
fulfill his grounds for “heresy,” as in what qualifies one as not being a proper Muslim (even 
to the degree of being subject to punishment). According to Adamson, al-Ghazālī believes 
Avicenna to possess all three.
452
 These are: “claims that the universe is eternal rather than 
created; that God has no knowledge of particular things, but only of universals; and that only 
the soul lives on after death, with no possibility of bodily resurrection.”453 
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Given al-Ghazālī’s criteria of religious orthodoxy, one can raise the question: how is 
al-Ghazālī refuting Avicenna’s philosophical argument that, for instance, the world is 
eternal? The answer is that al-Ghazālī used a dialectic method of first summarizing the 
opponent’s arguments and doctrines, then evaluating them as “false or simply inadequate” 
(Adamson 2016, 149). Avicenna had argued that “a temporally limited effect cannot come 
from an eternal cause. God is eternal, so His will should likewise be eternal. And if He has an 
eternal will to produce the universe, then surely the universe too will be eternal.”454  
Al-Ghazālī refutes Avicenna’s argument on the basis of “the faculty of estimation” 
(wahm), which “is . . . responsible for misleading impressions that we find almost impossible 
to resist.” Further, al-Ghazālī complains that the arguments of the “philosophers” in question 
do not meet his requirement of being adequately “demonstrative” (Adamson 2016, 150). 
What al-Ghazālī calls “wahm” may refer to Avicenna’s “thought experiment” that assisted 
Avicenna in making a “distinction between strict impossibility and inconceivability.” 
Adamson states “thought experiment” was nothing new, and even philosophers from 
antiquity employed it. He further explains: “intuitions are crucial in philosophical reflection, 
often providing its starting points, or objections to what seemed to be a promising theory” 
(Adamson 2016, 133). However, al-Ghazālī himself argues for the “direct contact with the 
divine,” which is “beyond demonstration;” nevertheless, he names it “dhawq,” translated as 
“taste,” pertaining to “the immediate perception of divine truth afforded the true mystic” 
(Adamson 2016, 145). On al-Ghazālī’s favoring mysticism as a method, Ebrahim Moosa 
notes: 
Of all the methods he experimented with, Ghazālī found the method of the mystics to 
be the most attractive and conducive for his purposes. Thus, his ethics was, in a sense, 
220 
 
traditional jurisprudence mediated by mysticism. What I think Ghazālī found 
persuasive about mysticism was the kind of imagination it cultivates within an 
individual.
455
 
To be sure, both Avicenna and al-Ghazālī drew from Neoplatonic ideas456 and 
imagination in shaping their philosophical works. The difference is by attributing the source 
to the divine, the latter obtained an authoritative position ensuring the credibility of his 
views. It is one thing to have a mystical experience; it is, however, another to hold it as a 
point of reference and judgment to formulate instructions on its basis. While the former 
seems individual, the latter transcends individual experience and falls within the domain of 
what shapes collective subjectivities. Adamson addresses this point. As if asking al-Ghazālī, 
[w]hat about the rest of us, who are not so fortunate . . . and have not tasted the 
sweetness of God, or seen His radiance? [Then he replies according to al-Ghazālī 
that,] [w]ell, we should demonstrate whatever we can, following the philosophers as 
far as they can take us—which is not nearly as far as they claim. But we must also 
trust in the guidance of true prophets, who should be assessed and verified through 
careful reflection on their works and deeds.
 457
  
Therefore, al-Ghazālī asks that we believe in the “possibility of prophecy,” and at the 
same time, “lays claim to a mystical insight that is beyond the reach of their [the 
philosophers’] arguments” (ibid). Further, in al-Ghazālī’s view (as an Ash’arite), he limits 
the issue of “agency to causes which act out of well-informed choices.” In other words, only 
God is “really the sole efficient cause of the universe and everything in it” (Adamson 2016, 
151). Therefore, there is no subject or free will other than what God has already determined 
freely. In the notion of “agency,” al-Ghazālī differs from Avicenna, who considers (as a 
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parallel to Plotinus’ Soul) an “Agent Intellect” to be responsible to give form to what is 
created (Adamson 2016, 139). 
Adamson states there are places in Avicenna that one is tempted to compare him with 
Descartes. He refers to Avicenna’s “flying man,” which is a thought experiment regarding 
Avicenna’s presenting his case on the man who has been just created, suspended in mid air, 
and not even having limbs touching his body, with “total sensory deprivation.” Avicenna 
claims that such a man is “self-aware,” however, as Adamson swiftly reminds us, not as a 
thinking subject, or even in a material body, but as “essence . . . an incorporeal soul” (135). 
In proving the separation between the soul and the body, too, Avicenna thinks differently 
from Descartes, in that the former deems the “intellectual part of the soul—what he calls the 
‘rational soul’—to be separate from the body in its activity” (Adamson 2016, 136). 
Nasr argues philosophy was received differently by Sunni versus Shi’ite Muslims. 
Whereas the Sunnis accepted only certain aspects of philosophy, namely logic and some 
“methods of argumentation” that proved useful in their debates with their non-Muslim rivals, 
in the Shi’a sphere there has been continuity in the teachings of “the philosophy of both the 
Peripatetic and Illuminationist school . . . as a living tradition through the centuries in the 
religious schools.” He further notes the fact that philosophers such as Mūllā Sadrā appear 
nearly five hundred years after al-Ghazālī is an indication of this consistency (Nasr 1992, 
294). 
What is of great interest here is the notion that how the already influential 
Neoplatonic philosophy was still firmly in place during modernity
458
 and continues to distort 
the content of the individual subject to this day. There seems to be a confusion on mystic 
subjective experience that quickly transforms into collective subjectivity and the subjecthood 
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in the “grammatical” sense as meant by Nietzsche. This dilemma even extends to scholars. 
Farzin Vahdat (2003) in response to Bassam Tibi, “one of the most erudite scholars of Islam 
and modernity,” opposes the idea that human subjectivity is contrary to monotheistic 
religions (126). Even so, he leans on Neoplatonic ideas first and foremost to make his 
argument. What Vahdat draws upon in his argument is the “Islamic mystical tradition and 
philosophy” that come directly from the idea of the “Perfect Human,” and Ibn Arabi as “one 
of the founders of . . . Neoplatonic tradition in the Islamic world” (ibid). However, there is 
nothing on the importance of individual’s lived-experience as a subject to oneself. He comes 
closest to the idea of subjecthood, when he notes in Islam, “the emphasis on the 
responsibility of the individual.” This responsibility, however, as he cites Armando Salvatore 
(1997), is assessed with respect to “salvation” through submission to the Divine authority 
(Vahdat 127). But, this Divine authority is often eclipsed under the various interpretations of 
the clerics, and those who claim to be the mediators even argue for the “human as God’s vice 
regent on earth (Koranic khalifat o’llah fi al-arz),” which “explicitly informed the discourses 
of the architects of the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1960s and the 1970s” (ibid). The class of 
clergy thusly created a position of power within the social structure that was interwoven with 
a political system that can be traced from the medieval to the present time.
459
 Although most 
influential, by the time we reach the nineteenth century, the religious class was not the only 
member of the socio-political structure. (See Appendix III). 
The social division of classes at this time in Persia, reveals a close interdependency 
between all except one group: the ūlamā, who had sources of revenue in charitable taxes and 
endowments (awqāf). They also had the most “influence among the laborers and peasants, 
and in the incitement of mobs.”460 Therefore, those among the ūlamā that were not affiliated 
with the court, were seen in as “the potential leaders of popular discontent” (Lambton 164) 
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that lacked the “relationship of man to man” (Lambton 166). The individual experience, 
therefore, remains a part of the “unlived” life for the Middle Easterners, and in the case at 
hand, the Iranians. One may argue the individual experience in the West that quickly gave its 
place to a collective consciousness after the Renaissance has been problematic in Europeans’ 
engagement with colonialism and exploitation of the “other” (Mignolo 1995). While this is 
true, just as with the fact that humans have never forgotten how to make images, once the 
individual consciousness is experienced and present as “being,” it is always there, even 
though from time to time it will need to be brought to presence (Nancy 1993). This 
experience is long overdue for the Middle Eastern subjects. 
Considering this, just as the experience with photography lacked the background 
process of individual vantage point for the Middle Easterners, modern reforms made 
Romantic Movement and Hegelian aesthetics more appealing in the Middle East during the 
nineteenth century, as received by a collective consciousness. The appeal perhaps was 
because it seemed familiar in how “artistic plan was ascribed to the creator of the universe, as 
had already been done by Plotinus” (Hauser 108).461 
However, the problem of inverting the subject and the predicate persists in Hegel. As 
the thinking, European philosopher who is defining discriminately who is a “being” and, who 
is not, Hegel’s dialectic appears to only be applicable to his fellow European citizens. 
Hegelian philosophy of “the manifold contingencies and particularities of world history into 
one gradual universal direction (essentially that of German Protestant Idealism), has . . . 
become a synonym for the archetypal Eurocentric thinker” (Almond 109). It is of little 
wonder then that the accounts of places like Africa, or religions like Islam are absent in his 
“unfolding World-Spirit,” even though he was very well read on the “orient.”462 Susan Buck-
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Morss (2009) argues this very point. She notes, despite knowing about the Haitian 
Revolution, Hegel was silent about it (17). She finds a sort of hypocrisy in his philosophy of 
the dialectic toward freedom. She argues: “Because of his own insistence on the necessary 
interconnection between history and truth, Hegel’s philosophy cannot be divorced from the 
repression through which the referent that we call Hegel has come to be historically known” 
(Buck-Morss 16). This brings up the subjectivity under the domination of the subject aware 
of itself, but poised to objectify its “other.” This is a discourse that paves the way for 
colonialism. Some of the most significant intellectuals in the nineteenth century Middle East 
were also among the influential figures in opposing colonialism. However, despite their 
familiarity with Western modernist theories, they built their counter arguments by 
maintaining the same patriarchal paradigms such as striving for an artificial unity i.e. Pan-
Islamism. One of the most influential and recognizable names whose inspiration transcended 
geographical borders in the Middle East and reached well into the twentieth century, and 
even to this day, is Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn Asadabadi (al-Afghānī). 
Modern Intellectuals of the Middle East: Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn Asadābādī (al-Afghānī) 
There have been many debates on the origin of Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn (1838/39-1897); 
scholars have been intrigued by the aura of mystery surrounding his biographical accounts 
for years. In Sayyid Jamāl ad-Dīn al-Afghāni: A Political Biography, one of the most 
comprehensive studies on Jamāl ad-Dīn, Nikki Keddie explains that due to his great ideas to 
unify all Muslims in the Middle East against the European colonialists, Jamāl ad-Dīn, when 
“in Sunni surroundings, maintained he was born and raised in Afghanistan, yet it can now be 
shown that he was in fact born in the village of Asadabad near the town of Hamedan in 
western Iran” (Keddie 1972a, 3). Keddie names Jamāl ad-Dīn “as a precursor of various later 
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trends in the Islamic world,”463 and “one of the first important leaders to try to reinterpret 
traditional Islamic ideas so as to meet the agonizing problems brought on by the increasing 
incursions by the West into the Middle East” (Keddie 1972, 1). Keddie states, al-Afghāni’s 
mode of reinterpreting the Islamic past in modern and nationalist terms displayed an 
approach that was to become increasingly popular in the Middle East. That Afghāni 
has been chosen as hero by so many modern Muslims gives his activities and writings 
an importance that withstands all evidence that his influence during his lifetime was 
sometimes small. His example of devotion to the cause of liberating Muslims from 
their Western conquerors has added to his appeal in the contemporary Middle East.
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The idea of “an evolutionary history of civilization” and what its implications were 
was “one of the seminal ideas of nineteenth century Europe.”465 This idea, argues Stephen 
Vernoit, “was disseminated in the Muslim world largely in the ideas of al-Afghāni, who was 
inspired by the lectures of the French statesman and historian François Guizot (1787-1874) 
on the history of civilization in Europe” (Vernoit 30). While al-Afghāni initiated the 
translation of Guizot’s book into Arabic in 1877, it did not prevent him from criticizing the 
Eurocentrism in Guizot’s theory, by insisting “that Muslims could also advance and 
contribute to civilization’s future” (ibid). Additionally, in his exchange with Ernest Renan in 
1883, one can see al-Afghāni’s Hegelian tendencies toward an evolutionary history. 
Rejecting Renan’s “racial argument,”466 Jamāl ad-Dīn asserted that the modern evolutionary 
idea was also applicable to Muslims, but attributed “the superiority of the modern Western 
intellectual climate . . . to the fact that Christianity had an evolutionary head start on Islam” 
(Keddie 1972a, 191). 
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Jamāl ad-Dīn’s education included “the traditional Islamic disciplines,” but he 
received a “considerable knowledge of the Islamic philosophers,” such as Avicenna who 
played an instrumental role in shaping his later views (Keddie 1972a, 18). Despite the earlier 
suppression of Greek influence and harsh criticism of Aristotelian philosophers like 
Avicenna, Keddie argues in the nineteenth century there was actually “a living philosophical 
tradition” in Iran that was taught in madrasas or religious schools (Keddie 1972a, 19). 
Therefore, it seems plausible to deduce that Jamāl ad-Dīn aimed to reestablish a reason-based 
argument in support of an anti-colonial movement against the Europeans. 
Another influential factor forming Jamāl ad-Dīn’s thoughts was the development of 
unorthodox movements during his youth. Keddie points to Jamāl ad-Dīn’s exposure to 
traditions such as Shaikhism (a school of Twelver Shi’ism, founded in the late eighteenth 
century by Sheikh Ahmad Ahsā’ī) and Bābism (a movement initiated in 1844 by Ali 
Mohammad Shirazi); being a witness to both, these shaped Jamāl ad-Dīn’s thoughts and 
writings (Keddie 1972, 19-21).
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The Shaikhi movement was a branch of Shi’a that “stressed both the philosophical 
and mystical aspects of Shi’ism, developing theories found in earlier philosophers and 
mystics about the coexistence of the real and spiritual worlds—worlds that the Shaikhis 
further defined and subdivided.”468 Keddie’s research demonstrates that a treatise written by 
a leader of the Shaikhis, namely Hajj Mohammad Karim Khan Qajar Kirmani (1809-1870), 
who led the group between 1840’s and 1860’s, was copied by Jamāl ad-Dīn in the 1860s; 
these writings, which left an impression on Jamāl ad-Dīn, reveal there could be many 
different levels of meaning to the Koran as well as allusion to the ever-present opportunities 
for guidance for Muslims. She explains: 
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The idea of the Koran as mystically encompassing an infinity of varied meanings is 
one that was used later by Jamāl ad-Dīn to attribute new meanings to this Holy Book. 
Another Shaikhi idea later echoed by Jamal ad-Din was their key difference from 
other Shi’is—what the Shaikhis called the “Fourth Pillar” of religion—the idea that 
there is always in the world a perfect Shi’i who can guide men in right ideas and 
action during the absence of the Twelfth Imam.
469
  
In his stay in Egypt (1871-79, during which time he visited Istanbul), his ideas 
gathered followings. One of his most notable students is Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), 
who “was soon to become . . . political activist and journalist . . . [and follow] the path of his 
master and closest confidant,” Jamāl ad-Dīn (Keddie 1972a, 90). At the same time, Jamāl ad-
Dīn angered the “religious conservatives,” whether in al-Azhar University in Cairo, or as in 
the time when he lectured in Istanbul on crafts. Keddie notes: “he referred to prophecy as a 
craft on almost the same level as philosophy, and drew comparisons between philosophers 
and prophets,” which caused his expulsion from Istanbul in 1871. Vernoit also notes Jamāl 
ad-Dīn’s comments on the importance of the arts in education for “the advancement of arts, 
crafts, and industry . . . were interpreted as placing the arts on an equal footing with divine 
inspiration,” and caused the closure of the university in Istanbul in the same year (Vernoit 
24). 
Perhaps one of the most critical points in Jamāl ad-Dīn’s political life was his 
understanding of the importance of mass media (Keddie 1972b, 46). He sought in his 
arguments to “mobilize the masses so that they would defend their country’s independence 
against the . . . encroaching West” (Keddie 1972b, 45). His anti-colonial and anti-
establishment sentiments are reflected in his writings, public lectures, and pamphlets he 
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distributed. One of the first newspapers that published a couple of articles by Jamāl ad-Dīn, 
was the London-based newspaper by the name of an-Nahla. The articles’ title, “English 
Policy in Eastern Countries,” and “The Reasons for the War in Egypt,” were both criticism of 
British policies in India and Egypt, as well as noting the concerns the British had regarding 
movements toward unification of all Muslims (through a “firm bond,” in Koranic terms: 
‘urwat al wuthqā) which, of course, encompassed the Muslims in India. He had also argued 
that the British were awaiting opportunities to undermine this “Pan-Islamism” under the 
leadership of the Ottoman Sultan Abdülhamid II, and that they “knew [it] would endanger 
their influence in the East and their rule in India” (Keddie 1972a, 184).470 
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s presence in France was reflected in James Sanua’s newspaper, the 
aforementioned Abu Nadara Zarka (in chapter four) in the January 19, 1883 issue. Sanua 
published an article by Jamāl ad-Dīn in his next issue, on February 9, 1883, titled “ash-Sharq 
va ash-Sharqiyyin” (The Orient and Orientals).471 Jamāl ad-Dīn used this and another Paris-
based Arabic language paper, al-Bashīr, to disseminate his idea on Muslim unification, even 
if it meant supporting one’s undemocratic government. This is significant, particularly in the 
latter publication, as its editor was a refugee from the Ottoman Empire, by the name of Khalil 
Ghānem, who often criticized the Ottoman Sultan in his newspaper. It is clear that in his 
writings in Paris, Jamāl ad-Dīn discouraged Ghānem’s criticism of the Ottoman Sultan, as he 
saw it undermining the unity of Muslims in facing the foreigners. Keddie notes “when forced 
to choose between advocacy or reform or self-strengthening for the Muslim world, Afghāni 
gave priority to the latter” (Keddie 1972a, 186). It is this unity he was striving for, however, 
by looking back at Islam’s Golden Age. 
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Jamāl ad-Dīn (al-Afghani) was a man who was very conscious of the history of 
intellectualism in Islam and, as his writings demonstrate, sought the solution to deal with 
colonialism in Islam’s own glorious past. Ilan Pappé, in the Modern Middle East argues al-
Afghani “lamented the weakness of the Islamic world in the face of European colonialism 
and imperialism, asserting that a return to the Golden Age of Islam was the best way of 
tackling this predicament [colonialism]” (Pappé 274). Nonetheless, al-Afghani seems to have 
been aware of the important role the individual has in modern times. Vahdat points out that 
“[u]nderlying Afghani’s discourse there is a strong assumption that the modern world 
necessitates a view of human agency” (Vahdat 131). This agency for Muslims, as argued by 
Jamāl ad-Dīn, required manifestation in “activism, the freer use of human reason and 
political and military strength” (Keddie 1968, 3). Yet, for Jamāl ad-Dīn, as a nineteenth 
century Muslim intellectual, this does not seem to translate into individuality or subjecthood. 
The reason may rest in a long-standing tradition that excluded the masses from the 
intellectual circles, may they be theologians, Sufis or philosophers. 
In “Intellectuals in the Modern Middle East: A Brief Historical Consideration,” 
Keddie provides a history of intellectualism in Islamic lands. She notes theologians like al-
Ghazāli actually “wrote treatise on the need of keeping theology from the masses.” This was 
also practiced by the Sufis, who “restricted their higher truths to the initiated, as did many of 
the Shi’is.” Most significantly for its persistence to this day, Keddie argues, it is the work of 
the philosophers who developed this theory “most elaborately” by “[i]nsisting that their 
Greek-based philosophy was enjoined on them by the [Kor]an,” and citing certain 
interpretations from selected verses in the Koran as their evidence (Keddie 1972b, 42).
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Further, the exclusion was established in the idea “that humanity was divided into a small 
elite capable of understanding philosophy and a large mass who could not be exposed to it, 
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lest it upset their literalist faith” (ibid). It appears that Jamāl ad-Dīn also followed this 
“duality” in his work. Vahdat asserts that Jamāl ad-Dīn  
created two discourses, one for what he considered to be the enlightened elite in 
Islamic societies, according to the principles of which individual subjectivity was 
affirmed in such concepts as critical thought. He also developed a parallel discourse, 
which appealed more to the “masses” motivated by his anti-imperialist goals, and 
which in many ways was in sharp contrast to his first critical discourse.
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Without a doubt, Jamāl ad-Dīn was actively trying to educate elite leaders in the 
Muslim communities, such as Abduh and others, by underscoring the importance of the 
sciences.
 474
 Jamāl ad-Dīn believed “no reform [was] possible in Muslim countries until 
Muslim leaders and ulama have reformed their outlook . . . and that the decline of Muslim 
countries began with these leaders.”475 Furthermore, he harshly criticized the Muslim 
religious scholars “for their blindness and hostility toward modern science and 
technology.”476 He argued for the “scientific proof,” and deemed “no incompatibility 
between science and knowledge and the foundation of Islamic faith” (Keddie 1972a, 163). 
Nevertheless, he drew the inspiration for reasoning from philosophy. 
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s emphasizing the importance of sciences and philosophy is evident in 
one of his articles; however, mysticism and openness to creative thinking is never far from 
his view.
477
 He cites names of philosophers such as Fārābi, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), and Mūllā 
Sadrā among others, who are from more mystical traditions.478 Moreover, Jamāl ad-Dīn 
criticizes the ulama, who “study . . . sciences that are ascribed to Aristotle with the greatest 
delight, as if Aristotle were one of the pillars of the Muslims. However, if the discussion 
relates to Galileo, Newton and Kepler, they consider them infidels.”479 He further states the 
231 
 
purpose of philosophy “is man’s becoming man and living the life of sacred rationality. Its 
aim is human perfection in reason, mind, soul, and way of life.”480 From the extant 
documents written by Jamāl ad-Dīn, one can surmise his “ties to mysticism of a Neoplatonic 
type” and continued interest in “this school’s combination of philosophy, mystical ideas, and 
religious innovation” (Keddie 1972a, 38); one can also grasp his attempts to strengthen all 
his bases against European imperialism, and primarily of the British colonialists’ intentions. 
While his influences in the region, from India to Egypt, to Ottoman Turkey and Iran, paved 
the way for multiple socio-political reformation movements, the issue of what happens to the 
colonized subject remains beyond the scope of concern for reformists such as Jamāl ad-Dīn 
and others and would have to wait until later in the twentieth century. 
FACING COLONIALISM: SUBJECTIVITY AND THE ARTS IN THE NINETEENTH AND THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY MIDDLE EAST 
Jamāl ad-Dīn’s concerns regarding colonialism and his plans to consolidate a 
confident “Pan-Islamic nation” led to reformation movements that began in the later part of 
the nineteenth century and continued in the first decades of the twentieth century. These 
reformation movements sought to overhaul the religious traditional beliefs, but at the same 
time the economy, and ultimately aimed to bring about modern states in the Middle East. 
However, the colonialists left their marks on the region. In this segment, it is necessary to 
discuss in further detail the implementation of colonial strategies that inflicted a sort of 
collective subjectivity, undermining the space and time within which a meaningful, 
“individual” stage may have come to be experienced. While nineteenth century reformers 
like Jamāl ad-Dīn and Muhammad Abduh recognized the pernicious effects of European 
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imperialism, it remained outside their reach to elaborate on the issue of the subject, such as 
what was undertaken later by Frantz Fanon and Edward Said. 
Colonial Discourses: Fanon and Said – the Imaginary Construction of the “Other” 
The ethico-aesthetic paradigm emerged to explore ways to circumvent the formal 
structure of power in order to bring about change when it would become necessary; it is 
informed partly by works of philosophers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who saw in the 
aesthetics and creative thoughts a pathway toward free consciousness necessary to bring 
about change (Nietzsche 2006, 65; Heidegger 1993, 197). Heidegger also warns against the 
calculative and systematic activities of humans that “enframe” earth’s resources, including 
other fellow humans and their relationships (Heidegger, 325). However, without criticism 
and critical examination, art and aesthetics can be another instrument in the hands of the 
power bases. Interestingly, I believe the requirement of this criticism is implied in 
Heidegger’s choice of the term “enframe,” even though he addresses the darker side of 
technology, as it connotes a sort of misuse or abuse of creative endeavors.
481
 Instrumental in 
this criticism is the examination of the mechanisms of colonialism, the subjects under the 
imposed colonial powers, and the role of the creative endeavors (i.e. imagination) in 
implementation of power mechanisms. 
Frantz Fanon in Black Skin, White Masks sets out to demonstrate “that what is called 
the black soul is a construction by white folk” (xviii). He analyzes the disruption through 
systematic treatment to the process of collective consciousness of the colonized. Fanon 
argues the process of transitioning from unconsciousness toward consciousness for the black 
man is intercepted, thus “the [blacks’] collective unconscious is not governed by cerebral 
heredity,” rather by what he calls “an impulsive cultural imposition” through which he [the 
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colonized] internalizes the sense of inferiority and all things negative about himself (Fanon, 
167). The imposed culture, through the negative representation of its “other,” immediately 
tips the scale in favor of the dominant race, thereby engendering a debt for the dominated 
people. Therefore, in this type of “debt economy,” their “lack” of the dominant culture’s 
values places the dominated in the position of need to receive from its “other.”482 
The “debt economy” finds a whole new meaning when viewed in “real” economic 
situations as explained by Maurizio Lazzarato (2012). Lazzarato argues that in capitalism, 
major creditors have become the recipient of exorbitant amounts of funds through what he 
calls “the simple mechanism of interest” (Lazzarato 20). Through producing “credit” for the 
population, the financial institutions have been able to “appropriate labor and wealth of 
others.” He quotes Gabriel Ardent that credit and credit system is a “power mechanism of 
exploitation” and “one of the most effective instruments of exploitation man has managed to 
create” (Lazzarato 20-21). Lazzarato further argues that “even though neoliberalism equally 
involves the economy and subjectivity, ‘work’ and ‘work on the self,’ it reduces the latter to 
an injunction to become one’s own boss, in the sense of ‘taking upon oneself’ the costs and 
risks that business and the State externalize onto society” (Lazzarato 93). Taking Lazzarato’s 
formula between the state and the society and extrapolating it into the economic relationship 
between Europe and the Middle East, as Roger Owen examined in the example of nineteenth 
century Egypt, the imperialists’ strategy to subjugate becomes evident on the state level. In 
other words, by closely controlling the state, they maintain a tight control over the 
population. This explains the support of capitalist powers of autocratic rulers in the Middle 
East, even to this day. Owen argues on the case of Egypt, “the role of the metropolitan states 
in relation to their capitalists, [and] the nature of the Egyptian state and the changes in the 
Egyptian social structure which imperial penetration produced,” all to be among the efforts to 
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transform the colonized region, not by military might, but through dependent economy, into a 
submissive colony (Owen 111). 
 In all examples above, the configuration of power determines the relationship 
between the members of society, or on the state level, between the colonizer and the 
colonized. Speaking from a post-modern view, we now have long left behind the early 
models of power, as Foucault elaborated; it is “not the ‘center of power’, not a network of 
forces, but a multiple network of diverse elements . . . [It is] . . . a strategic distribution of 
elements of different natures and levels” (Foucault [1975] 1977, 307). Nonetheless, as 
suggested in this study, the most powerful element remains the creative powers that can 
operate on multiple levels, particularly in implementing imperialistic mechanisms. The 
element of imagination has also played an instrumental role in colonialism and sustaining its 
grips on the Middle East. 
Edward Said in Orientalism (1979) asserts that the European colonial programs were 
predicated on an “imaginary Orient” (Said 177). He scrutinizes the role of the academics in 
taking part in constructing the “imaginative meaning of Orientalism” (Said 3). He argues  
that without examining Orientalism as a discourse one cannot possibly understand the 
enormously systematic discipline by which European culture was able to manage—
and even produce—the Orient politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, 
scientifically, and imaginatively during the post-Enlightenment period.
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Said further notes the power relation presupposes the idea of “Orient,” for it defines 
“the relationship between Occident and Orient . . . [as] a relationship of . . .  domination, 
[and] of varying degrees of a complex hegemony” (ibid). It is this “hegemony,” Said 
maintains, which ensures the continuity and power of the “Occident” over the “Orient.” It 
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solidifies “the idea of European identity as a superior one in comparison with all the non-
European peoples and cultures” (Said 7). Therefore, by creating “us” and “them,” the West 
has established and maintained its hegemony over the “Orient.” In all the political, cultural, 
and military interactions with the Middle East, as situations evolved into more modern times, 
the West’s written and cited authority on the Middle East has gone through a process as well. 
Said explains:  
The Orient needed first to be known, then invaded and possessed, then re-created by 
scholars, soldiers, and judges who disinterred forgotten languages, histories, races and 
cultures in order to posit them—beyond the modern Oriental’s ken—as the true 
classical Orient that could be used to judge and rule the modern Orient.
484
  
Thusly, Europe maintained its distance with the “Orient.” In the literary examples he 
closely examines, Said disentangles how the Western observer of the “Orient,” while his 
presence is not directly tangible, allows himself to speak of the Orient’s “backwardness, its 
silent indifference, its feminine penetrability . . .; this is why every writer on the Orient . . . 
saw the Orient as a locale requiring Western attention, reconstruction, even redemption,” not 
to mention receiving the added support from the literature on “the biological bases of racial 
inequality,” and those referencing “scientific validity” that quickly became incorporated into 
the discourse and epistemology that further accentuated the binary state of the “advanced” 
versus the “backward” subject (Said 206).485  
Through the process of imagining and creating an “Orient,” the West successfully 
dominated the “Orient.”486 This brings up the issue of mimesis through which the Europeans 
imagined an Orient that they could then possess and exploit.
487
 But, on a more apparent level, 
it is the general state of the visual arts during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries that 
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reveals emulation, whether from the European styles, or pre-Islamic arts in the case of Iran. 
In both cases, while exhibiting some innovations, mimesis achieves a sense of stability and 
continuity. 
Modernism and the Visual Arts in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 Century Middle East 
There appears to be a great difference in attitude toward the visual arts between the 
nineteenth and the twentieth centuries in the Middle East (Vernoit 19). Whereas the 
nineteenth century began with the domination of strict religious views on imagery, 
particularly for the majority of the population and those “who did not enjoy court favor,” the 
dawn of the twentieth century reveals “an unmistakable transformation in religious views” on 
the arts. 
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 The substantial changes were due to a series of religious edicts (fatwa), issued by 
none other than Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), the faithful pupil and follower of al-
Afghāni. In the spirit of modernization, Abduh argued for the “educational value” of the 
visual imagery and ruled it had no incompatibility with the religious law (Vernoit 19). The 
topic of visual imagery was not one that generally would be of concern to the Muslim 
population, unless it was linked to idolatry. Therefore, as Vernoit notes, when it came to the 
visual arts, not all held the same position. He explains: “The prevailing opposition to figural 
art . . . was stronger in Ottoman and Arab lands than Iran or India” (Vernoit 22). Nonetheless, 
with the emergence of Wahhabi’s movement in mid-eighteenth century, and their joining 
forces “with the Ibn Sa’ud family of Dar’iyya” in the Arabian Peninsula, actions were taken 
against shrine cities of Karbala, Mecca and Medina, which were meant as “directly 
challenging the Ottoman rule” in the region (ibid). It is worth mentioning that in Wahhabi 
belief, building elaborate tombs and mosques, as well as using any type of luxury material, 
were prohibited. Therefore, they were “hostile both to the Ottoman and the Qajar rulers, the 
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former on account of their Sufi tendencies . . . and the latter for their Shi’ism” (ibid). Their 
fundamental views advocated an emulation of the practices from the early years of Islam’s 
emergence. 
With all the oppositions and resistance from the orthodoxy, the visual arts became an 
inseparable part of the modernization in the Middle East. This is evident in the number of 
portraits commissioned by the rulers (Ottoman and Qajar) (Vernoit 23), as well as the 
funerary monuments for the Ottoman rulers that employed an eclectic combination of 
Baroque, Rococo and Neo-Classical, which became known as the Ottoman court style.
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Similarly, the city of Cairo under Muhammad Ali underwent transformation, particularly due 
to the demands of the “growing European community” (Behrens-Abouseif 111) there at this 
time. The civil architectural style in the rapidly expanding city was “introduced mainly by 
Ottoman Greeks, Armenians, and Italians.” Whereas the ordinary residences remained 
faithful to local taste, it was the religious architecture that demonstrated more of the “foreign 
influence (Behrens-Abouseif 112). Contrastingly, in building for industrial, administrative, or 
educational purposes, it was the European building styles that were adopted (Behrens-
Abouseif 113). 
While there are plenty of examples from Egypt and the Ottoman Turkey that show 
emulation from European grand styles, early on, the Qajars in Iran looked to the examples 
from the pre-Islamic past (Scarce 235-36).
490
 The Sasanian and Achaemenid styles of 
architecture can be seen in the palaces as well as the carved stone relief narratives (Scarce 
236). Nevertheless, in the second half of the nineteenth century, as argued by Scarce, 
“Nas[se]r al-Din Shah’s interpretation of the pre-Islamic past” became distinctly different 
“from that of his great-grandfather, as it was influenced by the impact of new technical 
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resources that both interested him personally and were used as effective means of royal 
propaganda” (Scarce 239).491 
Whereas the visual arts may not have been central in the everyday life of the general 
public in the nineteenth century Middle East, sending students abroad, the establishing of 
European style schools, and training artists continued until the early part of the twentieth 
century and no doubt left its impressions on the arts (Pappè 167), although the visual arts 
were never linked to the issues of identity and belonging in the cases of Turkish or Arab 
culture. It “indicates how the visual arts reflect the . . . hesitations of self and external 
identity” (ibid). As for Iran, the pre-Islamic art and culture remains (to this day) a source of 
inspiration, and “their revival and renewal . . . can be seen as an attempt to seek the security 
of a unique identity” (Scarce 246). It is in the mimesis, therefore, that a continuity of stability 
is sought. 
MIMESIS: THE SCHOOL OF IMITATION AND THE UNDERMINING OF SUBJECTIVITY 
By now, it should be clear that the process of modernization in the Middle East had as 
its major component the ever-present element of emulation from the West, whether it be art 
or technology. In the criticism of creative endeavors and what shapes subjectivity, therefore, 
it is important to tackle the issue of mimesis here. I intend to examine mimesis in two 
capacities: as a mechanism of representation, reflection, and imagination; and second, as a 
practical application: a practice within the religious realm as taqlīd, or imitation (Adamson 
defines it as “uncritical dependence on authority”), which developed as a way to facilitate 
and follow the religious instructions. I suggest, as a “fundamental mechanism” of power, in 
both capacities mimesis has been implemented by patriarchy to achieve unity and continuity, 
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as well to maintain a collective (as opposed to individual) consciousness that can be easily 
persuaded toward its own goals. 
The Significance of Mimesis in the “Dynamics of Affirming Continuity”  
The term mimesis in an Aristotelian context is a reminder of his argument with Plato 
in defense of the artist in the republic (Aristotle Poetics 1996). Plato’s low opinion of 
mimesis underscores the inadequacy of the imitative arts with respect to the realm of the 
“real,” thus resulting in the alienation of the artists as alterity in the process. Aristotle’s 
argument, however, emphasized the capacity of mimesis in illustrating human drama through 
imitating the character in the story as well as acquiring knowledge (Poetics xii). Whereas the 
concern with mimesis proved critical in the realm of the aesthetics, it is during the late 
antiquity and through Neoplatonism that the notion of mimesis expands to encompass all 
“philosophical issues from the sensory to the metaphysical domain” (Halliwell 2002, 313). In 
turn, mimesis enters the intellectual realm with far and wide consequences; its evolution into 
“mimetic theorization,” with the potential to adapt, reaches well beyond the late antiquity 
“from the fifteenth century Renaissance to the era of romanticism.” Stephen Halliwell 
elaborates: 
Neoplatonism is so revisionist as to require a concept of Platonism as something more 
than a static affiliation—rather as a kind of philosophical spirit capable of perpetual 
revivification, though each time in a subtly different guise. [Therefore,] Neoplatonism 
. . . became a primary channel for the transmission of Plato’s ideas beyond the 
boundaries of paganism.
492
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Plotinus appears to be ambivalent on the issue of mimesis. At times he appears to 
view it in a positive light, as how a work of art can remind us of the ideal form which 
manifests itself in the imagination of the artists; then, through technique and material, it is 
given physical form (V.8. 1-2).
493
 In other places, he seems prepared to placate the Platonists 
by downplaying the artistic products through stating they are inferior to nature (V.8.1. 33). 
Then, once again he argues that the arts are not just products of a mimetic process. In a larger 
scheme of things, Plotinus explains that in mimesis lies the intention of seeking and unifying 
with the original form (V.8.1. 35-36). Plotinus, therefore, redefines mimesis and develops it 
into a mode that itself can regenerate and transform according to one’s different purposes.494 
There are others who have explored opportunities of redefining mimesis with regards to the 
issue of interconnectivity of mimesis, continuity, and art. 
Tom Huhn in an article picks up on the renewal theme and notes: “Mimesis is an 
ideal term to describe the dynamics of affirming continuity between things and ourselves.”495 
In other words, mimesis bridges the gap between knowing and not knowing for us, between 
the realm of illusion and the domain of the real, and wherever there is obscurity and 
intermittence. Paul Ricoeur argues that the “reconceptualization” of mimesis actually first 
took place when Aristotle parted ways with Plato; it is when Aristotle recognized the 
“dynamism” and “action” involved in mimesis, and not just “producing a weakened image of 
pre-existing things” (Ricoeur 1991, 137-138). Thus, Ricoeur submits, this “mimesis brings 
about an augmentation of meaning in the field of action, which is its privileged field,” and 
which he calls “creative imitation” (ibid). Therefore, here in mimesis, the emphasis is on the 
“making of meaning,” which “is another mimetic means of forging continuities” (Huhn 204). 
The mediation of mimesis, by way of creativity and imagination, was extended to 
mechanisms of implementing power, particularly through religious authorities. 
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Taqlīd and its Relation to Sufism and Philosophy 
The term taqlīd, which means to imitate (it has also been translated as “to follow”496 - 
Adamson translates it as uncritical dependence on authority), is a significant phenomenon 
with respect to the issue of subjecthood. If we define free consciousness as one being a 
subject to itself, it then follows that one is responsible for one’s own actions, just as the 
Mu’tazilites had argued (Adamson 2016, 13). Thus the correlation between “freedom” and 
“responsibility” becomes evident in the above statement.497 Adamson refers to the Sunni 
criticism of taqlīd, as it has been practiced by Shi’ite tradition.498 However, both Sunni and 
Shi’ite, even the Sufi traditions, implemented mimesis into their practices in one form or 
another.
499
 Whereas the Shi’ites call it taqlīd,500 the Sunnis refer to it as qiyās (translated as 
“reasoning” or analogy in Adamson 2016, 167).501 Similarly, the Sufi tradition calls for the 
unquestionable submission to and the guidance of the pir or the master (the Perfect Man).
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Further examples, as discussed in chapter three, are the visual language used by Rūmī and 
Ibn Arabī (Adamson 2016, 195 and 349), who were heavily reliant upon mimesis in their 
literary works. 
Consequently, while each denouncing the other, all three groups, emulating a 
particular pattern of reasoning inspired at the source by Aristotelian reasoning, justified some 
sort of mimesis that undermined the free conscious, thus limiting freedom by way of 
relieving the individual of any responsibility. As a result, consistent with the master-slave 
pattern (in its ideological sense), and the deterministic foundation (laid since the time of the 
Ash’arites and al-Ghazālī), the binary division between those who “know” and those who 
don’t ensured the dependency of the individual on the ulama. What qualified the ulama was 
their studies in the Hadith and the Prophet’s Sunna (tradition) narrated by a chain of sources. 
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These extensive accounts were extremely influential in how the laws were interpreted and 
implemented.
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An important figure who played an effective role in the institutionalization of taqlīd is 
Nasīr al-Dīn al-Tūsī (1201-1274).504 Al-Tūsī believed in the necessity of a teacher or guide, 
since he was of the opinion that not  
all humans are equal in intellect. This would inevitably lead to a kind of relativism in 
which all believers would be equal, and there would be no point sorting true from 
false. Thus, the more imperfect minds should look to a perfect mind to help them.
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The requirement of “intellect” (aql) had already been argued for by Avicenna and 
established by him epistemologically; even though named differently by each, “intellect” was 
part of both Shi’ite and Sunni tradition of reasoning (Adamson 2016, 332). What is of most 
significance is that mimesis rests at the foundation of all judgments that have influenced, and 
continue to influence, laws and policy that impact the individual to the benefit of patriarchy; 
by removing all responsibility from the individual, such policies restrict freedoms as well. 
This becomes more visible during the twentieth century, despite the democratic movements, 
which I will examine in the next chapter. 
To sum up the proposed ideas in this chapter, it is the notion of the subject that 
continues to be the center of my concern. In this chapter my objective was to demonstrate 
how the origins of disregard for the subjective experience go back to medieval Baghdad. This 
is a significant point in the history of the Middle East, for it also coincided with the first time 
that Islam was transformed into a political ideology. While the Abbasid period marks the 
flourishing of the arts and sciences in the region, I demonstrated there was a political 
motivation behind the translation movement that collected and preserved the knowledge from 
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the antiquity. It was to provide a stable and concrete theory to philosophically legitimize the 
rule of the Abbasid empire. I established that while the knowledge was collected, translated 
and commented on, some of the scientific leads, particularly what could have had an impact 
on individual experience, did not reach their full potential. Instead, it was the Neoplatonic 
interpretation that was favored and mostly applied, since it well-matched the patriarchal and 
traditional structure in the region. 
I also demonstrated that there is link between the notion of subjectivity and seeing, as 
the idea was manifested through the camera obscura during the European Renaissance, but 
this idea actually came from Alhazen, and his new theory on vision invited one to experience 
for oneself through senses. However, unlike Europe, this idea did not find fertile grounds to 
develop further in the Middle East. Moreover, what additionally undermined the 
development of subjectivity was the important text, The Arabic Plotinus that consisted of 
translation of parts of the Enneads, as well as original and complementary ideas. The 
influential Arabic Plotinus eventually marks a watershed among Muslim philosophers as 
they part ways at its juncture: one group, headed by Averroes becomes rationalist and pro-
Aristotle, and the other, led by al-Ghazali, takes the Neoplatonic approach and becomes 
emanationist. The latter, not long after the split, dominates the scene of Islamic philosophy in 
such a way that it infuses with matters of faith and religion, and becomes unquestionable. 
Nonetheless, one witnesses in Europe, the subject turns against its “other,” even though they 
arrived at that position through their alterity (i.e. Muslims). 
Also considered in this chapter is the issue of colonialism, which not only formed 
subjectivities in the region, as argued by Fanon and Said, but also played a crucial role in 
shaping resistance against, now-the-Middle East’s other, the West. I discussed the theories 
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that attempted to bring about reformation, however with the focus on the idea of using Islam 
as means to counter colonialism. One form of coming to terms with modernism was to seek 
mimetic strategies in the production of the arts. Considering the importance of this concept, I 
concluded this chapter with an analysis of the idea of mimesis and mapped it on to a 
comparable religious practice, Taqlid, which has ensured the continuity and stability in the 
patriarchal system. 
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CHAPTER SIX  
The Formation of Islamic Republic of Iran upon Imagination and Mimesis: 
Subjecthood and The Rule of Jurisprudence 
 
The Iranian revolution of 1978-79 shocked the world and set in motion a search for causes. 
Most of the resulting analyses tend to locate the origins of the revolution in the errors of the 
shah and of various Americans, although some scholarly works assay socioeconomic 
explanations for the upheaval.
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        — Nikki Keddie 
 
In comparison with the revolutions in the West, the people’s uprising in the winter of 
1979 in Iran stands out in that it was led by the high-ranking members of the religious class, 
or the ulama, who toppled the last monarch and ended the rule of monarchy in Iran (Keddie 
1983, 579). However, this was not the first time that the people of Iran had risen up to bring 
about political change; during the course of the twentieth century and prior to the 1979 
revolution, the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-11, and the oil nationalization movement 
under Mohammad Mosaddeq from 1951-53, are the two major examples. Nevertheless, out 
of the three rebellions/revolutions in the twentieth century Iran, the 1979 movement was the 
first revolution that had led to the full usurpation of political power by the traditional, 
religious patriarchy (Paidar 1995, 18). It compels one to inquire: how was the class of clergy 
that historically always enjoyed a position of prominence, albeit in the shadow of the 
monarchy, able to achieve absolute political dominance in Iran nearly a hundred years after 
the start of the democratic and reformative movements? 
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I argue, despite the campaigns toward modernization and political reforms, the lack of 
a conscious subjecthood
507
 persisted into the twentieth century, mainly due to the 
pervasiveness of Neoplatonic ideas that by this time had become part of the knowledge and 
philosophy of the ulama,
508
 and after the Iranian revolution were implemented into the 
ideology of the rule of jurisprudence.
509
 I further submit the analysis of all significant events 
leading up to the Iranian 1979 revolution, as mapped onto Hegel’s master -slave dialectic, 
provides additional evidence that it was idealism in the thoughts of the Iranian reformers that 
paved the way for the rise to power of a theocracy. Moreover, the subjecthood as an issue has 
conveniently remained obscure to the theoreticians and philosophers, who initially helped the 
Iranian revolution to succeed, and later set out to resolve the inner conflicts of such a ruling 
philosophy. These thinkers strove to restore the aforementioned religio-political philosophy, 
either through a revival of the Hellenized Islamic philosophy, inherited from the philosophers 
of the translation movement through the incorporation of Aristotelian reason, or by applying 
Western hermeneutic philosophy, as in the case of contemporary reformists such as Mujtahid 
Shabestari, or by invoking a historical Persian past in the idea of “Iranshahri,” by Javad 
Tabatabaei. I maintain, thinking idealistically, none of these groups or individuals has taken 
into consideration the importance of emancipating the individual from being subject to all but 
itself first, prior to commencing any reforms. 
The modernization that had carried the fruits of the Enlightenment and made 
consumers out of the people of the Middle East, and in this case Iran, was extended to a 
superficial version of the idea of political freedom, without any provisions for the individual 
consciousness or recognition of the subject on its own merit. As a result, the subjects 
continued to be recognized either as subjects to monarchy and nationalistic aspirations, or 
later as subjects to their politicized Shi’ite belief, which had extended roots in medieval 
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times—the time of politicization of Islam by incorporating Greek philosophy, first during the 
Abbasids, then tailored specifically for Shi’ites through the Safavids as explained in the 
previous chapters. Consequently, all political revolutions/movements for democracy in Iran 
have failed to this point.
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 Further, I submit, almost all studies on the twentieth century Iran 
have sought the reasons behind these revolutions in the socio-econo-political factors. There 
are two examples in consideration here. In Ma Chegoneh Ma Shodim (How did we become 
who we are) ([1995] 2016), Sadegh Ziba Kalam criticizes all theories that reason the “falling 
behind of Iran,” rejecting the “the Arab invasion,” “colonialism,” and “conspiracy theory.” 
Instead, he argues this was due to the geography, harsh climate, underlying tribal nature of 
the government historically, nomadic life style and lack of social stability, a centralized 
government with a heavy hand, as well as “the extinguished light of sciences.” Another 
author, Kazem Alamdari argues in Why the Middle East Lagged Behind; The Case of Iran 
(2005) that the Middle East in general, and Iran in particular, lacked what capitalism made 
possible for the west, namely the separation of church and state. He further argues it is 
through a sociological study of the history that one understands the roots of the impediments 
in the socio-economic developments in Iran, which underscores the deeply integrated state 
and religion in Iran, as an antithesis to capitalism. Immanuel Wallerstein in his The Capitalist 
World Economy ([1979] 2002) is well aware of this problem and has responded by proposing 
a system of categorization that underscores the link between political power and economy. 
This study, however, concentrates on the philosophical analysis of what informs 
subjectivity and what has shaped the type of government emerging out of the 1979 
revolution. Tracking the trails of patriarchy, Neoplatonic, and creative enterprises into the 
twentieth century, I suggest a philosophical discourse acknowledging the issue of 
subjecthood, where there is none, is required to counterbalance all other philosophical 
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suggestions predicated on collective consciousness. I will limit the scope of this inquiry to 
the case study of Iran and its reformative and democratic movements in the twentieth 
century.  The Shi’ites’ complex view of spiritual versus political authority finds a new 
reflection after the 1979 revolution in taking over as a political authority, while maintaining 
its religious content. Whereas the religious and the secular positions of authority have always 
been important parts of the equation, I will begin by focusing on the relationship between 
these two sources of power and how they shaped the subjects in the twentieth century.
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THE RIVALRY OF RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY – FROM THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL MONARCHY TO THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION OF 1979 
The Safavid period (1501-1722) was not just a turning point in the consolidation of 
country and creating a strong economic partner to Europe, but it established Persia as a 
country with a strong unified political leadership. Internally, however, this was made 
possible through instituting the Twelver Shi’ism as the state religion at the cost of 
marginalization and exclusion of other religious groups and branches such as the Sunnis, 
Sufis, and even other Shi’a branches like the Ismailis.512 It is worth noting in comparison 
Sunni Islam developed in an environment of “Sunni state,” which meant “political sphere 
was incorporated into the doctrine of religious sphere,” thus the political establishment 
enjoyed the support of religion (Momen 191).
513
 However, being a minority among the 
Sunnis the majority of the time, the Shi’is drew authority from the “Imam” (a descendant 
from the Prophet through his daughter’s line), in whom they sought and valued the spiritual 
guidance, particularly in the pre-Safavid eras. Moojan Momen (1985) argues, it is at this time 
that the model of kingship was emulated from the pre-Islamic Sasanian period and “the title 
‘Shadow of God on Earth’ became an expression of that” (Momen 192). Nevertheless, 
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whereas the Sunnis lived in a society of well-integrated sacred with secular, Shi’is felt as 
outsiders, and maintained distinction, even a “rivalry” between the leadership of “Imam,” 
what was represented in the ulama, and his followers and those who controlled political 
matters (ibid). This equation changed after the Safavids and by nineteenth century the ulama, 
had achieved many advantages. 
Whereas the Qajar kings could not claim lineage to the Prophet’s family, similar to 
what the Safavid had done, they required the assistance of the ulama to provide the 
legitimacy of their rule. Momen argues “[t]he ulama were prepared to grant this but used the 
opportunity to consolidate their position and affirm their independence” (194).514 A “Shi’i 
political theory” emerged, which was predicated on the idea that “the Imam held both the 
religious and the political leadership in the community.” Nonetheless, since the Twelfth 
Imam had entered “Occultation” and was hidden, his authority was to be divided between 
two groups: 
[T]he Na’ibs (representatives or vicegerents) of the Hidden Imam: the ulama who are 
charged with religious vicegerency and the rulers who have political vicegerency. If 
these two co-operate then the affairs of the community run smoothly since the ulama 
cannot apply the Shari’a unless the ruler establishes order, while the ruler needs the 
ulama without whose guidance he will stray towards injustice and tyranny.
515
 
This, Momen argues, provided the “theoretical framework” until the revolution of 
1979 (195). Parvin Paidar notes that at this time the institutionalization of Shi’ism was 
accompanied by “acquiring features,” which made it distinctly different from the state of 
Islam in other regions within the Middle East.
516
 She elaborates on these different aspects as: 
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[f]irst, the institution of Shiism became economically independent from the state by 
setting up mechanisms for acquiring donations and endowment land (vaghf) from the 
public. Second, by the establishment of the practice of [i]jtihad, a process by which a 
mojtahed used his own reasoning in addition to the [K]oran and hadith to arrive at 
legal decisions and issued religious instructions to his followers in the form of fatva 
[…] Third, the Shii faithful were required to follow the religious instructions and 
judgments, fatva of a living mojtahed on all aspects of social life. Fourth, the Shii 
clergy took over the secular judicial system of the pre-Safavid period. These courts, 
which had government-appointed judges, were gradually replaced by shariat courts 
and Shii clergy gained the power to make judicial decisions and even administer 
punishment. Fifth, a ‘dry’ formal, dogmatic, legalistic style of Shiism’ developed 
which was reflected both in scholarly works and in more mundane religious 
instructions to the faithful.
517
 
It was these well-established and deeply rooted substructures, as the above quote 
summarizes, which eventually empowered the religious leaders during the 1979 revolution. 
Economically and independently funded, with the exclusive authority to interpret the key 
religious texts that could be (and were) decreed into rules and judgments, as well as the 
mandate to follow (taqlid), by the third quarter of the twentieth century, the religious class 
was poised to elbow its way all the way to the top.
518
 
When the modernization campaigns in the nineteenth century brought the European 
technological achievements to Iran as discussed earlier, it may be argued the intellectual 
exchanges that inspired the ideas of equality, justice, and freedom for the Iranian intellectuals 
on the basis of Western modernization also transmitted such ideas on the same superficial 
251 
 
level.
519
 In the nineteenth century, the attempts made to remedy this problem took the shape 
of anti-colonial arguments, as in the writings of Jamal ad-Din Asadabadi; his proposals were 
predicated on the idea that Muslims should seek their own evolution toward such ideas by 
drawing inspiration from Islam (Keddie [1968] 1983). However, as influential and 
revolutionary as his ideas were, Jamal ad-Din was striving for a unity among Muslims 
(Keddie 1983 [1968], 79), beyond ethnic and nationalistic differences, so that they may 
counteract the incursions of the Europeans into the Middle East. In his writings he criticizes 
the “egoism” and defines it as putting one’s own “personal interest above the general 
welfare,” which causes “the bond of fusion and interdependence” to be broken (ibid). 
Further, he was promoting a kind of “intellectual elitism” by drawing on “the traditional 
belief in the necessity and utility of social distinctions . . . bolstered by religious teachings” in 
order to elevate the masses (ibid). Combined together, the ideas of the reunification of 
Muslims and their striving for “privilege and distinction” through religion were prescribed by 
Jamal ad-Din as the solution to deal with European colonialism. However, one must keep in 
mind his Islamic references by this time had gone through Hellenization, once during the 
translation movement (Gutas 7), and then developed further and synthesized with 
Neoplatonic philosophy during the Safavids (Adamson 2016, 399). Although some argue his 
vision was inspired by what had taken place in the West (Adamiyat 1978, 32) and he was 
calling for reforms to eradicate superstitious interpretations of Shi’ite Islam of his time, it 
may be reasoned he was influenced by the Hegelian philosophy, itself influenced by 
Neoplatonism.
520
 Jamal ad-Din “was an ardent anti-imperialist, who considered the adoption 
of Western science and technology in Muslim countries as an instrument for waging an 
effective opposition against imperialist advances” (Paidar 46).521 Therefore, in Jamal ad-
Din’s mind, the concept of and what gave meaning to “freedom,” for instance, was 
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interpreted as freedom from European colonialism, not the liberation of a subject toward free 
conscious and individuality, similar to discourses that had shaped the European ego.
522
 
Among those who had seen modernism in Europe but viewed the implementation of 
the rule of law as the most important reform is Yousuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh (1813-
1895), who was a “decent man and a great diplomat and statesman.”523 Mostashar al-Dowleh, 
in his book Yek Kalameh (One Word), argued for a state with laws that treated all equally. 
Adamiyat regards Yek-Kalameh to be “the most important treatise on individual social rights, 
which was published in 1870” (1980, 83). Seyyed Javad Tabatabaei (2007) argues, more than 
being political, Yek Kalameh was a document advocating a legal system that necessitated the 
transition from shari’a (religious laws), to a “common law system” (Tabatabaei 2007, 14).524 
Mostashar al-Dowleh,
525
 therefore, had understood that an important aspect of individual 
freedom was to be held accountable, and that could be implemented through common law. 
However, this notion was not understood this way in his own time,
526
 and the main concern 
remained how one was going to negotiate and fare this legal authority with the center of 
tradition, which was shari’a; thus, the question of subjecthood persisted as indistinct.527 
Similarly, this ambiguity continued during the Revolution of 1979. At this time, too, 
the ideas of freedom and democracy were being expressed without a clear, common and 
agreed upon context (Abrahamian 1982, 515),
528
 and without the recognition of the 
individual subject, equivalent to what had been experienced by the Europeans. There was 
even no consensus on the definition of the word among the different opposition groups. 
Consequently, while there may have been a diversity of ideas, in the absence of independent 
subjectivity, there were essentially no effective intercommunication links; rather, there 
existed only conflicting and competing debates, ideas, and road maps proposed and 
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represented by the collective consciousness of the followers of each group. It is these 
competitions that eventually paved the way for the oldest patriarchal group of them all to 
take over the rest and eliminate its rivals.
529
 
Furthermore, the ideology behind the Revolution of 1979, which was supported by an 
established, synthesized religious philosophy that justified the interest and the role of the 
religious leaders of the revolution, was met with no countering philosophy on the part of the 
monarch that could bring to present the legitimacy of his rule philosophically.
530
 Hence, 
whereas the mechanisms of power predicated on the religious philosophy were embedded 
within the communities and in harmony with the masses (i.e. through charitable taxes, 
exclusive authority of the ulama on religious texts, taqlid, ritual gatherings, etc.) and were 
able to mobilize them,
531
 the secular and political state apparatus of the Shah had no such 
popular positions and were made to situate themselves against the revolutionaries.
532
 These 
revolutionaries had powerful presence on the streets through demonstrations during the 
months leading up to the night of February 11, 1979. 
To closely examine the complex role of the masses, one must return to the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution that “introduced the constitutional system of government in which 
‘the people’ were sovereign” for the first time (Abrahamian 1993a, 289). However 
comparatively, the crowd on the streets during all three political events (Constitutional 
Revolution, Nationalization of Oil and the ensuing 1953 coup, and the Revolution of 1979), 
were representative of different ideas, even though their movements have been collectively 
viewed as steps toward democracy in Iran. The Constitutional Revolution, for instance, has 
been called the manifestation of “the early phase of the discourse of modernity”533 and pro-
democratic movement (Paidar 52), due to the direct involvement of the masses.
534
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The Significance of the Crowd and the Role of “Fear” and “Pity” 
Prior to the mobilization of the masses toward a constitutionalist objective, it is worth 
noting the earliest signs of public demonstration appeared in the late nineteenth century 
following “an economic concession given to a British company by Naser od-Din Shah [sic] . 
. . for curing and selling tobacco,” in 1890 (Paidar 50 and Keddie 1968, 29). The news of this 
concession was made public and criticized by the contemporary Iranian newspapers 
published abroad, which “gave rise to massive protests . . . led by clerics . . . with merchants 
as [their] allies” (ibid).535 
There was no “legitimate reason” for making such a concession to the British 
company.
 536
 Adamiyat argues that this was a profitable domestic economic endeavor that 
“the Iranian tobacco planters, businessmen and merchants were perfectly capable of 
managing” (1978, 36).537 Even before the official announcement regarding the concession, 
the opposition began offering their reasons for why this was a bad decision on the part of the 
government and how it hurt Iran’s domestic economy (Adamiyat 1978, 37).538 The ulama did 
not remain silent on the issue and saw the concession as “the sale of Iran to unbelievers” 
(Keddie 1968, 29). This reference is to Jamal ad-Din’s “famous” letter to the Shi’ite mujtahid 
(religious authority) in Iraq and urging him to act, which he did (ibid). Mirza Shirazi’s decree 
(fatva) was issued and prohibited the use of tobacco by the Iranian consumers (ibid). It can 
be surmised, then, that when it came to imperialism and the British, Jamal ad-Din 
temporarily set aside differences with the traditional ulama, and sought to utilize their 
influence in any way he could in order to thwart colonial incursions. The consequence of the 
protests both by the merchants, the religious crowd, and women in particular, of which 
Paidar gives specific accounts, led to the cancelation of the concession.
539
 Paidar notes some 
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of the insults shouted toward the Shah during the protests “calling him the female with a 
mustache,” “scarf wearer” and “unbeliever” (Paidar 51). The fact that women themselves 
were active participants is noteworthy according to Paidar; however, the use of terms that 
were denigrating to women is telling of their unconscious subjectivity; it also reflects their 
religious concerns. 
The anatomy of the crowd in the Iranian Constitutional Revolution of 1905-9 has 
been examined by Ervand Abrahamian.
540
 He argues, contrary to the portraits painted of such 
a crowd as ‘criminals’ or ‘hired thugs,’ they were diverse groups of people, from 
“merchants” to “religious authorities,” “shopkeepers, workshop owners, craftsmen, 
apprentices, journeymen, and students” (Abrahamian 1993a, 306). Nevertheless, the 
changing sides of some groups in the midst of the revolution is of great significance. During 
1905-1906, it appears that the protests were initially for constitutional rights, and targeted the 
royal court and the injustices carried out by the court-appointed officials (Abrahamian 1993a, 
296; Paidar 1995).
541
 By mid-1907, however, the constitutionalists were not the only group 
on the streets; the royalists began to gather influence and demonstrate on the streets as well, 
challenging the constitutionalists (Abrahamian 1993a, 296).
542
 How some changed sides 
(from liberalist constitutionalists to royalists) and how conservative royalists’ plight was 
reacted to by the liberalist and even the intellectuals and the media is revealing. 
Abrahamian makes the point that the constitutionalists, “anxious to stress the popular 
legitimacy of the revolution, either ignored the royalist demonstrations or . . . dismissed them 
in derogatory terms.”543 This pitted the royalists, consisting of “upper” and “lower” 
classes,
544
 against the members of the bazaar, which was the center of urban economy. The 
same conflicts happened in other provinces, and reportedly out of the conflicts, two groups, 
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‘the people’s party’ and ‘the aristocratic party’ emerged.545 The royalists’ demonstrations 
received a boost from the support and participation of the religious leaders, which 
“transformed these demonstrations from purely pro-Shah assemblies into ‘Shah and Islam’ 
rallies and riots” (Abrahamian 1993a, 298). 
Up until 1906, there was indeed a divide, albeit an uneven one, between the religious 
communities, with those associated with the court supporting the royalists, and others like the 
“popular Mujtahids” (religious leaders) and traditional teachers supporting the 
constitutionalists. In fact, a number of clerics, such as Mohammad Hossein Na’ini, argued 
that there was no conflict between Islam and the constitutional rule. Na’ini also argued “that 
it was the best type of rule in the absence of the messianic twelfth emam [sic]” (Paidar 52). 
Eventually, this divide became more balanced once the liberalists “revealed . . . their secular 
intentions: anti-clericalism, feminism and egalitarianism between Shi’ites and non-Shi’ites, 
and Muslims and non-Muslims” (Abrahamian 1993a, 298; Paidar 1995, 56). In 1907, 
progressive newspapers began criticizing the ulama and satirized their decrying that “religion 
was dying.”546  
The issues of non-Muslims and women, argues Abrahamian, were a tipping point that 
compelled some of the ulama to “forsake the dangerous road of constitutionalism for the 
safety of traditional despotism,” which was clearly echoed in their motto “No Absolutism, 
No Islam” (Abrahamian 1993a, 299).547 They persuaded the “common people” to side with 
the royalists, by calling the constitutionalists “irreligious, heretical and anti-Islamic.”548 
There were also other factors, such as the rise in the price of bread, a staple food, and “the 
fact that they had gained nothing from the revolution.” Abrahamian’s associating the pro-
constitutionalists with the bourgeois class here underscores the role of business and 
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commerce, which proved to be not necessarily to the benefit of the “propertyless and lower 
classes” (Abrahamian 1993a, 300).549 The consequences of economic advantages the liberals 
received in the agricultural market translated into the continuous rise in prices that led to the 
angry crowd turning violent against the wealthy.
550
 
The poor members of the crowd were beginning to realize they “had nothing to gain 
from the revolution,” so they turned toward the religious leaders and the anti-constitutionalist 
royalists (Abrahamian 1993a, 300).
551
 This further strengthened the king’s camp and 
emboldened him to strike “harder by first organizing violent anti-constitutionalist 
demonstrations and then bombing the Majlis in June 1909 (Paidar 1995, 56). The king, 
Mohammad Ali Shah, accomplished the demolition of the parliament with the assistance of 
the Russians’ Cossack Brigade, which was followed by the imprisonment and execution of 
some of the liberal leaders (Abrahamian 1993a, 304). Despite the king promising “to reopen 
the parliament in three months, purged not of patriotic constitutionalists but of irreligious 
revolutionaries,” the unrest continued and spread to other provinces and cities and turned into 
a civil war (Abrahamian 1993a, 305 and Paidar 1995, 56). Once again, the “bourgeois” 
merchants in the bazaar began their strike, and by July 1909 “the Bakhtiari tribesmen and the 
Caucasian fighters reached Tehran.” Not having enough money to pay his mercenaries, and 
facing a “hostile bazaar, the royalist cause collapsed . . . M[o]hammad Ali Shah was deposed 
. . . [and the] prominent reactionaries such as Shaykh Fazlallah and Mir Hashim
552
 were 
executed for ‘hiring thugs to create public disturbances,’ and the second Majlis553 was 
convened.”554 
The second through the fourth decades of the twentieth century was, according to 
Paidar, “[t]he second phase of the discourse of modernity” in “nation building” that followed 
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the “post-constitutional developments” (Paidar 78). By 1925 the Qajars, who were “weak, 
corrupt and vulnerable to political manipulation by Western powers,” were replaced by Reza 
Shah Pahlavi (1925-1941), who, contrastingly, “seemed to fulfill the demand for a strong 
state capable of overcoming Iran’s economic, technological and military weaknesses” (ibid). 
The centralization came, however, at the cost of the elimination of the many of the diverse 
and grass root organizations as well as political parties that had been formed after the 
constitutional movement (Abrahamian 1982, 135 and Paidar 80); the concentration of power 
also alienated some of the clerics.
555
 There is much evidence that the clerics made their 
influence throughout the twentieth century.  
In the first half of the twentieth century, the struggle had been whether to maintain the 
national unity, or preserve Islamic values, as interpreted by the ulama. One of the harshest 
criticism toward the ulama came from Ahmad Kasravi (1890-1946). Kasravi was a judge and 
an advocate of reforms in Iran, but not of a blind following of Europe (Abrahamian 1982, 
161).
556
 However, his sharpest attacks were aimed at the Shi’ite clergy and the Sufis, to 
which I shall return.
557
 In his evaluation of Reza Shah, which was published in an article in 
1942, he lays out a criticism of what the founder of Pahlavi dynasty had accomplished, which 
speaks to an uncertainty toward Reza Shah.
558
 While Kasravi praised him for “centralizing 
the state, pacifying the tribes, disciplining the clergy, unveiling women, eliminating 
aristocratic titles, introducing mass conscriptions, undermining ‘feudal’ authorities, trying to 
unify the population, and establishing modern schools, cities and industries,” he admonished 
Reza Shah for “trampling over the constitution, favoring the military over the civilian 
administration, accumulating a private fortune, stealing other people’s property, murdering 
progressive intellectuals, and widening the gap between the haves and the have-nots” 
(Abrahamian 1982, 154). 
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While it appears, initially Reza Khan (before taking on the title “Shah”) wanted to 
establish a republic, in a move inspired by Ataturk’s newly founded Turkish Republic, he 
realized the clergy was not in agreement with the idea of “republicanism.” Since he still 
needed their support, he decided to abandon the idea (Abrahamian 1982, 134 and Paidar 81). 
By the end of World War II in 1945, and the occupation of Iran by the allies’ forces in order 
to defeat the Germans, Iran saw challenges from various provinces, through the formation of 
leftist, and some pro-Soviet parties, such as in Kurdistan and in Azerbaijan, each seeking 
autonomy. The fear of fragmentation of the national unity and the infiltration of communism 
will become the two most critical concerns of Reza Shah’s son and successor upon his 
ascension to the throne (Paidar 119, 123). It is early during his reign that the Nationalization 
of Oil movement takes shape, which tragically ended in the removal of his progressive and 
democratically elected premier, Mohammad Mosaddeq (1951-1953).
559
 
The study of the crowd during the toppling of Mosaddeq, the Iranian premier in the 
1953 coup d’état is also illuminating. Abrahamian argues that Mosaddeq called on his 
supporters to stay off the streets on that fateful day;
560
 instead there was a crowd of only 
three thousand that came out, which were connected with royalists and those who were 
receiving funds from the CIA, including those sent by a prominent member of the clergy 
(Abrahamian 2001). Abrahamian maintains that this was no uprising, and had it not been for 
the presence of 24 tanks, the three thousand who eventually came to the streets on August 19, 
1953 would not have been able to bring Mosaddeq’s government down.561 (See Appendix 
IV). 
The crowd during the Revolution of 1979 further demonstrates, if nothing else, the 
close connection with the clergy, once again, particularly through the merchants of the 
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bazaar. Furthermore, there were theoreticians who facilitated and provided the necessary 
ideology behind the change.
562
 Just as with the previous movements,
563
 the wave of the 
revolution in 1979 gained momentum from smaller, but significant earlier events (Keddie 
1993, 609). In a comparison with the climate during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905, 
Keddie argues that in 1978-79, “increasing number of Iranians shifted to progressive versions 
of indigenous Islamic ideology perceived as likely to restore Iranian self-esteem and combat 
Westernization.” This, she explains, was due to the general discontent from many groups 
among the population,
564
 who had witnessed attacks on their customs and beliefs during the 
fifty years of “forced . . . Westernization” by the Pahlavi dynasty (Keddie 1993, 615). 
Interesting to note Homa Katouzian’s analysis on Iranians’ discontent with their rulers 
(2009). He states: 
Iranians typically opposed their rulers precisely because their lives and property were 
in the rulers’ power. But they nearly always welcomed a ruler who emerged in the 
midst of chaos and brought order, although once this was done society went back to 
its habit of adopting a negative view of the state.
565
 
The public discontent at the end of the Pahlavi era, as argued by Amanat, was due to 
“the socio-economic, demographic, and cultural changes”; however, it was “not enough to 
explain the potency of the forthcoming revolution and its swift success” (705). While initially 
the only groups who “yearned for a revolution on the Marxist model” were the Fada’iyan-e 
Khalq and Mojahedin Khalq “guerilla organizations,” it was the mass support of a religious 
figure, Ayatollalh Khomeini “and his cohorts,” who capitalized on the people’s discontent 
that had been building for decades (Amanat 2017, 705). 
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Abrahamian elaborates and distinguishes in the support of the masses, two middle 
classes: the traditional and the modern middle class. He argues it was the traditional class, 
mainly “the bazarris and the clergy” that were “the backbone of Khomeini’s movement.”566 
However, it was “the modern middle class that sparked off the revolution, fueled it and, 
struck the final blows” (1982, 533). Among these were “[l]awyers, judges, and intellectuals 
[who] began to publish open letters, and form human rights associations” (ibid). One of the 
first open letters cited by Amanat is the letter dated June 12, 1977 to the Shah from Karim 
Sanjabi, Dariush Foruhar, and Shapur Bakhtiar in which they listed complaints ranging from 
the “seriously mismanaged” oil revenue to “the disregard for human right and personal and 
social liberties, a breach of the very foundation of the constitution,” to “growing corruption, 
decadence, and sycophancy” (706). Among the modern middle class demonstrating on the 
streets were the university students, joined by “bank clerks, civil servants” and others who 
had “crippled the economy due to the undertaking of mass strikes. An important question 
Abrahamian asks is, “[w]hy was the modern middle class, which in the past had deeply 
distrusted the clergy, willing to follow Khomeini?” 
To answer this question, Abrahamian suggests three reasons. First is the Shah’s late 
response to the complaints and criticism. He resisted negotiating with the secular opposition 
organizations, such as the National Front and the Liberation Movement until the final month 
in 1978; they were calling for a “conciliatory” action from the Shah to implement changes in 
his “autocratic rule” and to honor the Constitutional values. (Abrahamian 1982, 533 and 
Amanat 706). The second and third reasons rest in how Khomeini manipulated the diverse 
groups among the modern middle class. 
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In his statements in the fall of 1978, following the massacre of “Black Friday,” he 
particularly addressed the secular population with concerns that the Shah was planning to not 
only eliminate the ulama, but also the “intelligentsia.” He assured the population that neither 
he nor any of his cohorts had any intentions of replacing the monarchy with a theocracy. “He 
told the press that the future government would be ‘democratic’ as well as ‘Islamic’.”  567 
Khomeini also promised equality of women, drafting of a constitution of an Islamic republic 
by a “freely elected Constituent Assembly” (Abrahamian 1982, 533-34).568 
It is worth noting that the students and other modern middle class, due to the Shah’s 
oppressive measures, despite being familiar with the Constitutional Revolution, had missed 
the real history and had no critical knowledge of the “progressive thoughts” from earlier in 
the century. Abrahamian notes, therefore, 
[n]ot surprisingly [the] intellectuals . . . tended to see Khomeini, not as another 
“reactionary” Shaykh Fazallah[sic] Nouri—whom he admired for rejecting the 
Western systems of government—but as another “progressive Ayatallah [sic] 
Tabatabai or Behbahani—whom he despised for being “led astray” by Westernized 
politicians.
569
 
Finally, Abrahamian presents as the third reason, Khomeini’s ability to obtain the 
trust of the followers of Ali Shari’ati,570 even though “Shari’ati’s works contain a great deal 
of anti-clericalism.” Abrahamian argues that Khomeini successfully set himself apart from 
other “proregime” clerics by “stressing such themes as revolution, anti-imperialism,” and the 
message of martyrdom.
571
 By the end of 1978, Shari’ati’s followers saw in Khomeini, not 
just a cleric, but a true revolutionary leader, who was able to finally establish a “classless 
society.”572 They elevated Khomeini with the title of “Imam,” a title that until then had been 
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reserved only for the twelve holy Shi’ite Imams, who were the direct descendants of the 
Prophet (Abrahamian 1982, 534).
573
 Overall, Abrahamian’s impression of Khomeini’s 
movement and thoughts is that it is best described as “populism,” because “this term is 
associated with ideological adaptability and intellectual flexibility,” contrary to 
“fundamentalism [that] . . . implies religious inflexibility, intellectual purity, [and] political 
traditionalism” (Abrahamian 1993b, 2). 
The relationship between the clergy and the secular authorities cannot be thoroughly 
examined without a consideration of the role of the two emotions of fear and pity, which are 
closely tied to success or failure of action as noted by Aristotle (Poetics xxi). The creation of 
a thought and idea that incites fear has its roots in the past. The fear then becomes what 
controls and steers the power and energy of the crowd toward the objective of those whose 
imagination brought to existence that fear in the first place. 
The opposition of the religious leaders to the Western powers in manipulating the 
politics in Iran has long stemmed from a belief that the Westerners, who are considered non-
believers by the Shi’ite religious authorities, have had the intention of undermining “Iran and 
Islam.” Therefore, a defining factor in resisting foreign culture and influence has been “Shi’i 
Islam’s encouragement of self-sacrifice to combat enemies” (Keddie 1993, 607). Those who 
sacrificed were then the subject of pity from others, whom the clerics attempted to draw 
sympathy from for their own causes.
574
 One of the ways the religious leaders exploited this 
notion (Kasravi, 1943, 70) was when they channeled the crowd’s energy through the emotion 
of pity (aligning the stories of martyrdoms of the Prophet’s grandson in Karbala) with 
successful results during the demonstrations leading up to the revolution.
575
 This was not a 
new strategy. Kasravi notes in Shi’ism (1943) that “ever since the massacre at Karbala 
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happened, it has caused anger and pity among Muslims, and many rose up to avenge, and 
there has been much blood-shed. However, it was the Jafari
576
 Shi’ites who most exploited 
this event for political ends” (70). 
The issue of fear appears frequently in other contexts as well. While there are many 
accounts of protests and criticism by the opponents of Shi’i ulama and their influence on the 
policies, laws, and government, unlike the support and the protection Martin Luther received 
from Frederick III, the Elector of Saxony,
 577
 individuals like Ahmad Kasravi or Mohammad 
Mosaddeq not only did not receive such protection from the secular authorities, but the 
secular authorities seemed to always join forces and side with the religious class for the fear 
of one thing or another. Following the assassination of Kasravi in 1946, the secular 
authorities aimed to please and oblige the wishes of the clergy who were lobbying to free the 
assassins. During the premiership of Mosaddeq, the fear of the leftist Tudeh party compelled 
the authorities to be on good terms with the religious leaders because they “hoped to use 
them against the Tudeh” (Abrahamian 1982, 258) out of fear of the spread of communism. 
Perhaps one of the fastest growing influential ideas that emerged was the rise of the 
left in Iran, following the Russian 1917 revolution, even though Reza Shah had taken 
measures to suppress all socialist ideas, to the detriment of all progressive parties 
(Abrahamian 1982, 138, 139). Nonetheless, Abrahamian argues that the 1953 coup was not 
out of the fear of communism so much as it was for maintaining the “control” over oil. This 
may be true, but if we consider the confidential documents and intelligence collected by the 
British at this time,
 578
 it becomes clear that the element of fear of communism was clearly a 
useful strategy not just to manipulate the authorities in Iran, but to convince the Americans to 
get involved (Abrahamian 2001, 211). 
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An examination of the different opposition groups that unified under the leadership of 
Ayatollah Khomeini in the Revolution of 1979 demonstrates, argues Keddie, for the most 
part they “merely wished to escape the related evils of internal despotism and of 
‘Westoxication’579—socioeconimic and cultural dependence on the West” (1993, 616). This 
had been formulated into what Ayatollah Khomeini capitalized on in his speeches as he 
warned the population of the consequences (Abrahamian 1982, 533). If a more critical point 
of view had developed from judicious analyses that Kasravi started in the first half of the 
twentieth century, Khomeini’s statements perhaps would not have been as easily taken at 
face value. 
The Critique of Shi’ism and Sufism 
I cannot discuss waves of modernism and reforms without including the works of one 
of the most important figures of the twentieth century Iran, Ahmad Kasravi. It is Kasravi’s 
direct and blunt criticism of the religious, social, and political conditions in Iran that, while 
compelling him to become a prolific analytic writer, also brought his demise at the hands of 
the religious zealots in 1946. Two of his studies are of great interest here; these studies 
demonstrate the degree of his rigor and commitment to eliminate what he saw as backward 
and contradictory in any kind of reform. Kasravi writings on Shi’ism and Sufism reveal his 
deep understanding of some of the most challenging obstacles in Iran toward the path of true 
reforms.
580
 
Kasravi had studied as a religious scholar and even initially wore the attire of a 
cleric.
581
 As early as the 1930s he began writing analytically on Shi’ism. It has become clear 
that he opposed not religion itself but Shi’ism and Islam as interpreted by the clergy. He 
made a distinction between what all religions initially offered and what they turned into later 
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on.
582
 Kasravi believed that change for the people of Iran was not possible unless change 
came to their religious beliefs and they rejected values imposed by such beliefs.
583
 
In his introduction to Shi’ism he argues what he has undertaken has to do with the 
“problems of Iran” and that he has presented great evidence and “has reasoned,” and asks 
that the reader exercise “indulgence” and “wisdom” in reading. He states he understands 
many of the points he raises are unfamiliar to some, and that they may be “disheartened” by 
them, but that they should “read two or three times” because his strong reasoning requires 
that they do so, “for what they weren’t able to agree to the first time, upon the second and 
third readings, they will come to understand” (Kasravi 1943a, 36-37). 
Kasravi provides a historical account of the spread of Shi’ism in Iran and traces it 
back to the time of Umayyad caliphs, against whose domination many Persians resisted 
(Kasravi 1943a, 73). It was their resentment toward the Umayyads, argues Kasravi, 
specifically caliph al-Mu’awiyya and not necessarily their “love for Ali” (the Prophet’s 
cousin and deemed by Shi’ites to be his rightful heir) that led to the consolidation of their 
political movements against the Umayyad caliphs (ibid). It is worth noting that the 
Umayyads were toppled by the Abbasids, with the effective help and support of the Persians 
(Bloom & Blair 2002, 74). Therefore, from the start, politics are an essential component to 
the idea of Shi’ism, but perhaps the most effective strategy implemented by the clergy is 
what Kasravi bluntly calls “exaggerations” and “lies” in his criticism of the Shi’ism. 
In evaluation of the Shi’ite belief, Kasravi enumerates the pernicious effects of such 
belief. One of his complaints is regarding the exaggerations that he stated would “astonish” 
in phrases like “anyone who visits Hossein[’s shrine] in Karbala, it is as if he has visited God 
enthroned” (71), or phrases that are reminiscent of the papal indulgences during European 
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Renaissance. One of the obligatory rites for a good Shi’a was, regardless of the individual’s 
laxness toward the regular religious duties and committing every prohibited act, “visiting the 
tomb of Imam Hossein and weeping for him, [which] would wash away all their sins” (ibid). 
Kasravi also complains about the lies the clergy told, and the people believed. He also 
presents evidence that he himself was witness to, belief in a bird in Karbala that speaks the 
phrase “Hossein was killed,” or another instance, when two to three individuals rolled a 
bolder to the tomb of Imam Reza (the eighth Shi’ite Imam’s funerary sanctuary in North East 
of Iran), and proclaimed the stone rolled by itself to come visit the Imam’s tomb. Kasravi 
points out that the clergy, fully aware of falsity of such proclamations, chose to remain silent, 
for they believed such actions “would strengthen the belief of the populace” (166). 
There are pages filled with numerous examples that Kasravi offers to prove that such 
exaggerations and lies undermine the dignity of humans and are beneath the religion of 
Islam. These are, however, expressions from the imagination that perpetuate the superstitious 
belief among the Shi’ite, argues Kasravi. Thus, the role of creative imagination endures to 
maintain the clergies’ grip on the pulse of the people. These statements further undermine the 
issue of a conscious subject, one who is subject to one’s own existence. However, Kasravi 
does not stop at the criticism of Shi’ism. He mostly despised what he called 
“introspectivism” about which he wrote in his book Sufism. 
In Sufism (1943b), Kasravi attributes the roots of Sufism to Plotinus and Greek 
thoughts (1943b, 43). He explains Plotinus’ philosophy as how all is emanated from the 
“One,” thus exists the possibility of one re-joining the Divine consciousness by way of an 
“altered state of mind;” Kasravi goes on to note that according to Plotinus, human soul, by its 
descent in this world, has become contaminated, so by rejecting carnal desires, and focusing 
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on nurturing its spirit, it reduces that contamination and achieves piety. In criticism Kasravi 
states “these are dreamt by Plotinus, without offering any proofs” (1943b, 44). Kasravi 
sharply criticizes Plotinus’ statement that “we all separated from God, are from him, and 
toward Him we shall return.” He argues as if asking Plotinus, “How did you come to know 
this?” “How does one define the ‘altered state of mind?” and “If one needs to turn away from 
what this world has to offer, why and for whom was this world even created?” (1943b, 45). 
Perhaps most significantly, Kasravi laments the effects of Sufism in training up a 
population to be submissive, docile, and in the name of rejecting worldly needs, to relinquish 
home, family and the protection of the country (1943b, 57-59). He notes “the Mongols 
wanted the population this way, and it was in their interest that the Iranians surrender the 
country and its governance [to the Mongols], and to keep occupied with Sufism and things 
alike. [Indeed, t]he time of the Mongols was [like] the spring for such mis-guidedness and 
mis-directed education” (ibid). 
Kasravi was even critical of the works of Orientalists in the West, which he 
considered an impediment in the progress of the population. He argues: 
Sufism is and has been one of the causes of misfortune of the people [of Iran]. You 
see Orientalists, who don’t have the best interest of the [so called] Orientals in mind, 
have spent much effort to keep this institution [Sufism] from collapsing, and they 
write volumes and articles on the subject of Sufism, and under the guise of historical 
research, visibly support the sufis. This is why . . . the Cultural Ministry in Iran, 
which is an establishment founded by those opposing such groups, considers Sufism 
as one of the major wellsprings of its culture, and strives to publish and disseminate 
the literature by the Sufis.
584
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In his second chapter, Kasravi’s criticism centers on the analysis of the harm Sufism 
has brought on the population. One of his problems with Sufism is in the idea of Unity of 
Existence. Kasravi argues, the philosophy of Unity of Existence is nothing but the product of 
a creative mind that cannot resolve the conflict between the raising of humans to the status of 
the divine on the one hand, and the lowering of the divine to the degree of the “chained wild 
animals and quadrupeds” (1943b, 94). Further, he admonishes the Sufis for their idleness and 
lack of productivity (1943b, 95). Moreover, he criticizes the “perverted” notion of love put 
forth by the Sufis, and even casts doubt on whether the word was correctly translated from 
Plotinus (1943b, 108). He contends that judging by the mystic poetry,
585
 this is not the love 
Plotinus meant, for the former leads to self-alienation, and monastic tendencies, and the latter 
encourages doing good; if one searches goodness, one must strive to do good in order to find 
love. However, Kasravi notes “what we least know the Sufis for is doing good deeds” 
(1943b, 109). Finally, Kasravi harshly criticizes the Sufis for “showing animosity toward 
reason.”586 He cites a quote from a Sufi that 
our sage was asked once, what is reason? He replied one cannot reach the mysteries 
of divinity with reason, for the latter is ‘created’, and the former ‘eternal,’ and the 
created cannot fathom that which is eternal.
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Kasravi summarizes that the conducts
588
 of Sufis is in marked contrast with reason, 
and that is why they negate reason and reason-based ideas, for it questions their 
irrationalities. He is very critical of how the Sufis legitimized their actions by likening them 
to some divine attribute. For example, they interpret “idleness” as not submitting to the 
worldly affairs, and “vagrancy” as a self-imposed asceticism to “kill meaning and 
selfishness” (1943b, 103). 
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In both volumes, Kasravi lays out in detail examples and instances that clearly speak 
to a corrupted consciousness that believes and internalizes what the leaders in these two 
traditions suggest; he pleads for mindfulness and reason-based approaches to analyze what 
religious groups such as the Shi’ite clergy and the Sufi sages craft in the form of narratives, 
mystic accounts, and poetry. The more fantastic the narrative, the easier it is to compel the 
population to submit. Unfortunately, Kasravi did not live to continue his work in establishing 
his method of critique; with the support of the Shi’ite clergy, the second of the two 
assassination attempts finally silenced his passionate voice and ended his sobering language 
and his sharp criticism toward what he saw as ailment for the Iranian people (Kasravi 1943a, 
36-37). 
Kasravi’s criticism of the Iranian brand of Shi’ism inspired Ali Akbar Hakamizadeh 
(Moin 1999, Rajaee 2007, Martin 2007) to author a brief but bitter criticism of Shi’i practices 
in Iran, entitled Asrar e Hezarsaleh (Secrets of a Thousand Years), “refuting and mocking 
many of the tenets of Shi’ism in Iran” (Rajaee 65). Most interestingly, he “proposed thirteen 
questions in the final pages and invited readers to respond to them” (ibid).589 Hakamizadeh 
thus challenged the ulama, for instance, on “the authority of the mujtahid and the legitimacy 
of man-made laws” (Martin 104). While the impact of Hakamizadeh’s questions did not 
reach very far, it was the young Khomeini who wrote a book in response,
590
 Kashf al-Asrar 
(The Revealing of Secrets), because it had made him “enflamed with rage” (Moin 61) for 
“undermining religion and thereby destroying the country’s independence” (Martin 104). In 
Khomeini’s eyes this was reflective of Reza Shah Pahlavi’s systematic attacks on the clerical 
establishment.
591
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Perhaps Kasravi’s major error was, like Marx, that while he pinpointed the problem 
and had an accurate diagnosis for where the issues were, he failed in the prescription and 
solution, seeking to purify religion from superstition and backwardness.
592
 Indeed, this may 
have been influential in his elimination by the religious zealots.
593
 Further, his sharp criticism 
hit the Iranians’ collective cultural ego in its core from multiple fronts594 in such a way that 
left him with no allies; as a result he had neither the popular support, nor the support from the 
ruling or religious class. Consequently, his critical method did not develop further. From this 
point on, the ulama remained, more than ever, close to the political power and continued to 
assert their influences in the formation of policies despite the reformist campaigns. The 
politicization of Islam that had taken place earlier was headed for a major revision to reflect 
modernist philosophies and theories leaving major marks in the political and even 
geographical scene. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICIZING ISLAM IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY: THE STATE OF THE 
SUBJECT 
With the advent of modernism in the early twentieth century, the reformers were 
faced with the question of how to develop policies and laws in-sync with the modern world. 
At the same time, they aimed to reconcile the differences with the Shari’a law, which 
continued to be under the tight supervision of the ulama and maintained a powerful presence. 
Moreover, it is the interest in philosophy that had appeared dormant, but not annihilated, 
since the time of Avicenna, that resurges with the particular sensitivity to Hegel and 
Espinoza (Adamiyat 1970, 71). In this segment, I will investigate progressive and influential 
ideas put forth by key thinkers and reformers spanning from the Constitutional Revolution 
era and beyond the political changes in mid-century, to the Revolution of 1979. I aim to 
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demonstrate the theoreticians’ attempt that began with mediating the common law and 
Shari’a law evolved into idealistic thoughts and a political ideology with grave 
consequences, by-passing significant sparks of individual and critical thinking. 
Early Reformers: Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, Mirza Fathali Akhoundzadeh, 
and Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani  
The ideas of modernization and progress, while opposing the absolutism in 
monarchy, took shape during the last decade of Naser al-Din Shah’s rule (1886-1896) with 
the appearance on the scene of prominent political and intellectual figures such as Seyed 
Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Mirza Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-Dowleh, Mirza Agha Khan 
Kirmani, and Mirza Malkum Khan (Adamiyat 1978, 28). Initiated by these notable 
intellectuals, administrators, and statesmen, there were consistent attempts not just to 
implement measures of reforms; they understood all too well that no reform could 
materialize without the monarch’s support of the said reforms. However, this was not an easy 
task to accomplish. 
On the recommendation of his premier, Mirza Hossein Khan Sepahsalar (Moshir al-
Dowleh), Naser al-Din Shah went on a series of European trips. Sepahsalar had such a 
profound impact on the reform campaigns that his tenure is aptly known as “Sepahsalar Era 
of law and reform.”595 He inspired and supported the efforts of Yusuf Khan Mostashar al-
Dowleh Tabrizi (1813-1895) in authoring his book, the aforementioned Yek Kalameh (1853), 
to which I shall return shortly. Sepahsalar’s objective was to expose Naser al-Din Shah to 
Modern Europe and encourage him to support efforts toward modernization of Iran, 
particularly its legal system. However, the Shah apparently did not make the connection 
between the rule of law and setting limitations to his own power.
596
 Upon returning from his 
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third European trip, Naser al-Din Shah called a meeting and invited his administration and 
royal members of the government. He compared what he had witnessed in the matter of 
governance in Europe with what was in place in Iran, and expressed: 
In this trip what we witnessed [was] that all order and progress in Europe is due to 
having the rule of law. We too have emphatically decided to establish the rule of law 
and order in Iran, and rule in accordance to the law.
597
  
Nonetheless, a committee of five was formed to author laws for the country, and the 
translation of European legal texts was undertaken (Adamiyat 1978, 12). One of these the 
texts written was Yek Kalameh (One Word), which was about the importance of the rule of 
law and significance of personal and individual freedoms, as well as the fact that the people 
should be the source of legislation (MirzaYusuf Khan 11). However, as a student of Islamic 
law, and later becoming familiar with European laws, Mirza Yusuf Khan wanted to reconcile 
the two in his book. He compares the French codes of law with the Shari’a law in an attempt 
to justify the separation of the latter from common law. He states: 
[A]nd the most important . . . difference is that the code considers only the worldly 
matter, so that it is suitable for the condition of every person, irrespective of their 
ethnicity and religion. There is a different book for religious matters. In contrast in 
the books of Islamic law, worldly matters are tempered and mixed with other-worldly 
affairs, such as obligatory prayers, fasting and pilgrimage. This causes great harm in 
administrating the affairs of the common people, because non-Muslim people living 
in Islamic lands have no desire to read your code of law […] Thus if the foremost 
‘ulama’, wherever they may be, were to write Islamic codes in separate book such as 
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the book of acts of worship, the afterlife, and books of civil and commercial matters, 
this would not be detrimental to the Shari’a.598 
Mirza Yusuf Khan was not alone in pondering upon the separation of religion and 
state. The aforementioned premier, Sepahsalar, shared this idea with him that “religious 
matters such as congregational prayers,” should remain under the authority of the clergy,” 
however, he advised, “not so much as [the measure of] a miniscule they [meaning the clergy] 
should be involved in the affairs of the state, nor should they be placed in between the 
government and the people” (Adamiyat 1980, 199). While Sepahsalar has been a prominent 
secularist figure in the efforts to implement the rule of law, there are other intellectuals in the 
nineteenth century who advocated secularism, freedom, and equality, particularly with 
respect to the women’s rights (Paidar 46). 
Rule of law indicated civility for Mirza Malkum Khan (1833-1908), who was also a 
reformist during the reign of Naser al-Din Shah, at which time he was serving as Iranian 
ambassador in London but was “dismissed from his post owing to disagreements with the 
Shah” (Paidar 47). Malkum Khan published the newspaper Ghanun (Law) abroad that 
reflected his passion for the rule of law “and attributed the backwardness of Iran to lack of a 
constitution and codified law” (ibid). One of his efforts in advising Naser al-Din Shah was 
the “drafting of a Book of Reforms” 599 that was prefaced by a “general warning” against the 
foreign powers taking over the country “unless the shah immediately decreed laws for 
reform”. Abrahamian notes the use of the term ghanun by Malkum was intended to 
distinguish it from religious laws (shari’a) and “the old state regulations (‘urf ).” His advice 
to the monarch was basically predicated on two pillars: “the improvement of public welfare, 
and the equality of all citizens.”600 But, perhaps it was Malkum Khan’s widespread 
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reputation that mainly came from his establishing a secret society, the “Faramushkhaneh 
(House of Oblivion) in mid-nineteenth century . . . modeled on but not attached to the 
European Freemasons” that ultimately was viewed as his emulation of the “foreigners,” 
leading to his discredit by his opponents (Abrahamian 1982, 66).
601
 Despite Malkum’s 
reformist advice, the monarch became concerned when the objections from the religious 
leaders “denounced the concept of [gh]anun as ‘heretical innovation’ (bid’a) and accused the 
Faramushkhaneh as having connections to the ‘atheistic republican’ Freemasons in Europe.” 
It resulted in closure of the establishment and sending Malkum to exile in Ottoman Turkey 
(ibid). 
An earlier figure of note is Mirza Fathali Akhoundzadeh (1812-1878), who has also 
been viewed as a “reformist” and a “secular” thinker. Akhoundzadeh considered the source 
of all problems was the Arab invasion of Persia in the seventh century, and he subscribed to 
the view of returning to the pre-Islamic glories of Persia (Adamiyat 1970, Paidar 1995, 
Amanat 2017). Akhoundzadeh had great esteem for the Western cultures; in particular, “he 
was a great admirer of Russian high culture” (Amanat 322). Paidar notes “Akhoundzadeh 
was a professed atheist, declared polygamy a social ill and argued for women’s right to 
education”.602 Paidar astutely notes in praising the pre-Islamic Persia, Akhoundzadeh was 
merely seeking for a solution to counter the type of religious domination that was being 
experienced in Iran. She states Akhounzadeh’s “glorification of Zoroastrian Iran . . . had little 
to do with the ‘reality’ of women’s position in ancient Iran. On the contrary, such a 
presentation of the past was a construction relevant to the existing socio political situation” 
(ibid). It cannot be overlooked that such strategy is seeking a solution within the binary of 
Hegelian thesis and antithesis. In fact this strategy has been persistent throughout the various 
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attempts for change in the nineteenth and twentieth century Iran, that is to say countering, 
with the intention to substitute, of one source of authority with another.  
Similarly, albeit with conflicted attitude, there were other reformists who believed the 
problem was with the clergy themselves and saw them as unfit to be involved in the affairs of 
the state. Despite proclaiming his “lack of confidence in the class of the clergy” repeatedly, 
Mirza Agha Khan Kirmani (1854-1897) believed in seeking “the assistance of the ulama, if 
political affairs made it necessary.” Adamiyat criticizes Kirmani for taking this strategy too 
far, to a degree that it negates the enlightened thoughts, “of which he is oblivious himself.” 
Nevertheless, Adamiyat cites from Agha Khan’s letters to Malkum Khan that to implement 
reforms in Iran, “we must innately turn our hopeful eyes away from the Qajar clan and a few 
witless mullas . . . [for] all their actions are derived by self-interest and thus they cannot be 
trusted . . . these ulama of ours have no inherent independence of their own” (Adamiyat 
1978, 29). 
There is no doubt that Agha Khan’s source of inspiration “for modern thinking” was 
the “Western world” (Adamiyat 1970, 26). The significance of philosophic thoughts in Iran 
has been noted by Adamiyat. In a summary about the history of philosophy in Iran, he argues 
that philosophy reached its peak during the early Middle Ages (10
th
-11
th
 centuries), when 
Avicenna (980-1037) was the most prominent figure. But there are no noteworthy individuals 
in philosophy until the age of Nasir al-Din Tūsi (1201-1274). The gaps in between the two 
and a gap that existed between Tūsi and the present time was basically filled with “Mūlla 
Sadrā’s philosophy” 603 (i.e. Neoplatonic philosophy), who he sees as the “preserver of 
philosophy in Iran.” From there on, it was Mūlla Sadrā’s students who guarded those 
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thoughts until the nineteenth century and to the time of Hāj Mūlla Hādi Sabzevari (1797-
1873) (Adamiyat 1970, 71-72). 
One of Adamiyat’s criticisms of this philosophy604 in the modern times, nonetheless, 
is that it was considered “superior to the matters of nature,” thus deemed inappropriate to mix 
the two. Therefore, due to not being predicated on sciences and mathematics, as it was done 
previously, the philosophy remained deeply rooted in human imagination (Adamiyat 1970, 
72). He further points out that “our philosophers were unfamiliar with the new, practical 
sciences” (ibid).605 This was not unlike what had taken place in Europe, argues Adamiyat, as 
“the philosophers of scholastic era,” too, were reluctant to reconcile the tradition and 
experience-based sciences at first. However, over time, “new philosophy in Europe 
developed out of the heart of scholastic beliefs, and evolved by placing its foundation in 
science and experience” (ibid). 
In nineteenth century, one of the first attempts to translate and publish books on the 
new philosophy of the West was the translation of Descartes’ Discourse on the Method of 
Rightly Conducting the Reason (1637) that holds a contradiction in its preface. It was 
published in 1862, with the title “Book of Diyakert,” or “Hekmat Naseri”606 In the preface to 
the book, following acknowledging the king’s attention to this project, which was meant to 
“establish laws and politics of the regions, the execution of reforms and planning for sciences 
and industries and their patrons . . . and elevating the rule of order and justice,” it further 
notes, “of course it will lead to the exaltation of the Divine laws (hekmat) that are the essence 
of all” (Adamiyat 1970, 74). This conflicting attitude pervaded the nineteenth century 
philosophy in Iran.
607
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Adamiyat quotes from de Gobineau’s observation of the Iranian thinkers interacting 
with the Cartesian Cogito, which he mentions as “memorable.” Gobineau had noted that even 
though the Easterners were already aware of this “essential formula” from earlier times, how 
they understood it was not what Descartes was seeking. He further notes “the Iranian 
philosophers that I have met, are more interested in achieving complete knowledge of 
Espinoza and Hegel, and the reason is clear,
608
 because the thoughts of these two 
philosophers are Asian [Eastern]” (Adamiyat 1970, 74).609 The attempts to translate and 
make the history of philosophy available in Iran continued in the work by Mohammad Ali 
Foroughi (1877-1942), whose search for the philosophical wisdom and reason in the works 
of European philosophers initially prompted him to translate Descartes’ Discourse (ca. 
1931), but quickly realized he could not take on such a project without a thorough 
investigation of the history of philosophy (Foroughi, Introduction 1938).
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Foroughi is a noteworthy member of the twentieth century Iranian intelligentsia, 
whose career spans from being “a member of Revolutionary Committee in 1905” to 
negotiating an agreement on the exile of the founder of the Pahlavi dynasty, to furthering 
modernization of the country and holding the post of prime minister multiple times during 
the Pahlavis (Abrahamian 1982, 122, and 164). In authoring The Course of Philosophy in 
Europe, he “may be one of the earliest intellectuals and statesmen in Iran to pay serious 
attention to modern philosophy and to issues of rationality in modern Europe” (Jahanbegloo 
2012). But, perhaps most important for our purposes is his contribution in making that 
knowledge available in Iran. But, his contributions are not limited to this undertaking, as he 
believed in the preservation and reform of Persian language and literature necessary for any 
reforms in Iran (Jahanbegloo 2012, Amanat 2017). Foroughi’s strategy to reform, as argued 
by Jahanbegloo, encompassed both his interest and work in completing the history of 
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Western philosophy as well as his efforts to strengthen and modernize the Persian language 
though establishing of the Farhangestan-e Iran (Iran House of Culture), which was founded 
in 1935, “similar to Académie Française, [that] helped supervise the development and reform 
of the Persian language” (Amanat 475). 
The modernization tendency of Foroughi has been heralded by Jahanbegloo as 
“dialogical modernization that is exemplified by the dual project of ‘Enlightenment from 
above’ and ‘Enlightenment from below’.” Jahanbegloo further explains the objective in 
Foroughi’s “dialogical approach” was “to accommodate Iranian heritage, as presented in the 
canon of Persian history, philosophy, and literature, with modern European values” 
(Jahanbegloo 2012).
611
 It is problematic, nonetheless, that Foroughi, who “through his career 
. . . advocated liberal forms of citizenship,” supported the idea of “Enlightenment from 
above,” as manifested through the despotic reign of Reza Shah, to implement reforms. 
Foroughi’s solution to this problem, according to Jahanbegloo, was the balancing of 
compulsory reforms from above with the reformation in language and literature, in other 
words, his “Enlightenment from below,” until the Iranians “become more mature in their 
political judgment and everyday reasoning” (ibid). 
 Foroughi’s efforts toward modernization, rule of law, and advocating reason612 
paralleled with the way in which he integrated his works, may it be through his history of 
Western philosophy, or his works on Persian literature “into the narrative of modern Iranian 
nationalism.” Foroughi’s “progressive” works have been deemed as “a blue print for an 
Iranian national identity” (Amanat 476, Jahanbegloo 2012) that were meant to offset the Shi’i 
hold on the laws on the one hand, and to alleviate the tyrannical manipulation of the “blind 
Westernism” on the other. I found this argument problematic, for nationalism itself places 
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affairs back in the hands of patriarchy, albeit a modernist patriarchy; the need for a 
centralized power at this time eclipsed the necessity of an individual consciousness, and the 
need to change does not venture beyond a Hegelian synthesis.
613
 There can be no doubt that 
Foroughi tried to initiate an Iranian search for finding their own place through becoming 
aware of the modern philosophy’s use of reason, while standing firm on their own literary 
tradition. 
Virtually all attempts to reform in practice were formulated in a top-down model 
since the beginning of such movements in the nineteenth century. Great thinkers such as 
Jamal al-Din, in his grand plan to fight the British colonialism, had initially tried to persuade 
the king, underscoring the leadership of the enlightened ulama. However, it seems toward the 
end of his life he experienced remorse. Abrahamian explains:  
On his death bed in 1897, Jamal al-Din expressed to a friend both hope and sorrow. 
Hope because the “stream of renovation” flowing from West to East would inevitably 
destroy the “edifice of despotism.” Sorrow, because he had wasted so much of his 
precious ideas on the “sterile soil” of royal courts: “would that I had sown the seeds 
of my ideas on the fertile ground of the people’s thoughts.614 
During the modernist movements of the nineteenth century, Jamal al-Din was 
arguably the first to propose the use of the religion of Islam to resist against colonialism 
(Keddie 1968). While he was unsuccessful in ousting the British and their colonial intentions 
from Iran, or even bringing about any reforms, he had been able to leave a legacy behind that 
prompted followers to continue with his ideas after his death (Abrahamian 1982, 64). Keddie 
extensively addresses Jamal al-Din’s legacy, not just in Iran, but in the Middle East, and even 
in India (Keddie 1972). From the scholarly work done on the subject, it can be surmised that 
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Jamal al-Din’s influence unfolded in two paths: in Iran, it radically reverberated in the 
reactionary measure that materialized in the assassination of Naser al-Din Shah in 1896. 
Abrahamian notes initially Jamal al-Din made very little impact in Iran (Abrahamian 1982, 
64). However, the second path, which developed a more sustainable course came through 
another direction.
615
 
Muhammad Iqbal Lahori (1877-1938), poet and philosopher, who is renowned for his 
efforts to divide India into two countries of India and Pakistan (1947)
616
 argues in his book 
The Revival of Religious Thoughts in Islam (1930) that Muslims must rethink within Islam 
without severing ties with the past. He also praises Jamal al-Din as “being the living link 
between the past and the future,” as someone who fully understood the “significance and 
magnitude of this responsibility” of Muslims (Iqbal 1930, 113). Iqbal was popular in Iran 
among the intellectuals with his poetry, and among the religious class for his affinity for 
mysticism (Irfan).  
The individual in Iqbal’s understanding, which is colored by mysticism, is predicated 
on three concepts that he draws from the Koran: first, that he is chosen by God; second, that 
with all his fallibility, he has been given the responsibility to be God’s deputy on earth; and, 
third that the trusted man is a free man, who accepts this responsibility against his own well-
being (Iqbal 110).
617
 Contrary to Bergson,
618
 in Iqbal’s view, the “real’ individual experience 
is in the understanding of the introspective unity, which he distinguishes from those he found 
in the Islamic thoughts tainted by other traditions (Iqbal 111). He argues: “the perfection of 
this experience in the religious Islamic life culminates in the expression of Hallaj’s ‘Ana’al 
Haq’ [I am Truth/God]” (ibid). This makes the individuality defined by Iqbal a constructed 
and an imaginary one, since it disregards the sense-based experiences. 
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The definition of the “I’ in Iqbal eloquently describes a being that is incomplete in its 
natural form and is understandably in search of a unity which is “more inclusive, more 
effective, more balanced, and more cohesive” (Iqbal 114). In explaining this “I,” he cites 
Ghazali, who deems it one with essence and distinct from “our varied states of mind.” It is 
that which time has no influence on, and “our experience comes from the consciousness of 
relation between the particulars and that expansive essence” (Iqbal 116). In response to 
arguments on the determinism dominant over the Islamic regions at the time, Iqbal notes, 
“[p]hilosophy is nothing but seeking the causes, in such a way that can be aligned with God . 
. . and with pondering of time, which is like the foundation of the link between the cause and 
effect, [one] cannot arrive but at the understanding of the Divine, which is above all in the 
world.” In support of his argument he submits the example of “Hegel’s view on the Truth 
and the Real, which he equates to the lack of limitation of the mind, and from which can be 
surmised that all that is true and real contain the essence of the mind” (Iqbal 128-129). 
 Around the time that Foroughi was writing The Course of, Iqbal published one of his 
most distinguished works in Persian language called Javid-nama,
619
 which is like “an 
encyclopedia of Iqbal’s thought” guiding one through his philosophical, political, and even 
his aesthetic ideas.”620 Admittedly, he utilized his poetry “as a medium for spreading his 
ideas which he hoped would awaken Muslims from their centuries-long slumber.”621 Iqbal 
opposed the idea of “art for art’s sake,” and stated in Javid-nama: “[i]f the formation of men 
is the goal of poetry, then poetry is the heir to prophethood.” Nonetheless, while relying on 
the traditional vocabulary and symbols, Iqbal sets out to fill the traditional symbols with new 
idealistic meanings that reflect what needs to be done through martyrdom and sacrifice.
622
 
Iqbal’s affinity with mysticism in his poetry, and his political ideas predicated on Islamic 
principles became influential for the next generation of reformers in Iran. 
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Reformers in Mid-Twentieth Century: Mohammad Nakhshab, Ali Shari'ati, and Mehdi 
Bazargan 
In the period between the two world wars and the 1953 coup, following the rise and 
fall of the Tudeh party’s influence, in opposition to the Tudeh party’s ideology, there was an 
interest in combining the idea of socialism with Islamic thoughts. A number of intellectuals 
such as Mahmoud Taleqani (1911-1979), and Mehdi Bazargan (1907-1995) (later 
revolutionary government’s first prime minister) argued that “Islam had answers for modern 
problems,” and that economic equity had been one of the objectives of Islam from the onset 
(Abrahamian 1982, 459). One of the intellectuals who has been credited with “being the first 
Iranian to attempt synthesizing Shi’ism with European socialism” is Mohammad Nakhshab 
(1923-1976). Nakhshab is the founder of a movement called “God-Worshipping Socialists” 
(Abrahamian 1982, 463). He was the first who saw “socialism and democracy as two 
manifestations of the same truth of the rule of people over people.”623 
Nakhshab’s contribution was in arguing for “morality” and ethics. In Marxism, he 
believed Marx’s philosophy was a reaction to capitalism’s excesses as well as the church’s 
corruptions. Thus, he insisted on “morality and ethics as a necessity in politics and society” 
(Nekoorouh 2017). This morality could be arrived at by way of a sort of “nihilism” (elahiyyat 
e tanzihi) of all that was conjured up by man in order to remove absolutism from all and any 
human endeavors. At the same time, his approach on the Divine, in the context of politics 
and administration, was nihilistic as well, in order to “reach progress on earth,” for “man hath 
only that for which he maketh effort”624 meant no excess value (capitalism) and the 
“consideration of morality until the [recognition of] rights of others” was necessary to 
preserve the rights of the individual (Nekoorouh 2014). Other intellectual and political 
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figures made attempts to find a middle ground. Khalil Maleki (1901-1969) had tried for a 
“third” solution. Following his disillusionment of and leaving the Tudeh Party, due to 
“political differences with the party’s leadership” (Abrahamian 1982, 256), Maleki had 
proposed a “third force,” and elaborated on what this “third force” was: 
We are independent of both Western imperialism and the Soviet Union, of both the 
Tudeh party and the ruling class, of both internal militarism and international 
communism. We identify with the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America, with 
the social democratic movements in Europe, and with the rank and file of the Tudeh 
that is dissatisfied with their pro-Russian and undemocratic leadership. We stand at 
the left wing of the National Front. The national bourgeoisie stands at its right 
wing.
625
 
Similarly,
626
 except for his inclusion of an Islamic faith–inspired ethical notion, 
Nakhshab attempted to find a median ground. Therefore, what the “Movement of the God-
Worshipping Socialists” proposed, was a “new school” in between the two super powers at 
the time (Abrahamian 1982, 463). It is worth noting that Žižek in his analysis of the “Arab 
Spring” in 2009, pondering upon an inscription in a clay dish,627 argued the same point: 
[I]nsofar as we tend to oppose East and West in terms of fate and freedom, Islam 
stands for a third position that undermines this binary opposition—neither 
subordination to blind Fate nor freedom to do what one wants, both of which 
presuppose an abstract external opposition between the two terms, but rather a deeper 
freedom to decide (‘choose’) our fate.628 
Nakhshab tried to establish a new link between “rights, freedom, and morality” for 
the first time that called for “human for itself,” or one who is “subject to itself,” which was 
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predicated on a “self-sustaining reason.” This individual was very different from the tradition 
that made him, historically and continuously, subject to a “God imagined on earth . . . in the 
form of [a] king or [a] sage” (Nekorouh 2017). It was, however, Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977) 
who “saw himself as continuing and completing what . . . Bazargan, Taleqani, and Nakhshab 
had started: formulating a secular religion that would appeal to the modern intelligentsia 
without alienating the traditional bazarris and the religious masses” (Abrahamian 1982, 467). 
It is Ali Shari’ati (1933-1977) who argues Islam to be “a revolutionary ideology that 
permeates all spheres of life, especially politics, and inspires true believers to fight against all 
forms of oppression, exploitation, and social injustice” (Abrahamian 1982, 466).629 
Shari’ati’s views prompted him, while studying in France, to write three letters to Fanon that 
criticized Fanon’s negative assessment of the role of religion in colonialization (Fanon 1963). 
Similar to Jamal al-Din Asadabadi, Shari’ati argued “the people of the Third World could not 
fight Imperialism until they first gained their cultural identity, which in some countries was 
interwoven with popular religious traditions” (Abrahamian 1982, 465). Therefore, for 
Shari’ati, there was a clear link between cultural identity and religion that could be used 
against imperialism. Nonetheless, he had a long list of ailments, from which he believed the 
human society of Iran was suffering, that in addition to a global imperialism, included 
“international Zionism, colonialism, exploitation, oppression, class inequality, cartels, 
multinational corporations, racism, cultural imperialism, and gharbzadegi (blindly following 
the West)” (Abrahamian 1982, 467). 
Thus, Shari’ati opened a space that was distinct from all active and influential groups 
that encompassed “progressive” thinking and the young population, while not excluding the 
traditionalist merchant class. He clarified his position on two leading waves that had been 
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struggling and at odds with one another to this point. On the one hand, he “denounced 
Western Imperialism,” but distinguished his theories from those on the left (i.e. Tudeh party, 
popular among the older generation of Iranian intelligentsia) in his criticism of Marx, 
particularly of the “Stalinist variety.” One the other hand, he had turned on the traditionalist, 
religious leadership for misinterpreting Islam as “apolitical” (Abrahamian 1982, 467 and 
Momen 258) without being anti-religion or anti-Islam. In a series of lectures titled Bazgasht 
(Return),
630
 Shari’ati argues for a return to one’s own cultural roots, but not to one’s race, as 
in pre-Islamic Iranian Aryan roots, for he adamantly opposes racism.
631
 He states “for us 
return to our roots . . . means a return to our Islamic, especially Shi’ite roots.”632 Shari’ati 
further explains these roots are embedded not in the Caliphate Islam, but the Islam of the 
revolutionaries,
633
 that which has been exemplified in the martyrdom of the prophet’s 
grandson and Ali’s son, Imam Hussein. He further clarifies: “[w]e want the Islam of fighters, 
not that of rouhani [spiritual leaders]; the Islam of the Ali’s family, not that of the Safavid 
dynasty.”634 Consequently, for Shari’ati the “passion plays depicting Hussein’s martyrdom 
contained one major lesson: that all Shi’is, irrespective of time and place, had the duty to 
oppose, resist, and even rebel against overwhelming odds in order to eradicate their 
contemporary ills” (Abrahamian 1982, 466). 
The political ideology was formulated by Shari’ati and well received by various 
groups while raising controversy with those in positions of power.
635
 For Shari’ati it was the 
“Alawi Shi’ism”636 and not the “passive Safavid Shi’ism” that had “an obligation to strive for 
achieving the ideal Shi’ite society” (Momen 259).637 In Abrahamian’s view, “Shari’ati 
produced exactly what the young intelligentsia craved: a radical layman’s religion that 
disassociated itself from the traditional clergy and associated itself with the secular trinity of 
social revolution, technological innovation, and cultural self-assertion.”638 Furthermore, 
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Shari’ati, in his ideal vision of an activist, created a synthesis between the intelligentsia and 
the militia. This idea would be capitalized on by Ayatollah Khomeini, whose opposition to 
the Shah went back to 1963, at which time he was sent to exile in Najaf (Momen 195). Safely 
from his location in Iraq, away from Iran’s secret service, Khomeini began a campaign in 
support of the ulama’s political role. In a book first published in 1971 called Hokumat-e 
Islami (Islamic Government), he laid out his theory of the rule of jurisprudence predicated on 
the executive and administrative role of the ulama (Khomeini 1979). 
THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN – TOTAL MONOPOLIZATION OF POWER: FOUCAULT AND THE 
IRANIAN REVOLUTION 
The idea of Velayat-e Faqih (rule of jurisprudence) had been proposed earlier, 
although in a different capacity, by two prominent Shi’i leaders, namely Mūlla Ahmad 
Narāqi (d. 1829), and the aforementioned Mohammad Hossein Na’ini (d. 1936).639 The 
extent to which the ulama, such as Naraqi and Na’ini delineated the authority of the ulama, 
was to offer “guidance” to the secular rulers to ensure their adherence to the Shari’a law, as 
considered in the 1906 Iranian Constitution (Momen 196).
640
 Mehdi Hāeri, in Philosophy and 
Government (1995), submits that Narāqi, who was a contemporary of Fath Ali Shah Qajar, 
initiates this idea first, then in order to “reason,” sets out to collect references and evidence, 
“without proper criticism and investigation,”  which enabled him to “arrive at the desired 
conclusion” (Hāeri 178). More drastic is Khomeini’s proposal that contrasts with others in 
that he “asserts that the faqih should supplant the ruler and rule in his place (Momen 196). 
In his book, Khomeini, without providing any references or sources, offers his 
reasons for forming an Islamic government and argues that Islam is not limited to ethics, and 
that it is not adequate for an Islamic society to just have laws. For this reason, he contends, 
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“Glorious God, alongside of a collection of rules—meaning Shar’ia—has established a 
government, and an executive and administrative system” (Khomeini 26). Further, he 
substantiates his reasoning by a mimetic comparison (qias) with what the Prophet had done, 
disregarding the different circumstances.
641
 He further notes: 
[A]fter the passing of the Prophet (PBUH), enemies and the sons of Umayyads (may 
God’s curse be upon them), did not allow Ali to establish Islamic government . . . and 
changed the foundation of the government. The regime and the way in which they 
managed and the Umayyads’ and the Abbasids’ politics were against Islam. The 
governing system was turned completely upside down, and was turned into a 
monarchy in Iran and an Imperial Rome and the Pharaohs of Egypt and continued in 
later times to what we see today.
642
 
According to Khomeini, this necessitates revolution in all Muslim lands that have 
been artificially, based on colonial intentions, divided and separated from one another (41). 
Hāeri argues, however, that historically, the rule of jurisprudence has never been part of the 
discourse in the Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence), and that it has never been considered, either by 
Sunni or Shi’i ulama that, in addition to possessing the authority to issue religious edicts, the 
ulama have the right to rule, simply because they are experts in jurisprudence (Hāeri 178). 
Khomeini’s position on the extent of the authority of the Shi’ite ulama, as documented in his 
own and others’ writings, demonstrates his gradual revealing of the idea that the authority of 
the faqih is as boundless as the Divine, hence absolute (Kadivar 2017).
643
 
289 
 
The Theory of Velayat e Faqih (Rule of Jurisprudence) as Absolute 
Vali Nasr in The Shi’a Revival (2006) argues that the Shi’i ulama “relied heavily on 
the Platonic notion . . . of a specially educated ‘guardian’ class led by a ‘philosopher-king’” 
(87). He notes Khomeini in his early career was recognized as a “noted philosopher (with a 
specialty in the study of Aristotelian logic) and had dabbled in mysticism, probably while 
influenced by his reading of the Andalusian Sufi mystic, Ibn Arabi.
644
 He even wrote 
mystical poetry, though none of it was published before his death in 1989.” Nevertheless, 
what is significant for our purposes, is that among his peers, Khomeini had earned the 
reputation of being an expert in analysis of one of the most difficult, yet popular texts—
Mūlla Sadrā’s Asfar Arba’a (Four Journeys) among the Shi’i scholars. In Asfar, just as Ibn 
Arabi had done earlier, and echoing a Neoplatonic voice, Mūlla Sadrā explicates the journey 
toward Truth in four stages: “travel ‘from Him, to Him, in Him and through Him’” 
(Adamson 2016, 387). It has become clear that Khomeini saw himself as a man who has been 
“led to God, learns to open himself up to spiritual wisdom and then returns to the world as 
one who has become united with God, reflecting his divine attributes and qualities” (Nasr 
2006, 84). Nasr quotes a conversation with Hāeri about the latter’s meeting with and 
expressing concerns to Khomeini during the Iran-Iraq war and the tremendous loss of life. 
Nasr recalls: 
One night during the dark years of the Iran-Iraq war, as the 1980s were being 
consumed in blood, with countless thousands of Iranian young men perishing at the 
front, he went in distress to visit his old teacher. He found Khomeini alone, sitting on 
a rug in his garden before a small pool […] He opened up his heart to Khomeini and 
asked his mentor if he could not find a way to stop the awful slaughter. “It is not right 
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for Muslims to kill Muslims,” Haeri began. “Hundreds of thousands are dying in a 
war that has no end and no good purpose.” Khomeini made no sound until Haeri 
stopped talking. Then without turning his head and in even but reproachful tones, he 
asked: “Do you also criticize God when he sends an earth quake? 645 
This anecdote makes it clear that Khomeini was confident of his own “spiritual 
stature,” according to his interpretations of the concepts of the “Unity of Existence” and the 
“Perfect Man,”646 and possessed a “sense of destiny;” it was in this confidence that he could 
employ imagination and innovation to not only give a different picture of Shi’i Islam, but to 
use that image to control an entire country (Nasr 2006, 85) and beyond.
647
 However, the 
problem of the “individual” remains as hidden as before until we come across Foucault’s 
writings from his experience of visiting Iran in September and November of 1979. 
In a letter to Mehdi Bazargan, the prime minister at the time, Foucault, who had been 
elated at the news of the uprising of the people and removing of the Shah and his despotic 
regime, expresses concern regarding the execution of a number of key individuals during the 
first few months after the revolution. He notes the “responsibility” of the government, 
regardless of what term prefaces it (e.g. democratic, Islamic, etc.) toward its citizens 
(Foucault 2000, 440). Foucault writes, “[w]e spoke of all the regimes that oppressed people 
while invoking human rights. You expressed a hope: that in the will, so generally affirmed 
then by Iranians, for an Islamic government, those rights would find a real guarantee […] No 
government can escape from those fundamental duties. And from that view point, the trials 
that are now taking place in Iran are nothing short of alarming.” (ibid). Further he 
emphasizes, “[n]othing is more important in the history of a people than the rare moments 
when it rises up as a body to strike down a regime it can no longer tolerate.” Foucault is 
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impressed by witnessing how Iranians were willing to give up their life to bring about 
change. In an earlier article, on the people’s struggle, Foucault writes: 
If societies persist and survive . . .  it is because behind all the consent and the 
coercion, beyond the threats, the violence, and the persuasion, there is the possibility 
of this moment where life cannot be exchanged, where power becomes powerless, 
and where in front of the gallows and the machine guns, men rise up.
648
 
It is the same concern that prompts Foucault to write the aforementioned letter to the 
then prime minister Bazargan. What Foucault seems to be alarmed about is the lack of 
empathy for individual life, as unfolded in the later months following the revolution. This 
issue has been consistent since the very beginning, that what was being implemented as 
Islam, was a kind of an ideology that was deemed more important than the life itself, which 
was supposed to protect. Foucault reminds Bazargan of the assurance he gave that “[b]eing 
Islamic, such a government would be bound by a supplement of ‘duties.’ And it would 
respect these ties, because the people could turn this shared religion back against it” 
(Foucault 2000, 440). However, the reality unfolded in a different manner. Under the rule of 
jurisprudence, individual life or individual experience has no feasible space to be recognized, 
and it can easily be sacrificed for the ideals put forth by the leaders. 
The absolute power and the rule of jurisprudence has maintained power predicated on 
the Neoplatonic philosophy and its synthesis with Islam. Where there is no regard for 
individual life, there is no regard for individual rights. Yet, the idea of the individual still 
eludes the contemporary thinkers, who tend to propose solutions that continue to overlook 
the individual’s place, in exchange to save the unity of the country as a whole. 
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Contemporary Thinkers: Mojtahed Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush, and Javad 
Tabatabaei 
The theory of Velayat-e Faqih was first proposed to the parliament by Hassan Ayat, a 
member of the legislative body and the Assembly of Experts for the Constitution in the 
summer of 1979 (Amanat 784); it was endorsed by Ayatollah Montazeri and Ayatollah 
Beheshti (Yaghmaian 253). However, more than ever, there has been an unprecedented crisis 
that has led to further fragmentation of factions, especially within the dominant parties 
(Yaghmaian 206). The gulf between the Iranian president and the supreme leader and his 
supporters continuously grows deeper. Among contemporary thinkers and reformers, there 
are many theories that have been proposed. 
Responding to the necessity of different interpretations, Mohammad Mojtahed 
Shabestari (2005) argues that interpretation of the religious and other texts, such as the 
prophetic revelations, require understanding of the hermeneutic “process” (Shabestari 7). He 
criticizes the common belief (among the religious scholars) that one must “empty the mind of 
any pre-understandings, interest, and expectation before interpreting the Book [Koran], and 
the [Prophet’s] Tradition (ibid). Shabestari holds value in one’s previous experiences and 
knowledge and rejects that it causes conflict among the experts. He advocates a view that 
there should be a dialogue between the knowledge of fiqh (principles of religious knowledge) 
and other knowledge, and laments the lack of such interaction. (Shabestari 8). The argument, 
however, distinguishes between philosophy and religion and does not include the individual, 
for Shabestari is addressing the “experts” in the field, when he focuses on the religious texts 
(Shabestari 200). 
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Similar to Shabestari, Abdolkarim Soroush seeks to establish links between 
knowledge and religion but strives to expand the place of religion beyond time and space. In 
More Abundant than Ideology (1996), Soroush is particularly interested in clarifying the 
position of ideology with respect to religion and argues that religion (of course he means 
Islam) does not have the restrictions that ideology does (Soroush 125). His comparison of 
two prominent thinkers of the revolution era, Shari’ati and Mottahari, demonstrates the case 
in point. Whereas Shari’ati’s hero, Abuzar Ghaffari, more than anything else, represented the 
voice of social justice in early Islam, and with which Shari’ati always identified and 
understood Islam, Mottahari’s role models admittedly consisted of the religious and mystic 
sages
649
 as well as scholars (Soroush 99-100). While Mottahari had always been “sensitive to 
all affairs pertaining to God,” Shari’ati was seeking to nurture an “Abuzar-like” individual, 
who was “restless, rebel and faithful” (Soroush 102). Soroush concludes with the idea of 
“paradox of modernism,” in which he describes the entrapment of modernism in between the 
past (tradition), to which it can no longer look, and post-modernism that has brought “doubt” 
and “awakening.” Soroush’s solution is to only “seek asylum” in erfan (mysticism), which 
“holds within the ancient heritage of mysticism that from the beginning has doubted reason” 
(363).
650
 
Since the early decades after the revolution, and establishing of the Islamic Republic 
of Iran on the constructed idea of the Velayat-e Faqih, and the need to maintain control to 
preserve the status quo, discourses have shifted from preserving the passion for the 
revolution to how to continue holding on to the political power. At the same time, corruption 
and mishandling of the country’s affairs and injustices toward diverse groups of people have 
alienated the population, and disenchanted them with religion, not to mention disheartened 
them, due to the internal strife that has gripped the entire nation and obscured any hopes for 
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the future. This has prompted theories on how to create a unity from the diversity (different 
ethnic groups that make up the population) that has existed in Iran for centuries. 
The “Iranshahri” thesis has been proposed by Seyed Javad Tabatabaei as a solution to 
this problem. Tabatabaei’s attempt is to circle around the sensitive and deadlocked 
discussions on religion, and look toward the Iranian history. In The History of Political 
Thoughts in Iran, he aims to put forth evidence from the history of political thoughts and 
strategies during other times of crisis (e.g. Abbasid Caliphate, rule of Saljuqs, etc.) that have 
been able to reinstate rule and order of law in Iran. According to Tabatabaei, the political 
thoughts in Iran can be traced back to the time of Sasanians, which have survived through the 
writings of distinguished literary and political figures, before and through the Islamic rule 
(Tabatabei 2015, 139). He argues, therefore, that treatises which were the “continuation of 
the “Iranshahri political thought” and focused on how to conduct effective administration and 
bureaucracy, developed independent of the “idealistic caliphate theories,” proposed by 
theoreticians such as Mawardi of Baghdad
651
 (Tabatabei 2015, 26-27, 147). Tabatabaei cites 
the examples of Abdalla Ibn Mūqaffa’ (d. ca. 760), who translated into Arabic one of the first 
political Iranshahri treatises possibly for al-Mansūr the Abbasid caliph, and of Nizam al-
Mūlk’s (1064-1092)652, Siassat Nameh, which he compares with a Sasanian document 
Nameh Tansar, written by “an illuminated . . . and Neoplatonic sage” by the same name 
(Tabatabaei 2015, 105). While Tabatabaei emphasizes the pre-Islamic political art of 
government of ancient Iran, and prescribes it to remedy the current crises, he does not 
address the current synthesized nature of political power that reflects the Shari’a and carries 
concerns of preservation of Islamic fiqh as once-expressed by Khomeini, nor does he 
demonstrate any concern about the issue or the place of the individual in his theory. 
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The synthesis of the Iranian ancient heritage with the Islamic culture is problematic 
for Aramesh Doostdar. He is critical of “our approach toward the Islamic part of our culture, 
which is relentlessly ambiguous. On the one hand . . . we look toward the glories and 
grandiosity of the ancient Iranian civilization, and with a defeated pride remember the 
unsuccessful uprisings, which took place against the barbaric and injustices of Islam . . . on 
the other hand we take pride that our spiritual culture has flourished with Islam and [has 
been] nurtured in it” (105). Doostdar expresses concern for lack of thinking due to Iranians’ 
affinity for religion, and submits “we must battle our historical self, until perhaps gradually 
the power of our thinking can flourish” (414). Doostdar notes the religious, and more 
specifically the Islamic “I,” is devoid of the ability to think (415). Nonetheless, his definition 
of the “I” reveals a “unity that is the center of gravity of its being and is constant.” That being 
is in connection with its “other,” he argues. However, his examples identify this “other” as 
one’s own religion, nationality, or all that makes that “I.”653  He states: “the ‘I’ is the cause or 
base for unity of feelings, imaginations and thoughts of every human who observes things” 
(416). It must be noted that what Doostdar argues here is not individuality, but rather a 
universal feeling, and is distinct from what Bergson remembers in the “scent of the rose.” His 
rejection of religion, and specifically of Islam regarding thinking, is moot when it comes to 
“being,” because it is more of an existential question. A being has to “be” first before 
thoughts can be produced, for that which mind produces is nothing but imagination (Moradi 
2017). 
In criticism of Tabatabaei, Mohammad Ali Moradi notes the underlying Hegelian 
“master-slave” theory, which he argues has been inappropriately applied by the “leftist 
Hegelians” in Iran.654 Whereas Hegelian “master-slave” theory was aimed toward arriving 
from consciousness to self-consciousness in a society to which the issue of the “I” or the 
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subject has never been introduced, the idea of “master-slave” can be understood only in the 
context of “political ideological conflicts” (Moradi 2017). 
The subject of the final chapter in this study focuses on the history of socio-political 
movements in Iran in nineteenth to twentieth century. One of the aspects of political 
developments during this period in Iran that sets this country apart from the other countries in 
the region is the competition between the two classes: the religious and the secular. I 
demonstrated how the class of the clergy, building on the Safavid political and philosophical 
legacy steps out from behind the king to place itself at the position of political rule. 
I selected three sets of exemplary figures to mark the pathway to show this 
progression. The first group reflect the early reformers that strove, on the one hand, to bring 
the rule of law to the country, where its king ruled with absolute power, and on the other, to 
mitigate changes in the religious realm. The members of the second group that by the mid 
twentieth century had been exposed to some of the progressive and revolution-oriented ideas, 
in seeking social justice and equality, attempted to interpret from religious texts and religious 
historical accounts to bring about a solution to the persistent challenges of reformation, as 
well as countering colonialism and Western cultural and political influences. The third group, 
selected from among prominent contemporary thinkers, have proposed solutions to the 
continuous socio-economic problems that have now been added to the previous concerns. My 
objective in this chapter was to make visible that none of the individuals in these groups have 
been successfully either arguing for, or proposing a solution for the future of the country, 
because they have all overlooked and taken for granted the issue of the subject in their 
equations.   
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CONCLUSION 
PATRIARCHY, NEOPLATONISM, SUBJECTHOOD: 
HISTORY, ART, PHILOSOPHY 
 
Do we need a theory of power? Since a theory assumes a prior objectification, it cannot be 
asserted as a basis for analytical work. But this analytical work cannot proceed without an 
ongoing conceptualization. And this conceptualization implies critical thought – a constant 
checking.
655
 
         — Foucault 
 
This study investigates the principle question of why the movements toward 
individual rights have been unsuccessful in the Middle East up until now. By focusing on the 
example of a sixteenth-seventeenth century dynasty in Persia, this inquiry examines how the 
art and philosophy shaped the collective consciousness rather than promoting individual 
experience and subjectivity; subsequently, contrary to what the German Idealists such as 
Hegel and others have argued, and despite the Middle East’s affinity with Hegelian 
philosophy, artistic endeavors have not paved the way toward the making of a free subject for 
the people of that region. The main argument rests on how formulas from antiquity were 
effectively appropriated to unify a diverse population to submit to the rule of the 
philosopher/sufi/religious-kings strengthening patriarchal systems. Through 
intertextualization and establishing a three-pronged inquiry—i.e. patriarchy, Neoplatonism 
and art—I began this research with a genealogical investigation into the long tradition of 
patriarchal domination as it has informed the subject since the early centuries of civilization. 
This tradition corresponds to those in Europe only to a certain point, at which time there 
appears a split: one development heads for nuances of patriarchal strategies and toward the 
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Enlightenment, and the other maintains its traditional patriarchal models, which has 
preserved the dominance of absolutism and held collective subjectivity firmly in place. 
Considering the integral role of art, it was necessary to commence from the 
prehistoric roots of the act of creation, that is to say, from the earliest known human creations 
in the caves that come closest to what we call art today; this approach signals an appropriate 
parallel to what lies at the foundation of Plato’s philosophical creation of the Allegory of the 
Cave. I suggest, following the period called “creative explosion” (Spivy 2005), once humans 
learned to give material form to their hallucinatory imaginations that were experienced inside 
the dark caves, they never ceased to remember how to create. Further, they continued and 
enhanced the act of creation by imbuing ideas into what they created in material form, 
consequently engendering myths. One such myth that has had lasting expression, exists in the 
idea of patriarchy itself. 
The myths were perhaps the first attempts to give order to what Foucault calls “codes 
of a culture” (1994). Upon establishing a hybridized system—from the structures which 
existed in the early cities, and what came from the rural and marginalized dwellers (which 
aimed to protect families)—the first “other” was determined. Since this new system was 
reliant on the rule of men, the first other was identified as man’s other, i.e. the woman. This 
is where the foundation of misogyny rests which, systematically, has never left the 
contexture of civilizations, and it has unfairly tipped the balance of power to the benefit of 
patriarchy. The use of imagery was so prevalent in strengthening the position of patriarchal 
systems that it invoked a revolutionary and countering idea in the region at that time; since 
patriarchy in ancient times was reliant on polytheism, its counter argument became 
monotheism.
656
 Monotheism, however, was absorbed within the idea that was patriarchy, for 
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it was ultimately interpreted as suitable for such infusion and deemed crucial for its 
perpetuity. This did not happen without one main nagging criticism making its way 
throughout the centuries. I mean the concept referred to as the “prohibition of imagery” that 
still raises questions about what it actually means, and perhaps has been one of the few 
remaining gaps, through which one can find a space to critically examine that which humans 
have created and continue to create across time in relation to power. 
Subsequently, one of patriarchy’s self-preservation strategies, well executed and 
implemented, has been through the arts which has contributed to what I have referred to as 
“artificial unities.” The artistic endeavors that include that which humans create, encompass 
the idea behind patriarchy itself, hence making it permissible to critique it, for the central 
idea of the prohibition of imagery was initially aimed to discourage inflating human creation 
with transcendental ideas that were also generated through human imagination and 
consequently assuming absolutist positions of power. The artificial unities have exerted great 
influence on the shaping of subjects, pulling them away from becoming a subject to 
themselves to experience free consciousness, toward self-alienation and a collective 
consciousness in the service of autocratic rulers. 
The critical exploration of art and subjectivity, therefore, can uncover the hidden, 
implicit power relations between humans and works of art predicated upon the philosophy of 
power to establish a theory that can reach beyond what Foucault developed, but this is only 
part of the picture, so to speak. One of the most persuasive human creations has been 
Neoplatonism, itself a hybridized philosophy combining the earlier thoughts that 
acknowledge some sort of space in between (Republic 202-207 and Poetics xxxviii), with the 
idea of emanation of all from the “One” (IV.8). By supplanting and assuming the position of 
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the “One,” however, patriarchy, at least in the Middle East, has continued its dualistic and 
divisive strategy of constructing “artificial unity,” and simultaneously its “alterity” as means 
to gain undisputed authority. 
I approached the issue of alterity from the perspective of consciousness. This is not 
unlike what Hegel argues; nonetheless, contrary to Hegel, I argue for an equal, engaging field 
between the two. To demonstrate this relationship, I utilized the example of the development 
of the Continental Philosophy from French (Cartesian Cogito), German (Kantian “thing-in-
itself and Hegelian Lordship and Bondage), and even Analytic Philosophy (Hume). Another 
example has been achieving Renaissance in the West by way of the works from Christian 
Europe’s other, meaning the Muslims. Both examples effectively attest to the results of 
learning from one’s “other.” 
The relationship between a subject that becomes aware of itself and others who have 
not done so, as attested to by history, has not been equal. One of the contributing factors to 
this imbalance has been “abjection” (Kristeva 1982). Abjection means not being aware or 
conscious of the “gap” that exists, the gap between what is real and what is made to appear as 
real, and that which is temporarily concealed by patriarchy’s numerous tactics and techniques 
of power (Foucault 2000) but exacerbated by alterity. However, my concern in this study has 
been the Middle East. 
To concretize my theory, I presented the case study of the development of a 
significant dynastic rule in Persia in chapter three. The origins of the Safavids and their 
casting into a new patriarchy exemplify the use of creativity in constructing power 
techniques that on the one side, contributed to a made-up image of the king (as a sufi-king 
initially, and as a philosopher-king eventually), and on the other, gave material representation 
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to such an idea, as in the example of the Mi’raj painting. This creativity was also extended to 
iterations of Islam that strengthened the political power of the ruler. The Safavids kings 
exploited the ideas of the “Unity of Existence,” and the “Universal Man,” that had been 
given eminence by Ibn Arabi and others earlier. Using selected key paintings, I demonstrated 
how such strategy was implemented in material form to link the figure of the Prophet to that 
of the king’s as a Sufi par excellence. 
Further, I argued for Plotinus’s power of imagination, found in both the Safavids’ and 
the German Idealists’ affinity with the transcendental in Neoplatonism. In the Safavids, it 
was refined through the philosophy of Mūla Sadrā, whose influence is still present in what 
has legitimized the rule of jurisprudence in Iran. Inspired by Plotinus, Mūla Sadrā develops a 
philosophy that successfully interweaves Platonism, Neoplatonism, and Islam into an 
authoritative principle of political governing system. But these traditional ideas are forced to 
come face-to-face with modernism following the European military campaigns into the 
region that left the Middle Eastern rulers apprehensive about their deficiencies in the new 
technology. 
The confrontation between the Middle East and Europe was the subject of chapter 
four in this study, which illustrated in the three regions of Egypt, Persia, and the Ottoman 
Turkey, how they each grappled with modernization and reform. Without having access to 
the European experiences that brought about modernization and technology, the leaders in 
these three regions strove to emulate modernity, as it appeared in modern products, such as 
new technology that made photography and mass publication possible. 
What this research revealed was that in the Middle East, proponents of modernism 
made a leap, bypassing the issues pertaining to the individual subject and individuality, and 
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moved directly toward the Hegelian idealism with which they found familiarity and felt at 
home. One of the greatest challenges for the Middle East at this time was colonialism, which 
was the result of Europe’s already experiencing its own subjectivity (albeit quickly turning it 
into a collective ego in Eurocentrism, opposing its other, the Middle Easterners). Therefore, 
it was once again the formation of camps around certain ideologies (artificial unities against 
the othering of the colonialists); as admirable as their goal of fighting colonialism was, most 
reformers missed any opportunity toward the individual experiences, and the results only 
strengthened a collective consciousness. In the meantime, colonial policies corrupted the 
subjects (Fanon), and gained legitimacy through accumulation of knowledge in the academic 
arenas that solidified the positions of the colonialists (Said). Both strategies left the colonized 
subject desiring to emulate the Westerners. 
The idea of mimesis, however, was already hard at work as a technique of power in 
the Middle East that ensured the subjects’ dependency on the central source of authority, and 
removed any responsibility from the individual. Despite each using a different term, imitation 
or taqlid, (analogical reasoning or qiyas) respectively, have been central to both Shi’ite and 
Sunni branches of Islam. However, in Iran the conflict between these two branches was 
overshadowed by the rivalry between the religious versus the secular positions of authority in 
the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. 
In the final chapter, I expanded on the rivalry between two groups: religious and 
secular. First, it was the Shi’ite ulama, who, carrying the abjection in their historical memory 
from the time when they were a minority under Sunni caliphs, always perceived the ruling 
class as unjust and undeserving to rule over them. The other group is the line of 
kings/dynasties that ruled Iran in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and were the subject 
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of resentment by the ulama. In the historical frame, from the Constitutional Revolution of 
1905 to the 1979 Revolution, this resentment fueled further politicization of Islam, building 
on “fear and pity,” culminating into an ideology that successfully and effectively crippled 
reformations, and ultimately placed the ulama at the helm of the political rule, legitimized by 
the constructed title of the “Rule of Jurisprudence.” 
The Velayat-e Faghih (Rule of Jurisprudence) theory was fine-tuned to achieve total 
power in Iran shortly after the triumph of the revolution, but as with any totalitarian regime, 
to maintain its grip on power, it needed to fill the existing gaps between what had been 
created and the challenges they faced in reality. An investigation of some theories currently 
flowing in Iran’s philosophical arena demonstrates that the question of individual experience 
is still hidden from view and is yet to receive any attention from the prominent figures among 
the theoreticians. This brings a greater sense of urgency to the main thesis of this study, at a 
time when the artificial ties (religious, ethnic, and political) are beginning to unravel, as 
exemplified by the in-fighting between the various groups: those struggling to separate their 
region with a semi-cohesive ethnic population, or those in conflict because of Sunni or 
Shi’ite affiliations—not just with those outside of Iran—but within the borders as well. 
Unfortunately, the Western capitalistic powers, by implementing policies that are aimed to 
protect big businesses (producers of arms and technology) and trade, have exacerbated the 
crisis in the region. 
The history of patriarchy is intertwined with artistic enterprises which have 
implemented imagination and mimesis so firmly into its mechanisms of power that it is often 
indistinguishable from it; thus, it has deprived the subject any meaningful attempt toward 
consciousness. Hegel provided the blue print of patriarchy in his “master-slave” dialectic, in 
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which he not only has explained the power struggle throughout the history of civilization, but 
also offered a projected plan that works like a prophetic statement that ensures and foretells a 
perpetuity for patriarchy in its essence. Stated differently, Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage” 
contains the genetic material of the power struggle from the early cities and early 
civilizations that requires a binary conflict and the subsequent ascension of only one above 
the other. This has turned Hegel’s philosophy into a philosophy of power, mainly exploited 
by authoritative systems to ensure their prominence. 
The objective of this study, therefore, has been first, to draw attention to the issue of 
subjectivity in the Middle East. Second, it aspires to create a space in which the Middle East 
and the West, each through its “other,” can recognize the importance of the process of the 
formation and preservation of the individual within a collective subjectivity. Daryush 
Shayegan perhaps came closest when he identified an “ambiguous space” that emerged from 
the “Westernization” that the Middle East was subjected to, and when he notes the “mental 
distortion” of the nations in the Middle East as a result of this ambiguity. However, the only 
“I” he offers, is the “I” of the narrator, the author himself. Moreover, this research aims to 
make more visible the modern movements underscoring the sparks of individual subjectivity 
in the Middle East since the beginning of modernization and reformation, and to work toward 
developing discourses that will acknowledge and preserve individual rights as expressed by 
the contemporary voices. 
It is also the intention of this study to point to an alternative that neither seeks to 
reach an unverifiable, vague goal of becoming one with the universe, hence achieving an 
artificial unity, nor seeks to negate artistic and creative endeavors. This study, instead, 
hopefully brings light to the notion that human creation will always remain human creation 
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and never grander than human beings themselves; as such, what humans create should be 
subject to interpretation and criticism. However, the history of patriarchy demonstrates that 
has not been the case. 
Ever since humans learned how to pin down images in the caves and imbue those 
images with transcendental ideas, this skill has aided a strategy toward crafting a philosophy 
of power to achieve prominence and continuity. By espousing philosophy of power, 
patriarchy, under different names and different guises through various alliances, has been 
successful in maintaining its hold on power and domination continuously utilizing 
imagination. It has done so by first creating or championing unverifiable (simply the words 
of other humans) theories that lay out perfectly crafted and articulated formulas; these 
formulas determine how everyone else should perceive and abide (Foucault 1994) by that 
which is beyond human grasp, be it metaphysics, the ideal realm, or the Divine. These 
formulas are then labeled as essence, form, abstract, and known by many other names. They 
are infused with an imposed transcendental power, sometimes through visual or literary 
representations, whether it be Being, existence, and other philosophical terms that do not 
always clearly explain how some rise to political prominence, capitalizing on such ideals. 
Those who seek prominence then duplicate these formulas through mimesis and take 
possession for themselves of such relationships to the Transcendental, for mimesis affirms 
unity and continuity. Even the most materialistic systems use the idealized, imagined 
formulas and mimetically extrapolate from them a seemingly legitimate position of authority 
for themselves. 
Therefore, supporting the foundation of every authoritative system, whether religious, 
secular, or even intellectual, are two significant pillars: artificial unity and imposed alterity, 
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achieved and maintained through imagination and mimesis. These elements are then 
incorporated into a philosophical theory solidifying and justifying it as a political theory, in 
other words, ideology. It is imperative for a patriarchal rule to demonstrate it dominates all. 
Just as it was important for the prehistoric people to give visual form to possibly an 
individual experience to be able to establish ownership of it, it has been necessary for rulers 
or political systems to have an encompassing philosophical theory, that not just signals their 
subjects as such, but also establishes them as the source of power and authority over those 
subjects. 
As the first superpower, the Persian Achaemenids understood this well when they put 
forth their idea of “king of kings.” Ever since then, constructing political philosophy has been 
intertwined with art, as exemplified later in Plato. Therefore, there is creative endeavor at the 
root of hybridization of ideas supporting political rule. The creative mind can argue for a soul 
enveloped in the divine presence, or convince subjects there is only unity and nothing else. 
But there always remains a gap—of which one should always be mindful—between what is 
real (beyond our reach) and what we experience or create. The gap between the symbols and 
meanings, or between noumena and phenomena, should never be concealed by imagination 
and mimesis, for the gap is the only place we have to formulate questions that ensure growth 
through dynamism and dialogism. 
Plato was right to identify the realm of the real and the realm of illusion. However, he 
could not build his republic had he not sought some sort of authority, which he did by 
crafting a hypothetical “perfect” formula as the essence and form, from the ideal realm he 
envisioned on the one side, and mimetically applying that to his republic on the other. This 
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system does not tolerate competition; therefore, to strengthen his position of power, he had to 
eliminate other creative thinkers by banishing the artists. 
Aristotle recognizes Plato’s use of mimesis, and argues for the use of this valuable 
tool to make it work for the benefit of the state. Here art and politics mingle, and it becomes 
difficult to separate oneself (the subject) from that which provokes emotions, and creates a 
sense of community (artificial unity) in the process. From here on, every philosopher has 
tried to somehow follow suit. Plotinus’ story of hypostases offers a brilliant way to establish 
links to the metaphysics and makes accessible that which was supposed to lay beyond 
humans’ reach. Others, once again, have tried to use Plotinus’s formulas and somehow 
prove, by way of creating an alterity, that they alone are connected to the transcendental and 
hence are the only legitimate and worthy ruler, as in the Safavids or the current religious 
leaders in Iran. 
The gap exists, yet autocratic leaders or thoughts have tried to obscure it, to conceal it 
through imagination and mimesis. By doing so, they take possession of that space, just as the 
cave people pinned down their hallucinations inside the caves, to take ownership of that 
which was extraordinary and magical. The processes of imagination and mimesis without a 
proper polyphonic criticism undermines subjecthood, and if there is a subject, weakens its 
being a subject to itself. 
The subjects under such a system are distorted and suffer from self-alienation, as they 
are constantly pulled away from that which may bring questioning, self-examination, and 
ultimately establishing a healthy relationship with their alterity. The “other” is used to create 
a false unity by running a wedge between the subjects, so that they may never be able to 
know what the real problem is. 
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It has been important to use the philosophical language to justify being. Foucault talks 
about the authority of the word and epistemology. It seems necessary then to have a theory in 
place to analyze and critically study a phenomenon. I assert, even though activism takes 
place, it can be written off as history if there are no theories to help analyze the phenomenon. 
Theories give existence to phenomena, as if they confirm it, but, as with everything else, 
patriarchy has taken ownership of theories to its own advantage. It freely selects, hybridizes, 
and formulates - before capitalizing on - theories. 
Hybridization, reconciliation, and blending ideas have taken place since the time of 
the early cities when the concept of patriarchy mingled with the structure of administering 
and running the city. Since then, patriarchy has only grown more immense; as a result, a 
potentially free subject is either preoccupied with the self, as in the current Western societies, 
or dissolved in the collective, as anywhere else that has not yet experienced individuality and 
the affirmation of the dignity of the being as subject. 
The value of the individual has been defined in various contexts. Marx saw the value 
of humans in their work and production. Some, like Plato, view it in their ability to reach the 
highest good, as defined by the philosopher. Others deem humans’ worth in their ability to 
become masters of themselves, or define their existence as “free,” and perfection in unity. 
Still others contend a being is determined based on its ability to think. All of these qualities 
can be turned against another and easily create the alterity required for an autocratic system. I 
have argued for the worth of humans in their “being.” The value comes from the fact that 
they exist, not for their membership in an ethnic or religious community, not for their gender 
or sexual orientation, not for their unique geographical origin, and not for what they produce, 
materialistically or intellectually. The worth of humans intrinsically comes from simply 
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“being,” first. However, this being is constantly changing and must grow and achieve 
consciousness and presence (Aristotle and Heidegger). The individual existence and the 
dignity from that existence is intrinsic, and other affiliations and belongings follow later. 
This is not unlike what the Existentialists argued; however, the individual in question 
here is not a constant, nor is it in a vacuum to create its own definitions and meanings of life 
for itself. It exists in an organic network (rhizome) with other beings, constantly changing. 
Therefore, no affiliation or belonging (i.e. being subject to) should hinder the growth and 
consciousness of humans, which should underscore individual responsibility and shaping its 
subjectivity by its “other” in a dynamic equity. How does one achieve consciousness? If we 
agree with Massumi, who argued that consciousness, or “thinking-feeling,” cannot take place 
without a well-established multitude of “relational” networks (2013), then it is plausible to 
suggest that the more the links between beings within the rhizomic network, the more 
consciousness can be attained. 
Human survival is dependent on its other; humans are defined in their “other.” But, 
first they must re-examine their relationship with that “other,” for philosophy of power (i.e. 
patriarchy) has damaged those connections for centuries. Periods of conflict, self-centrism, 
and artificial unity, have provoked violence toward the “other” and invoked abjection. Those 
are missed and “unlived”657 periods that should have been spent recognizing the “other” as 
the one through whom we reach consciousness. Thus, the individual consciousness is made 
possible, not by artificial and manufactured techniques of patriarchy but, as Bakhtin noted, as 
shaped dialogically by its alterity through “utterance.” 
Hegel’s “Lordship and Bondage,” seen through Kojeve, has it partially correct in 
bringing up the notion of recognition. The recognition must be predicated, however, on the 
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fact that they are both beings in an a priori sense. Nonetheless, as argued by Hegel, one 
becomes non-essential, because it is defined by the first self-consciousness. Defined through 
words and mediated by language, the first self-consciousness supersedes the other and seeks 
the position of superiority. Therefore, the relationship gets off on an uneven start (Deleuze in 
Keenan 251). The same holds true for twentieth century Iran. 
Ali Shari’ati, the ideologue of the Islamic Revolution, once stated, “[i]t is in 
becoming that we can be . . . It is in action that truth manifests itself . . . Faith is [to be] 
turned into a conscientious ideology” (Matin 9).658 Therefore, it is not the “being” first, but 
rather the “becoming,” as defined by Shari’ati, that informs the potential of being. Without a 
being, a subject to oneself, Hegel’s master-slave is easily turned into a political ideology. It 
must be noted that the Hegelian theory of master-slave is the philosophical explication of the 
story of patriarchy that has been instrumental in producing philosophy of power, rather than a 
philosophy of peace. As such, the master-slave dialectic can then be applied to the 
relationship between the secular monarchy and the rise of a theocracy in Iran. 
The consciousness of monarchy during the Shah came face to face with the 
consciousness of the ulama, and the long history of their mastery in filling the gaps of 
knowledge with imagination, mimesis, and constructed truth. The struggle between the two 
had its roots in the earlier Revolution of 1905; subsequently, the constitutional revolution led 
to the ulama proving their mastery over the monarchy following the 1979 revolution. One 
finds volumes of meaning in just the constructed titles, whether given to the aristocrats and 
endowed by the king to the court associated dignitaries, or the titles the ulama have 
designated for themselves.
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 The struggle between the monarchs and the ulama ended in the 
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rise to political power in the form of theocracy in 1979 in Iran, and the formation of an 
autocratic regime that is still in power. 
But the ulama (read master) could not have accomplished this task had they not have 
the recognition of the population, who were not free subjects (read slaves). This recognition 
came even from the intellectuals and the educated class, who had bypassed the issue of 
subjectivity, and directly emulated the Hegelian left’s formulas. Hence, the relationship 
between the jurisprudence and the people is also the relation between master and slave, for it 
is the position of the theocratic authority that defines the subjects. But, the question remains: 
How does one bring about change in the face of an all-encompassing system? 
“Change” can be a double-edged sword, if Nietzsche was right in saying: “the whole 
history of a ‘Thing,’ an organ, a custom, can . . . be regarded as a continuous ‘sign-chain’ of 
perpetually new interpretations and adjustments, whose causes, . . . sometimes follow and 
alternate with each other absolutely haphazard” (Nietzsche [1887] 2006, 48). There are 
moments in human history when certain events unexpectedly produce impetus for change 
that is not unlike an electron in the orbit around the nucleus in atoms that, when provoked, 
jumps its orbit back and forth, releasing a spark. Such were the events of May 1968 in France 
that began with student demands for co-ed dormitories but rapidly expanded to include other 
groups, namely workers that nearly brought down the established government in France at 
the time.
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 Even though the students lost politically and the establishment was back in power 
before the end of the year, more oppressively than before, the effects of that spark found 
lasting impressions in the proceeding wave of anti-establishment aesthetics and philosophical 
thought. 
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These thoughts, which have since been manifested through the ethico-aesthetic 
theory, revealed that the events of spring 1968 confirmed it was possible to take action 
outside of the established formulas such as the class struggle, or the old familiar dialectics 
(both born out of human mind and enjoying certain credibility and weight), and that the 
linear relationship between the cause and effect can be transcended (Nietzsche [1887], 2006, 
48). Nonetheless, in our own time these thoughts have yet to establish a way to overcome a 
paradox between the impromptu, schizophrenic, and creative action on the one hand, and the 
unpredictability (which Nietzsche calls “haphazard”) in reaching the desired outcome, on the 
other. After all, one of the arguments for re-establishing a centralized authority has been to 
avoid chaos and to maintain order. Even the diversity and interpretability awarded by 
postmodernism could not successfully challenge absolutism. The “bearers of absolutes” have 
welcomed the postmodern idea of “interpretability” and “the view that truth is a matter of 
interpretation,” and they have been swift to adapt it to their own ends (Vattimo 1997, 1 and 
2009, 6). But it is not so much the question of “truth,” or “multiplicity of interpretation,” as it 
is being mindful of the gaps within that which becomes an “absolute.” 
What authoritarian systems unavoidably rely upon is a system of illusions that lead 
one toward what may be even against the individual’s basic instinct, which is self-
preservation, much less any “hopes of happiness” (Vattimo 2009, 7). The illusion can be 
destabilized by individual experience and one’s presence in that experience, keeping it in 
check and validated through links with human communities and networks of empathy. It is 
for this reason that all absolutists deny individual experience (or try to channel it as a 
collective), which can trigger what they may not be able to foresee or control. The human 
experience, particularly of where the “gaps” lie, are of utmost importance, for there is where 
questions can be formulated. This is why the authoritarian regimes conceal the gaps produced 
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in the process of illusion-making. But every time change forces these regimes to update their 
positions of authority, as happened in the Middle East during modernization, the Arab 
Spring, etc., there are sparks that can point to the existing gaps that should be focused on and 
dialogically examined and discussed. It is because of such gaps that the once-absolutist-
powers have had to abandon restrictions on many of the fronts they held, such as gender and 
race. Nevertheless, there are more questions to be asked, since the challenges of alterity still 
remain and there is still more work to be done. 
I have had to place outside the boundaries of this study several remaining but 
important questions. Among them are: Why weren’t the Germans able to read Hegel as the 
French did? How and through what process is subjectivity actually shaped by its alterity? I 
am also interested in pursuing further the issue of competition and superiority in patriarchy, 
which I have had to defer to a future opportunity. Moreover, I think there is much uncharted 
territory when it comes to studying Islamic Art and its philosophy, most specifically the work 
by the “Arabic Plotinus.” There is also great opportunity in an intertextualization between the 
creative arts and philosophy of the Islamic lands in general. Scholars have only recently 
begun to notice links between the issue of subjectivity, art, and power (Gruber 2018). And 
finally, a close investigation of the modern to contemporary visual arts in the Middle East as 
a separate topic went beyond the limitations in this study, hence it had to be deferred to a 
future occasion. 
All that which has informed subjectivity through patriarchy and the ever-present 
Neoplatonism, has done so at the peril of the subject. One may challenge the status of 
individuality in the West; the individual under a “dominant reality” is also a slave itself 
(D&G 130). In the words written by Nancy: 
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The capitalist economy accumulates impasses, abscesses, and uncontrollable 
disorders. The society it governs does not believe in itself anymore. Words and 
concepts that were still valid fifteen years ago, like the “rule of law,” “human rights,” 
and “democracy,” are losing visibility and on a daily basis their practical as well as 
theoretical and symbolic credibility. Scientific, technical, juridical, and moral 
progress immediately displays, at every step, ambivalences that suspend the name 
“progress,” and along with it, those of “humanity,” “reason,” and “justice.” That’s 
when one brandishes idols, that is to say ideas reduced to a kind of belch. On one 
side, “God’s will,” on the other, “human freedom.” These expressions provide a front, 
of course, for large scale maneuvers aimed at seizing power and wealth. But this front 
is marked with figures of identification (or rather, of subjection) and of mobilization 
(or rather, of compulsive repetition). And these figures are painted on bombs.
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This demonstrates that the dominant reality makes individuals imagine they are free, 
but they are actually subject to their own imagined reality, as under capitalism; thus, self is 
sacrificed for the dominant reality. After two World Wars and millions of its people killed in 
the process, the West’s insistence on its superior position has turned the Middle East into a 
domain with an expendable population to prove that position of power by turning attention 
away from its own economic inequities. 
It is my hope in this study to bring the issue of the “subject” to the forefront. A 
subject that knows the difference between “subject and object,” and is not persuaded or 
programmed to treat others as objects, is more likely to establish a reciprocal relationship 
toward mutual consciousness. Nevertheless, one cannot achieve superiority this way because 
this relationship is predicated on equality.   
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APPENDIX I  
 
The evolvement of the Qizilbash itself underscores what is of great interest in this 
study, which is the formation of the collective against the individual, and the reformulation 
required for the new patriarchy. Kathryn Babayan comments on how,  
Qizilbash religiosity created the structure around which individuals coalesced into a 
single group, like the Shamlu, Rumlu, or Takkalu. A system of belief then entered 
into the dynamics of a set of Turco-Mongol kinship ties in the process of 
reformulation (Babayan 2002, xxxix). 
Isma’il (1487-1524) was the youngest of the three sons of Shaykh Haydar, sixth 
generation and successor of Shaykh Safi al-Din (d. 1334), the founder and leader of the 
Safavi Sufi Order. In his ancestry, Isma’il’s mother and grandmother possessed royal Greek 
lineage, and his grandfather, Uzun Hassan (d. 1478), was the leader of the Aqquyunlu tribe, 
which ruled a considerable part of Iran in the second half of the fifteenth century (Newman 
10). Furthermore, Isma’il was groomed for his future role among the Zahediyeh Sufi Order, 
founded by Shaykh Zahed Gilani (1216/17-1301), which was centered in Lahijan, in the 
north Iranian region of Gilan. His grandfather, Junayd (1447-1460), had taken up arms 
against Shirvanshahs in the Caucasus, and had been killed in the process. Upon the killing of 
his father Haydar that was by the hand of the Shirvanshahs with the support of the 
Aqquyunlu leader (Uzun Hassan’s younger son, Ya’qub) in 1488, Isma’il was taken into 
hiding, and taught in the ways of the Shi’i sect, under the protection of the local governor, 
Mirza Ali Karkiya. Newman sums up: 
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[t]hus was Isma’il by birth descended on both sides from princely families of 
differing faiths, by upbringing associated with well-established Tajik sayyid 
practitioners of a distinct body of Shi’i doctrine and practice and, at his father’s death, 
the spirituo-political leader . . . of a Sufi-style movement comprised of the region’s 
Turkish tribal levies . . . whose spirituality was informed by similarly Shi’i-tinged 
radical messianism circulating in the region (Newman 2012, 11). 
Moreover, the decision to situate the “Ithna Ashari” or “Twelver” Shi’ism at the 
political foundation of the new dynasty, despite Shah Isma’il’s Sunni heritage, was not by 
coincidence. Babayan notes the “scholarly attention” this issue has received, in that upon the 
conquering of Iran, the emphasis changed from “Messianic claims” to the “political aspect of 
the title of shah drawn from the Iranian tradition of kingship” (xxxix). Roger Savory in Iran 
Under the Safavids notes three contributing factors to the justification of this decision. It was 
the Safavid leader’s “claim to be the representatives on earth of the 12th Imam or Mahdi (if 
not the Imam himself) . . . and [second,] the position of murshid-i kamil, or perfect spiritual 
director . . .; finally, by asserting that ‘Ali’s younger son, Husayn, married the daughter of 
Yazdigird III, the last of the Sasanid kings” (27). The idea of murshid i kamel is predicated 
on the idea of the “Universal Man,” and the potentiality of some to achieve a state of 
perfectness. In their view, the last point established a blood link between the family of Ali 
and the ancient Persian royal tradition (ibid), thereby validating the “divine right” of the 
Iranian kings by way of substituting the “kingly glory” endowed by “Ahuramazda,”, the 
ancient Persian “Mazdean Lord Wisdom,” (Babayan 2002, 186), with the Prophet’s lineage. 
Hence, the “Twelver” Shi’ism was firmly placed at the core of “Safavid religious propaganda 
and political ideology” (Savory 27). Babayan’s historiography of the Safavids identifies two 
distinct phases in the development of the Safavids: the revolutionary phase (1477-1501) and 
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the imperial age (1501-1722). However, she is interested in the ways in which “embracing 
Shi’ism” and “Alid loyalty” (the cult of Ali, the Prophet’s son-in law and his blood line) 
“created a common culture” that brought about solidarity among the Qizilbash and the 
artisans (xl-xli).  Furthermore, one must keep in view the issue of a “distinct political and 
cultural identity.” Bert Fragner, in his article “The Safavid Empire and the Sixteenth-and 
Seventeenth-Century Political and Strategic Balance of Power within the World System,” 
asserts: 
Being officially Twelver Shi’ite, it was not difficult for Safavid representatives to 
present themselves as a distinct cultural and political unit in comparison to their 
western, northern and south-eastern neighbors, all of whom were Sunni (Fragner 
2015, 23). 
At the time of Isma’il’s birth, following the decline of Timurids’ rule, there existed 
multiple principalities that ruled Iran; each group was entangled in power struggles, vying for 
domination over the others through internal conflicts, in addition to responding to external 
pressures from the Ottomans to the west, who, since the capture of Trabizand in 1453, had 
been trying to move eastward (Floor and Herzig 2015, 18). Noteworthy is the rise to 
prominence of the military group known as Qizilbash, who were at the heart of the Safavid 
“political-military” body and were the confederation of a number of Turkish tribes known by 
the same name due to the adoption of a distinct red headdress since the time of Haydar. 
Savory mentions an “anonymous history” to be the reference on source of the head dress, 
known as “sufi taj.” According to the source, Haydar showed Uzun Hassan this head dress 
and that Uzun Hassan “kissed it and put it on his head (20). He explains the term “qizilbash” 
to have been applied initially to the Turcoman inhabitants of the regions east of Anatolia, 
318 
 
north of Syria and the Armenian highlands, and who had converted and become followers of 
the Safavids; eventually however, the term came to refer to non-Turcoman supporters of the 
Safavids as well (ibid). 
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Appendix II.A - Egypt 
On the issue of competition, Juan Cole in Napoleon’s Egypt states: “[t]hroughout the 
1790s, British naval superiority had confined the expansionist French to the Continent and 
thwarted an attempt to overthrow the British enemy” (13). Others like Iradj Amini in 
Napoleon and Persia (1999), reveal a more egocentric picture, drawing from Napoleon’s 
own recollections in exile: 
I knew . . . that I had to draw attention to myself to remain in the public eye, and that 
I would therefore have to attempt extraordinary things, because people like to be 
amazed. It was by virtue of this opinion that I imagined the expedition to Egypt . . . 
This expedition was meant to create a great idea of France; above all, by founding a 
French colony on the Nile, it was to make up for the American colonies France had 
lost, and by ensuring trade with the Orient open up the paths to England’s possessions 
in India (Amini 1999, 10. See also, Mémoires de Napoléon, écrits sous sa dictée a 
Sainte-Hèléne par un de ses valets de chamber, Paris 1819, 00.21-22). 
In Egypt, Napoleon’s swift capture of Lower Egypt and ousting of the Ottoman client 
ruler Ibrahim Bey in less than a month was in part due to Ibrahim Bey’s soldiers deciding 
they were no match for the French; therefore, prior to abandoning the capital, they set their 
fine residences and merchant boats alight so that they would be of no use to the enemy (Cole 
2007, 69). 
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While the British did not view Persia as a direct colony, they were concerned with its 
strategic location due to their interest held in the affairs of their East India Company 
(Lambton 1993, 149). This concern extended to the influences of other powers who had 
either gained (as in Russia) or had the potential to gain influence in Persia. Russian 
excursions into the northern regions of Persia had “deprived her of all her provinces north of 
the Aras River in the early years of the century and of territory in the north-east in the middle 
of the century” (Lambton 149). The “encroachment of foreign powers,” therefore, served as a 
great source of persuasion for Persia to seek the much needed advanced military technology 
and training from Europe (Amini 1999, 100). Amini writes of the review of Napoleon’s 
infantry by Persian ambassador, Mirza Mohammad Reza, who was “greatly amused,” by the 
event and had asked “how it could happen that all the soldiers marched together.” Amini 
quotes from the Duke of Rovigo that the Persian ambassador “particularly liked the military 
music. He had asked if the Emperor would kindly give him some of the musicians, as though 
they were slaves.” 
To summarize, as the backdrop to the surge of modernism in the nineteenth century, 
there were two technologically significant facets to the increasing influences of Europeans in 
the Middle East. First, it was France’s new military power that emerged from the French 
Revolution, as attested to by their short-lived occupation of Egypt in 1798. Additionally, in 
the realm of military was Russia’s excursions from the north, briefly in Ottoman European 
regions, and on a more permanent basis, the Caucasus regions . Mary C. Wilson writes: “The 
ancient Christian kingdom of Georgia and part of the Iranian region of Azerbaijan were 
absorbed, and a treaty with Iran in 1828 showed Russia’s superior power” (7). Where 
military technology opens new territory, trade is not far behind. Innovations that changed the 
nature of trade between Europe and the Middle East are the other aspect of the European 
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influence. The use of steamships from the 1830s, and “the extension of telegraphs” in 1850s 
and 1860s are among such technologies that facilitated the import of goods such as textiles 
from factories in Europe in exchange for the raw material such as cotton from Egypt (ibid). 
When Muhammad Ali took the reins in 1805 in Egypt, almost immediately he 
initiated a series of reformations which began with the purpose of self-preservation by first 
and foremost, establishing a bigger and more modern army and building a strong economy at 
the same time. Nevertheless, the superficiality of changes he had planned on and the external 
pressures from European economies did not allow for real reforms. Muhammad Ali’s new 
army was to replace the foreign mercenaries on whose services he had come to rely during 
the first year of his rule (Owen 114). To provide financial support for his army that by this 
time was made up of 100,000 men, Muhammad Ali,  
replaced the tax-farmers with a system of direct collection by government agents […] 
In addition, further sums were raised by an extension of the state monopolies to cover 
almost every type of agricultural produce. Crops were taken from the peasants in lieu 
of taxes and sold abroad on government account, leaving the cultivator little more 
than enough for bare existence (Cole 2007, 114.).  
In further expanding the economy to increase the government’s revenue, Muhammad 
Ali introduced new crop, namely cotton, which he knew was in high demand in Europe. 
There were also plans to produce textile from that cotton in order to reduce import, as well as 
send young Egyptians abroad to be trained in new technology. However, Muhammad Ali’s 
plans to create a modern administration that was capable of mediating and strengthening 
Egyptian economy proved unsuccessful. The pressures were building up from outside, 
particularly through “the Anglo-Turkish Commercial Convention of 1838, which outlawed 
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state monopolies and established a low external tariff of 8 per cent.” This led to the decrease 
of the revenue that had been mainly allocated toward the military, hence weakening 
Muhammad Ali’s military that dwindled to 18,000, as well as the loss of control over the 
agricultural export (Owen 115). Owen also notes that the weakening of the economic role the 
Egyptian government was playing at this time was hastened by the landowners and the 
producers of raw material, who were “anxious to end the monopoly system so they could sell 
their produce direct to European merchants rather than to the government (116). 
With the state monopoly out of the way, the path was paved for European financial 
expansion and investment, which manifested in the establishing of the first European banks 
in Alexandria in 1850. Further, by this time, the modernization of the military and public 
projects, such as the construction of Suez Canal, were being funded by the European 
financial establishments. This left Egypt deeply in debt. Owen notes: “By 1875 Egypt had 
borrowed a nominal sum of nearly £100 million from Europe, of which the Treasury had 
obtained no more than £68 million” (116). 
Appendix II.B - Ottomans 
The Ottoman Turkey arguably felt the most pressure since it suffered its first major 
loss of a Muslim territory to Russia in the final quarter of the eighteenth century. The treaty 
between the Ottomans and the Russians at the end of this conflict “showed the unequal 
power of the two empires and led to the loss of . . . Crimea […] The Ottoman government 
began to create a new army on the European model” as a result . (See Mary C. Wilson, 
“Introduction,” in the Modern Middle East, edited by Albert Hourani pp. 6-7).  
Within half a century, Ottoman Turkey began reformation of the Empire by acquiring 
Western military weapons, also with the blessings of the religious leaders. Sultan Selim III (r. 
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1789-1808) had the support of several şeyhül-islāms in his campaigns to modernize the 
administratively and militarily. Heyd names a number of religious authorities (9) as 
supporters of Selim III, who “loyally cooperated with his successor, Sultan Mahmūd II, in 
destroying the Janissaries, abolishing the Bektashi order and modernizing the army and 
State” (Heyd 30). One example would be actually the submission of a project by one of the 
religious authorities, Tatarcik ‘Abdu’llāh, who proposed “the adoption of Western military 
science and drill, the systematic translation of European technical works into Turkish, and 
the employment of foreign instructors and experts” (Heyd 30). 
While both Selim III and his successor, Mahmūd II (r. 1808-1839) enjoyed the 
support of some of the ūlamā, not everyone from the religious ranks agreed with the 
Westernization and modernization plans. Early in the nineteenth century, Mahmūd II began 
by changing his own appearance: he shortened his beard and dressed like his contemporary 
Europeans counterparts “in frock coats and trousers” (Shaw 49). He initiated a compulsory 
dress code by 1829 for male civilians, soldiers, and government bureaucrats, at which time 
most government ranks had accepted it (ibid). What particularly did not sit well with the 
opposing ūlamā, were first, the mandatory headdress from a turban to a “red fez” (1828), and 
second was Mahmūd having his portrait painted in the European style. This was not the first 
time the Sultan’s portrait was painted despite the şeyhül-islām’s objections; Selim III had 
also had his portrait painted multiple times (Heyd 34). In 1836 the display of the monarch’s 
portrait in government offices became customary, regardless of the ūlamā’s “expressed . . . 
discontent” (ibid). The Ottoman autocratic Sultans, however, ruled undisputedly and were 
clear in asserting their will and power, regardless of opposition. 
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Among those objecting change were the softas, or the poor, underprivileged students 
at the madrasa (school of religious studies), who were “the breeding ground of discontent 
and trouble-making” for the Ottoman Empire. Whereas there existed corruption, nepotism, 
and class difference among the ūlamā who occupied high posts in the government, the 
underprivileged softas were among those elements of “class-struggle within the ūl[a]mā 
corps” that had “turned against all authority” including the modernization initiated by such 
authority, even the presence of the European in their midst (Heyd 35-36). Heyd discusses a 
divide among the religious community regarding the reforms that aligned with economic and 
social status of the members of the said community. He mentions an account of an incident in 
April 1801 involving the softas and the Russian ambassador and other diplomats, 
accompanied by “a few ladies,” who had been granted permission by the Ottoman 
government to visit the Sūleymānīye Mosque. The softas greeted the Europeans with their 
slippers and stones (36). While Heyd dismisses these kinds of actions as “fanaticism and 
narrow-mindedness” that “often far surpassed those of the ūlemā leaders, I argue there is 
more to such incidents that, while beyond the scope of this study, merits further 
investigation, if one considers the affected subjectivity of these students, who were actually 
executed following the incident. 
Nevertheless, the position the “high ūl[a]mā” took on the modernization campaigns, 
whether expressed in verbal or written format, was in support of the said reforms, sustaining 
their position based on “religious law and early Islamic history or . . . on reason and common 
sense” (Heyd 37). I suggest that mimesis played such an important part in these decisions that 
legitimized the learning from the “infidel enemy.” Heyd states the ūlamā’s argument as: 
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Djihād, the holy war against the infidels . . . was one of the foremost duties of 
believers. To strengthen the army of Islam by every means was therefore an important 
religious obligation […] [Thus,] [t]o learn from the infidel enemy would not 
constitute a religiously illicit innovation (bid’at) but would be an application of the 
legitimate maxim of mūkābele bi-‘l-misl or reciprocation, that is, fighting the enemy 
with his own weapons (Heyd 37). 
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The complexity of the socio-political and religious structures and class hierarchy in 
the Middle East in general, and in Persia in particular, is distinct from Europe (Hauser 1951, 
1962, 1999). (See the chapter on Germany and the Enlightenment.) Hauser explains the 
situation of the middle class in Europe (France and Germany) in 17th century to be that of 
indifference to political affairs, “by leaving the direction of  state affairs to the holders of 
power”(98). By 1830, however, the middle class itself is in power. Hauser in volume IV 
states at this time “[t]he bourgeoisie is in full possession and awareness of its power. The 
aristocracy has vanished from the scene of historical events and leads a purely private 
existence” (2). Lambton explicates the issue as refracted through initially four identifiable 
hierarchic classes in nineteenth century Persia. The first group, is made up of the ‘men of the 
sword,’ who not surprisingly initiated the modernization reforms, and came mainly from the 
aristocratic families. The second group, the ‘men of the pen,’ consisted of educated men, 
bureaucrats, and those who were active in running the administrative offices. The bureaucrats 
in charge of Tanzimat in Ottoman Turkey became so politically powerful that they even 
marginalized some of the same young men they sent to Europe to become educated. They in 
turn formed the Young Ottoman Turks group. (See Findlay 1982, pp 147-180). The ūlamā, or 
the members of the religious class formed the third group, who drew power and prestige not 
from the secular class, “but from religious learning, and the more learned among them were 
regarded as the representatives of the Hidden Imam, who was, for most of the population, the 
‘true king’.” Although Lambton does not make the connection, but here I want to draw 
attention to the relationship between the idea of the Hidden Imam and the Neoplatonic idea 
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of the “Perfect Human,” from which the ulama surely drew inspiration (Lambton 163). 
Finally, the fourth group according to Lambton, was made up of the merchants, which 
included “big merchants,” “money-lenders,” and members of the “bazaar and shopkeepers.” 
Adamson provides further information on the four groups’ origin. The classification 
of the Ottoman society, modeling after Plato’s Republic, was the work of Ottoman 
philosopher, contemporary of Süleymān the Ottoman sultan, Ali Çelbī Kinalizādeh. The 
balance between these groups, according to Kinalizādeh, was maintained by the rule of the 
Ottoman sultan, as he “praises Süleymān as a real-life philosopher-king.” (See Adamson 
2016, 413). Lambton explains these groups 
were not in any way closed groups. Two things in particular served to unite them: 
marriage alliance and land ownership […] As a result . . . the difference between the 
classes were less sharp than might otherwise have been the case. By the end of the 
century members of the Qajar family were to be found in almost all walks of life; they 
were not only provincial governors and military commanders, but also ministers and 
members of the bureaucracy, writers, poets and Sufis (but very rarely ulama) 
(Lambton 163-166). 
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The coup was the culmination of the “oil crisis” that began in 1948, as argued by the 
historians like Abrahamian, which ultimately led to the nationalization of Iranian oil in 1951 
and the electing of Mohammad Mosaddeq as the premier by the parliament (Abrahamian 
2001, 184-86). The parliament (majlis) in 1948 rejected a proposal from the Soviets to obtain 
concession to the oil from the northern region. The parliament also rejected an earlier 
Supplementary Agreement with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company dated 1933, which was 
made in secret and did not consider an equal interest for Iran (Abrahamian 2001, 184). 
Mosaddeq’s objective was to bring Iran “full control of the oil industry.” Nonetheless, 
Britain could not give up control and sought to “safeguard its vital interest” by removing 
Mosaddeq from power (Abrahamian 2001, 187). It is clear that Mosaddeq believed true 
independence of Iran was not possible if foreign powers could control its natural resources 
through receiving concessions as it had been done during the Qajars (ibid). It is also clear 
that Britain, as repeatedly appeared in the classified documents, could never lose “control” of 
the production, process and distribution of oil in Iran, or to relinquish full control to the 
Iranians (Abrahamian 2001, 189). Here is an example of an old patriarchy, not willing to 
relinquish “control,” and is willing to use whatever means it can to ensure its position of 
authority and interests. Amanat notes this from the attitude of the British toward Iran as 
expressed through the British Foreign Minister at the time, Anthony Eden, “who had studied 
Persian at Christ Church and earned his degree in Oriental studies; he viewed the world 
through the all-too-familiar Orientalist prism and was unwilling to accept the painful 
prospects of a postcolonial Britain” (Amanat 2017, 544). While I believe Amanat is jumping 
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ahead a bit here, I think his statement is a good example of the old patriarchy’s persistence in 
colonial intentions. Abrahamian notes that Britain expected Mosaddeq to fail on his own, and 
they tried to expedite his fall “through economic pressure, propaganda campaigns, and 
subsidies to the opposition” (Abrahamian 2001, 190). However, when these attempts failed, 
“they turned to the United States and harnessed the CIA” (ibid). Abrahamian explains that 
while the British were awaiting the collapse of Mosaddeq’s government, they continued with 
a series of charades in the form of negotiations that appeared as though they were willing to 
come to an equitable agreement, and that the failure of negotiations was due to “Iranian 
intransigents” (Abrahamian 2001, 191). 
Abrahamian notes that indeed in the negotiations, “the impasse came . . . because of 
the clashes of economic interest between imperialism and nationalism.” However, the image 
projected of Mosaddeq by the Westerners was one of being “backed by the communist 
party,” (Quoted from President Eisenhower in Abrahamian 2001, 182) “anti-foreign,” 
“nihilistic,” and indulgent “in an orgy of mob rule” (Abrahamian 2001, 210). Abrahamian 
cites the Christian Science Monitor, dated September 21-22, 1953. See also Amanat, 2017, 
544. 
Thus in 1952, with the support of the United States, the British moved to persuade the 
Shah to replace Mosaddeq. On July 21 (known as Siyeh-Tir) Mosaddeq turned to the people 
(Paidar 131) and declared that the British were trying to take back the control of the oil, and 
that the Shah was using his influence through the army to manipulate the situation. 
Abrahamian presents many documents written by British authorities, the Foreign Office, and 
the British Embassy in Tehran that described Mosaddeq in unflattering terms, but they 
secretly admitted that “he had captured the imagination of people” (Abrahamian 2001, 187), 
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and that “he still had a hold on public opinion” (ibid). The British also began a smearing 
campaign through the media (newspaper and BBC). The Observer characterized Mosaddeq 
as “a ‘Robespierre fanatic,’ and a ‘tragic Frankenstein’ with a ‘gigantic head’ impervious to 
‘common sense’ but obsessed with one xenophobic idea’ (May 10, 1951)” (Abrahamian 
2001, 193). It is at this time that the crowds took to the streets “from the National Front,” to 
the “communist Tudeh party;” however, the day ended in bloodshed (Abrahamian 2001, 
195). See also Amanat 2017, 540. Amanat notes people on the street chanted, “[w]e 
sacrificed our lives, we write with our blood: either death or Mosaddeq,” which was “voiced 
by ordinary people, [who] saw in Mosaddeq not merely a political leader but a savior of the 
Iranian nation” (ibid). 
The United States ambassador, Loy Henderson concurred with the British Charge 
d’Affaires on the idea that only a coup d’état could now bring the events to a close to the 
benefit of the Western powers. Paidar argues that the Americans initially supported the 
nationalization of the Iranian oil because of their own competition with the British; however, 
they became “alarmed” as they saw the involvement of the pro-Soviet Tudeh Party (Paidar 
131). Abrahamian notes it was the British that led the Americans to believe this, as the Tudeh 
Party at this time was in no position to threaten the government (from a BBC Persian 
interview, August 26, 2013). He comments that up until this point, the Americans were more 
inclined to exert “economic pressures and constitutional means to remove Mosaddeq” (2001, 
196). Nevertheless, the CIA and MI6 began preparing for a coup through a plan called 
TRAJAX. The TRAJAX plan was a consolidation of MI6 “blue print named Operation Boot” 
and of CIA operation named “Bedamn,” a project they had initiated against the spread of 
Communism, and particularly the Tudeh party (Abrahamian 2001, 197). What the Americans 
lacked in information about the key personalities in Iran, the British more than made up 
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through their connections and business affiliates, whether in the army, among the merchants, 
or in the various tribes (Abrahamian 2001, 199-200). This soon changed and Americans like 
Wilber and Cottam became instrumental in the 1953 coup, by which time “the Tudeh Party’s 
support for Mosaddeq [sic] had weakened” and the prominent clergy, Kashani, who had 
supported him to this point, changed sides as well (Paidar 131). 
Recently unclassified documents released from the U.S. government reveal that 
Ayatollah Kashani (who was part of the National Front, a party founded by Mosaddeq), had 
been in contact with the U.S. embassy and the CIA prior to the coup d’état. The documents 
prove however, that Ayatollah Behbahani, received large sums in monetary assistance (that 
became known as Behbahani Dollars) to helped mobilize a number of unsavory characters, 
including Sha’ban Jafari and Tayeb Haj Rezai in support of the monarch during the 
demonstrations two days prior to the August 19, 1953. (Kambiz Fatahi from BBC-Persian 
report broadcast on July 22, 2017). The clergy, as a result, remained an important player. 
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NOTES 
 
1
 Foucault, [1967], p.368. 
2
 The criticism of the fact that the terms “West” and the “Middle East” do exist, and 
utilized by nearly everyone is beyond the boundaries of this study. However, I have been 
mindful of its problematic nature. 
3
 Is it possible there is a connection between this oversight and Baudrillard’s criticism 
of Foucault? 
4
 One such example, found in the ancient Mesopotamia, is the Stele of Hammurabi 
that shows Hammurabi receiving the divine laws from the deity, Shamash. 
5
 Gruber, 2004, pp.24-31. 
6
 BBC News. October 5, 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-
34440759 , retrieved November 16, 2015. 
7
 Grun, Remondino, and Zhang, (September 2004), pp. 77-199. 
8
 It can be argued that the current destructions of works of art by the radical groups 
which are recorded and shared across social media are to construct their own image. 
9
 The term patriarchy, while undoubtedly tied to the history of its development, is 
meant here in a broader context, which is not limited to gender, or even individual. Viewed 
from the perspective of power, it is inseparable from inequity; it fosters collective 
subjectivity through religious interpretations and social, political, and economic apparatuses. 
10
 By free here I mean being subject to oneself, not to any group or political agenda. 
11
 This is a criticism of Hegel’s dialectic that argues for a progression out of conflict 
toward the unity of self-consciousness. It is noteworthy the root of the word “art” is “ar” 
(plural ars) means to join, to bring together. 
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12
 This is an extrapolation on Said’s theory; historically, the difference in religions 
has played a key role in highlighting the differences between the West and the Middle East. 
13
 On July 22, 2011, Andres Breivik killed 85 young Muslims on a retreat in a 
Norway Island. Also, a reference should be made here to the attack on the office of the 
French satirical magazine, “Charlie Hebdo” on January 7, 2015 in Paris. 
14
 References come from Augustine’s City of God (Book XVIII), and Thomas 
Aquinas’s On Kingship: To the King of Cyprus (Chapter 14). Both philosophers draw 
parallels between what God creates/does and what the church/king should do and stand for. 
Also, there is compelling argument for the affinity between Neoplatonism and Islamic 
thought made by scholars in Neoplatonism and Islamic Thought, edited by Parviz 
Morewedge, to which I will be returning for a more in-depth investigation. 
15
 Foucault uses “apparatus” to point to mechanisms that are for “transforming human 
beings” ([1975] 1977). In an article, “What is dispositif?” (1988), Giles Deleuze unpacks 
Foucault’s “apparatus,” and explicates it in terms of lines: “curves of visibility, . . .utterance, 
[…] lines of force, […] and . . . lines of subjectivations” (in French Philosophy since 1945, 
398-399). 
16
 This is not unlike the Aristotelian cathartic formula, for the outcome is a collective 
experience of purging of that which can be counter-productive to the state.  
17
 By ideology here I mean ideas that are representative of a particular group and are 
meant to legitimize their political domination and to artificially unite.  
18
 This raises the question of: How does one avoid such pitfall, when engaged in 
intellectual or philosophical discourse? I consider constant examination of one's thought 
through dialogical discourses to be a possible solution. 
334 
 
 
19
 I believe it was in a process of going back and forth, from the moment that the 
Cartesian “I” was perceived, to when it crossed the border into Germany to be the center of 
the Idealists’ philosophy, bouncing off of the Analytical philosophy in Great Britain, to 
bringing Hegel from Germany over to France, through Kojeve’s lectures, it is all within the 
frame of each as each other’s “other” that new ideas in European philosophy emerged in the 
mid to late twentieth century. 
20
 Heidegger notes that something compels the humans to “set upon” the resources, 
thus to enframe, but he does not elaborate on it.  
21
 Nochlin, 1989, pp. 33-57. 
22
 It is true that what Nietzsche says here, were interpreted to suit the Nazis’ ISA even 
though what Nietzsche means here is regarding the individual striving for excellence. I think 
it is intriguing to note the relationship between art and power on the one hand and the 
individual versus the collective on the other. After all, Nietzsche considers this “forming” a 
sort of art, which makes the overlapping of art and power unavoidable. 
23
 A prevalent example that is found under every dome and on every rug design is that 
of a cosmic medallion with a focal point at the center. 
24
 I must add that the individuality in the West has always been fragile and in flux and 
by no means a fixed destination. 
25
 The events following the September 11 demonstrated a reveres, in passing patriot 
acts, and similar measures, that rolled back individual freedoms in the United States. 
26
 A similar example is during the Iran-Iraq war that proved successful (for those in 
power) in uniting the country that was threatening to fracture by diverse political groups, 
which were growing in discontent toward the government that was slowly solidifying its total 
grip on power. 
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27
 This is true, perhaps until more recent events, about which I shall continue to 
investigate. 
28
 By free society I mean a society that respects and protects individual rights and 
freedoms. Also, “the struggle for critique,” is a means to counter the possibility of these 
struggles turning into hegemonic move themselves. 
29
 Jaspers [1957] 1962. p. 63. 
30
 Iskandar and the Hermit, from “Khamsa Nizami,” attributed to Mir Mussavir, 
1535-1540. The story bears a striking resemblance to the mystic story of a supposed meeting 
between Alexander and Diogenes. 
31
 The term “event” here may be similar to what Alain Badiou uses in Being and 
Event. Badiou’s event is applied with regards to philosophy and its conditioning of “truth 
procedures” external to and distinct from it (Badiou xviii); here, I use the term “event” to 
point to the seismic shifts of power, whether political, artistic, or ideological, in which one 
rises to a dominant position from a rift. 
32
 I will include the fact that patriarchy has abandoned many fronts that once held 
tightly, such as education, right to vote, etc. due to spreading of consciousness in those areas. 
33
 On a broader perspective, as argued by Adunis (1930 - ), the Syrian poet, both 
Shi’ites and Sunnis are affected with the notion of the dissolving the “I” into the greater 
unity. (Antoon, July 11, 2011, Aljazeera Opinion) 
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/07/201179124452158992.html), retrieved 
November 20, 2015.  
34
 There were moves from the merchant class, under the leadership of the clergy that 
boycotted and severely criticized any governmental patronage of the arts. This took place 
while the government of Iran during the 1970s, right up to just before the revolution of 1979, 
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had heavily invested in purchasing modern works by American and European avant-garde 
artists. (New York Times. “Masterpiece Basement,” published December 2, 2007.) 
35
 The support of this group proved extremely influential in the Iranian Revolution of 
1979. 
36
 It is noteworthy that what sparked the flames of the 1979 revolution, was the 
setting fire to a movie theater in Abadan, southwest of Iran, on August 19, 1978 at which 470 
people perished, while watching a politically controversial film.  
37
 Shayegan 7. 
38
 Monique Bellan/ Nadia Bou Ali/ Dahlia Gubara, “Articulations of Subjectivity and 
Objectivity in the Modern Middle East, North Africa, South and Southeast Asia,” in: TRAFO 
– Blog for Transregional Research, 03.03.2015. https://trafo.hypotheses.org/2065. Retrieved 
on May 29, 2018. 
39
 From the conference blog, https://trafo.hypotheses.org/2065. Retrieved on May 29, 
2018.  
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Payne, 1997, p. 524. 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 The other side of the problem is “translation,” which I will discuss in the next 
segment. 
44
 In clarifying this distinction, Benveniste introduced the two terms “subject of the 
enunciation” and the “subject of the enounced” ([1966] 1971). 
45
 The speaking subject shaping the “other,” is addressed by Mikhail Bakhtin in 
Problems of Dostoevsky’s Poetics (1999). 
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46
 Lacan has explicated it as the “aggressive turn of the subject on the other” (Ecrits 
1966). I argue, it is the fear of the aggression that compels the individual, although 
unwillingly at times, to submit to the collective consciousness. 
47
 The superiority issue is a problem that will remain outside the boundaries of this 
study and merits a separate project. David Graeber has thoroughly addressed the problem of 
conflict between the early communities, to which I will return in chapter two. 
48
 Shayegan 3. 
49
 Here I focus on Western philosophy, because the Islamic philosophy, at least the 
branch that became dominant, is mostly entangled with religion, and preoccupied with the 
metaphysics, therefore its definition of the group or individual is within that context 
(Yazdchi, 2013). 
50
 I use “re-interpretation’ here, because Plato has already interpreted his vision in his 
Allegory of the Cave. 
51
 R. Bain Harris notes the idea that there is a real versus an illusionistic world is not a 
new idea and existed in ancient Greece as well as in Hindu writings, however it is an 
imaginary idea. He states “[i]t is only a presupposition and not a scientific fact. It is a 
hypothesis and a point of faith, since its verification is beyond that which can be 
scientifically ascertained” (Preface, ix-x). 
52
 Harris, ix. 
53
 In addition to Plotinus’s own interpretation of his imagined system, the collection 
and editing of his teachings by Porphyry adds another level of interpretation, which was not 
immune to “exaggeration” (Corrigan 1), adding another layer of interpretation to the text. 
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54
 Harris states in the Preface of Neoplatonism and Western Aesthetics, that a system 
of “evaluation” dominates Plotinus’s philosophy, in which the different components are 
valued at how much “real” or “illusion” there is within them (ix). 
55
 This is possibly a link between Neoplatonism and what Kant argued much later. 
The difference however is that Kant aims to untie the subject from being predicated on the 
Divine, by focusing on the unification between the universal in our faculties and the 
subsequent knowledge. 
56
 Will to Power, p. 85, 86. 
57
 The notion of beauty and ugliness is also significant during Renaissance and 
dictated much of the standardizing of the art. Giorgio Vassari in his Lives, elaborates what 
these standards are with regards to the High Renaissance artists such as Leonardo and 
Michelangelo. 
58
 Adamson 2002, 1. Examples I found referenced in S.H. Nasr ([1968], 1992), pp. 
32-33, and. Hourani ([1991] 2013), pp.172-73. 
59
 Adamson 2002, 1-2. 
60
 Ibid. 
61
 S.H. Nasr 1992, 32. 
62
 Qtd. in Adamson from Gerhard Endress (1973). 
63
 One such groups is the Mu’tazilites, which I have discussed in more details in 
chapter five. 
64
 Adamson 2002, 1. 
65
 Gutas, in his first chapter refers to the agents of intellectual activities as 
“international scholars . . . active in the Near East,” who were “practicing their profession” 
(116). 
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66
 Gutas 107. 
67
 Gutas 119. 
68
 Adamson notes that the “Arabic Plotinus” is actually made up of three texts, out of 
which, the Theology of Aristotle is the longest of the two. The Arabic edition of all three texts 
was published in 1955 by Abdurrahman Badawi, the source of Adamson’s reference. 
69
 Gutas mentions although many Abbasid caliphs contributed to this task, due to 
propaganda, most of the credit has gone to Harun ar Rashid, and his son Ma’mun (Gutas 122-
25). I found further evidence of dedication of the scholarly work conducted during the two 
centuries of translation to other caliphs and princes, such as al-Mu’tasam and his son, 
Ahmad, in the Great Islamic Encyclopaedia (vol.6, pp. 579, 582). 
70
 Ricoeur 2006, xiii. 
71
 Marx has addressed this in chapter 24, volume I of his Capital, which explicates 
how the surplus value is transformed into capital. While I understand Marx wrote his book 
with the economic concerns, I believe it can be argued that there is also an economy in 
adding to meaning in the context of text and image. 
72
 Asad’s note is on his criticism of Godfrey Lienhardt’s paper, “Modes of Thought,” 
(1954), in which Lienhardt notes: “The problem of describing to others how members of a 
remote tribe think . . . begins to appear largely as one of translation, of making the coherence 
primitive thought has in the languages it really lives in, as clear as possible in our own (97). 
Qtd by Asad (1993, 172). 
73
 Shayegan 4. 
74
 Dabashi surveys an impressive list of Persophiles and Persian subjects in their 
works, from Montesqieu’s Persian Letters, to Nietzsche’s Thus Spake Zarathustra. He cites 
Xenophon’s Cyropaedia (ca. 370 BCE), and Cyrus Cylinder to point to the issues of 
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tolerance and diversity, but he does very little to bring up the fact that such artistic and 
cultural products have yet to be critically studied.  
75
  Shayegan in one of the last interviews (Andishe Pouya, no. 45), before his death, in 
a confessional manner, declared: “Our generation messed up!”. Gooya News, October 9, 
2017. https://news.gooya.com/2017/10/post-8143.php. retrieved August 3, 2017. 
76
 Arkoun 1992, 17, cited by Abu Zayd (83). 
77
 Arkoun 1992, 56, cited by Abu Zayd (84). 
78
 This is because, Arkoun argues God (or Allah) cannot be problematic, since the 
understanding is “He has revealed Himself in his own words.” 
79
 Qtd from Abu Zayd 2006, p. 85. 
80
 Kamali notes specific examples that in his view indicate, and even ensure, such 
freedoms. For example “the principle of hisbah  . . . commanding good and forbidding evil, 
nasiha, or sincere advice, shura or consultation, ijtihad or independent juristic reasoning” 
(2). 
81
 Interpreting the Self, 2. 
82
 I have discussed in my final chapter, the ideas of thinkers such as Shabestari, 
Soroush, and others in more details. 
83
 Yazdchi quotes from a text titled Seyed Ahmad Fardid, Didar Farahi va Fotouhat 
Akhar e Zaman, by Mohammad Madadpour, p. 77. 
84
 Foucault 2000. 
85
 Althusser and Foucault both refer to such apparatuses in terms such as RSA or 
dispositif, respectively.  
86
 We witness this in liberal feminism in how they focused on women winning the 
same rights as men. In response, radical feminism asserted, it was not adequate to just allow 
341 
 
 
women in society to take on the same positions as men, unless the issues of misogyny and 
violence against women were addressed. Further, the cultural feminists sought an identity for 
women, which they argued was rooted in the tradition of femininity, and that it “was simply 
better than masculinity” (Eller 16). 
87
 This is not limited to the visual arts and it has been extended and developed into 
creating property, such as in brand names. 
88
 Patriarchy also absorbs that which it cannot bring to conform, particularly in the 
artistic achievements. 
89
 Graeber (2012) discusses in length how the debt economy gave rise and 
strengthened patriarchy in his chapter 7. 
90
 Foucault, Essential Works, 1954-1984, volume 2. Introduction, p. xxxv. 
91
 Ibid, xxxiv. 
92
 http://LAFF-experiment.org. Here, I am reminded of Foucault’s Order of Things, 
where he contextualizes the way we organize in opposites, which he sees as a way of 
othering (xxiv). 
93
 I consider individuality in relation to the idea of a dominant power, a volatile issue. 
Even in the most politically progressive societies in the West today, we often find the 
individual rights and freedoms, particularly concerning women, at the core of hot-button 
political debates. 
94
 Feminists have given a specific date of five thousand years, but Eller disagrees that 
the prehistory was matriarchal (2000, 3). 
95
 Patriarchy and matriarchy imply binary divisions, and together they have a 
patriarchal connotations. There is no evidence that female or mother-centered societies did 
not follow the same structure as what they changed into as such societies (Eller 2000, 6). 
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96
 Bergson, [1910], 1951, x. 
97
 Lerner makes a distinction between “history” and “history-making” with the latter 
being a “historical creation” from the time of the invention of writing in ancient 
Mesopotamia (1986, 4). 
98
 Spivy 2005, 14. 
99
 Spivy 2005, 20-32. 
100
 Ibid. 
101
 V.S. Ramachandran in an article demonstrates the link between the neurological 
activities of the brain and visual experience, with what becomes dominant in art (1999, pp. 
15–51). I will be discussing the issue of “exaggeration” in chapter three. 
102
 Bataille (1955). 
103
 Shlain (1998).  
104
 Salomon Reinach (1858-1932) suggested a religious interpretation of the 
Paleolithic art (London: Heinemann, [1909] 2008). 
105
 Breuil (1877-1961) argued that the cave paintings were connected to ritual 
activities and that the caves were places of worship, hence saw the art as sympathetic magic 
(Spivy 27). 
106
 Freeman (1987).  
107
 This study was the result of examination of patient who had reported having visual 
hallucinations (Ffytch, 2004). Indeed there is a condition called Charles Bonnet Syndrome 
that causes vivid visual hallucinations. 
108
 Lewis-Williams argues that the Paleolithic artists painted images that had come to 
them in an “altered state of consciousness” inside the dark caves (2002, 41). 
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109
 It is not just cultural theorists, but those among environmentalists, Afro-centrists 
and others who have created the “matriarchal myths” that have in turn become, “by default,” 
“the feminist account of prehistory” (Eller 29). 
110
 Foucault notes how information and knowledge collected, published and 
distributed, can become a source of authority. (1994). 
111
 The reference is the cradle of civilization in Mesopotamia, and its early centers of 
urban life. 
112
 Both Nietzsche and Foucault have pointed this out. 
113
 Eller’s note makes references to Emily Vermeule’s Greece in the Bronze Age, 282; 
Dominic Collon, “Mesopotamian Iconography,” in Encyclopedia of Religion, Mircea Eliade, 
ed. 27, 30-31. Walter Burkert, Greek Religion, 42. 
114
 Eller notes: “the iconography of Mycenaean Greek religion is ‘overwhelmingly 
feminine,’ but written tablets reveal that a host of additional deities—significantly male 
deities—were also worshipped.” She also notes similarities in Iron Age Israel, which while 
“adamantly monotheistic,” they kept “female figurines of a specific type: . . . [with] a ‘pillar’ 
base, breasts and molded head . . .  Scholars have termed these Dea Nutrix or ‘nourishing 
deity” (141). 
115
 King and Rabil Jr. (2003) xi.  
116
 This is significant since both the Middle East and Europe trace their heritage back 
to the ancient Mesopotamia. 
117
 After exploring the traditionalist/religious views that place women’s inferiority to 
men as a natural and God-created relationship, and giving Engels credit for redefining the 
sexual relationships in terms of “changing social relations,” to feminist theories relying on 
the “matriarchal” theories, not based on evidence, but based on myth, she arrives at the 
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conclusion that “most egalitarian societies are to be found among hunting/gathering tribes, 
which are categorized by economic interdependency” (29).  
118
 Lerner 54. 
119
 Graeber 182. 
120
 Eller quotes Cantarella from Pandora’s Daughters, 27. Also a second reference is 
Sara B. Pomeroy, “A Classical Scholar’s Perspective on Matriarchy,” in Caroll, ed., 
Liberating Women’s History, 219. 
121
 King and Rabil Jr quote from Aristotle’s Physics. Aristotle, Physics 1.9.192a20–
24, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes, rev. Oxford trans., 2 vols. 
(Princeton, 1984), 1:328. 
122
 It must be noted in his Republic, Book 7, Plato deemed both men and women to 
possess virtues in theory and ideally (Plato’s Republic 236); however, in the real world, 
Aristotle’s biological statements was more influential and had political and social 
ramifications. 
123
 There are numerous accounts of Persian literature and poetry from the middle 
Ages that echo Aristotelian view on men and women. 
124
 Graeber demonstrates the complexity of the honor issue for men, versus the 
reducing of it to one thing for women. He points out that it was an aristocratic thing to loath 
commerce, because it was a symbol for interdependence. However, in reality the markets 
operated and money and goods exchanged hands. Further, he notes the veiling custom was 
adopted for the Greek women, from the Assyrians, which contrary to the “stereotypes” about 
Western civilizations’ roots of democracy and freedoms, was in contrast to Persia and Syria. 
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125
 While it has been predominantly accepted that the roots of monotheism is linked 
with Abraham, there are other evidence pointing to monotheistic tendencies elsewhere, such 
as Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) and Akhenaton (1353-1336 BCE) (Shalain 71). 
126
 Shlain 1998, 80. 
127
 Lerner notes the importance of keeping in mind the complexity of the formation of 
the writing of the book of Genesis, which took place over a period of “roughly four hundred 
years” (162). 
128
 Lerner’s extensive research identifies three written versions of the Book of 
Genesis, by the hands of three different authors. She distinguishes between the narrative of J 
(for Yahweh), and the version called P (a merged version between the text written by an 
author called Elohist ‘E,’ and the J version). The accounts of the creation of Eve in the P 
version is different than the J text (162). 
129
 Reference in the Bible to the letters sent to the Persian king complaining about 
what Ezra was planning to do (Bible: Nehemia and Ezra’s books). 
130
 This notion can also be seen as giving intangible, divine characteristic to a 
material thing, namely blood in this case, another version of an artistic representation to its 
criticism this study has been devoted. 
131
 The nomadic and semi-nomadic patriarchal tribes, as described in the Book of 
Genesis, were comprised of clans, a community of families, each family made up of “a man, 
his wife, his sons and their wives and children, his unmarried daughters, and his servants.” 
Clans unified under a common ancestry or leader, would form a tribe. Blood strengthened the 
bond between the members to such a degree that imposed the responsibility of protecting 
members of the same blood against others, and bringing vengeance upon their adversaries 
(163). 
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132
 Book of Ezra, Chapter 10, verses 7- 16, 18. Ezra speaks on how those in Jerusalem 
had sullied the blood of the “chosen people” by marrying outside their Jewish heritage, and 
proclaims these actions as “abomination.” This is an example of what I will refer to as intra-
alterity. 
133
 In Ezra, Chapter 4, when he mentions “the adversaries of Judah and Benjamin,” 
who had written letters to the Persian king in opposition of rebuilding the temple (Ezra 4:1-
24), he is referring to those who were the residents of the city of Jerusalem but did not follow 
the strict code Ezra was advocating. 
134
 Lerner brings in the example of Rachel’s theft of the ‘teraphim’ from her father’s 
house to her husband’s house. While her reference is meant to show the “changes from 
matrilocality to patrilocality,” I think it also reveals an important connection with respect to 
the subject of interest in this study (168). There are numerous extant examples of teraphim, 
one even discovered in Israel recently, in February 2016 
(http://www.cnn.com/2016/02/25/middleeast/israel-boy-finds-ancient-figurine/).  
135
 Stokstad, and Cothren 2011, 462. 
136
 I am arguing that fear, much like the sexual instinct as argued by Freud, is subject 
to deferment. Freud (2011). 
137
 Virilio [2000] 2004, 29. 
138
 The imagination therefore, can help cover the gap between form and content. 
Kristeva notes the issue of gap, and that we are born into fear and gap; we strive to fill that 
gap over our life time. Further, Heidegger’s essence of being as time, can prompt the fear of 
time in not knowing the future. 
139
 Bevan explains there was a universal belief that connected the supernatural with 
material, the law that connected a waxen figure of someone hated was believed to be 
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connected to the individual whose image it represented, and whose presence could be altered 
through the altering, or destruction of the image (28). 
140
 I could have included emotions such as pleasure or pain, however in recognition of 
the limitations of this study, I chose “fear” and “pity.” Kristeva notes humans are born with 
fear, and that it is pre-form and objectless. It is critical as it comes out when confronted with 
its “other” (6). 
141
 The quote within the quote is from Burke, page 36. 
142
 These emotions are focused on by Aristotle, not as random examples of human 
emotions Plato wished to suppress, but specifically as two emotions tied closely to the 
success or failure of action (Poetics, xxi). 
143
 Spivy 2005, 47-49.  
144
 Spivy 2005, 40.  
145
 By “historic” I mean what monotheistic religions have unfolded in time, with the 
blending of pre-existing practices and beliefs. 
146
  Gombrich 1969, 114. 
147
 A manifestation of this point can be seen in the long, self-proclaimed title of the 
ISIS leader, Abubakr al-Baghdadi, al-Husseini al-Hashemi, al-Qurashi, in which he is laying 
claims to the first successor of the Prophet, followed by names that designate his political 
lineage. 
148
 This is usually done with concern to solidify political power. The recognition of 
the power of imagery has a long history. From prehistoric time to the classical Greece, to 
Persian and the Roman Empires, there are countless numbers of artifacts, motifs and 
buildings that testify to this. 
149
 Levinas, [1969] 1979, 36. 
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150
 This view has been so prevalent that authors such as Shlain, or Kirsch, have often 
compared monotheism and polytheism in a binary way, concluding that monotheism has had 
less religious tolerance. Kirsch quotes Freud at the beginning of his book: “[r]eligious 
intolerance was inevitably born with the belief in one God” (1). 
151
 This is rather more of a complex issue than I can tackle within the limits of this 
project; there are two parts to this argument: first why the Germans could not read Hegel as 
the French did, and second, how subjectivity is informed by alterity. Further investigation on 
the second part shall be deferred to future projects. 
152
 I thought a comparison between Bowie and Keenan’s book covers was so 
revealing of this point. 
153
 The reference is to Keenan’s book. Each contributing author reveals a different 
aspect of Hegel’s work. 
154
 Belting (2011). 
155
 Belting 2011, 3. 
156
 I will discuss this in the optical theory of Ibn al-Haytham, in Chapter Four. 
157
 Belting mentions this story quoting from the Sultan following the revealing of the 
images of the angels, and seeing them for the first time in the former church: “[h]ow 
beautiful they are! But we must plaster them over again, since our religion forbids them” 
(55).  
158
 Derrida (1987). 
159
 Kristeva states “[p]urification is something only the Logos is capable of” (27). 
160
 The reference is to the paintings on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel, in which 
Michelangelo included nude male figures not part of the Biblical narratives. Further, 
Veronese’s inclusion of multiple figures and characters, as well as “lack of decorum” in his 
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painting, Feast in the House of Lévi (1573), brought him in front of the inquisition tribunal in 
July 18, 1573.  
161
 Mir Emad Hassani (1554-1615) is an example to mention here. He was 
assassinated on the order of the king, Shah Abbas in 1615 due to being suspected of having 
Sunni inclinations. His body was left on the street for a few day, for no one had the courage 
to bury him (Soudavar, 272). 
162
 Khata’i. Il Conzoniere di Shah Isma’il, verse 249/9. Quote from Kathryn Babayan 
(2002), xxxi. 
163
 Newman 2012, 13. 
164
 Floor & Herzig. 2012, 1. 
165
 Babayan notes Shah Isma’il’s view of himself as the legendary king, Jamshid, is 
reflected in his book of poetry (Divan) (2002, xxix-xxx). 
166
 It is the premise of this study that “individuality” is a step, and not the objective, in 
the process toward arriving at a society/community that is predicated on fairness and 
concerns for human rights. 
167
 As an example here, I can quote Schiller, who wrote: “[m]an must pass 
through the aesthetic condition, from the merely physical, in order to reach the 
rational or moral. The aesthetic condition itself has no significance—all it does is to 
restore Man to himself, so that he can make of himself what he wills.” (Schiller 2004, 
12).  
168
 Nietzsche uses these terms in On the Genealogy of Morality, to explain how this 
trait becomes inherent at the cost of individuality. He states: “The strange limitation of 
human development, its hesitant, long-drawn out, frequently recoiling and cyclic nature, is 
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due to the fact that the herd instinct of obedience is inherited most easily and at the expense 
of the art of giving commands” (Cambridge [2006]147). 
169
 Newman 2012, 8. 
170
 Babayan, 2002, xxx. See also, Newman 2012, 13. 
171
 The seven members, ahl-I Ikhtisas, or “persons singled out for special duty 
. . . played . . . a vital role in bringing the Safavid revolution to a successful 
conclusion” (Savory 1980, 21-22). 
172
 Babayan points to Ismai’il’s “charismatic persona” (2002, xxxi), while Savory 
seems more realistic about the fact that the young Isma’il could not have accomplish what he 
accomplished without the help of the advisers (22). 
173
 Newman discusses the efforts Uzun Hassan made on multi-levels, from political 
marriages to paying homage to urban, rural and tribal constituencies in an attempt to bring 
them all together under a “universalist discourse” (10). 
174. Babayan explains “[d]uring the revolutionary phase (1477-1501), the Qizilbash 
composed mainly of Turkmen converts to the Safavi cause, had organized themselves 
militarily into oymaqs, a Mongol term loosely translated as ‘tribe’” (2002, xxxix). 
175
 Savory 1980, 23.  
176
 Junayd and Haydar, Isma’il’s grandfather and father had converted members of 
the tribe in Anatolia and Syria, but not all had converted (Babayan 2002, xxxix).  
177
 Babayan refers to Paul Ricoeur’s Time and Narrative, (1984) (2002, xix-xx). Also, 
to David Wood’s introduction to On Paul Ricoeur: Narrative and Interpretation (1991). 
178
 This example was discussed in the second chapter. 
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179
 V.S. Ramachandran in his theories on the ‘science of art’ argues that human brain 
is “hard-wired to concentrate perceptive focus upon objects with pleasing association, or 
those parts of objects that matter most” (Spivy 59). 
180
 Although Spivy specifically focuses on the visual exaggeration, I argue there is no 
reason this cannot be extended to other aspects of human activities. 
181
 Düttmann 2007, 5. 
182
 http://www.coldbacon.com/poems/fq.html, accessed October 20, 2016. Also, 
Spivy quotes from Elliot to conclude “human trait of distorting images of the body seems to 
be pervasive in many cultures (81). 
183
 While I don’t argue with Newman on the heterogeneity of Isma’il’s discourse, I do 
see a distinction between “heterogeneity” and “contradictory.” Isma’il calling himself both 
Faridun and Zohak in the same poem, is exemplary of this point that reveals his Neoplatonic 
(as explicated in the Unity of Existence) views. 
184
 Canby, 1999, 10-11. 
185
 Bloom and Blair (2002). Both Sasanian and the Byzantine emperors had puppet 
regimes and claims in the Arabian Peninsula. 
186
 Blair and Bloom 2002, pp. 49, 65-67.  
187
 A major conflict I have found is the form of government which has gone from a 
form of voting (bay’at) at the time of the prophet or his son in law Ali, to the formation of 
dynastic rule that has endured in the Middle East in one form or another for over fourteen 
centuries. 
188
 Grabar rightly points out that the formation of the Islamic art was not because of 
religious or intellectual directives, but rather it was the “result of the impact on the Arabs of 
the prevalent art” (Grabar 1987, 93). 
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 Hillenbrand 1999, 38. See also Bloom and Blair 2002, 84, 124.  
191
 It is important to distinguish between Gnosticism and philosophy here. Plato and 
his true follower Plotinus tried to philosophize the Gnostic viewpoint. Plotinus often 
criticized Gnostics who pointed to God for example, but in reality had no plan or program to 
teach how to reach God. What Plotinus did was to use reasoning to establish the idea of 
human potential to reach divine status (Pagels 1989, 135). 
192
 This took place through the translation movements in Medieval Islam, and as 
emphasized by some scholars, through the work of someone by the name of the Arabic 
Plotinus. Peter Adamson in his book by the same title notes that the Arabic Plotinus did not 
just translate the Enneads into Arabic; he rather added innovative philosophical thoughts 
there as well (2002, 1-3). The connection has also been brought up by Gutas (1998), in which 
he argues for a political reason behind the translation movement (2). 
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 Nasr 1992, 338.  
194
 Nasr 1987, 139. There are enough examples in Persian literature alone just on this 
topic to support this claim that will require many volumes to fill, but is beyond the scope of 
this study. 
195
 Titus Burkhardt mentions this title in the Preface of Ibn Arabi’s The Bezels of 
Wisdom, (1980), xiii Also, Nasr. 1992, 338. 
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 Bloom and Blair 2002, 228-29. 
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 Ibn Arabi (1980), 1-41. Also The Great Islamic Encyclopedia vol.4, 226-233 
(Tehran: Center for the Great Islamic Encyclopedia, 1991). 
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 Mirmobiny 2012, pp. 243-272. 
199
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 Nasr 1992, 344. 
201
 Ibn Arabi (1980), 15. 
202
 Nasr 1992, 338. 
203
 An example would be the carpet medallion and under the-dome designs that are 
reflective of the cosmic patterns according to the mystics. 
204
 Nasr 1992, 339. 
205
 Ibn Arabi (1980), pp. 96-97. 
206
 The Great Islamic Encyclopedia vol.9 (Tehran: Center for the Great Islamic 
Encyclopedia, 1991), “Plotinus” (Afloutin) by Sharaf al Din Khorasani, pp. 605-6. Also, 
Benton and Di Yanni 2008, p. 460. 
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 The Great Islamic Encyclopedia vol.4 (Tehran: Center for the Great Islamic 
Encyclopedia, 1991), Ibn Arabi by Sharaf al Din Khorasani, pp. 226-271. 
208
 Ibn Arabi (1980), xiii. Burckhardt uses these terms I have placed in quotation 
marks and says Ibn Arabi’s “thought . . . lacks a certain cohesion” because of it.  
209
 Ibn Arabi (1980), 45. In the Preface of his book, Ibn Arabi says that he saw the 
Apostle of God (meaning Prophet Mohammad) in a vision, who gave him the book called 
Fusus al Hikam, which he then decided to embark on writing the Bezels of Wisdom. 
210
 Ibn Arabi (1980), xii. Burckhardt points out that such works are contemporary 
with the Bezels of Wisdom. 
211
 Ibn Arabi (980), 51. 
212
 Ibn Arabi (1980), 50. The well-known phrase of “I was a hidden treasure who 
longed to be known, therefore I created the world” is among the Muslim esoteric belief that 
sums up Divine motive in creation. An echo of this thought can be heard from the German 
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Idealists such as Fichte, who believed consciousness happens in “reflexive splitting” (Bowie 
73). 
213
 Bloom and Blair 2002, 187. 
214
 Nasr 1987, 139, 181. 
215
 Ibid. See also 57, 58, and 113. 
216
 In Meydan e Naghsh e Jahan, the inclusive polity of the Safavids was duly 
reflected in Ali Qapu, (as the symbol of the government), the Masjid e Jameh (representing 
the religious community –shari’a), Masjid e Shaykh Lotfollah (representative of the Sufi sect 
– tariqa), and the bazaar, or the markets (the economic side –commerce). 
217
 Babayan explains: “Semnani’s ontology construed divine self-manifestation as 
occurring only through intermediaries who acted as mirrors of the divine, active witnesses of 
his essence” (2002, 99). 
218
 Just as views of philosophers like Democritus are completely left out from Plato’s 
philosophy, in comparison, Luther’s Ninety Five Theses, even though initially was an 
internal debate, was translated and leaked beyond the ecclesiastical circle. 
219
 Kakaei, (March 19, 2007) http://www.noormags.com . 
220
 This has been essentially what every philosopher in the history of philosophy has 
striven for (Russell 1972, xiii). 
221. The use of the term “Islamic” as a prefix to Islamic art itself is problematic, since 
there are no instructions or prescriptions in Islam regarding devotional art or any type of art 
(Mirmobiny 2010, 1-7). 
222
 Gruber investigates the attitude of “preservation” as opposed to “destruction” of 
the works of painting in seventeenth-century Ottoman Empire (Gruber 2018, 95). 
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 Recorded by one of the earliest biographers of Prophet Mohammad, Ibn Ishāq (d. 
768), and al-Bukhārī (d. 870) who recorded the Prophet’s accounts or hadith. (Gruber, 2010). 
224
 Gruber & Colby [2010], 299. 
225
 Gruber & Colby, p. 29. 
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227
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228
 Derrida, I987. pp. 4-5. 
229
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230
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231
 Gruber 2013, 12.  
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 Foucault 1994, xxiv. 
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 Gray 1977, 15. 
234
 According to Miller there were contacts as early as the fifth century BCE; she 
points out that there were Athenians in Persia who “sought the protection of the king when 
they suffered political reversal at home” (Miller 1997, 97-104). 
235
 In Shahnama, Firdowsi goes as far as declaring Alexander’s mother to be the 
Persian princess who marries Philip following Philip’s defeating the king. Shahnama, verse 
no. 2537 (Firdowsi 1979, 345). Alexander arrived in Persia through Anatolia and 
Mesopotamia in 334 defeating Darius III. On overthrowing the Persian Empire by Alexander 
see Stokstad 2008, 46. 
236
 Babayan notes the idea of the “Universal Man,” which she calls “perfect 
individual,” during the Safavid was understood as where “sufism, philosophy, Shi’ism and 
ghuluww merged ( 2002, xliv). 
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 Worthington (2012).  
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 Ibid. 
239
 Unfortunately this statement sometime is mistranslated as “God is great!” which is 
inaccurate; for example as appears in Bloom and Blair (2002, 99). ‘Akbar’ in ‘Allahu Akbar’ 
is a comparative adjective in Arabic meaning “greater.” This makes a significant difference 
when explaining the first principle of Islamic belief and the difference between the Creator 
and the created. 
240
.Another example to consider is Martin Luther’s criticism of the Catholic Church, 
arguing the point of conflict in the issuance of the “indulgences.” Luther points this out in his 
95 Theses, no. 6 (Stokstad1995. pp.73, 234-35, 248-49). 
(http://www.luther.de/en/95thesen.html, accessed December 25, 2017). 
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 Matthews 1993, 5. 
242
 I found many conflicting statements in the King James Bible quoted from Jesus for 
instance, that has the same problematic nature as the philosophy behind the Islamic art does, 
in that it adheres more to the Gnostic belief of unity than to monotheism. References to “son 
of God” (e.g. Luke 1:35) and “son of man,” (e.g. Mark, 10:45) are a couple of such 
examples. If we understand monotheism as the belief in one God, then here again the 
difference between the Creator and the created becomes muddled. (Mirmobiny 2010). 
243
 Ibn Arabi 2006, v. 
244
 Corrigan 2005, 23. 
245
 This statement not only points to the imperfection of the child and the necessity of 
the father, but also sets the goal as to becoming like the father. 
246
 Although Plato believed women could lead the Republic, this did not change the 
patriarchal structure by any means. 
247
 Plotinus IV.8, 1.  
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 Kenny 801. 
249
 The life of Plotinus is recorded through the words of his pupil Porphyry in the 
Enneads 1992, 1. Also, Corrigan 2005, pp. 1-2. 
250
 Deleuze and Guattari (1987). 
251
 I will discuss Lacan’s theory in detail in the next segment. 
252
 In sufi literature it is often the sage or the master, who acts as a mirror. 
253
 It is important to note here that the human freedom project in Kant is reliant upon 
this very point. 
254
 Clark and Holquist (1984).  
255
 It is significant that this starting point begins in France, but moving the other 
direction (from France to Germany) it finds a level of consciousness through the works of the 
German philosophers. This is another instance of consciousness through alterity, 
investigation of which however is beyond the scope of this paper and shall be deferred to a 
future project. 
256
 Here I would like to make a distinction (gap) between the Abrahamic monotheism 
and Neoplatonism. My argument is predicated upon this difference, so far as there is the 
discussion of human interchangeability with the Divine (or the ability to unify with it), that 
makes this substitution possible. In my research I found that there is essentially a 
fundamental difference between the Abrahamic monotheism and Neoplatonism. Here, I 
argue the Christianity that is present is one that has been already mingled with Neoplatonism. 
257
 Quoted in Keenan 219. 
258
 Bowie 2, 49, and 98. 
259
 The reference is to Kant’s “sublime.” 
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260
 This “paradoxical principle” in Novalis finds impressions in Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics, in which he (Novalis) proposes bringing “systemlessness . . . into a system” 
(Bowie, 94). 
261
 Here is where I think Derrida is paying close attention to Heidegger. 
262
 I also detect presence of Freud here with the notion of adaptation and ego. 
263
 This may be true about all patriarchies, which can explain the adaptability and 
their longevity that results from how each patriarchy comes to terms with the conflict 
between the two. 
264
 Babayan cites precursor attacks such as on Hallaj (d. 922), Yahya Sohrevardi (d. 
1191), indicative of the said fragmentation. (2002. 98). 
265
 The reference here is the story of the Ustad Yusufi Tarkishduz, from being 
enthroned by Shah Abbas I, and overthrown in three days, followed by his execution as well 
as the suppression of the group Nuqtavis that ensued (Babayan 2002, 4). Further, during the 
confrontations with other Nuqtavis, such as Dervish Kamal, the conflict of his belief in what 
can claim sanctity was exposed. Therefore, Shah Abbas I’s “survival was linked to a move 
away from past beliefs” (Babayan 2002, 107).  
266
 Babayan asserts that a number of revolts that had been suppressed, such as the 
Nuqtavis in 1593, and Dervish Reza in 1631, in addition to the declining power of the 
Qizilbash, as well as the ongoing debates that began to question the supremacy of the Safavi 
kings by contesting the power, both spiritual and temporal, in favor of the jurisprudence 
made it necessary for the king to “rely on legal (shari’a) rather than popular legitimacy to 
rule” (406). 
267
 Babayan 2002, 91. 
268
 Babayan 2002, 95. 
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 Adamson 2015, 196. 
270
 Adamson also notes: “[a] century after Ptolemy, Plotinus took a great interest in 
astrology, devoting a treatise to the topic and discussing it at length in other treatises” (2015, 
201). Although Plotinus did not believe in the influence of the heavenly bodies on souls, he 
“accepts that the universe is bound together by a kind of sympathy” (ibid). 
271
 Newman 2012, 51. 
272
 Babayan and Babaei 2004, 7. 
273
 Ibid. 
274
 Babayan and Babaei. p. 8. 
275
 The example of the “appeal of the Nuqtavis” has already been discussed. 
276
 Among artists, who voluntarily had removed themselves from the service of the 
court is Reza Abbasi, whose change of his subject matter during the period (1603-10) attest 
to this. Newman writes that Abbasi painted “older men as dervishes and laborers he saw in 
the city” (Newman 69). 
277
 The two opposing scholars, preceding Mullā Sadrā have been identified by 
Adamson, as the two “feuding” schools in Shiraz; Sadr al-Din Dashtaki and Jalal al-Din 
Dawani (Adamson 2016, 373). 
278
 Adamson 2016, pp. 388-389. A note I shall have to come back to in a separate 
research project is the relationship between Ibn al Haytham’s optics and the notion of light as 
manifestation of existence, with creation emanating as rays of light (Adamson 2016, 82). In 
my view, Ibn al Haytham’s theory of optics, which could have led to the point of one 
person’s view/perspective (i.e. individual perspective), had Muslims not followed the 
Neoplatonic path of linking it with the Divine, it could have had a major impact on the 
awareness of the subject. Instead, Ibn al Haytham’s (known as Alhazen in the West) theory 
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became influential in Europe, and the linear perspective, as investigated by Belting (2011, 
136, 254). Additionally, Adamson notes the significance of al Haytham’s theory of optics, as 
influencing the Western thinkers such as Roger Bacon and Kepler. He states: “[t]his was only 
one of the bright ideas to emerge from mathematical thought in the Islamic world, and to 
illuminate the European scientific tradition. Ibn al-Haytham’s whole project, in the tradition 
of authors like Euclid and Ptolemy, was an application of geometry to the problem of 
explaining sight (2016, 83). 
279
 Adamson cites J.W. Morris translation of Mūla Sadrā’s The Wisdom of Throne, 
Princeton, 1981. 
280
 The philosopher has been named by Adamson, as the elder Dashatki, one of the 
feuding parties within the Shiraz School (Adamson 2016, 387). 
281
 This is where the individual experience is undermined in Mullā Sadrā’s 
philosophy and becomes idealized. 
282
 Adamson cites this from a work by Porphyry that “is lost to us but was known in 
Arabic.” It suggests that when we know we have knowledge that “our minds literally 
becomes identical to the things known” (ibid). 
283
 Hourani, Khory & Wilson, 1993. 
284
.Vahdat argues within the context of modernism in the Middle East 
“progress is codified as the mere development of science and technology and their 
application to the social sphere” (Vahdat 2003, 129). 
285
 Here I am differentiating between hegemony as experienced in ancient times, as in 
Persian or Roman Empires, with the consciousness Freud demonstrated that the individual 
has a history as well. 
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 It is interesting that the technology that exists today, such as phone, camera, 
computers, developed for military purposes first. Friedrich Kittler in Gramophone, Film, 
Typewriter notes while “radar installation, missile bases . . . will be connected to computers . 
. . and thus will remain operational in wartime […] pleasure is produced as a by-product: 
people are free to channel-surf among entertainment media” (Kittler 1). My argument is 
predicated on the understanding that military success for the Europeans was the reassurance 
of the place of the Eurocentric “I.” 
287
 Although, these artistic productions sometimes came out of commercialization of 
the medium, specifically evident in the advent of photography, the sparks of critical thinking 
is visible across almost all the mediums the artists experimented with in the Middle East. 
288
 As apparent from the poetry, an age old tradition of art form, the only “I” that is 
spoken of, is one that which has found itself dissolved in the “beloved” (see poems by Rumi, 
Hafiz and many others). 
289
 By “capitalized” I mean art that develops into state sponsored projects, or part of 
the State Apparatus, which becomes either a source of pride or propaganda. In either case, it 
undermines a conscious and independent subject. I am very cognizant of the role of 
imagination in that which is “capitalized,” and crafted to work in the interest of patriarchy.  
290
 Belting 2011, 26. 
291
 My reference is exemplified in artifacts such as Stele of Hammurabi, the Cylinder 
of Cyrus, the Rosetta Stone, and even the so called Elgin marbles. It is about the issue of 
European archeological excavations (even theft) and research that they could have been part 
of a dialogical discourse with Europe’s “other,” the Middle Easterners or even the Greeks; 
instead, they became part of the knowledge in the West perpetuating their position of being 
the master in the colonial relationship. At worst, the knowledge facilitated the manipulation, 
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and at best it has contributed to a false sense of pride for the Middle East and even Greece, 
but has not led to a critical reexamination of the self for the aforementioned regions. Quoting 
Juan Cole (2008): “[e]arly twentieth century Egyptian nationalists often, ironically enough, 
also viewed Bonaparte’s expedition as the irruption into a traditional society of dynamic 
modernity, bringing with it printing, the press, modern commerce, hospitals, and science, 
including the archeology that eventually allowed the recovery of Egypt’s Pharaonic past 
through the decipherment of the Rosetta Stone” (245). The debate on the question of “whose 
artifact is it anyway?” continues, as the opponents of the returning of the artifacts are 
skeptical, particularly given the recent devastation brought on by ISIS, that these artifacts can 
be preserved by the original cultures, from which they came. 
292
 This is predicated on the fact that the scholars in Diaspora have been exposed to 
the views of their “other,” and are supposedly familiar with the contemporary theories. 
293
 As discussed earlier in this study, competition is a patriarchal tool that is ever- 
present in the Middle East, and elsewhere, but it has become more and more invisible. 
294
 As demonstrated in chapter two of this study, Biblical sources are problematic, for 
much of the information has been written by the hands of later authors. 
295
 Milani does not however mention that indeed Persia itself received these 
influences from Egypt, Babylon, Assyria, and other nations it came to conquer. 
296
 This interference includes colonialism as well, which will be addressed in chapter 
five. 
297
 One strategy has been “mimesis,” to which I shall return at the end of chapter five. 
298
 The events of the recent decades have brought the question of modernity with 
regards to the Middle East and Islam. While some work has been done on the subject in the 
1990s by scholars such as Karimi-Hakkak (1995), Boroujerdi (1996), Lee (1997), and Khuri 
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(1998), however “an elaborate discussion of the phenomenon and a theory of modernity 
remain wanting […] the traditional ‘western’ analysis of the region and its cultural modalities 
in terms of modernity is based on a notion of modernity, which suffers from an overly 
unilinear and unidimensional interpretation and conceptualization of the modern world” 
(Vahdat 2003, 123). 
299
 “Eighteenth century French officers and intellectuals were immersed in Greek and 
Roman history, which they knew intimately, and they identified with it (Cole 2007, 11). 
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 Cole 2007, 56. 
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 Cole 2007, 11. 
302
 Cole notes in writings of Captain Moiret who “said that the soldiers indulged in 
reveries about Egyptian women, hoping they would be Cleopatras [...] The men began 
thinking of Alexandria; they imagined the city of the Ptolemies and of the Roman Empire 
(Cole 2007, 11). 
303
 Cole further notes al Jabarti could not understand Napoleon’s use of the term 
“liberty, suggesting that perhaps Bonaparte meant to boast that he was not a slave like so 
many of Egypt’s emirs” (ibid). Al Jabarti also rejected the pamphlet’s claim that “all are 
equal before God.” Cole quotes: “[h]ow could it be, when God has chosen some above 
others, and all the people of the heavens and earth have borne witness to it?” (Cole 2007, 34). 
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 Cole 2007, 68. 
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 See Pallini 2004 (2003), pp. 39-50. 
306
 See “The Egyptian Satirist Who Inspired a Revolution,” by Anna Della Subin and 
Hussein Omar in New Yorker Magazine, June 6, 2016. 
http://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/the-egyptian-satirist-who-inspired-
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a-revolution, accessed 2/10/2017. The problem of debt still continues to plague 
Egypt. 
307
 The information on James Sanua had been very difficult to find until the 
University of Heidelberg made the “project collection” of the journal, Abou Naddara 
possible. A significant portion of the work was completed in a dissertation by Elaine Ursula 
Ettmüller, titled “The Construction of a National Self through the Definition of its Enemy in 
James Sanua’s Early Satirical Writings.” 
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 Quoted from James Sanua’s unpublished memoirs, with the permission of Mrs. 
Eva Milhaud. Sanua’s biography from the “project collection,” University of Heidelberg. 
http://kjc-sv016.kjc.uni-heidelberg.de:8080/exist/apps/naddara/biography.html, accessed 
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310
 Lambton explains in the nineteenth century Persia, there was no sense of 
nationalism, and all affiliations and loyalties rested locally, or between classes. Only 
religious ties transcended all interests, as “[t]he shah was still padishāh-i Islām and Persia the 
mamālik-i Islām” (150).  
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.Lambton writes, among a handful of Persians who were sent to England, between 
the years of 1811-1815, were influential figures “in spreading knowledge of Western Europe 
in Persia.” There were also others who were sent to study languages, medicine, engineering 
and fortification, as well as “artillery,” “cavalry . . . and the art of gunsmith” (1993, 151-
152). 
312. In his first volume, page 5 (equivalent to page 6 in the printed edition), “Majlisi 
describes his aim as providing the believers with the means to ‘humble the despicable 
heretics,’ (i.e. the Sunnis).” According to the Encyclopaedia Iranica, he achieved this through 
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texts deemed to be lost or forgotten. Encyclopaedia Iranica, on Mohammad Bāqer Majlisi, 
and Majlisi’s major writing Behār al-Anwār, accessed July 5, 2017. 
313
 Momen 1985, p. 116. 
314
 Afary and Anderson cite from page 117, in Momen’s Introduction to Shi’i Islam 
(1985). They note that Majlisi “propagated a dogmatic and legalistic reading of Twelver 
Shi’ism and stressed the role of the imams as ‘mediators and intercessors for man with 
God’,” an iteration that is basically associated with Shi’ism and is one of the points of 
disagreements with the Sunni branch of Islam. They also argue that Majlisi was the “first 
major theologian,” who translated a series of texts about “Shi’ite theology, history, and 
rituals,” which had traditionally written in the language of the Koran, into Persian. Majlisi 
has also been credited for the spread of Shi’ism, by encouraging pilgrimages to cities such as 
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for a more in depth discussion on how mimesis does not just produce events and actions, but 
that it produces meaning as well (A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination, 138). 
316
 See also Checklowsky (1979). 
317
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 Kamal al-Mulk wrote in his memoirs (edited by Dr. Ghani) about his studies in 
Florence, Rome and Paris. (Soheili-Khwansari [1368] 1989, pp. 176-177). 
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338
 While an important publication, Vaghayeh Etefaghieh (Happenings) was 
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341
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reign (1834-48); he was Nasser al-Din Shah’s predecessor (650). 
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 It demonstrates the infusion of Neoplatonic philosophy into Islamic thought, 
which as I have argued earlier, is predicated on human imagination and creativity that was 
introduced through the translation movement, and the works of the “Arabic Plotinus.” 
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diversity in the theater continues, when in 1844 “a Syrian actor, Mihail Naum, who founded 
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century that is to the point: “Every picture is an idea. A picture can inspire political and 
emotional meanings which cannot be conveyed by an article of a hundred pages.” Quoted in 
373 
 
 
Engin Çizgen Photography in the Ottoman Empire, 1839 1919, Istanbul: Haşet Kitabevi A.S, 
1987, p.22. Also quoted by Shaw, p.83. 
380
 Woodward. 2003, p. 363. 
381
 Under the Ottoman Empire, during the nineteenth century, it was established, 
“both in his own conceptual scheme and in the eyes of his neighbors and his governors,” that 
one was essentially recognized and classified by one’s religious affiliations. “He was a 
Muslim, Greek Orthodox, Gregorian Armenian, Jew, Catholic, or Protestant before he was a 
Turk or Arab, a Greek or Bulgar, in the national sense, and also before he felt himself an 
Ottoman citizen” (Davidson 62). 
382
 Woodward, 363-364. 
383
 Foucault 2000 (1994), 332. 
384
 See “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East” (Part II) by Carter 
Vaughn Findley, Studia Islamica, No. 56 (1982), pp. 147-180. Published by: Maisonneuve & 
Larose. While Hegel is dismissive of the Turks, and “ambiguous” about the Arabs (Almond 
132, Hourani 1991, 301), it appears Findlay recognizes the inspiration received by those who 
were sent to Europe to study. 
385
 Hegel. (1977, 23). He states: “[i]t is precisely on account of the importance of the 
moment of designating the complete otherness that the term ‘true’ and ‘false’ must no longer 
be used where such otherness has been annulled. Just as to talk of unity of subject and object, 
of finite and infinite, of being and thought, etc. is inept, since object and subject, etc. signify 
what they are outside of their unity, and since in their unity they are not meant to be what 
their expression says they are, just so the false is no longer qua false, a moment of truth.” 
386
 Neoplatonism went through a process of translation and appropriation by the 
Arabic Plotinus during the 9
th
 century translation movement in Baghdad (Adamson 2002, 3). 
374 
 
 
For later connections, see Lahuri (1979), 31. In 1905 Iqbal, in his trip to London, met and 
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 See Introduction, Hockney, 2001. Hockney accumulated visual and textual 
evidence that clearly shows, starting early fifteenth century, the images began to look more 
“realistic.” He argues that artists began using camera obscura to accurately place their 
subjects in space. 
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and thirteenth centuries ‘the sign (0) stayed within the confines of Arab culture, resisted by 
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incomprehensible and unnecessary symbol’” (Belting 2011, 10). 
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attested to by miniature paintings that follow a different kind of spatial arrangement and 
perspective, which reached its height during the Safavids. This is evident in the “distinctly 
Mongol style of painting [that] began to emerge . . . at the end of the thirteenth century” 
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there are no shortages of imagery despite this prohibition, however it seems the prohibition 
of imagery effectively rendered the critical power of analyzing imagery non-existent. It is 
thus safe to assume that non-recognition (i.e. prohibition) of something will not engender 
analytical debates on it, which is my point here. 
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 See Neoplatonic and Islamic Thought (1992). Morewedge on the “unity of being” 
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(ittihād, ittisāl, hūlūl) of the mystic’s experience and a Divine state, e.g. the self and the 
Necessary Existence.” I have addressed the “misrecognition” in this context projected by the 
Neoplatonists through the image of al-Insan al-Kamel, or the “perfect man” in Ibn Arabi’s 
philosophy in chapter 2. 
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 I understand the “death of God” in Nietzsche as specifically removing what causes 
the individual to ask the question “why.” However, if the place of the subject and the 
predicate is reversed, thinking, as in Cartesian cogito, becomes a condition to be counted as a 
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 Horkheimer and Adorno 1989 (original 1944), p. 54. This is certainly applicable to 
a collective consciousness as well. 
424
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specific occasions. Then by way of comparison, adjust and adapt to circumstances and 
challenges at hand. It is clear however, the Prophet’s situation was very different in scope 
and in objectives. Therefore, it seems the use of Hadith, and quoting may have served as a 
way to legitimize the action of the authorities after the prophet. 
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demonstrates the conscious efforts to emulate and appropriate the art and architecture of the 
Sasanians as well as the Byzantine courts. See Hillenbrand (1999). It is my argument that 
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such reconciliations are creative endeavors and should be viewed as artistic products 
alongside of the other artistic productions. 
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Abbas. That is where the name of the dynasty was also derived. See Hillenbrand 1999, 38. 
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 Particularly, since they had come to power with the aid of the Persians (Bloom and 
Blair 2002, 74). 
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of Baghdad. There seems to be a dual purpose to the city planning of Baghdad in the round 
form. Euclid’s definition of a circle has come up in describing the location of al-Mansur’s 
palace at the center (Elements Book 1, definition 15), leading us to believe (Gutas presents 
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he wanted to put to practice “the ancient knowledge.” On the other hand, he was asserting the 
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Muslims saw themselves closer to Christianity than the pagan Greeks, the intention was 
“Islam, or the different versions of it vying for supremacy in the . . . ninth-tenth centuries” 
(Gutas 90). 
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 Adamson explains that al-Farabi takes Aristotle’s argument of God being pure 
intellect as the “First Cause of motion for the entire universe, […] but one intellect for each 
of the simple motions of the heavenly bodies.” The Neoplatonic addition comes from his 
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description of the intellect “in a kind of cascade of causation” from God (Adamson 2016, 
68).  
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 Averroes is the foremost Muslim Aristotelian philosopher, who argues God 
necessitates creation, and knowledge is arrived at by discovering the rules of his creation. 
Therefore, Averroes uses reason to bring together Islam and Greek thought. Al-Ghazali on 
the other hand, argues for a “free” God that is beyond any necessities (this is where he differs 
from Avicenna), and all is nothing but according to what he wills. Al-Ghazali’s philosophy 
closely follows Neoplatonic philosophy in the hierarchy of creation, soul and intellect (see 
Adamson 140, 179). Adamson also notes that the Aristotelian reason-based arguments were 
not as accessible as the Neoplatonists, since in those days, either their books had to be written 
and copied to be distributed, or like Ibn Arabi they had to travel to the region to disseminate 
their ideas. 
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 Adamson 2016, 11. The Abbasid caliph, al-Ma’mūn favored the position of the 
Koran as created, and not eternal, as proposed by the Mu’tazilites, and in fact toward the end 
of his reign in 833, he had taken measures to ensure that “the judges and scholars . . . admit 
that the Koran was created by God, and not eternal like God Himself.” Adamson notes that 
this was unusual because it was within the scope of the scholars’ authority to determine such 
issues. He argues this probably was due to al-Ma’mūn’s plan to “assert his own authority 
over that of the scholars” (ibid).  
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 I have mentioned this in the previous chapter. This question often comes up about 
the autocratic regimes in the Middle East, particularly among the Sunnis. The Shi’ites 
situation is a bit different, as it is more weighted down by Neoplatonic interpretation of the 
religion. 
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 See Joseph Owens C. Ss.R 1992, pp. 41-50. Owens argues that Avicenna did not 
just transmit Aristotelian metaphysics. 
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 Moosa 2005, p. 6. Moosa gives the date 1091 of the appointment and Adamson 
just mentions “following the year 1085.” What seems clear is that al- Ghazālī was in 
Baghdad between 1091-95, at which point he experiences depression and anxiety (Adamson 
2016, 142). 
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 While I continue to look for additional historical evidence on this, I am tempted to 
also consider as a contributing source of anxiety to al-Ghazālī’s condition at this time, the 
threat of the Christian Crusades, as he must have also been concerned about the state of 
Islamic political power in facing with the Christian Crusaders. We see similar language from 
Ibn Arabi in facing with the shrinking Muslim territories in Medieval Spain. 
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 Although Adamson tells us like al-Farabi, he “considers acceptance of authority 
appropriate for most people” (143). 
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 Adamson 2016, 140-141.  
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 Adamson 2016, 141. He uses the example of the shadows that seem static as seen 
by the eye, but the as moving throughout the day, as perceived by the mind. 
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 This seems to be the motivation behind his book Munqidh min al Dalal, or 
Deliverance from Error. 
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 Adamson 2016, 141. 
449
 It must be noted here that al-Ghazālī does not see a contradiction between logic 
and religion, as he “emphasizes that logic has no bearing on religious belief, and it would be 
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a misunderstanding of both logic and religion to think they could come into conflict” 
(Adamson 2016, 144). 
450
 Adamson informs us: “al-Ghazālī wrote a work summarizing the views of 
Avicenna, and called it Maqāsīd al-Falāsīfa, which means Aims of the Philosophers. This 
was followed by a second treatise called Tahāfūt al-Falāsīfa . . . usually translated 
Incoherence of the Philosophers […] al-Ghazālī’s summary and critique had an ironic legacy 
in Latin Christendom, where for a long while only the Maqāsīd was known” (2016, 147). 
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 Moosa 2005, p. 213. While Moosa is making the argument for individuality in al-
Ghazālī, he is doing so within the Neoplatonic framework of a “virtuous state of mind and 
virtuous dispositions” that deems the self the same as the spirit (ibid). 
456
 Adamson points out that “the eastern lands of the Muslim empire had seen an 
influx of Hellenic philosophy and science in the ninth and tenth centuries” (113). 
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 Adamson 2016, 145-146. 
458
 Following the translation movement and the widespread readership of the Arabic 
Plotinus, through the works of scholars like al Ghazali, all the way to Mulla Sadra, and from 
there to Hajj Mulla Hadi Sabzevari, a direct link can be seen. The Neoplatonic thoughts, 
continued their impressions straight through the contemporary times, to the philosophy of the 
“rule of jurisprudence” that evolved out of the Iranian revolution of 1979. I will discuss this 
further in the final chapter. 
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 The authority comes from the institution of Marja’ Taqlid that was established to 
focus on the extensive sources for Hadith and the Prophet’s sunna (which was deemed 
sources of imitation, but in order to adapt to the contemporary problems they needed to be 
interpreted), in order to issue judgment on the subsidiaries of the faith, which have to do with 
practical aspects of the religion (Jafarian 3). 
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 Lambton 164. 
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 Hauser, vol. III. [1962], 1999, the chapter on Germany and the Enlightenment.  
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 Almond 2010, p. 109. 
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 Keddie explains that Jamāl ad-Dīn’s views were situated in between “pure 
traditionalism” and “pure Westernism.” She provides the range of examples within “modern 
Islam,” that came to have affinity with Jamāl ad-Dīn’s “style of thought . . . from the Islamic 
liberalism . . .  to the later more conservative Islamic revivalism . . . and the Muslim 
Brethren, and include Pan-Arabism and various forms of Middle Eastern nationalism” 
(Keddie 1972a, 2). 
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 Keddie 1972a, 20. The more orthodox Shi’is believed that in the absence of the 
twelfth Imam, Muslims must follow the guidance of the “learned but fallible judgment of one 
or one of several mujtahids, [while] the Shaikhis, following the ideas of Shaikh Ahmad 
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Ahsai, believed that each epoch had its own ideal guide, whose role was more exalted than 
that of the mujtahid.” The movement of the Babis that in a way was anticipated by the 
Shaikhis, is also another historical movement that Keddie argues left an impression on the 
young Jamal ad-Din, not as a follower, which he clearly was never a Shaikhi or Babi, but as 
how he witnessed firsthand in these movements that there can be different ways of religious 
interpretation (Keddie 1972a, 20-22). 
470
 Keddie points out that this is the first time Jamāl ad-Dīn “speaks favorably of Pan-
Islamism and of Sultan Abdülhamid II. The connection of support for the Sultan and for Pan-
Islam with opposition to British encroachments on Muslim territory . . . . made explicit” 
(Keddie 1972a, 184). 
471
 Keddie 1972a, 185. 
472
 Keddie 1972b, “Intellectuals, pp. 39-57.  
473
 Vahdat, 2003, p. 131. It seems Vahdat is not distinguishing between 
individuality as a subject to itself and “agency” in Jamal ad-Din’s discourse, which 
primarily underscores the role of the elites in modernity. 
474
 In the biography of Jamāl ad-Dīn Muhammad, Abduh writes, that upon Jamāl ad-
Dīn’s arrival in Egypt, he “began to take lessons from Afghani in mathematics, philosophy, 
and theology, and brought other people to take such lessons.” Keddie cites Abduh as having 
written: “Afghani first of all drew to him a group of young students, that later officials and 
notables also frequented his gatherings, and that the differing reports of his teaching made 
people eager to meet him and know what he was like.” Jamāl ad-Dīn according to Abduh 
then, focused on “the rational sciences” (Keddie 1972a, 83). 
475
 Keddie 1972a, 163. 
476
 Keddie 1972a, 162. 
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477
 This particular article was titled “The Benefits of Philosophy” and was published 
in Mu’allim-i Shafīq (Keddie 1972a, 163). 
478
 These names include Shihāb ad-Dīn Suhravardī (d 1191), who was the founder of 
Illuminationism. Also, Mīr Dāmād, Mūlla Sadrā’s teacher, both were directly involved in 
reconciling “mysticism, rationalism, and Shi’i beliefs” (Keddie 1972a, 163n). 
479
 “Lectures on Teaching and Learning,” translated from Maqālat-i Jamāliyyeh in 
Keddie, An Islamic Response, p. 107. 
480
 “The Benefits of Philosophy,” from An Islamic Response, translated by Keddie, 
pp. 109-122. See Also Keddie 1972a, 163-164. 
481
 Heidegger uses the term “Gestell,” which ordinarily is a “fixed” term. However, in 
Heidegger it is revealed as “challenging forth,” and “gathering together.” 
482
 These values according to Fanon include language, or “wearing European clothes . 
. . using European furniture and European forms of social intercourse . . . all these contribute 
to a feeling of equality with the Europeans and their achievements” (Fanon 9). 
483
 Said, p. 3. 
484
 Said 92. 
485
 Said cites Gobineau’s Essai sur L’inegalite des races humanines, and Cuvier’s Le 
Regne animal, as well as Robert Knox’s The Races of Man (ibid). 
486
 This is not unlike the process I have explained in the second chapter. Once humans 
learned to give a visual form to something, they could possess it and establish hierarchy. 
Similarly, by creating an imaginary “Orient” through cultural products (literature, visual arts, 
and an entire movement called Orientalism), the Middle East was successfully colonized by 
the West. Said notes two types of Orientalists: those who speak to the exoticism and 
backwardness that define the west in sharp contrast (as in Flaubert), and those who highlight 
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the brilliance of the past civilizations (as in Massignon), to which Europeans saw themselves 
as heirs (Said 207, 258). 
487
 Here I am reminded of Erich Auerbach’s Mimesis, in which a literary comparison 
between the West (e.g. Homer) and the East (post Christianity) reveals a different style of 
narrative, with more focus on the humanities in the latter. Auerbach argues the Western style 
in which the thoughts of the characters are externalized, are different from the Biblical stories 
(as in the story of Abraham’s sacrifice), through which not all point are illuminated, hence 
there are gaps open to different interpretation (Auerbach [1953] 2003, xviii). See also Said 
1979, pp. 258-59. 
488
 Vernoit 19. 
489
 Mehmet Baha Tanman in Islamic Art in Nineteenth Century (2006). 
490
 Jennifer Scarce in Islamic Art in Nineteenth Century (2006). 
491
 In chapter four I have explained Nasir al-Din Shah’s interest in photography as 
another example of this. 
492
 Halliwell 314. 
493
 This is not unlike his “hypostasis,” which is predicated on a hierarchical mimetic 
relationship, and applicable to the artist’s work. Therefore, Plotinus can maintain the 
superiority of the creator over its creation, something that the Muslim philosophers could 
agree with. 
494
 It is this aspect of Neoplatonism that plays an important part in what becomes the 
“rule of jurisprudence,” as a system of political government in Iran after the revolution of 
1979, engineered by Ayatollah Khomeini, to which I will return. It is worth mentioning here 
that Halliwell’s argument demonstrates more than Plotinus’s direct influence; it is this 
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transformative and regenerative potential that impresses the future theoreticians and 
philosophers (Halliwell 323). 
495
 Huhn (June 2013),.Art Bulletin, 203-205. 
496
 Vernoit translates it as “the principle of following established religious doctrine” 
(31). 
497
 There are also a number of Koranic verses underscoring the individual’s 
responsibility. See Koran: “Every man’s fate We have fastened On his own neck” (17:13); 
also, “And pursue not that Of which thou has No knowledge” (17:36); see also, “Every soul 
will be in pledge for its deeds” (74:38). 
498
 Although the sharp point of criticism of the Shi’ites by the Sunni scholars such as 
al Ghazālī and others appears to be the Ismāilīs (Adamson 2016, 54 and 143-44), taqlīd is not 
restricted to this branch alone (Momen 1985). Also, Adamson notes “[t]eologians regularly 
accused other theologians of slavish adherence to authority, while philosophers like al-Fārābī 
happily tarred non-philosophers with the taqlid brush” (Adamson 2016, 143). 
499
 The objective that should have been individual’s independent judgment (as 
explained in the concept of ijtihad – meaning independent judgment –Adamson 2016, 143) 
gradually and over the centuries became reliant upon the expert opinion of the scholars, who 
referenced the established customs and laws that existed mainly for business before the 
advent of Islam. Adamson notes when disagreements in the interpretations of the major 
sources took place regarding a law (as in prohibition of drinking and gambling), after the 
death of the Prophet, the religious scholars sought to resolve the conflict by referring to the 
“legal practices . . . [that] grew out of pre-Islamic Arab society” (165).  
500
 One of the Shi’ites reasoning sources stems from this Koranic verse “Ask those 
who are reminders of God, if you do not know” (16:43), which eventually divided the 
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population within the Islamic communities to two groups of “knowledgeable” and 
“ignorant.” From this the necessity for ijtihad and taqlīd emerged among the Shi’ites 
(Jafarian 1). It seems there is a great leap of imagination to go from “asking” to “blindly 
following.” 
501
 Qiyas and Istiqra are two terms within the Sunni practice, which mean comparison 
and inductive respectively, are both predicated on mimesis. They are applied to resolve 
conflicts between the sources of religion. It is worth noting that there are four sources, with 
particular importance regarding the laws. These sources for both Shi’ite and Sunnis in “legal 
matters” are so close that “its jurisprudence does not differ more from the four schools of 
Sunni jurisprudence that they differ among themselves” (Momen184). However, others have 
argued that the methods maybe similar, but the difference lie in their laws (ibid). The 
principles of jurisprudence (Usul al-fiqh) draw authority from four sources: the Koran, 
Hadith, Sunna or accounts of the Prophet (since there is a reference in the Koran 33:21 to 
take the Prophet as an example), consensus, and intellect (intellect or reason, which is called 
aql is only accepted by the Shi’ites). The difference between Sunni and Shi’ite laws come 
from, consensus by way of qiyas (analogical reasoning) for Sunnis, as opposed to, consensus 
based on intellect (aql, the source of human reason, meaning the aql of the ulama) for the 
Shi’ites (Momen 184-186). I argue there is very little difference between the two, if we view 
them from the perspective of mimesis. The “analogical reasoning” has led to uncritical 
imitation of the Prophet’s accounts, and the successors in Sunni Islam, and the consensus by 
way of the ulama’s reasoning has ended in taqlīd or imitation in Shi’ite religious practices. 
502
 An example would be of Rumi himself, who criticized taqlīd in one breath, and 
then submits to Shams with such devotion that it provokes Rumi’s students’ jealousy 
(Adamson 2016, 349). 
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503
 There are two parts within the religion of Islam: acknowledgement (called 
Principles) and practice (called Subsidiaries) of faith. According to Shi’a belief, when 
disagreements arise from how to carry out certain religious duties, or rules, it is the “Imam,” 
who fills in, in the absence of the Prophet. After the twelfth imam (from the lineage of the 
Prophet) disappeared, it has become the duty of the ulama to take on the responsibility of 
interpreting the instructions for the “Subsidiary” part of the faith (Jafarian 3). I must note one 
of the quotes from an Imam cited by Jafarian indicates that the Shi’ite Imams (from the direct 
lineage of the Prophet) made it clear that it was their responsibility to interpret the Principles 
of the faith and that they would leave it up to their followers to figure out the subsidiaries of 
their faith. Jafarian however does not explain that “the followers of the Imams” meant the 
people, not necessarily the ulama; obviously, because such a class did not exist at the time. 
Here is another instance of an imaginary jump that ensures the prominence of the ulama over 
everyone else. 
504
 Not to be confused with Shaykh Tusi (995-1067), who was also instrumental in 
establishing taqlid (Walbridge 2001). He was a pupil of Shaykh Mufid (948-1022), both 
followers of the Twelver Shi’a belief. It is worth noting that the evidence to the founding of 
the taqlid goes back to the time of the translation movement, after which point the need to 
incorporate reasoning into religion became evident.  
505
 Adamson 2016, 332-333. 
506
 Keddie 1983, 579. Keddie offers a two part explanation predicated on a 
comparative study, one with internal, and the other external examples in other revolutions. 
507
 This is not to say instances of individual responses did not take place. As 
discussed in previous chapters, it is the lack of theory that leads to the lack of 
acknowledgement and hence, the lack of consciousness about the issue of subjectivity.  
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508
 This philosophy had justified the position of the monarchy up until the moment 
when the ulama themselves assumed the synthesized position of religious and political 
authorities after the revolution of 1979. I should also mention the emergence of other groups 
such as the Babis, who severed ties with the “Arabic religion” and “tyrant Shi’ite rule,” and 
sought to offer new interpretations out of the Sufi tradition. However, they were not much 
different in neglecting the issue of subjectivity than the other groups. Their leader, Ali 
Mohammad Bāb in his pilgrimage to Mecca made statements predicated on the negation of 
God and revering humans (Homa Nategh in Mullayan-2).  
509
 I must also note the role of British and Russian policies and influences, which 
played a role. While the British appeared to be supporting the Constitutional reform, by 1909 
the Russians entered the picture directly by supporting the monarchs, both pursuing their own 
interests. The point is, such influences are carried out with more facility in the presence of a 
society, whose members have missed (or never have experienced the acknowledgement of) 
the issue of subjecthood. 
510
 The same argument can be extrapolated to other movements in the Middle East, 
and for the same reason. 
511
 While there is the example of the Bābis, a group that was also inspired by 
Neoplatonic thoughts, I have chosen to exclude them, for their influence on subjectivity 
merits a separate study. 
512
 Paidar 33. 
513
 Abu al-Hassan al-Mawardi (972-1058) was a Sunni jurist who contributed to the 
integration of politics and Sunni Islam (Momen 192). 
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514
. It was Shaykh Ja’far Kashifu’l Ghita, a contemporary of Fath Ali Shah, who 
issued a religious edict that declared jihad (religious war) against the Russians, which 
authorized the king to enter the conflict (Momen 194). 
515
 Momen 195. 
516
 See also Keddie 1993, 604. 
517
 Paidar 33. See also Momen 1985, pp. 116, 186, 191. 
518
 Following the 1953 coup d’état, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi had “spent the 
remainder of the 1950s eliminating his political opponents, particularly Tudeh Party, The 
National Front, and other segments of the secular left, which he regarded as the most 
important threats to his regime” (Afary 2009, 202). This left no secular opponents to counter 
the religious class’s rise to political prominence in 1979.  
519
 The idea of freedom, was understandably aimed in response to colonialism; 
therefore, by superficial I do not mean insignificant. My main point here is that there seems 
to have been no place for the individual rights in the preoccupied minds on how to unify 
against colonialists through the suggested strategies to eliminate foreign influence. 
520
 I discussed this connection in Chapter 5. The point is regardless of whether it is 
from the Islamic Neoplatonism or the Western Neoplatonism, it still invokes the same 
collective conscious, rather than an individual one.  
521
 Paidar cites Keddie’s An Islamic Response to Imperialism, 1968. 
522
 It must be said that arriving at free consciousness is not the end. It has not been for 
the Europeans, and it must not be for the Middle Easterners. However, it is a necessary step 
toward establishing a free and just society predicated on empathy and dialogical relationship. 
As noted by Afary (2009), “the modern notion of freedom became unbearable for some, to 
whom freedom of choice meant insecurity and loss of identity […] Some wished to ‘become 
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one with the world by submission to a person, to a group, to an institution, to God,’ in order 
to transcend their loneliness and individual existence and to become ‘part of some body or 
something bigger than’ themselves” (200). 
523
 Tabatabaei 2007, 14. See Also Amanat 2017, 328. 
524
 See also Adamiyat 1980, p. 105. 
525
 Mostashar al-Dowleh had spent early professional life as a secretary at the British 
Consulate in Tabriz. Adamiyat notes “Mirza Yusuf Khan was knowledgeable in Islamic Law 
and aware of the European Laws” (1980, 173). Adamiyat also points out that Moshir ad-
Dowleh Sepahsalar (Naser ad Din Shah’s premier) advised Mirza Yusuf Khan to make sure 
he does not enter the ulama, into the secular and governmental institutions, as he believed in 
the separation of religion from state (pp. 198-200). 
526. Tabatabaei mentions “according to some reports, on the order of Naser ad-Din 
Shah [they] beat him over the head [with his book] so hard that it affected his eyes, and he 
passed away soon after” (2007, 14). 
527
 It is worth mentioning that Mostashar al-Dowleh’s book was influential in writing 
the Constitutional laws. On the opposition side from the ulama’s camp, was the Hāji Molla 
Ali Kani, who wrote: “the horrid word freedom . . . seems attractive on the surface and good, 
but on the inside, [it] is full of deficiencies and problem. This . . . is to the contrary of the 
prophetic laws and their guidance, and of all the exalted kings and of their high-ranking 
officers” (Adamiyat 1980, 200). 
528
 This was evident in the slogans raised, which included “death to the Pahlevis,” 
“throw out America,” “Hossein is our guide” (reference is to the third Shi’ite Imam), 
“Khomeini is our leader,” “independence, freedom and Islam.” Abrahamian also mentions 
this is the first time the crowd shouts “we want Islamic Republic” (1982, 515). 
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529
 This elimination appears in sync with the Hegelian dialectic, as one group 
subsumes, or eliminates others in arriving at the synthesis. Here, the role of the Tudeh party 
and their support of these developments is crucial. 
530
 Hamid Shokat in his book A Conversation with Kourosh Lashai: An Inside Look 
at Iran’s Left Movement (Akhtaran Publication 2003, Tehran, Iran) asks Lashai about an 
invitation he received, as a member of the left movement, from the court to help develop a 
“dialectic” ideology as a means of justification for the monarch’s White Revolution in 1963 
(268). Also, the Shah had already eliminated all the political and secular leftist groups that 
could have been worthy opponents after the 1953 coup (Afary 2009, 202). 
531
 To this I also might add contact with the external influences against Mohammad 
Mosaddeq, as recent declassified documents from the 1953 CIA coup in Iran demonstrate. 
(BBC, Washington, July 22, 2017, reported by Kambiz Fatahi). Accessed September 10, 
2017. While these documents do not prove the prominent clerics’ direct involvement in the 
coup, among the documents there is evidence that per Shah’s request, two days before the 
overthrowing of the prime minister, the US embassy had transferred large sums of money to 
their operatives, including a prominent cleric, Mohammad Behbahani to support the Shah in 
opposition to Mosaddiq. 
532
 On September 8, 1978 a peaceful, “staged sit-down demonstration” was met with 
shooting rampage from the air and ground by the Shah’s troops. Abrahamian notes 
“September 8 became known as the Black Friday and left a permanent mark on Iran. It 
placed a sea of blood between the Shah and the people. It enflamed public emotions, 
intensified popular hatred for the regime, and thereby further radicalized the population 
(Abrahamian 1982, 516). 
533
 Paidar 50. 
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534
 Keddie notes: “Iranians, who in peaceable periods seem eager to please and loath 
to disagree openly with the powerful, whether in home or with political superiors, have in the 
last 90 years engaged in an unusual number of large scale popular revolts and revolutions” 
(1993, 602). 
535
 Paidar emphasizes the role of women in the protests, which included attacking 
“shops which had not closed in protest and [forcing] them to do so.” Further, the role of the 
Shii mujtahid (clerics with authority to issue religious edicts), Haj Hasan Mirza Shirazi, who 
officially issued a fatva forbidding the use of tobacco (Paidar 51).  
536
 Here I must note that, just as it had done with Egypt’s cotton, the British wanted to 
get direct access to the raw material of tobacco, via by-passing the middle merchants. It 
already had the monopoly of tobacco from the Ottomans through a company by the name of 
Regie. The British also wanted to expand the domain to Iran; that is why they persuaded 
Naser al-Din Shah to grant them the concession. However, this was costly to those domestic 
investors and merchants. This common adversary brought the merchants closer to the ulama, 
particularly after the ulama were urged to act (Adamiyat 1978). 
537
 Adamiyat mentions this concession apparently impacted 200,000 jobs negatively 
(ibid). 
538
 Adamiyat cites Haji Mohammad Rahim Esfahani in making statements against the 
concession (1978, 36). 
539
 A great example of this is in the harem of Naser al-Din Shah. When the king 
wanted to ignore and break the prohibition decree, his wives took away the water pipes 
stating that those who wed us and made our union legitimate, have forbidden tobacco (Paidar 
51 and Taymouri 1982, pp. 106-8). 
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540
 Abrahamian defines the crowd as “any large gathering whose behavior is not 
regulated by formalized rules of conduct and whose aim is to impress its opponents either by 
collective action or by the show of group solidarity. This includes protest demonstration 
indoors as well as hostile outburst in the streets. But it excludes institutionalize gatherings, 
such as parliamentary assemblies, where laws of procedure structure the behavior of 
individuals” (Abrahamian 1993, 307). 
541
 Paidar’s investigation underscores the role of women in strikes, demonstrations 
and even street-by-street fights during the Constitutional reforms, then the revolution, and 
even after the second Majlis. According to Paidar, women even contributed in collecting 
money and jewelry to raise funds and establish a “national bank” to pay off the government’s 
debt to Russia that had enabled the Cossacks to fight the constitutionalists (Paidar 59). 
542
 Abrahamian notes that the Qajar did not have the organized mechanism of despots 
such as an organized police or secret service, but they were the largest employer of many, 
from different groups of people, such as servants, clerks, kitchen, etc. When the first 
parliament (majlis) convened, one of the items addressed was the court budget and cutting 
back on the excess spending. The House Treasury announced to the employees that it cannot 
meet its obligation to pay their wages. This led to the employees petitioning the majlis first, 
then taking to the streets. (1993, 297-298). 
543
 Abrahamian mentions examples of “reformist newspapers,” such as Sur-i-Israfil, 
Habl al-Matin, and Musavat to be among the publications that were describing the 
demonstrators as “hired hooligans,” “gamblers,” “blood thirsty drunkards,” and terms of such 
sort.  
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544
 Abrahamian quotes Malik al-Shi’ara Bahar, who only passingly noted this, but he 
himself identifies them as “aristocrats, merchants, craftsmen and unskilled laborers tied to the 
palace economy” (1993, 297). 
545
 The latter was in the words of the British representative in Kirmanshah (in 
Western Iran) (Abrahamian 1993, 298). 
546
 Sur-i Israfil openly criticized the clergy in “articles and pamphlets . . . and 
described mullas as ignorant, corrupt, and parasitical” (Sur-i Israfil, February 13, 1907). (also 
Abrahamian 1993, 298). Another paper, Habl al-Matin, criticized the ulama’s demands to 
oversee the laws passed by people’s representatives to ensure its religious legitimacy, by 
mockingly stating the ulama should also form a court to judge the representatives elected by 
the people (Habl al-Matin, June 18, 1907). ( Abrahamian 1993, 298). It is worth mentioning 
that this sarcasm has become reality, as in the current legislative bodies, after the 1979 
Revolution, go through two cleric assemblies’ screening to determine their qualification.   
547
 Noteworthy in this slogan is the correlation between Neoplatonic absolutism as it 
maps onto iterations of Islam at this time. 
548
 Abrahamian names two clerics, Haji Mirza Hasan in Tabriz, and Sheykh Fazlallah 
in Tehran, whose defecting to the conservative side had a huge impact on the population, as 
also pointed out by Ahmad Kasravi, who himself was critical of the clerics (Abrahamian 
1993, 300).  
549
 Abrahamian’s use of the term is a bit problematic here, in that as Ann Lambton 
has pointed out, there was very little distinction in the classes in Iran at this time, for the 
merchant class and the clergy appeared to have a rather complex relationship that dissuades 
one from equating them to the bourgeoisie in Europe. 
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550
 Abrahamian notes: “[i]n Tabriz, […] in June 1907 . . .  a mob had besieged the 
City Council and had lynched one of its prominent members, a wealthy grain merchant who 
was suspected of cornering the market” (1993, 301). 
551
 Abrahamian specifies that the religious leaders had great influence on three groups 
within the society that proved instrumental. The first group was consisting of people from the 
religious schools, mullas, students, mosques, and “ecclesiastical foundations (vaqfs).” Those 
in the second group were “lutis,” who “were religious-minded athletes in the bazaar.” The 
third group was the “orthodox Shi’ite,” consisting mostly of various types of laborers, and 
low-skilled workers. 
552
 Mir Hashim was a local preacher in smaller districts of Tabriz, “whose popularity . 
. . had won him a parliamentary seat” (Abrahamian 303). 
553
 The majlis was initially called National Assembly (Paidar 54). 
554
 Abrahamian 305. 
555
 Reza Shah (formerly Reza Khan), in his rise to power, initially formed alliances 
with conservative reformers in the fourth majlis and began to restore some of the aristocrats 
into their prominent positions (Abarahamian 1982, 131). He initiated legislation for 
compulsory military service, which transformed a “professional army to a truly national 
army,” with himself as the commander, but the support of the landowners, whose labor 
forces now had to be drafted into military service for two years, abruptly ended. Further, to 
achieve leverage over the balance of power between the northern neighbor, the Russians, and 
“southern neighbors,” the British (because of all the concessions they had received), brought 
in a third power, the United States and New York’s Standard Oil Company, and appointed an 
American, Dr. Millspaugh, as “the treasurer-general of Iran” (ibid). The compulsory military 
service directive did not meet with the agreement of the ulama either. They saw two years of 
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military service, as “indoctrination in a secular institution administered by anti-clerical 
officers [that] would corrupt social morality and public religiosity” (ibid). The fifth 
parliamentary assembly, with the “working majority of Socialist and Revival parties under 
the leadership of Reza Khan as the “prime minister,” began a series of reforms (Abrahamian 
1982, 132 and Paidar 80). 
556
 Kasravi was deeply a believer of religion. Amini in the Introduction to Kasravi’s 
Shi’ism quotes from Kasravi’s Aiyin (1932) that “ever since Europe commenced inventions 
and has built a few machines, it has risen up against religion, and has set out to uproot that 
which contains the essence of peace for the people of the world. Now, anti-religionism is 
what the [Middle] Easterners [who are] returning from Europe are bringing as souvenirs for 
their fellow countrymen” (2011, 6).  
557
 Kasravi wrote, among others, two books, Shi’i-gari (Shi’ism) and Sufi-gari 
(Sufism), in which he provides a phenomenological study of each phenomenon, then includes 
his criticism of each with respect to negative impacts on subjectivity (edited by Mohammad 
Amini, 2011 and 2014 respectively). 
558
 Abrahamian considers this as the ambiguity of Kasravi’s own generation toward 
Reza Shah; he compares it to the later generation, who took a more negative attitude toward 
the Pahlavis, basically focusing on the admonishments (1982, 153-54). It is my 
understanding that the ulama had a hand in this attitude, for many of the reforms were aimed 
at undermining their power and influence, to be sure. 
559
 Abrahamian 2001, 186.  
560
 Reference is the day of the coup, August 19, 1953. 
561
 From a BBC (Persian) interview, Be Ebarat e Digar: Goftogoo ba Ervand 
Abrahamian, broadcast date August 26, 2013. 
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562
 I will discuss the theoreticians such as Ali Shari’ati and Mohammad Nakhshab 
later in this chapter. 
563
 These events range from the tobacco protest in 1891, to the nationalization of oil 
in 1951, to the “last economic and political crisis of 1960-64, highlighted by demonstrations 
in 1963 that resulted in many deaths and brought about the exile of the religious leader of the 
movement, Ayatollah Khomeini, in 1964” (Keddie 1993, 609). 
564
 Keddie names “the ulama,” “the bazaaris, “ordinary peasants, nomads, and the 
urban poor” (ibid). 
565
 Katouzian 2009, E-version, from Introduction (no page number). 
566
 Abrahamian explains, whereas the regime had taken extensive measures to 
suppress all secular voices, however the two groups within the traditional middle class, the 
bazarris and the clergy had remained independent from the state, both financially and in 
terms of the popular institutions such as mosques and other religious gathering places (1982, 
533). 
567
 Abrahamian cites: R. Khomeini, “Proclamation,” Khabarnameh, special number 
21, 9 September 1978), p.1.   
568
 Ibid. 
569
 Abrahamian 1982, 534. 
570
 I will discuss Shari’ati in length further in this chapter. 
571
 Abrahamian 1982, 534. Abrahamian refers to it as the “radical message of 
Muharram,” the month in which the Prophet’s grandson was killed in Iraq in the year 680. 
572
 This was an appropriation from the Marxist groups. 
573
 Abrahamian states Khomeini incorporated into his speeches expressions in the 
style of Fanon such as “the mostazafin [those were kept powerless] shall inherit the earth.” 
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“[T]he country needs a cultural revolution,” and the “people will dump the exploiters onto 
the garbage heap of history” (ibid). 
574
 Keddie notes, following an article in the Ettela’at paper that contained an attack to 
Khomeini, who was in Iraq at the time, there were demonstrations and conflicts that resulted 
in casualties (1993, 614). The religious observance of the 40
th
 day of mourning concurred 
with more demonstration, to which more people joined from liberal to the leftists (ibid). 
575
 Abrahamian quotes from a parliament deputy who spoke with a foreign social 
psychologist in 1973, “religious ceremonies, especially Muharram plays were politically 
useful in that they channeled social frustrations away from communism into harmless 
directions.” Cited from a Ph.D. dissertation by M. Good “Social Hierarchy and Social 
Change in a Provincial Iranian Town,” Harvard University, 1977, pp. 426-84.  
576
 The “Jafari jurisprudence” is a Shi’ite school of thought that derives its name from 
the sixth Imam, Jafar Sadeq, and has followers among the Twelver, and Isma’ili Shi’ites. 
577
 From Martin Luther’s “Diet of Worms Letters and Papers,” 
http://www.reverendluther.org/pdfs2/Diet-of-Worms-Papers.pdf.   Accessed October 8, 2017. 
578
 Abrahamian brings detailed account of experienced British diplomats as well as 
“informal network within the armed forces,” in addition to their “contacts” from among the 
various tribes, newspaper editors, the bazaar, and nefarious characters such as Shaban Jafari, 
a “gang leader,” even with “mid-ranking clerics” (2001, 199). 
579
 The term ‘Westoxication’ is from an essay published in 1962 by Jalal Al-e Ahmad 
that suggest Iranians should look “to their own and Oriental ways” (Keddie 1993, 616). 
580
 It must be noted that Kasravi was not anti-religion or anti-Islam. He deemed 
however, necessary to purify religion of what he considered corruption and superstition.  
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581
 Kasravi wrote in his autobiography he was actually persuaded to wear the garb of 
the ulama by his guardian following the death of his father (Amini 2016, 56). 
582
 In his criticism of the Ismai’il Shi’s Kasravi writes “ in Islam, there has never been 
a more contemptible and a more harmful invention than the invention of introspectivism, and 
no other enemy has brought on such harm that the introspectivists have brought on Islam” 
(2011, 7). 
583
 Amini in the introduction Kasravi’s Shi’ism, page 17. 
584
 1943b, 64. 
585
 He uses examples such as: “if you submit all you have to love, call me an infidel if 
[you] experience any losses.” Or, another quadrant by Hatef Esfahani that states: “from the 
dew of love the clay that was, became Adam; from that [creation] numerous rife and 
excitement resulted in the world. The tip of the blade of love hit the vein of spirit; one drop 
fell, and was named [the] heart.” 
586
 In Sufism, reason is the opposite of love. Kasravi quotes Sufi poems that admonish 
reason: “love arrived, and reason wandered away; morning broke and candle became 
destitute. The leg of those who reason is wooden; wooden leg does not bend in submission 
(Rumi). Love arrived and took reason as spoil; oh my heart to thy soul this heralds” (Najm 
al-Din Razi). 
587
 Kasravi, 1943b, 114. 
588
 Kasravi is very disturbed at what Rumi narrates for example of his relationship 
with and devotion to his mentor Shams. Rumi writes, during the time he and his teacher spent 
three month fasting in seclusion, he obliged the wishes of his mentor, when he wished to be 
with a women, Rumi offered his own wife. Then Shams wished to be with a young boy, and 
Rumi offered his own son. Then Shams wished for wine, and Rumi obliged by personally 
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carrying the wine jug through the markets. Then Shams proclaimed and praised Rumi’s 
submission, and stated he was testing the devotion of his pupil. Kasravi notes the conflict 
between such acts and wishes, and wonders whether this is a true story, which would be 
“absurd,” or if it is fabricated, he wonders about the followers, who would make up such 
stories and attribute them to such prominent personalities (ibid).  
589
 Hakamizadeh asks questions such as: “isn’t it sacrilegious to seek indulgences 
from the Prophet or the imams, or seeking to be healed from their burial places, prostrating 
on them, building domes and high courts? Say so if it is, and if it is not, please explain 
‘sherk’ [equating anything with God] first, so that we can see how this ‘sherk’ is different 
from that which Islam and the Koran challenged all along?” pp. 85-87. 
590
 Rajaee notes that there were actually two treatises, one by Ruhollah Musavi 
Khomeini and the other by Muhammad Khalesizadeh, both teachers at the Qum Seminary. 
Since Khoemini’s treatise was lengthier and more comprehensive, the leadership of the 
seminary approved Khomeini’s version to be published (65-66). 
591
 Moin 61, Marin 104. 
592
 In his book Bahaism (Bahaigari), he refers to his proposed religion as “pure 
religion” (pakdini), which he encourages everyone to read (1943c, second chapter, page 1). 
593
 This would have caused alarm among the ulama as it would have been seen as 
innovation (bed’at) in the religion, strictly prohibited in Islam according to common 
knowledge. 
594
 My references here are his criticism on Shi’ism and Sufism as well as literary 
tradition that in his view was filled with ideas that “mis-educated.” I must also reiterate, in 
addition to the volumes mentioned above, he authored a book on criticism of the Baha’ism, 
which branched out from Shi’ism earlier in the century. Kasravi admonished Baha’ism with 
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the same harshness as he did Sufism, for he believed both groups, just as with Neoplatonism, 
were founded based on imagination and creative mind (Kasravi 1943c, second chapter, page 
1. http://www.kasravi.info/ketabs/bahaigari/BAHAYIGARI%20b2.pdf accessed October 28, 
2017. 
595
 Adamiyat 1980, 119.  
596
 Adamiyat quotes from Abbas Mirza Molk Ara’s memoirs that “none of us who 
understood this could express to the Shah that the first line of such a law would be one that 
restricts and takes away the concessions and autocratic rule of the Shah himself and you [the 
king] would never agree to that. Therefore, we had no choice but to nod our heads in 
agreement” (1978, 12). 
597
 Adamiyat 1978, 12. 
598
 Mostashar al-Dowleh 15. 
599
 Abrahamian translates Daftar e Tanzimat as the Book of Reform. Raeen names the 
book as “secret book,” which was meant to provide advice to the Shah in how to establish 
law and order (Raeen 12). 
600
 Abrahamian 1982, 66. 
601
 Raeen notes Malkum Khan’s founding of the Faramushkhaneh was his way of 
continuing to promote his progressive thoughts, to familiarize people with the Western 
civilization, and countering the ancien regime (Raeen 13). 
602
 Paidar 46. Paidar cites Sholeh Abadi’s article titled “Mirza Fath Ali 
Akhoundzadeh Va Masaleh Z[a]nan” [Akhoundzadeh on the question of women], published 
in Nimeye Digar, no. 17, Winter 1371 (1993). 
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603
 Adamiyat uses the phrase “Mulla Sadra’s philosophy” here in an anachronistic 
manner, but clearly he means a philosophy that is linked by Neoplatonic thoughts, since 
Mulla Sadra (1572-1640) the philosopher emerged in the seventeenth century. 
604
 Important to note here is the fact that the philosophy in question, since the Middle 
Ages and the time of Ghazali, has been seen as partly divine knowledge, that which is 
predicated on Ontotheolgy. 
605
 Adamiyat brings in the example of photography and Sabzevari’s problem with 
photographs, which I discussed in previously. 
606
 de Gobineau notes publication of a translation of Descartes, which was also 
ordered and supported by Naser al-Din Shah. This was made possible through the efforts of 
the secretary of the French embassy and Al’azar Rahim Musa’i Hamedani, known as “Mulla 
Lalezar.” The first time a translation was done was nine years earlier, and according to 
Mujataba Minovi most copies of it was burned, and very little or none of that edition survives 
(Adamiyat 1970, 72). 
607
 It is important to note, the term hekmat and philosophy has been interchangeably 
used in the texts I have examined. One example would be Foroughi’s Seyr e Hekmat dar 
Oroupa (The Course of Philosophy in Europe) (1931-43). 
608
 While, Gobineau’s reputation as a Eurocentric orientalist can be seen here, I think 
he correctly makes the connection on the issue. 
609
 Adamiyat’s source for this passage is Gobineau’s book titled Les Religions et Les 
Philosophies dans L’Asie Centrale (Religions and Philosophy in Central Asia,) translated to 
Persian by Farahvashi, Tehran (year unknown). It is worth noting that later during the 
Pahlavi era, from 1931 to 1941, Mohammad Ali Foroughi (1877-1942) completed one of the 
most seminal and comprehensive works on the history of Western philosophy. 
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610
 In the introduction to his history of philosophy, the volume from the antiquity to 
Descartes (1938), Foroughi notes: “a few years ago, in order to undertake a scholarly work 
that would also benefit humanity, I embarked upon translating a small treatise, which was the 
most famous work by Descartes, the renowned French philosopher. On completion, I realized 
this work, will not serve useful for those who are not aware of European knowledge. Thus, in 
order to make it useful, I added a preface to it and authored the Course of Philosophy in 
Europe (Sayr e Falsafeh dar Oroupa), from the antiquity to the time of Descartes. […] Since 
it pleased the minds of the knowledge seekers so much that they insisted to know the rest 
from Descartes to the contemporary times, for this reason, following further editing . . . it 
became the first volume to the Course of Philosophy in Europe, and included Descartes 
treatise in it ” (Foroughi Seyre Kekmat, Preface). 
611
 I am understanding the term “dialogical” here as an integration to achieve a 
balance, not as what is consistent with what Bakhtin argued for instance. 
612
 In 1937, Foroughi translated portions of a principle book by Avicenna “dealing 
with the philosophy of natural sciences” from Arabic to Persian. He also undertook the 
project of editing the collective works of Sa’di, who is a celebrated Persian poet, providing 
advice for a variety of occasions and persons (Amanat 476). 
613
 Although, Foroughi’s criticism of Hegel’s Eurocentricism and superior attitude 
toward other cultures is noteworthy, I do believe he buys into the same dialectic. 
614
 Abrahamian 1982, 65. 
615
 Ali Shari’ati underscores the role of Iqbal in the history of philosophy and 
mentions his name in the same breath as Bergson and Descartes (Shari’ati 79-80, vol.5, p. 
11). 
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616
 Mohammad Arasi in his article “On the Anniversary of the Separation of India and 
the Founding of Pakistan” criticizes this action as the “high price paid to create an ommat 
[Islamic nation] in the Indian sub-continent.” Published at armanfoundation.com. Retrieved 
October 25, 2017. 
617
 The Koranic references are: 20:121, 2:29, 6:165 and 33:72. It is worth mentioning 
that what Iqbal interprets in his take on an introverted individual, is in conflict with the 
Koran. 
618
 I am reminded here of Bergson: “I smell a rose and immediately confused 
recollections of childhood come back to my memory” (Bergson [1910] 1950, 161). 
619
 Iqbal dedicated this book to his son, Javid. 
620
 Encyclopaedia Iranica’s article on Muhammad Iqbal.  
http://www.iranicaonline.org/articles/iqbal-muhammad, retrieved on 11/12/2017. 
621
 Ibid. 
622
 Iqbal’s favorite symbol in flowers is the tulip that is the representative of the blood 
of the martyr and grows in the wild, unlike the trimmed and well-tended-to rose. This is 
because he is turning the attention of man within. He also replaces the nightingale, symbol of 
love and longing with the falcon, as “the symbol for man, soaring high” (ibid). 
623
 Nekoorouh 2014. The quote is from Nakhshab’s book Neza’ Kelissa va 
Materialist, in which he argues, “God-worshiping” is predicated on socialism, and if one 
interprets it correctly, it can lead to freedom for the Iranians.  
624
 Koran, 53:39. http://www.quranexplorer.com. 
625
 From the newspaper Niyru-e Sevum (The Third Force), August 22- September 29 
1952. Cited by Abrahamian 1982, 257. 
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626
 Nekoorouh argues that Nakhshab had started this way of thinking, before Maleki’s 
parting ways with and criticism of the Tudeh party, by publishing books such as his Bashar e 
Mauddi (Materialist Human), Neza’ Kelissa va Materialism (The the Church’s Dispute with 
Materialism), Farhang e Vezhe haye Ejtemaei (The Culture of the Social Terminology), and 
Iran dar Astaneh yek Enghelab e Ejtemaei (Iran in the Threshold of a Social Revolution) 
(Nekoorouh 2017). 
627
 The art object was a ceramic vessel at the Museum of Islamic Art in Doha, with 
the inscription “[f]oolish is the person who misses his chance and afterwards reproaches fate” 
(63). 
628
 Žižek 2012, 67. 
629
 Shari’ati’s writings and role in formulating an Islamic ideology merits a separate 
study and criticism. For this reason, I have had to limit the extensive information I found. 
630
 Jalal Al-e Ahmad, an influential author and a critic, also wrote about this return to 
a “cultural authenticity,” in his book Gharbzadegi (Westoxication). Al-e Ahmad’s work, in 
the final months of the decade of 1970s, “evolved into a journey of rediscovery for ‘true 
Islam’. A powerful motif before and during the 1979 revolution, Gharbzade[h]gi later 
rendered a rhetorical tool in the service of the Islamic Republic and its polemists” (Amanat 
690). 
631
 Shari’ati 1979-80. 
632
 Shari’ati is very clear that the Iranians now are not interested in knowing their pre-
Islamic past, and are “unmoved by the heroes, geniuses, myths and monuments of these 
ancient empires” (Bazgasht pp. 11-30). 
633
 Shari’ati, Islamshenasi, Lesson 13, pp. 14-15. 
634
 Shari’ati, Islamshenasi, Lesson 2, p. 98. 
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635
 Abrahamian 1982, 467. 
636
 “Alawi” is in reference to the first Shi’ite Imam, Ali. 
637
 Shari’ati’s theory aligns with Khomeini’s doctrine of Velayat e Faqih and how to 
follow the path of an Imamate that is active, and not passive (Khomeini 170, 173). 
638
 Abrahamian 1982, 473. 
639
 Paidar 52, Momen 196. 
640
 Na’ini had proposed, in the absence of the Hidden Imam, and if the king dies, the 
ulama have the authority to rule, but as pointed out by Momen, this was not a central theme 
in the writings of Naraqi or Na’ini.  
641
 The circumstances under which the Prophet conducted his leadership among his 
people of the Arabian Peninsula are completely overlooked in Khomeini’s citation, and 
“historical facts” mentioned are generalized and erroneous.  
642
 Khomeini 39. 
643
 In this article, Kadivar examines various sources that cite this quote from 
Khomeini that “the boundaries of the authority of the jurisprudence is as limitless as the 
divine’s.” 
644
 V. Nasr cites Alexander Knysh, “Irfan Revisited: Khomeini and the Legacy of the 
Islamic Mystical Philosophy,” Middle East Journal 46, 4 (Autumn 1992), pp.631-53. 
645
 Nasr 2006, 84. 
646
 I have explained these theories in chapter three of this study. 
647
 This is evident in a letter dated January 1, 1989 that Khomeini wrote to Mikhail 
Gorbachev. Khomeini invites the “Soviet” leader to consider the mystic interpretations of 
Islam in order to “solve their problems,” which Khomeini viewed as lack of religious faith 
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(Sahifeh Nour, vol. 21, pp. 66-69) retrieved on January 19, 2018 from http://iec-
md.org/monasebatha/digar/nameh_emam_gorbachev.html.  
648
 Foucault’s article was titled “Is it Useless to Revolt?” was printed in Foucault and 
the Iranian Revolution, 2005, pp. 263-267. 
649
 Mottahari notes in his Jahan Bini-e Towhidi (The Monotheistic Worldview), 
clearly states his Neoplatonic interpretation of Islam (84-86). 
650
 Soroush is one of the influential figures since the beginning of the revolution, who 
was a member of the Cultural Revolution committee. 
651
 Mawardi was asked by the Abbasid caliph to develop a theory for the legitimacy 
of his caliphate, during the time Baghdad had come under attack by the Shi’ite Buyids 
(Tabatabei 2015, 148). 
652
 Tabatabaei notes contrary to Mawardi’s treatise, which was on “defending of the 
religio-political and imamate, Iranshahri is idealistic monarchy . . . [in which] the king is 
chosen, not by previous religious leaders, but by God, and possesses kingly farrah 
(splendor)” (148). 
653
 Doostdar uses the example of an Afghani’s feeling of being an Afghani, or a 
mother’ feeling of being a mother, or a faithful feeling as if being at the center of their faith 
(415). 
654
 Tabatabaei’s views are influenced by the Hegelian left. Moradi explains that 
“Marxism in other worlds of thought, including in Iran, which has not yet experienced the 
awakening breeze from the ‘dogmatic slumber,’ and their philosophical constitution lies in a 
pre-Kantian world, and epistemologically mind has not become the subject of the mind, 
experienced another course of development and [and those thoughts] quickly turned into 
ideology.” This ideology, Moradi argues, includes the principles of dialectic, and of course 
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the Hegelian “master/slave” that became a favorite of the left, because they could easily “turn 
it to a political matter.” 
655
 Foucault 2000, 327. 
656
 It can be argued that the first Monotheistic religion was Zoroastriansim, dating 
back to 1500-1000 BCE. (Bekhrad, April 6, 2017). However, there seems to have been a 
closer and more direct interactions with Monotheism that stems from the Abrahamic 
religions in the Near East. 
657
 Agamben 2009, 51. 
658
 Shari’ati, in describing how to develop a “revolutionary character” argues: “to 
grow into to a revolutionary individual, as a principle and an essential and an objective, is to 
perfect one’s own essence of being, which requires participating in the [shaping of the] fate 
of the people that requires our humanity and perfected being” (Shari’ati vol. 2, 133). 
659
 The titles given by the monarch saw its height of elaborateness during the Qajars. 
The titles of “al-Dowleh,” “al-Din,” “al-Saltaneh,” that was tacked onto the person’s job title, 
such as “Mostashar,” were in use until the time of Foroughi. Similarly, the clergy bestowed 
upon themselves titles such as “Ayatollah,” meaning sign of the divine, “Hojjatol-Islam,” 
meaning the proof of Islam, which are still in use and exemplify the ulama’s system of 
hierarchy. 
660
 From the Independent, UK. “Egalité! Liberté! Sexualité!: Paris, May 1968. 
February 23, 2008.  http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/egalit-libert-sexualit-
paris-may-1968-784703.html#. Other examples that are very much on my mind are the 2009 
Iranian uprising, due to the election fall out, and the 2011 Arab Spring, both now suppressed. 
It remains to be seen what theories or thoughts will follow these experiences. 
661
 Nancy 2008, 8. 
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